Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock)

Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using Multi-Player Games

Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed, such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider a class of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid, must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we force the houses to follow a pre-computed schedule that maximises the proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.Comment: In Proceedings Cassting'16/SynCoP'16, arXiv:1608.0017

Quantitative Games under Failures

We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also leads to better complexity

To Reach or not to Reach? Efficient Algorithms for Total-Payoff Games

International audienceQuantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games – that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games – are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics to speed up the computations

IO vs OI in Higher-Order Recursion Schemes

We propose a study of the modes of derivation of higher-order recursion schemes, proving that value trees obtained from schemes using innermost-outermost derivations (IO) are the same as those obtained using unrestricted derivations. Given that higher-order recursion schemes can be used as a model of functional programs, innermost-outermost derivations policy represents a theoretical view point of call by value evaluation strategy.Comment: In Proceedings FICS 2012, arXiv:1202.317

One-Clock Priced Timed Games with Negative Weights

Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the cost of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary integer weights and show that, for an important subclass of them (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in pseudo-polynomial time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called negative-reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary integer weights and one clock). The decidability status of the full class of priced timed games with one-clock and arbitrary integer weights still remains open

Author Material: Neuroimaging evidence for a role of neural social stress processing in ethnic minority associated environmental risk

This supplementary material has been provided by the authors to give readers additional information about their work

Successful application of ancient DNA extraction and library construction protocols to museum wet collection specimens

Millions of scientific specimens are housed in museum collections, a large part of which are fluid preserved. The use of formaldehyde as fixative and subsequent storage in ethanol is especially common in ichthyology and herpetology. This type of preservation damages DNA and reduces the chance of successful retrieval of genetic data. We applied ancient DNA extraction and single stranded library construction protocols to a variety of vertebrate samples obtained from wet collections and of different ages. Our results show that almost all samples tested yielded endogenous DNA. Archival DNA extraction was successful across different tissue types as well as using small amounts of tissue. Conversion of archival DNA fragments into single-stranded libraries resulted in usable data even for samples with initially undetectable DNA amounts. Subsequent target capture approaches for mitochondrial DNA using homemade baits on a subset of 30 samples resulted in almost complete mitochondrial genome sequences in several instances. Thus, application of ancient DNA methodology makes wet collection specimens, including type material as well as rare, old or extinct species, accessible for genetic and genomic analyses. Our results, accompanied by detailed step-by-step protocols, are a large step forward to open the DNA archive of museum wet collections for scientific studies.publishedVersio