The Money Laundering Prevention System

The paper presents the money laundering and terrorist financing prevention system in Croatia. The basic concepts are defined, the principles and fundamentals of international regulations analysed, and the regulatory system in Croatia covered by statute and money laundering prevention Regulations is presented, in conjunction with a description of the organisation, remit and international actions of the Money Laundering Prevention Office. The infiltration of dirty money is a crucial problem from national economies. The purchase of shares, of real estate, the establishment of dirty investment funds and the use of the banking system for the embedding of such resources is a danger to the credibility of a whole country, and in particular to the security of the financial and banking system. Croatia has adopted statutory measures aimed at the effective detection and prevention of suspicious financial transactions, in other words the prevention of money laundering. Launderers constantly find new ways, make use of new non-financial channels and expand their activities to real estate, artworks and insurance. Hence it is necessary to keep up with European approaches and recommendations, to strive for further improvement of the laws and the modernisation of the system, and to adopt new regulations harmonised with international standards, particularly with Directive 2005/60/EC.money laundering, terrorist financing, prevention, harmonisation with international standards, due diligence, reporting suspicious transactions

The long road from Ljubljana to Kyoto: Implementing emissions trading mechanism and CO2 tax

According to the Kyoto Protocol, Slovenia is required to reduce GHG emissions to an average of 8% below base year 1986 emissions in the period 2008-2012. Slovenia established different measures for reducing GHG emissions long before its ratification. It was first transition country who implemented CO2 tax in the 1997. Several changes in CO2 tax have not brought the desired results. CO2 emissions have actually increased. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU member states by implementing the emissions trading instrument, defined by new EU Directive. At the same time, Slovenia has adopted a new CO2 tax system, which is compatible with the new circumstances. The main purpose of this paper is to present the characteristics of Slovenian approach to national allocation plan for emissions trading and analyze the problems of the CO2 tax in Slovenia. Paper also describes the compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and expected movements on the Slovenian allowances market.CO2 tax, Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading, national allocation plan, emissions allowances

Dug je put od Ljubljane do Kyota: dozvole za zagađivanje i porez na ugljični dioksid

U skladu s Protokolom iz Kyota, Slovenija se obvezala da će u razdoblju od 2008. do 2012. smanjiti zagađivanje plinovima za prosječno 8% od razine zagađivanja zabilježenog u baznoj 1986. godini. Još prije ratifikacije Sporazuma, u Sloveniji su uvedene brojne mjere za smanjenje zagađivanja plinovima. Slovenija je prva tranzicijska zemlja koja je 1997. godine uvela porez na ugljični dioksid (CO2), no on nije donio željene rezultate – razina zagađivanja ugljičnim dioksidom u stvarnosti se povećala. Početkom 2005. godine Slovenija se provedbom instrumenta trgovanja dozvolama za zagađivanje, definiranoga prema novoj smjernici EU, pridružila ostalim zemljama članicama EU. Istodobno, usvojila je novi sustav oporezivanja zagađivanja ugljičnim dioksidom, koji je u skladu s novonastalim okolnostima. Glavni je cilj ovog rada predočiti obilježja slovenskog pristupa u izradi nacionalnog plana raspodjele dozvola za zagađivanje i analizirati probleme poreza na zagađivanje ugljičnim dioksidom u Sloveniji. U radu se također opisuju troškovi prilagodbe ciljevima iz Kyota i očekivana kretanja na slovenskom tržištu dozvola za zagađivanje

The Long Road from Ljubljana to Kyoto: Implementing Emission Trading Mechanisms and CO2 Tax

According to the Kyoto Protocol, Slovenia is required to reduce GHG emissions to an average of 8% below base year 1986 emissions in the period 2008-2012. Slovenia established different measures for reducing GHG emissions long before its ratification. It was first transition country who implemented CO2 tax in the 1997. Several changes in CO2 tax have not brought the desired results. CO2 emissions have actually increased. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU member states by implementing the emissions trading instrument, defined by new EU Directive. At the same time, Slovenia has adopted a new CO2 tax system, which is compatible with the new circumstances. The main purpose of this paper is to present the characteristics of Slovenian approach to national allocation plan for emissions trading and analyze the problems of the CO2 tax in Slovenia. Paper also describes the compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and expected movements on the Slovenian allowances market

Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is therefore of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one's neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Journal of Theoretical Biolog

EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AS A SPIN SYSTEM

Očitno je, da se naše podnebje spreminja in s tem ustvarja globalni problem, s katerim se moramo spopasti na mednarodni ravni. Podnebne spremembe so zato obravnavane kot primer največje socialne dileme, s katero se človeštvo sooča. Zakaj? Učinki podnebnih sprememb niso enakomerno razporejeni po celem svetu. Rezultat je klasičen problem, ki se ustvari kadar imamo opravka z javnimi dobrinami. Globalno-podnebni problem lahko uspešno rešimo samo na način, ki bo zagotovil mednarodno koordinacijo skupnih aktivnosti, kjer bodo sodelovale vse države sveta. Stroški posamezne države se lahko kaj hitro izračunajo, medtem ko bodo koristi porazdeljene med vse "igralce", neodvisno od njihovih dejanskih prispevkov k trajnostnemu razvoju. Evolucijska teorija iger je eno izmed najprimernejših teoretičnih orodij za preučevanje izzivov na področju podnebnih sprememb, s pomočjo katere bomo definirali glavne kriterije za evolucijo uspešnega sodelovanja. Svet je spoznal, da obvladovanje podnebnih sprememb povzroča stroške in zato bo nagnjenost k onesnaževanju vedno prisotna. Zato se vprašamo, ali lahko stohastični vplivi, kompleksne interakcijske mreže in koevolucija v podnebni igri zvišajo verjetnost prevzema čistejše strategije? Uporabljene so metode statistične fizike, Monte Carlo simulacije in igra zapornikove dileme z namenom podati nove odgovore na vprašanje kako rešiti naše podnebje in zaustaviti globalno segrevanje. Zapornikova dilema je še posebej primerna, saj proučuje evolucijo sodelovanja med sebičnimi posamezniki, kjer je kooperacija vprašljiva zaradi mamljivosti izbire strategije defekcije, hkrati pa lahko dilemo obravnavamo kot spinski sistem, in na ta način vpeljemo fizikalni pristop obravnave podnebnega problema.It is obvious that the climate change is underway, constituting a pressing global problem that needs to be dealt with at the global level. Tackling climate change means tackling the biggest social dilemma in the human history. Why? Because the adverse effects of climate change are not equally distributed across the world, the result being that this is a classical problem of dealing with global goods on a massive scale. Climate change mitigation can be successful only if the whole world will undertake an internationally coordinated collective action. Costs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases can be easily calculated for each individual, but benefits of the successful reduction will be distributed among all the "players", independently of their actual contributions to sustainable development. Evolutionary game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for studying the challenges of climate change, and we will reveal the main criteria for the successful evolution of cooperation. It has namely become painfully obvious that alleviating the negative consequences of the climate change will be costly, and accordingly, the temptations to pollute will always be present. Thus, we ask whether unpredictability, complex interaction networks and coevolution can increase the probability of adopting the cleaner strategy? We employ methods of statistical physics, Monte Carlo simulations and the spatial prisoner\u27s dilemma game in order to provide new insights and answers that may help us to save our climate by stopping the adverse changes. The prisoner\u27s dilemma game is particularly suited as it captures the essence of the problem when cooperative individuals are faced with temptations to resorting to the defective strategy, while at the same time the dilemma can be treated as a spin system, thus enabling a physics-inspired treatment of the climate problem

Model for Determining the Stability of Retail Deposits with Higher Outflow Rates / Model za izračun stabilnosti vlog na drobno z višjo stopnjo odliva

Vloge na drobno veljajo za enega najcenejših in tudi najstabilnejših virov financiranja za banke, ki razpolagajo z večjimi vrednostmi teh vlog. Za namen poročanja in izpolnjevanja zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja definira banka tri glavne skupine vlog na drobno, ki jim pripadajo različne stopnje odlivov. Za prvi dve glavni skupini so značilne stopnje odlivov 5 % oziroma 10 %, za tretjo glavno skupino pa banka sama določi stopnje odlivov. Tretja glavna skupina je tudi predmet obravnave v tem članku. Banka na podlagi števila in dejavnikov tveganja razvrsti vloge na drobno v tri kategorije. Dejavniki tveganja so glede na stopnjo tveganja razdeljeni v dve skupini. V članku je najprej opisan zakonodajni okvir, nato pa način izračuna višjih stopenj odlivov za vloge na drobno v skladu s preteklimi nihanji in pričakovano oceno nestanovitnosti v situaciji stresnih razmer. Na koncu je na kratko podana prihodnja obravnava vlog na drobno z višjimi stopnjami odlivov

Model za izračun stabilnosti vlog na drobno z višjo stopnjo odliva

Retail deposits are treated as one of the cheapest and most stable funding sources for banks, especially for those with high volumes of retail deposits. A bank defines three main categories of retail deposits that are subject to different outflow rates for the purpose of liquidity coverage requirements in reporting and compliance. The outflow rates for the first two main groups are 5% and 10% respectively, but for the third main group the bank calculates its own outflow rates. We analyzed the latter in this paper. Each bank should assign retail deposits to one of the three categories based on the number and type of predetermined risk factors. Risk factors are divided into two groups according to the degree of risk. The paper first describes the legislative framework, followed by the method of calculating higher outflow rates for retail deposits according to the historical movements and the expected volatility assessment in the situation of stress conditions. At the end of the paper, we briefly provide the future treatment of retail deposits with higher outflow rates.Vloge na drobno veljajo za enega najcenejših in tudi najstabilnejših virov financiranja za banke, ki razpolagajo z večjimi vrednostmi teh vlog. Za namen poročanja in izpolnjevanja zahteve glede likvidnostnega kritja definira banka tri glavne skupine vlog na drobno, ki jim pripadajo različne stopnje odlivov. Za prvi dve glavni skupini so značilne stopnje odlivov 5 % oziroma 10 %, za tretjo glavno skupino pa banka sama določi stopnje odlivov. Tretja glavna skupina je tudi predmet obravnave v tem članku. Banka na podlagi števila in dejavnikov tveganja razvrsti vloge na drobno v tri kategorije. Dejavniki tveganja so glede na stopnjo tveganja razdeljeni v dve skupini. V članku je najprej opisan zakonodajni okvir, nato pa način izračuna višjih stopenj odlivov za vloge na drobno v skladu s preteklimi nihanji in pričakovano oceno nestanovitnosti v situaciji stresnih razmer. Na koncu je na kratko podana prihodnja obravnava vlog na drobno z višjimi stopnjami odlivov

Climate change cooperation in the prisoner\u27s dilemma game

Podnebne spremembe so obravnavane kot eden izmed največjih izzivov na ravni mednarodne kooperacije, s katerimi se sooča človeštvo. Podnebni problem je namreč klasičen problem, ki se ukvarja z javnimi dobrinami. Teorija iger je eno izmed orodij, s pomočjo katerih lahko definiramo glavne kriterije za izvedbo mednarodnih skupnih aktivnosti obvladovanja podnebnih sprememb. Takšne skupne aktivnosti bodo v članku uporabljene z namenom predstavitve evolucije uspešnega sodelovanja. Svet je spoznal, da obvladovanje podnebnih sprememb povzroča stroške, in nagnjenost k onesnaževanju bo vedno prisotna. Zato se vprašajmo, ali lahko stohastični element v podnebni igri, ki pomeni neko stopnjo negotovosti, zviša verjetnost prevzema strategije kooperacije. Naš model temelji na igri zapornikove dileme, ki proučuje evolucijo kot sodelovanje med sebičnimi posamezniki.Climate change has been described as one of the greatest challenges to international cooperation that the world has faced thus far. Indeed, the climate problem is a classic problem of dealing with global goods. Game theory is one of the tools that can be used to identify key criteria for designing frameworks for international collective action on climate change. Such collective action is used in the current paper to present the evolution of cooperative behaviour. The world has realised that tackling the climate change will be costlytherefore, the temptation to pollute will always be present. Can the stochastic element in our climate game, which refers to some level of uncertainty, increase the probability of adopting the cooperation strategy? Our model is based on the prisonerʼs dilemma game, in which the evolution of cooperative behaviour among egoistic individuals is considered

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON VISIBILITY GRAPHS

We show that time series of different complexities can be transformed into networks that host individuals playing evolutionary games. The irregularity of the time series is thereby faithfully reflected in the fraction of cooperators surviving the evolutionary process, thus effectively linking time series with evolutionary games. Pivotal to the linkage is a simple visibility algorithm that transforms time series into networks. More specifically, periodic series yield regular networks, chaotic series yield random networks, while fractal series yield scale-free networks. As an example, we use a chaotic time series from the Logistic map and a fractal time series of Brownian motion, yielding an interaction network with an exponential and a power-law degree distribution, respectively. By employing the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, we demonstrate that such heterogeneous interaction networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation if compared to the traditional square lattice topology. Due to the simplicity of the employed methodology, newcomers with a basic command of nonlinear dynamics or stochastic processes can become easily acquainted with evolutionary games, and moreover, integrate these interesting and vibrant subfields of physics more effectively into their research.Evolutionary games, time series, complex networks, visibility algorithm