Spatial Elements in Visual Awareness. Challenges for an Intrinsic “Geometry” of the Visible

Un enjeu majeur pour les recherches actuelles dans les sciences de la vision consiste à mettre au point une approche dépendante de l’observateur – une science des apparences visuelles située au-delà de leur véridicité. L’espace dont nous faisons l’expérience subjective est en réalité hautement « illusoire», et les éléments de base du champ visuel sont des structures qualitatives, contextuelles et relationnelles, et non des indices métriques et dépendants du stimulus. Sur la base de nombreux résultats disponibles dans la littérature traitant de la manière dont fonctionnent les divers constituants de l’espace (formes, surfaces, etc.), l’article décrit les éléments qualitatifs de base d’un tel espace et pose la question de la « géométrie» des apparences visuelles. Il formule enfin un ensemble de propositions pour d’éventuelles recherches poursuivant l’examen de l’espace visuel d’un point de vue expérimental.A challenge for current vision science is to develop an observer-dependent science—a science of visual appearances beyond veridicalism. The space that we subjectively experience in vision is, in fact, highly ``illusory’’, and the primitives of the visual field are qualitative, contextual, and relational patterns rather than metric or stimuli-dependent cues. Drawing on the extensive evidence that the experimental literature on visual space perception offers on the behavior of the various constituents of that space such as shapes and surfaces, the paper describes the qualitative primitives of such a space and addresses the question of the intrinsic ``geometry’’ of visual appearances. The paper also makes suggestions for potential future developments of examining visual space from an experimental viewpoint

Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have?

Quite a few cognitive scientists are working toward a naturalization of phenomenology. Looking more closely at the relevant literature, however, the ‘naturalizing phenomenology’ proposals show the presence of different conceptions, assumptions, and formalisms, further differentiated by different philosophical and/or scientific concerns. This paper shows that the original Husserlian stance is deeper, clearer and more advanced than most supposed contemporary improvements. The recent achievements of experimental phenomenology show how to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology without destroying the guiding assumptions of phenomenology. The requirements grounding the scientific explanation of subjective experience are discussed, such as the nature of the stimuli, their variables, and their manipulation by properly phenomenological methods

Color determinants of surface stratification

Although color plays a crucial role in the demarcation of surfaces in the visual field, its role in depth perception is not well understood. Certain special effects of color on depth perception that arise from optical factors such as chromatic aberration (chromostereopsis) have been studied, but less is known about the role of perceptual factors of color in determining depth relations. The present study explores the role that the different attributes of color such as hue, chroma, and lightness play in the stratification of surfaces in depth. In two experiments, subjects manipulated specific dimensions of colors (hue, chroma, lightness, and whiteness) while making judgments of coplanarity of either two or more abutting surfaces. The results demonstrate that for surfaces to appear coplanar, their lightness has to be proportional to the natural (intrinsic) lightness of the hues. No meaningful effects of chroma, whiteness, or blackness were found in depth stratification. The results suggest a primary role of the natural lightness of hues in depth perception.PostprintPeer reviewe

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In our study, for a small number of antonyms, we investigate whether they are cross-modally or ideaesthetically related to the space of colors. We analyze the affinities of seven antonyms (cold-hot, dull-radiant, dead-vivid, soft-hard, transparent-chalky, dry-wet, and acid-treacly) and their intermediate connotations (cool-warm, matt-shiny, numb-lively, mellow-firm, semi-transparent-opaque, semi-dry-moist, and sour-sweet) as a function of color. We find that some antonyms relate to chromatic dimensions, others to achromatic ones. The cold-hot antonym proves to be the most salient dimension. The dry-wet dimension coincides with the cold-hot dimension, with dry corresponding to hot and wet to cold. The acid-treacly dimension proves to be transversal to the cold-hot dimension; hence, the pairs mutually span the chromatic domain. The cold-hot and acid-treacly antonyms perhaps recall Hering's opponent color system. The dull-radiant, transparent-chalky, and dead-vivid pairs depend little upon chromaticity. Of all seven antonyms, only the soft-hard one turns out to be independent of the chromatic structure

The psychophysics of the soul. Aristotle and Brentano

1. Introduction The nineteenth century saw an Aristotelian revival which was most manifest in philology and exegetic analysis. The leading proponent of this revival was Franz Brentano, who set out an original interpretation of Aristotle in his book On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle and was himself an Aristotelian in the systematic sense, given that he developed his theory of intentional reference on specifically Aristotelian bases. The writings of particular interest to Brentano wer..

Il laboratorio della filosofia. L'influenza di Meinong nella psicologia italiana del Novecento.

Il rapporto tra filosofia e psicologia non è immune da problemi. Talvolta, infatti, la filosofia ha subito l'accusa di psicologismo, ovvero di un riduzionismo psicologico; altre volte l'attacco è stato rivolto direttamente alla psicologia, sulla base dell'assunzione che la fisica o la fisiologia del sistema nervoso e degli organi di senso avrebbero già potenzialmente in mano le risposte ad ogni quesito di tipo psicologico o cognitivo. Dei fenomeni psichici, in breve, si sarebbe autorizzati a parlare solo in 'termini cerebrali', come notava finemente De Sarlo. Una delle ragioni di tale difficoltà è da ricercare nel fatto che tanto le filosofie empiriste che le filosofie razionaliste pretendono di avere carattere scientifico, ma non sono immediatamente riducibili a epistemologie

amodal completion of boundaries in coloured surfaces

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