Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established.cooperative games;interval games;the core;the dominance core;stable sets

Cooperative Interval Games Arising from Airport Situations with Interval Data

This paper deals with the research area of cooperative interval games arising from airport situations with interval data. We also extend to airport interval games some results from classical theory.cooperative interval games;concave games;airport games;cost games;interval data

Convex Interval Games

In this paper, convex interval games are introduced and some characterizations are given. Some economic situations leading to convex interval games are discussed. The Weber set and the Shapley value are defined for a suitable class of interval games and their relations with the interval core for convex interval games are established. A square operator is introduced which allows us to obtain interval solutions starting from classical cooperative game theory solutions. It turns out that on the class of convex interval games the square Weber set coincides with the interval core.cooperative games;interval data;convex games;the core;the Weber set;the Shapley value

Cooperation under Interval Uncertainty

Classification: JEL code C71Cooperative game theory;Interval uncertainty;Core;Value;Balancedness

Sequencing Interval Situations and Related Games

In this paper we consider one-machine sequencing situations with interval data. We present different possible scenarioes and extend classical results on well known rules and on sequencing games to the interval setting.cooperative games;interval data;sequencing situations;convex games

Connection Situations under Uncertainty

cooperative cost games;minimum cost spanning tree situations;robustness;worst-case scenario;input interval data;uncertainty

Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established

Connection Situations under Uncertainty

Moretti, S.

Big boss interval games

This paper introduces and studies a class of cooperative interval games suitable to model market situations with two corners where players face interval uncertainty regarding the outcome of cooperation. In one corner there is a powerful player called the big boss; the other corner contains players that need the big boss to benefit from cooperation. Various characterizations of big boss interval games are given. The interval core of a big boss interval game is explicitly described, bi-monotonic allocation schemes using interval core elements are introduced, and it is shown that each element of the interval core of a big boss interval game is extendable to such a scheme. Two value-type interval solution concepts are defined on the class of big boss interval games which generate for each such game the same interval core allocation which is extendable to a bi-monotonic interval allocation scheme