On the co-evolution of investment and bargaining norms

Two parties bargaining over a pie whose size is determined by the investment decisions of both. The bargaining rule is sensitive to the investment behavior. If a symmetric investments profile is observed, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game; otherwise bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game. We are interested in the evolutionary emergence of both an efficient investment norm and a bargaining norm. Under some conditions we prove that these norms co-evolve; when this happens they support the efficient investment and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus. In addition, when surplus requires that at least one agent invests, then either both norms co-evolve or no norm evolves.

Knowing Versus Telling Private Information About a Rival

As part of a broad competitive intelligence strategy, firms expect to acquire information about their rivals’ customers and production processes. In this study, we examine the firms’ incentives to disclose this information. We find that firms adopt a policy of disclosing their information regardless of whether it concerns a rival’s customers or production costs or whether the firms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors. Firms that have private information about their rivals tell. Their willingness to disclose private information about their rivals contrasts with the results in the literature when the firm has information about itself. This literature shows that the chosen disclosure policy depends on whether information is about the firm’s own payoffs or industry demand and whether the firms’ strategies are substitutes or complements.disclosure policy, voluntary disclosure, asymmetric information, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition

On Damage Spreading Transitions

We study the damage spreading transition in a generic one-dimensional stochastic cellular automata with two inputs (Domany-Kinzel model) Using an original formalism for the description of the microscopic dynamics of the model, we are able to show analitically that the evolution of the damage between two systems driven by the same noise has the same structure of a directed percolation problem. By means of a mean field approximation, we map the density phase transition into the damage phase transition, obtaining a reliable phase diagram. We extend this analysis to all symmetric cellular automata with two inputs, including the Ising model with heath-bath dynamics.Comment: 12 pages LaTeX, 2 PostScript figures, tar+gzip+u

The first record of Cambrian conodonts from the Huqf-Haushi outcrops, Oman, Arabian Peninsula.

Outcrops of Cambrian sediments of the uppermost Miqrat Formation, the Al Bashair Formation and the basal Barik Formation were sampled for conodont and palynomorph studies. The units are part of the Palaeozoic Haima Supergroup, exposed in the Huqf-Haushi area in central eastern Oman, Arabian Peninsula. Palynomorphs were absent but conodont samples yielded a small conodont fauna. The presence of Muellerodus? erectus allows the recognition of the Muellerodus? erectus Zone established for North China (late Paibian – early Jiangshanian), in accordance with previous reports on the trilobite fauna from the same interval

Financial Reporting and Supplemental Voluntary Disclosures.

Using a Verreccia [1983]-type model, we study the optimal voluntary disclosure strategy of a manager with private information that helps the market interpret financial information the firm is required to report. In equilibrium, the manager’s disclosure strategy enhances upward or mitigates downward revisions in the market’s estimate of firm value conditional on the firm’s financial reports. Hence, what the manager discloses (large or small values of her private information) and the probability of disclosure depend on the information in the firm’s financial reports. This leads to testable implications regarding the probability of voluntary disclosure (e.g., firms whose financial reports are more surprising provide more voluntary disclosures), and how earnings and revenue response coefficients depend on the manager’s voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, we show that changes in mandatory disclosure regulations can reduce the probability of voluntary disclosure even though the manager’s private information is used to interpret the firm’s mandatory disclosures.voluntary disclosure ; financial statements ; earnings surprise ; asymmetric information ; price efficiency ; good news ; bad news