Applying geomorphological principles and engineering science to develop a phased sediment management plan for Mount St Helens, Washington

Thirty-seven years post-eruption, erosion of the debris avalanche at Mount St. Helens continues to supply sediment to the Toutle-Cowlitz River system in quantities that have the potential to lower the Level of Protection (LoP) against flooding unacceptably, making this one of the most protracted gravel-bed river disasters to date. The Portland District, US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) recently revised its long-term plan for sediment management (originally published in 1985), in order to maintain the LoP above the Congressionally-authorised level, while reducing impacts on fish currently listed under the Endangered Species Act, and minimising the overall cost of managing sediment derived from erosion at Mount St Helens. In revising the plan, the USACE drew on evidence gained from sediment monitoring, modelling and uncertainty analysis, coupled with assessment of future LoP trends under a baseline scenario (continuation of the 1985 sediment management strategy) and feasible alternatives. They applied geomorphological principles and used engineering science to develop a Phased Sediment Management Plan that allows for uncertainty concerning future sediment yields by implementing sediment management actions only as, and when, necessary. The phased plan makes best use of the potential to enhance the sediment trap efficiency and storage capacity of the existing Sediment Retention Structure (SRS) by incrementally raising its spillway and using novel hydraulic structures to build islands in the NFTR and steepen the gradient of the sediment plain upstream of the structure. Dredging is held in reserve, to be performed only when necessary to react to unexpectedly high sedimentation events or when the utility of other measures has been expended. The engineering-geomorphic principles and many of the measures in the Phased Sediment Management Plan are transferrable to other gravel-bed river disasters. The overriding message is that monitoring and adaptive management are crucial components of long-term sediment-disaster management, especially in volcanic landscapes where future sediment yields are characterised by uncertainty and natural variability

AR 10-50, Organization and Functions, United States Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency, 15 December 1980.

The purpose of the regulation is described as setting “… forth the mission and functions of the Director, US Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (USMIIA)…” The mission of the USMIIA…”is to produce timely medical intelligence support to the following: Offices of The Surgeons General, major commands, and staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. DOD [Department of Defense] and national level intelligence production agencies. Other Government agencies as required. [and] Administer and coordinate the medical aspects of the Army Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program. “ This regulation states more clearly than the 1975 edition, that the USMIIA provided medical intelligence support for the entire US armed forces. Under the section on Command and Staff relationships, USMIIA was described as a field operating agency of The Surgeon General, US Army. In other words, the USMIIA was a special purpose organization reporting to The Surgeon General, chief of the Army Medical Department and senior medical staff officer in the US Department of the Army

EIG 21, Collection of Information on Highways, May 1959.

This Engineer Intelligence Guide was prepared to provide intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination guidance by the Chief of Engineers to elements of the Corps of Engineers. The Introduction contains a list of five key army manuals and documents related to transportation intelligence. This guide contains detailed instructions for gathering information about highways and bridges. It also contains extensive illustrations and a glossary of highway terms. The distribution list shows engineer-related organizations interested in engineer intelligence

EIG 21, Collection of Information on Highways, May 1959.

This Engineer Intelligence Guide was prepared to provide intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination guidance by the Chief of Engineers to elements of the Corps of Engineers. The Introduction contains a list of five key army manuals and documents related to transportation intelligence. This guide contains detailed instructions for gathering information about highways and bridges. It also contains extensive illustrations and a glossary of highway terms. The distribution list shows engineer-related organizations interested in engineer intelligence

An availability study for a SME

A case study of an availability analysis for a small commercial company is presented. The analysis was carried out to meet a customer requirement for the availability of an electronic ground-based system in a benign environment. Availability calculations were based on failure data provided and an explanation of the methodology and problems encountered and dealt with are discussed. The methodology includes failure classification according to MIL-HDBK-781A and how it may be used to promote and develop internal processes. A commentary on the background to reliability/availability specification is provided and a number of recommendations for monitoring reliability and availability are given

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 May 1960.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Particularly, it was intended to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” This is essentially the same as the 1958 version. It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications grids of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised subordinate organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 November 1958.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Specifically, it was inteded to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications infrastructure of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center

CSR 381-1, Military Intelligence, Technical Intelligence Relationships, 12 May 1960.

This document was issued by the Chief of Staff to prescribe relationships between different officers in the Army staff. Particularly, it was intended to “prescribe relationships between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and the technical Services in the field of intelligence activities.” This is essentially the same as the 1958 version. It was published as part of an attempt to solve an ongoing organizational problem: how to coordinate the intelligence activities of the US government. In the 1950s, military intelligence was decentralized. There was no national-level military intelligence agency. In theory, the Chief of Staff and the army general staff directed the activities of the army. However, much of the work of the army was done by the special staff, a set of special-purpose bureaus. Within the special staff, the army technical services – the Army Medical Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Transportation Corps – supplied the army with weapons and equipment, services, training, and personnel services. They had a long tradition of independence and did not yield to intrusion from the general staff readily. Each of the technical services performed intelligence functions. All were responsible for technical intelligence, that is, intelligence concerning weapons and equipment used by foreign forces. For example, the Ordnance Intelligence Agency was concerned with the small arms, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and ammunition used by foreign forces. In addition, some had area intelligence functions concerned with the geography, industrial base, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. of foreign countries where US forces might be expected to operate. The Signal Corps Intelligence Agency had been tasked with producing intelligence on the civilian power and communications grids of the Soviet Bloc. The Medical Information and Intelligence Agency produced intelligence about the medical infrastructure, sanitary conditions, epidemiology, etc. in foreign countries. The Corps of Engineers supervised subordinate organizations concerned with mapping and geographic intelligence, foreign ports and harbors, and potential landing beaches. Since, in theory, ACSI supervised intelligence activities and DCSLOG supervised activities related to supplies and equipment, this directive attempted to spell out the responsibilities of each official and of the chiefs of the technical services. Organizational conflicts within the army in the 1950s are discussed at length in From Root to McNamara by James E. Hewes, Jr., which is available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/040/40-1/index.html Eventually, the army was radically reorganized in 1962 with the functions of the army technical services redistributed to centralized organizations like the newly created Army Materiel Command. The intelligence functions of the technical services were divided. Technical intelligence responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Army Foreign Science and Technology Center and area analysis functions were transferred to the newly organized Defense Intelligence Agency, Production Center