Bygones are Bygones

'Bygones are bygones' might seem to be an analytic truth, lacking any substantive content. Yet, economists think that, when they state that bygones are bygones, they are asserting something interesting and important. Furthermore, others would argue that the statement 'bygones are bygones', when read appropriately, is false. By interrogating the statement 'bygones are bygones' we identify a number of key issues relating to rational choice theory and the treatment of intentions, habits and promises. The more philosophical discussion of the things that economists say (and what they might mean) is particularly appropriate in honoring Hartmut Kliemt, much of whose work has brought philosophy and economics into closer proximity.philosophy of economics, intervention principle, future-orientation

Expressive political behaviour : foundations, scope and implications

A growing literature has focused attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings, particularly voting. A common criticism of the expressive idea is that it is ad hoc and lacks both predictive and normative bite. No clear definition of expressive behaviour has gained wide acceptance yet, and no detailed understanding of the range of foundations of specific expressive motivations has emerged. This article provides a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour accounting for a range of factors. The content of expressive choice – distinguishing between identity-based, moral and social cases – is discussed and related to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. There is also a discussion of the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour

Simulation sample sizes for Monte Carlo partial EVPI calculations

Partial expected value of perfect information (EVPI) quantifies the value of removing uncertainty about unknown parameters in a decision model. EVPIs can be computed via Monte Carlo methods. An outer loop samples values of the parameters of interest, and an inner loop samples the remaining parameters from their conditional distribution. This nested Monte Carlo approach can result in biased estimates if small numbers of inner samples are used and can require a large number of model runs for accurate partial EVPI estimates. We present a simple algorithm to estimate the EVPI bias and confidence interval width for a specified number of inner and outer samples. The algorithm uses a relatively small number of model runs (we suggest approximately 600), is quick to compute, and can help determine how many outer and inner iterations are needed for a desired level of accuracy. We test our algorithm using three case studies. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Paying for politics

In Disclosure V. Anonymity in Campaign Finance, Ian Ayres broaches a very particular issue in the design of democratic institutions, discusses that issue in a very particular context, and advocates a very particular institutional remedy. The specific issue concerns the regulation of information concerning political donations. The specific context has two relevant dimensions. Ayres is clearly concerned with the case of the US, and, implicitly and explicitly, the discussion takes many other aspects of the US political environment as the relevant background. At the same time, Ayres is primarily concerned with the prevention of corruption, so that the relevant criterion by which alternative institutional regimes are judged is just the extent to which corruption is deterred. Within this context, Ayres argues that the norm of full anonymity in respect of political donations would operate more effectively to prevent corruption than would the norm of full disclosure; so that rather than ‘sunlight [being] the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman’, Ayres argues that total darkness is the real cure for corruption. Ayres’s constructed ‘veil of ignorance’ is nothing like Rawls’s, but it does involve a putatively constructive use of ignorance in the same way that Rawls’s construction does. The essential argument is simple enough. Under full information, all campaign donations are matters of public record, so that there can be nothing covert about the funding process; nevertheless, the possibility of buying political favours is still present. Indeed, in the limit, one might imagine that competitive political donations constitute a straightforward market for political influence that operates alongside the electoral process to determine political outcomes. Whether or not we describe open financial transactions in such a market as ‘corrupt’1, or ‘unfair’ (given an unequal distribution of income and wealth), there is certainly a presumption that such a ‘market’ might be expected to influence political outcomes and so reduce the reliance of political outcomes on the electoral process and other more strictly ‘political’ mechanisms. At the other extreme, under perfect anonymity, campaign donations are organised in such a way that no one (other than the donor - and specifically not the recipient) has any reliable information about the existence, or size, of any individual donation. In this case, so the argument goes, since there can be no proof that a donation has been made, there can be no political deals struck: it is impossible to buy influence if it is impossible to demonstrate payment. Of course, this sketch does not do full justice to Ayres’s argument, but we believe that it suffices to focus attention on the key issues: the idea that corruption takes the form of market-like deals that ‘pervert’ the democratic process in the sense that political outcomes differ from those that would be realised under purely political process; and the argument that such deals are effectively ruled out by complete anonymity. We also note that Ayres’s discussion is informed by a recurring analogy with the process of voting itself - and with the idea, in particular, that the secret or ‘Australian’ ballot provides an appropriate exemplar for secrecy in the political process. We will return to the significance of this analogical reasoning, and to other aspects of Ayres’s specific argument, in due course but first we wish to make some effort to widen the discussion a little. The design of democratic institutions may be approached in either of two styles - a ‘piecemeal’ style or a ‘synoptic’ one. A piecemeal style characteristically focuses on this or that piece of institutional practice and subjects it to scrutiny. A synoptic style is one that attempts to work from general principles in developing an overview of the operation of democratic institutions and to develop thereby implications for the design of particular institutional devices2. Clearly, neither style holds a monopoly on usefulness, and it is likely that the iteration between these styles offers the most plausible route to reasonable conclusions. It is for this reason that, initially at least, we wish to respond to Ayres’s piecemeal proposal in a rather more synoptic mode. Even if we narrow our range of concern to the institutional framework for financing democratic politics, we must recognise that a number of inter-related issues are raised: the relative merits of private and state funding of political parties or candidates; the possibility of regulating either the set of agents who may make political contributions, or the size of the political contributions they may make; the possibility of regulating the flow of information about the financial affairs of donors, parties or candidates; the possibility of regulating expenditures made by parties or candidates; and so on. None of these issues is trivial either in the sense that the normatively appropriate answer is obvious, or in the sense that the same practice has developed almost universally across democratic countries. And matters become still more complicated if we open up the possibility of interactions between these various issues, or with other aspects of the institutional fabric such as voting rules, the structure of representation, and so on. Indeed, it is not even obvious how we should go about addressing these matters. Two ingredients seem essential however - a reasonably clear statement of the model of democratic politics to be used as the test-bed within which to conduct the relevant thought-experiments, and a reasonably clear statement of the relevant normative criteria. Unfortunately, neither ingredient is readily available or widely agreed. The first aim of this brief essay is to say something about the appropriate ingredients to use in constructing particular arguments concerned with the funding of democratic politics or, indeed, any other aspect of the design of democratic institutions. Only then will we return to the specific issue of anonymity in political donations

Republican liberty and resilience

The object of this paper is to focus attention on the ‘resilience’ property of republican liberty – a property that, at least in some formulations, is among those features that distinguishes republican liberty from its more familiar ‘liberal’ counterpart. Our analysis proceeds by way of an analogy with the idea of risk aversion. After setting the stage with a brief description of what we are taking republican liberty to be (in Section I), we turn to the question of how to conceptualise resilience and how the notion might most plausibly be formulated (Section II). Examining alternative possible formulations serves to suggest an analogy between resilience and ‘risk aversion’. In Section III, we exploit that analogy to develop some implications that resilience carries for institutional design. Section IV offers a brief summary

How can health economics be used in the design and analysis of adaptive clinical trials? A qualitative analysis

Introduction Adaptive designs offer a flexible approach, allowing changes to a trial based on examinations of the data as it progresses. Adaptive clinical trials are becoming a popular choice, as the prudent use of finite research budgets and accurate decision-making are priorities for healthcare providers around the world. The methods of health economics, which aim to maximise the health gained for money spent, could be incorporated into the design and analysis of adaptive clinical trials to make them more efficient. We aimed to understand the perspectives of stakeholders in health technology assessments to inform recommendations for the use of health economics in adaptive clinical trials. Methods A qualitative study explored the attitudes of key stakeholders—including researchers, decision-makers and members of the public—towards the use of health economics in the design and analysis of adaptive clinical trials. Data were collected using interviews and focus groups (29 participants). A framework analysis was used to identify themes in the transcripts. Results It was considered that answering the clinical research question should be the priority in a clinical trial, notwithstanding the importance of cost-effectiveness for decision-making. Concerns raised by participants included handling the volatile nature of cost data at interim analyses; implementing this approach in global trials; resourcing adaptive trials which are designed and adapted based on health economic outcomes; and training stakeholders in these methods so that they can be implemented and appropriately interpreted. Conclusion The use of health economics in the design and analysis of adaptive clinical trials has the potential to increase the efficiency of health technology assessments worldwide. Recommendations are made concerning the development of methods allowing the use of health economics in adaptive clinical trials, and suggestions are given to facilitate their implementation in practice

Calculating partial expected value of perfect information via Monte Carlo sampling algorithms

Partial expected value of perfect information (EVPI) calculations can quantify the value of learning about particular subsets of uncertain parameters in decision models. Published case studies have used different computational approaches. This article examines the computation of partial EVPI estimates via Monte Carlo sampling algorithms. The mathematical definition shows 2 nested expectations, which must be evaluated separately because of the need to compute a maximum between them. A generalized Monte Carlo sampling algorithm uses nested simulation with an outer loop to sample parameters of interest and, conditional upon these, an inner loop to sample remaining uncertain parameters. Alternative computation methods and shortcut algorithms are discussed and mathematical conditions for their use considered. Maxima of Monte Carlo estimates of expectations are biased upward, and the authors show that the use of small samples results in biased EVPI estimates. Three case studies illustrate 1) the bias due to maximization and also the inaccuracy of shortcut algorithms 2) when correlated variables are present and 3) when there is nonlinearity in net benefit functions. If relatively small correlation or nonlinearity is present, then the shortcut algorithm can be substantially inaccurate. Empirical investigation of the numbers of Monte Carlo samples suggests that fewer samples on the outer level and more on the inner level could be efficient and that relatively small numbers of samples can sometimes be used. Several remaining areas for methodological development are set out. A wider application of partial EVPI is recommended both for greater understanding of decision uncertainty and for analyzing research priorities

MY TURN: Preparing for Regional Growth

Earn a reputation for achieving results and, more often than not, your organization will face a flow -- perhaps even a flood -- of requests to expand. Responding eagerly to as many as possible is a natural reaction, not only because it seems like the right thing to do, but also because saying "no" can be so very hard. But, altruism aside, saying "yes" to any and all comers has its problems. It effectively puts others in the driver's seat when it comes to your strategic direction and priorities.Consider the experience of MY TURN, Inc. Over its first 20 years, MY TURN had grown to be a leading provider of vocational and educational services to youth in southeastern Massachusetts, largely by responding to requests from neighboring communities. With documented proof that the MY TURN model worked and multiple national awards for excellence in serving youth, its management and board were ready to accelerate growth and expand regionally. But faced with more opportunities than MY TURN possibly could take on, they wanted to understand which to seize and which to let pass by