既有知識との適合性からみたテキスト記憶の体制化

　When we memorize a story, new information and old, established knowledge are integrated to organized the story. Even if the new information is organized with the schema as a tag, the information will be lost in a short time if it is not associated with the schema. The text will be kept in the memory with little modification of the contents when the text is associated with the knowledge of the story. However, if the text does not fully fit the knowledge of the story, the recalled text will be different because new information and old knowledge will be integrated. 　In the present study, the effect of the title upon the organization of information was examined by comparing immediately recalled text and delayed recalled text produced by different subjects. This effect was also examined by comparing immediate recalled text and delayed recalled text within the same subjects. 　The study was designed with two stages. First, the degree of consistency between the title and the text was determined. Then, the following hypotheses were tested. Hypothesis 1. The memory of the units which fit the text (HU) will be retained and the memory of the units which do not fit the text (LU) will be distorted because information is organized in accordance with title.Hypothesis 2. Information which is immediately recalled will be kept in momory in the way it is presently organized until the delayed recall occurs. Method 1. Subjects 　Seventy-three collage students were divided into the following groups: Text-correction group (21subjects) ; Delayed-recali group (28 subjects) ; and Immediate- / Delayed- recall group (24 subjects). 2. Stimulous text 　The stimulous text consisted of 5 sentences. The sentences included, the common factors of the story of"Kaguyahime"and*Cinderella\u27\u27so that the subjects could associate the text with either "Kaguyahime" or "Cinderella" when they read it. The text was read in a female recorded on audio tape. The duration of the recorded text was 38 seconds. 3. Procedure 　Text-correction group: Subjects were presented the stimulous text with the title "kaguyahime" or "Cinderella". The subjects were asked to correct the sentences of the text so that the text will be more appropriate for the given title. 　The delayed-recali group: The title "kaguyahime"was given to 13 subjects, while the titIe"CmdereHa"was given to 11 subjects. All the subjects were asked to recall and write the text 24 hours after they listened to the tape. 　Immediate- / Delayed- recall group: The title "kaguyahime" was given to 13 subjects and the title "Cinderella" was given to 15 subjects. All the subjects were asked to recall and write it immediately after and also 24 hours after they listened to the tape.　The text was divided into 28 units according to the meaning. Each units was assigned to one of the four categories: Correspondance; Ommision; Synonymity ; or Affected by the title. Results and Discussion 1. Consistency with the title: A unit was considered as a LU if more than 5 out of 21 subjects found it modified. Six units of K and 5 units of C were LU. Other units were considered as HUs. 2. Figure 1 and the figure 2 shows the modification style of the immediate-recall and the delayed recall of LU and HU. A greater correspondence between text and title was observed for HU in both the immediate recall and in the delayed recall conditions. No differences were found between two titles. Ommisions were found more in the immediate recall condition in the case of K. No differences were found between the immediate-recall and the delayed-recall. Synonymities were seen in the delayed -recall condition with the title C in LU. Affected-by-the-title appeared more frequently in the delayed-recall condition with the title K in LU. Overall, Ommisions, Synonymityies, Affected-by-the-title were likely to occur in LU. The results supported the Hypothesis 1. 3. The results of the delayed-recall after the immediate-recall are shown in the figure 3 and figure 4. When the immediately recalled text was exactly the same as the delayed one, or ommited from both, it was considered to be consistent. The occurance of consistent units were 70% in both K and C. The consistancy of the correspondence was high in HU with the title C. The consistency of ommisions occured at a high rate in LU with the title K. The results indicated that the immediate recall functioned as a form of rehersal and that the effect of this rehersal remained after 24 hours. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported

準拠集団と道徳性の発達(第3報告) : 交友選択の範囲及び対人態度と準拠人・道徳判断の類似性

This is one of the study concerning reference groups and moral development. In the first part, the bounds of friend selection as a reference person was analysed. The objects were 250 fourth graders of elementary school and 151 first year students of junior high school. As the result of sociometric test, it was found that concerning the fourth graders, their friend selection rates among the Classmates was found high. While there was quite a variety of their selection outside their class. About the first year students of junior high school, when they think about the situations of playing or studying, rate of their selection among the classmates appeared high. However, when they consult their personal problems, this rate was rather low. In such cases they tended to choose their friends among those of their same age. In the second part, the relationship between interpersonal attraction and similarity was analysed. The objects were 39 fourth graders and 95 sixth graders. The questionnaire for reference person, moral development test and sociometric test were used. Two kinds of selection pairs were set up. The first was the pair between the selector and his most prefered friend. The second was the pair between the selector and his least prefered friend. Comparing these two pairs, the first tended to choose the same reference person. When the friend was regarded as the reference person, this tendency was accurately seen in the sixth graders. When the family was the reference group, there was not clear difference between the first and second pairs in the fourth graders. However, the second pairs of the sixth graders was selected more often their family as the reference group. Concerning the moral judgement, there was not clear relationship between similarity and attraction. It was discussed that those who select friends as reference persons were tended to be chosen as friends by others. As the same time, the similarity of the reference person might be the significant factor of interpersonal attraction

心理学的循環経路の析出による自己体制化活動についての省察

　Suppose here we have a chair, a stool, a bench, and a sofa. When you are very tired, you would take a sofa for making yourself comfortable. A bench would be preferable when you enjoy talking together with your love. These are all made as a seat, but they can also be used for other purposes. For example, a stool is available as a footstool, and a bench, a sofa as well, good for building a barricade, because the weight keeps it from removal. When you want to take a rest after a long walk, you could seat yourself on a stone, a log, or else rolling around there. Neither a stone nor a log is, of course, not a seat in itself, but it serves as a seat when you are seated on it. 　An English word "Thing" could be translated into Japanese in two ways; either Mono and Koto. Let\u27s take a typical example. "Thing" in the sentence "I haven\u27t had a thing to eat all day" would be Mono in Japanese. On the other hand, "Thing" in the sentence "It is a good thing to give up smoking" would be Koto. Mono is a thing, grammatically speaking, an indication of the subject or the object in a statement. Koto is a thing, an expression of the predicate. A chair, a log as well, is Mono, a material which can materialize itself as a seat only through one\u27s action of taking a seat. This action is Koto. Therefore, the action of taking a seat functionally transforms a chair or a log as a material into a thing which can materialize itself as a seat. In other words, Koto of one\u27s taking a seat acts as a possibility of actualizing oneself, which we define as koto. Under some appropriate requirements, koto has a possibility of being transformed into KOTO as an action to the object. If you are such an infant that you can\u27t be seated by yourself, Koto of taking a seat must remain as a latent, probable action. A stool can be defined as mono, a thing which can be probably transformed into a seat, a footstool, or whatever through some action. When you are seated on a stool, it is defined that the stool is now materializing itself as MONO of a seat. When the stool seems fragile, it must remain as a latent, probable material, because it may not bear the weight of you in spite of the appearance as a seat, which will keep you away from seating yourself. 　Mediated by Koto, mono can be transformed into MONO, and koto can also be transformed into KOTO by Mono. In this way, there could be theoretically supposed an interactional process between Mono and Koto. If we take a view-point of the subject of self-organizing activity, we could hypothetically analyze out four directions of the interactive actualization. Firstly, when I am doing an action to a thing, mono is being actualized into MONO mediated by Koto. SURU is a Japanese word corresponding to the DOING an action. See Figure 1. Secondly, when my action is becoming in effect, koto is now being actualized into KOTO mediated by Mono. NARU is a Japanese expression of the BECOMING. Thirdly, when I choose a thing to do something with, I am recognizing it as being there. The recognition that a thing, mono, is there is an action of mine, KOTO. BEING of a thing is ARU in Japanese. Fourthly, when I am going to do some action, I am conscious that I am having myself as a subject who is going to act upon a thing. Activity, koto, concentrated on some action leads to the consciousness, MONO, of myself as a behavioral subject. HAVING myself in act upon a thing can be expressed as IRU in Japanese. When I am having myself as a subject, I will be able to do a thing in effect. At the same time, the effectiveness will be fed back to the becoming of my action. The becoming will direct me to recognize a thing as being there. And the recognition of an object will guide me to the subjective consciousness of myself in action. 　Psychological self-organizing activity could be assumed to actualize itself continuously by way of this feed-backing route, as illustrated in Figure 1. In this paper, some episodes are psychologically examined in order to demonstrate this feed-backing process between Mono and Koto. Through the reconsiderations, first of all, we can also get to the conclusion, as B. Kimura (1982) suggested, that Koto must be superior to Mono so that self-organizing activity could maintain its subjectivity in one\u27s phenomenal world. The second is that the reversal of Koto\u27s superiority to Mono would cause behavioral retardation and subjective reduction or collapse. Needless to say, this conclusion can naturally be led from the first. Thirdly, autonomously waving rythm predominantly generated in one\u27s looping process of feed-back would synchronize others\u27 looping into the self-organizing activity

不協和の発生と解消の過程を規定する心理論理の再考

The idea that people are more comfortable with consistent than with inconsistent cognitions has been proclaimed in the social psychological literature. People are not only rational but also rationalizers. We want our attitudes and beliefs to support rather than contradict our behavior, and we want our cognitions tied together in a coherent, mutually reinforcing systems. Such basic assumptions characterize a variety of consistency theories in the huge compendium edited by Abelson et al. (1968) "Cognitive dissonance theory" proposed by Festinger (1957), because of its generality and simplicity, has continued to generate more researches and more controversies than any other one approach. One of the intriguing aspects of dissonance theory is that if frequently leads to predictions which stand in apparent contradiction to those made by other theoretical approaches, - most notably, to a general "reward-incentive theory." For example, in the well-known experiment by Festinger & Carlsmith (1959), subjects were induced to tell a waiting confederate for $1 or$20 that the experiment which the confederate was about to take part in was interesting and exciting. In fact, as the subject well knew, it was extremely dull. According to dissonance theory, if a person says something he feels untrue, he experiences dissonance: The cognition "I said X" is dissonant with the cognition "I believe not-X." In order to reduce dissonance, he might attempt to convince himself that what he said was not so very untrue. Thus, dissonance theory suggests that advocating an opposite position increases one\u27s tendency to believe in that position. However, if one is provided with a great deal of justification for advocating an opposite position, one experiences less dissonance. The cognition that I received $20 is consonant with having lied. Consequently, I would have less need to justify my action by convincing myself that I really believed what I said than if I had been paid a mere$1 for lying. This type of prediction has been confirmed by experiments. On the other hand, considerable controversy has been aroused. Much of the more recent research on dissonance theory, as well argued by Cooper & Fazio (1984), specifies the precise conditions under which cognitive dissonance is or is not aroused. In particular, research on the role of foreseeability, personal responsibility, and aversive consequences has led to a new emphasis on implications of behavior for the self-concept. Aronson (1968; 1980) asserts that inconsistency between behavior and attitudes is not sufficient for dissonance arousal unless the attitude are firmly anchored in the self-concept, and that the behavior produces aversive consequences that could have been foreseen. He concludes that dissonance-generation will derive from the derogation of a high self-concept and dissonance-reduction will function for its maintenance and restoration. Accepting Aronson\u27s assertion, it should be recalled that the subjects of Festinger & Carlsmith\u27s experiment were male students in the introductory psychology course at Stanford University. No doubt, they must have had a high self-concept as well as a high sensitivity. When asked to tell supposedly unsuspecting fellow student that an experimental task which they knew to be dull was in fact interesting, such students of ability and sensitivity ought to have realized the experimenter\u27s inducement. Their attitude change in pretence may have been a good service to their professor of psychology, not for resolving dissonance, but for demonstrating their kindness as a man of good consideration. The role played by a $20 inducement, as Rosenberg (1965) pointed out, may have seemed like a bribe than an incentive. Such students of a high self-concept ought to have resisted to change their attitudes after having received a bribe. This new look at the dissonance process, we propose here, being possible, subjects offered$20 must have felt more discomfort than those offered $1. Oour new look seems highly consistent with Aronson\u27s basic position on self-concept, but inconsistent with his dissonance interpretation. Needless to say, it should be confirmed by experiments. Consistency theories, having established mainly in the cultural background of the West, propose than a man wants his attitude and beliefs to support rather than contradict his behavior. Turning to our Japanese psychology, it seems that consistency between attitude and behavior or consistency among cognitions is not always a requisite. In our culture, as well discussed by Doi (1971; 1985), a Japanese noted psychiatrist, discrepancy between attitude as "Honne" in Japanese and behavior as "Tatemae" is not only rather acceptable but also more necessary to live on as a grow-up. Our experimental study (1980) after Aronson & Carlsmith (1963) and our daily experiences have led us to a conclusion that the differences between our psycho-logic and theirs should be taken into consideration when we apply dissonance theory to Japanese psychology. What we propose in this paper is a trial so that we can accomodate dissonance theory based on their psycho-logic into our psycho-logic. (A) Being Awaken to the Outcomes to Come When a man is to engage in some behavior to comply with a request from another or others, he estimates how much the compliance will be debt to him. If he can reject the burden, if he can withdraw his committed compliance, or if his expected behavior is acceptable or admitted, his psychological burden awaken from the compliance will be counterbalanced. (B) Being Conscious of Psychological Debt He will be conscious of psychological debt, when he is decided or forced to engage in such a behavior that he foresees it as troublesome. If he is indifferent or self-indulgent enough to ignore the expected reactions from others, or if the burden can be cleared away by some ritualized appology, dissonance as psychological debt will not come to his awareness. (C) Being Aware of Dissonance Dissonance will generate when his passive wishful-thinking is derogated by a person whom he regards as considerate of his own debt. If the passive wish "I wish that he would take my burden into consideration" is not in conflict with the passive expectation, "He ought to be considerable of the phychological debt on me," or if the wish can be separated from the expectation, the dissonance will be tolerable. And if his wishful-thinking is obstructed by a person who does not share considerations with him, he will be able to resign himself to fate. (D) Attitude Change as an Exertion for Dissonance-Resolution After the failure of his desire for indulgence to find the expected response, he will involve laboring for resolving the dissonance under the delusion that he is being treated unjustly. The more he involves feigning indifference to the person who has derogated him, the more he will become keenly awaken to the dissonance, so that he will be enforced to change his attitudes toward the relationship that he has presumed to exist between the two

自己および自我を実現させる媒体としての「あなた」の心理学的含意

　Figure 1 shows singular and plural forms of English personal pronouns and their corresponding present forms of be verb. An inexperienced student of English said there was something unacceptable in the figure. Please look over the figure to guess his question. 　His question is why the singular form in the second person is identical with the plural, though the singular form in the first and the third person is distinguished from the plural. Another question is why \u27Are\u27 is used after \u27You\u27 even in the singular form. Shouldn\u27t \u27Are\u27 as a be verb follow the plural form of a subject? 　These questions given by the innocent student have strongly stimulated the authors. If the singular form of \u27You\u27 simultaneously implies plurality, who and who are held in the mind of a speaker? 　Let\u27s suppose the interpersonal situation, where Jack and Betty are in the discourse. When Jack is conscious of himself as a speaker, \u27You\u27 for Jack is naturally Betty. When Jack is aware that Betty expresses herself as a speaker, Jack inevitably stands as \u27You\u27 for Betty. This implies that the two persons\u27 discourse begins with the complementary consciousness of \u27You\u27, and goes on with the recurrent exchnage of \u27You\u27. 　The use of \u27You\u27 is well correspond to the use of Japanese word \u27Jibun\u27. \u27Jibun\u27, as well as \u27You\u27, has two aspects. In one aspect, \u27Jibun\u27 expresses oneself as an actor. And in the other aspect, \u27Jibun\u27 realizes oneself as a mediator that makes it possible for the other person to express oneself. When \u27Jibun\u27 becomes conscious of expressing oneself as the second person, \u27Jibun\u27 gets aware of realizing oneself as the first person. Therefore, \u27Jibun\u27 or \u27You\u27 can be recognized as a complementary and recurrent unity, which is ready to express oneself in one context, and which is ready to realize oneself in the other context. The singular form of \u27You\u27 may reflect the unity of recurrence, and the sense of plurality of \u27You\u27 may reflect the complementarity of the two possible aspects. 　Next, let\u27s take a view of the interpersonal situation, where Betty, Jack, and Tom are in the discourse. Here, the singular form of the second person will be symbolized as \u27You\u27, and the plural form as \u27You\u27. When Betty calls herself as \u27I\u27, Jack or Tom is \u27You\u27, or Jack and Tom are \u27YOU\u27. In the three persons\u27 discourse, \u27You\u27 for Betty remains uncertain till Betty decisively points out either Jack or Tom. When Betty chooses Jack as \u27You\u27 or \u27WE\u27, Tom is inevitably signified as \u27not You\u27 or \u27THEY\u27 in her mind. 　From this, \u27YOU\u27 can be recognized as a possible state which may divide into \u27WE\u27 or \u27THEY\u27. In this sense, \u27I\u27 is the first person or a subject, and \u27YOU\u27 is the third person or an object. Because \u27YOU\u27 judged as \u27WE\u27 is subordinate to the subjectiveness of \u27I\u27, and \u27YOU\u27 judged as \u27THEY\u27 is opposed to the subjectiveness. Both subordinates and opponents are not \u27You\u27 after all. 　Then, we can define \u27Self\u27 as \u27i\u27 who recurrently and complementarily generates from \u27You\u27, and \u27Ego\u27 as \u27I\u27 who subjectively and decisively classifies \u27YOU\u27 as subordinates or opponents. In other words, the consciousness of \u27You\u27 is a process of self-expression, and the signification of \u27YOU\u27 is a processing of ego-realization. These two aspects are also complementarily integrated into \u27Jibun\u27. 　Hypothesis 1 takes the point of view of a baby in the interaction with its mother, and gives some assumptions on how to realize its \u27demanding-ego\u27. Reversely, hypothesis 2 takes a point of view of a mother in the interaction with her baby, and gives some assumptions on how to express her \u27contacting-self\u27. The demanding-ego illusionary develops its internal subjectiveness in the support of \u27You\u27, so that \u27I\u27 can dependently occupy the center of its phenomenal world. On the other hand, the contacting-self realistically acquires its external objectiveness for the support of \u27You\u27, so that \u27i\u27 can dependently share its ecological world. 　\u27I\u27 demands and expects how the world should go on, and so \u27I\u27 must be very conscious what might be assimilated by \u27YOU\u27 in the reflection. This process is called as feedback\u27 in the figure 4. \u27i\u27 contacts and foresees how the world can go on, and so \u27i\u27 must investigate what can be accommodated by \u27You\u27 in the trial. This process is called as \u27feedforward\u27 in the figure 4. \u27YOU\u27 demonstrates standards to be accommodated for regulating the demanding-ego. And \u27You\u27 illustrates clues to be assimilated for planning the contacting-self. These recurrently on-going processes are integrated and illustrated into a kind of cybernetic system in the figure 4

行動制御回路モデルにおける自己保存系としての態度

　The concept of attitude has played a central role in the development of social psychological studies. From its relatively simple beginning as a state of readiness to respond, the concept has grown into the present-day formulation. An attitude is an intervening variable, hypothetically inferred from the relationships between independent and dependent variables, which has contributed to building up general, deductive theories on human social behavior. It is an organization, consisting of affective, cognitive, and conative components, which show a tendency toward intra- and/or inter- consistency, seeking for one\u27s adjustment and self-maintenance. It is a structuring process of forming and changing his behavioral field, which enables him to rehearse his behavioral and symbolic operation with the changing world. These natures of attitude have been demonstrated theoretically and positively. Generally speaking, attitudes are inferred from what a person says about an attitude object, from what he feels about it, and from the way he says he will behave toward it. To what extent are what he says, how he feels, and how he intends to behave consistent with what he actually does? It is often pointed out that behavior does not always conforms to attitudes, while attitudes are theoretically assumed to be determinants of behavior. To resolve this apparant contradiction, the authors propose to integrate the concept of attitude into the more general framework of behavior regulatory system. From the view-point of cybernetics, especially on the basis of E. von Holst\u27s feedback theory, we have constructed Behavior-Controlling Circuit Model, consisting of Perceptual System (P-system); Self-Conservative System (C-system); Behavioral System (B-system); System of Sign-Sources (S-system), as illustrated in Fig. 4. P-system is defined as the functional system of sign-extraction from sign-sources by way of assimilatory transformation ((1)) in Fig. 4), such as partitioning, generalizing, abstractioning, and so on, as illustrated in Fig. 5. The transformations of sign-extraction will provide the formal criteria for behavior regulation ((2)). The categorizing responses induced by extracted signs must be classified, preserved, and ordered for the utility of .behavioral functioning. These functions are prescribed in C-system and will give the utilitarian criteria ((3)). B-system regulates the effectors for operating sign-sources ((4)). The disturbances caused by inadaptability to changing sign-sources feed back to B-system ((5)), and regenerates self-conservative accomodation. This accomodatory conservation will provide emotional and anticipatory criteria to behavioral modification ((6)). The residue generated from emotional accomodation regenerates perceptual accomodation, and determines the affective criteria for readjustment of sign-extraction ((7)). These emotional and affective regulations help a person to accomodate with changing sign-sources ((8)). The assimilatory processing of sign-extraction prescribed by affective accomodation can be defined as Pattern Preserving Transformation, and the assimilatory processing of ordering sign-utility prescribed by emotional accomodation can be defined as Measure Preserving Transformation. In this hypothetically constructed Behavior -Controlling Circuit Model, we propose that attitudes should be integrated in Self-Conservative System. The Behavior-Controlling Circuit is assumed as a directive and dynamic organization, formed through differentiation from less specific to more specific. Therefore, attitudinal categorizing responses show various developmental modes: affective identity (γ\u27); formal identity (β\u27); utlitarian identity (α\u27); utilitarian equivalence (α); formal equivalence (β); affective equivalence (γ),as illustrated in Fig. 6. They also show various stratificational modes of change and resistance, which interact with pattern preserving transformations and/or measure preserving transformations, as analysed in Table 2

心理学的行動座標の仮説的構成の試み

Our some accumulations of observing and describing the behaviors of organisms of some kinds have led us to the conclusion that it is necessary to construct a new framework which would enable us to collect data about the adjusting and chaining processes of behavior in perspective. Here is a product of our on-going efforts, which we call \u27Psychological Coordinates of Behavior\u27, enlightened mainly through the works of \u27Psychological Map\u27 by H. Umezu (1976), our teacher, and \u27Analysis of Behavioral Patterns\u27 by N. Tinbergen 1951). If we consider an organism as the system regulating its changing state, the behavior might be conceptualized as the patterns of changes, which should be organized under the conditions prescribed by the properties of signal-processing and-distributing, sent out from the inner and/or outer states of organism. Under this basic assumption, we define the properties of behavior by the modes of behavior-actualizing, -developing, and/or-terminating. When an actualized behavior is terminated through some novel developing, we call it Revolutionary Behavior (see the symbols of A and B in Table 1). When an actualized behavior is terminated through some prepaved course, we refer to it as Activated Behavior (C and D). When an actualized behavior gets terminated without any developing, we name it Saving Behavior (E and F). When an actualized behavior goes on only because it has no adequate terminals, it is Abreacting Behavior (G and H). We assume that the formation of behavior is under the transformational regulation throgh differentiation and integration, which results in specialized applicability in behavior organization. The three processes, such as the regulation within the organization, the regulation between the organizations, and the regulation of the whole levelling, could be hypothetically discriminated among regulatory strategies. As we infer them from common responses made by an organism to an array of objects, we refer to the first regulatogy strategy as functional (see the symbol of I in Figure 1), the second as formal (II), and the third as affective (III), taking after J.S. Bruner et. al. (1956). If we take it that a distinction by Bruner between the identity and the equivalence in categorizing responses is parallel to that by J. Piaget (1966) between the practical and the rational in intellgence, we could assume, from the point of view of forming the regulatory criteria for adjustment, the functional, formal, and affective regulations in the identity categorization as well as in the equivalence. Reinterpreting the properties of the developmental stages described by Piaget, we could know that sensori-motor intelligence (see the naming of Formal Identity and the symbol of β\u27 in Figure 1) is differentiated from spontaneous, global, and rhythmic activities (Affective Identity; γ\u27) and integrated into the organization of means-end relations (Functional Identity; α\u27). The differentiation between means and end (Functional Eqivalence; α) makes it possible to set pre-adjustment to anticipating processes, even though the pre-adjustment is still irreversible in operation, and consequently it gets re-integrated into the reversible, but still concrete, operations (Formal Equivalence; β), The differentiation between operations and the operated objects makes it possible to try every probable rehearsal in simulation, and to transform the level of the whole regulation in preparation against coming impacts, if necessary (Affective Equivalence; γ). We don\u27t take these sequential processes as the principle of the developmental stages but the orderly arranged steps of the criteria-construction, in which one need to acquire a good adjustment to behavioral objects and fields. On the basis of the above discussion, we assume the complex and compound organization of behavior, mapped out in Figure 1. Table 1 is our hypothetical framework for collecting data about behavioral processes. We will nominally decide the degree of the behavioral regulation (less special to more special) by the combinations of the distinctive features of X Ordinate; Y Ordinate; Z Ordinate, which are all defined bi-nominally. On the assimilatory aspect of behavior-regulation, we discriminate Inner-Oriented Strategy of Regulation (+x), where behaviors are regulated subordinately in accordance with the regulation-level of the innner system, from Outer-Oriented Strategy of Regulation (-x), where behaviors are regulated subordinately in accordance with the regulation-level of the outer system. Concerning the aspect of the organization in behavior-regulation, we discriminate Organization of Equivalence (+y), where behaviors are controlled under the anticipatory organization of feed-back, and re-feed-back, from Organization of Identity (-y), where behaviors are governed by the unique properties of individual behavioral objects. Regarding the accomodatory aspect of behavior -regulation, we discriminate Accomodatory Expanding (+z), where behaviors are expanded into the anticipatory transformation of the regulation-level on the whole or into the emotional explosion for the abreaction against the assimilatory aspect, from Accomodatory Reducing (-z), where behaviors are reduced into the anticipatory organization of the individual levels or into the emotional enclosure for the protection against the assimilating. We discriminate the case (+z\u27), where behaviors are expanded or reduced at a quick rate, from the case (-z\u27), where behaviors are expanded or reduced at a slow rate, though both of the cases are subcategories of Z ordinate. The property of the behavior in question is determined by the combination of distinctive features of X; Y; Z or X; Y; Z; Z\u27. Table 2, 3 shows our first application of the Coordinates to the analysis of children\u27s behaviors in dissonance reduction processes

心理学的対処方略としてのスル的視点とナル的視点の二重性

　"Attribution theory," one of the imperialistic theories in social psychology today, generally characterizes people as naive scientists striving to understand, predict, and control the course of events in which they are concerned. On the basis of observation, they form beliefs or theories about what is causing the observed events. When an individual is inclined to interpret in terms of the contingency upon his own behavior or his own relatively enduring dispositions, J. B. Rotter (1966) has termed this a belief in "internal control." When the events are typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control of others, or as unpredictable, this belief has been labeled as "external control." 　1-E scale, constructed by Rotter, has been used for measuring individual differences in a generalized belief for internal versus external control. Comparing the locus of control between Japanese and American college students, Japanese are much more external than American. From the standpoint of attribution theory, the belief of internal or skill determined control is assumed to be more adjustive than that of external or chance determined control. Then, is it possible to say that Japanese are more maladjustive than American? Surely, we Japanese feel some hesitation to say yes to the skill determined belief. This, however, does not necessarily mean that we are maladjustive in our culture. 　Let us take an example out of Japanese traditional poems: 「和歌の浦に潮満ち来れば潟を無み葦辺をさして鶴鳴き渡る.」 The phrase of 「鶴鳴き渡る」 can be literally translated into English as "cranes go crying," but a delicate, essential difference remains unsolved. In the English expression, cranes are noted as acting subjects independent of the background. In the Japanese expression, on the other hand, the transitory scene, including cranes as a component, is perceived as a whole. As Y. Ikegami (1981; 1982) noted, English as language of SURU (DOING) - logic has a way of making actors conspicuous from the background, in contrast with Japanese as a language of NARU (BECOMING) - logic, which has a way of burying actors into the whole. This kind of difference is generally noticeable not only in language but also attitude and behavior, as referred by T. Doi (1980) and others. 　Authors (1985) theoretically supposed an interactional process between Mono and Koto, and hypothetically analyzed out four directions of the interactive actualization, taking a viewpoint of the behavioral subject of self-organizing activity, as summarized again in Table 1. SURU (DOING) is in the direction of actualization when "I" am doing an action to a thing, where mono is being actualized into MONO mediated by Koto. Secondly, NARU (BECOMING) is under actualization when my action is becoming in effect. Thirdly, when I choose a thing to do something with, I am recognizing it as being there, or ARU (BEING). Fourthly, when I am going to do some action, I am being actualized in such a consciousness, or IRU (HAVING), as I am having myself as a subject, which is activating myself to act upon a thing. 　This actualized activity of self-organizing will be subjectively insighted as being spontaneous, released, induced, or enforced, mediated by the observation as to whether my behavior and its behavioral context are contingent or dependent each other, as shown in Table 2. When I take my behavior as spontaneous, I expect myself to be a subject coping with other things or persons surrounding me. This feeling of spontaneity is based on my subjective expectation of subordinatedly co-acting others. When the surroundings, which I am embedded in, is perceived to have a spontaneous direction of changing as a whole, I feel enforced to guess and accept the direction so as to adapt myself. Therefore, feeling spontaneous or enforced is a phenomenal aspect of the two-foldedness dependent on the way of interaction, as assumed in Table 3. So is feeling released or induced. Table 4 hypothetically shows some psychological strategies to facilitate the self-organizing activity of others to actualize, coping with these aspects of the two-foldedness of SURU and NARU viewpoints