不協和の発生と解消の過程を規定する心理論理の再考

Abstract

The idea that people are more comfortable with consistent than with inconsistent cognitions has been proclaimed in the social psychological literature. People are not only rational but also rationalizers. We want our attitudes and beliefs to support rather than contradict our behavior, and we want our cognitions tied together in a coherent, mutually reinforcing systems. Such basic assumptions characterize a variety of consistency theories in the huge compendium edited by Abelson et al. (1968) "Cognitive dissonance theory" proposed by Festinger (1957), because of its generality and simplicity, has continued to generate more researches and more controversies than any other one approach. One of the intriguing aspects of dissonance theory is that if frequently leads to predictions which stand in apparent contradiction to those made by other theoretical approaches, - most notably, to a general "reward-incentive theory." For example, in the well-known experiment by Festinger & Carlsmith (1959), subjects were induced to tell a waiting confederate for $1 or$20 that the experiment which the confederate was about to take part in was interesting and exciting. In fact, as the subject well knew, it was extremely dull. According to dissonance theory, if a person says something he feels untrue, he experiences dissonance: The cognition "I said X" is dissonant with the cognition "I believe not-X." In order to reduce dissonance, he might attempt to convince himself that what he said was not so very untrue. Thus, dissonance theory suggests that advocating an opposite position increases one\u27s tendency to believe in that position. However, if one is provided with a great deal of justification for advocating an opposite position, one experiences less dissonance. The cognition that I received $20 is consonant with having lied. Consequently, I would have less need to justify my action by convincing myself that I really believed what I said than if I had been paid a mere$1 for lying. This type of prediction has been confirmed by experiments. On the other hand, considerable controversy has been aroused. Much of the more recent research on dissonance theory, as well argued by Cooper & Fazio (1984), specifies the precise conditions under which cognitive dissonance is or is not aroused. In particular, research on the role of foreseeability, personal responsibility, and aversive consequences has led to a new emphasis on implications of behavior for the self-concept. Aronson (1968; 1980) asserts that inconsistency between behavior and attitudes is not sufficient for dissonance arousal unless the attitude are firmly anchored in the self-concept, and that the behavior produces aversive consequences that could have been foreseen. He concludes that dissonance-generation will derive from the derogation of a high self-concept and dissonance-reduction will function for its maintenance and restoration. Accepting Aronson\u27s assertion, it should be recalled that the subjects of Festinger & Carlsmith\u27s experiment were male students in the introductory psychology course at Stanford University. No doubt, they must have had a high self-concept as well as a high sensitivity. When asked to tell supposedly unsuspecting fellow student that an experimental task which they knew to be dull was in fact interesting, such students of ability and sensitivity ought to have realized the experimenter\u27s inducement. Their attitude change in pretence may have been a good service to their professor of psychology, not for resolving dissonance, but for demonstrating their kindness as a man of good consideration. The role played by a $20 inducement, as Rosenberg (1965) pointed out, may have seemed like a bribe than an incentive. Such students of a high self-concept ought to have resisted to change their attitudes after having received a bribe. This new look at the dissonance process, we propose here, being possible, subjects offered$20 must have felt more discomfort than those offered $1. Oour new look seems highly consistent with Aronson\u27s basic position on self-concept, but inconsistent with his dissonance interpretation. Needless to say, it should be confirmed by experiments. Consistency theories, having established mainly in the cultural background of the West, propose than a man wants his attitude and beliefs to support rather than contradict his behavior. Turning to our Japanese psychology, it seems that consistency between attitude and behavior or consistency among cognitions is not always a requisite. In our culture, as well discussed by Doi (1971; 1985), a Japanese noted psychiatrist, discrepancy between attitude as "Honne" in Japanese and behavior as "Tatemae" is not only rather acceptable but also more necessary to live on as a grow-up. Our experimental study (1980) after Aronson & Carlsmith (1963) and our daily experiences have led us to a conclusion that the differences between our psycho-logic and theirs should be taken into consideration when we apply dissonance theory to Japanese psychology. What we propose in this paper is a trial so that we can accomodate dissonance theory based on their psycho-logic into our psycho-logic. (A) Being Awaken to the Outcomes to Come When a man is to engage in some behavior to comply with a request from another or others, he estimates how much the compliance will be debt to him. If he can reject the burden, if he can withdraw his committed compliance, or if his expected behavior is acceptable or admitted, his psychological burden awaken from the compliance will be counterbalanced. (B) Being Conscious of Psychological Debt He will be conscious of psychological debt, when he is decided or forced to engage in such a behavior that he foresees it as troublesome. If he is indifferent or self-indulgent enough to ignore the expected reactions from others, or if the burden can be cleared away by some ritualized appology, dissonance as psychological debt will not come to his awareness. (C) Being Aware of Dissonance Dissonance will generate when his passive wishful-thinking is derogated by a person whom he regards as considerate of his own debt. If the passive wish "I wish that he would take my burden into consideration" is not in conflict with the passive expectation, "He ought to be considerable of the phychological debt on me," or if the wish can be separated from the expectation, the dissonance will be tolerable. And if his wishful-thinking is obstructed by a person who does not share considerations with him, he will be able to resign himself to fate. (D) Attitude Change as an Exertion for Dissonance-Resolution After the failure of his desire for indulgence to find the expected response, he will involve laboring for resolving the dissonance under the delusion that he is being treated unjustly. The more he involves feigning indifference to the person who has derogated him, the more he will become keenly awaken to the dissonance, so that he will be enforced to change his attitudes toward the relationship that he has presumed to exist between the two