Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation

The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. The typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today’s actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by punishment, reward, or both in the setting of truly repeated games, in which player identities persist from round to round. We show that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.EconomicsMathematicsOrganismic and Evolutionary Biolog

Assortative human pair-bonding for partner ancestry and allelic variation of the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene

The 7R allele of the dopamine receptor D4 gene has been associated with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and risk taking. On the cross-population scale, 7R allele frequencies have been shown to be higher in populations with more of a history of long-term migrations. It has also been shown that the 7R allele is associated with individuals having multiple-ancestries. Here we conduct a replication of this latter finding with two independent samples. Measures of subjects’ ancestry are used to examine past reproductive bonds. The individuals’ history of inter-racial/ancestral dating and their feelings about this are also assessed. Tentative support for an association between multiple ancestries and the 7R allele were found. These results are dependent upon the method of questioning subjects about their ancestries. Inter-racial dating and feelings about inter-racial pairing were not related to the presence of the 7R allele. This might be accounted for by secular trends that might have substantively altered the decision-making process employed when considering relationships with individuals from different groups. This study provides continued support for the 7R allele playing a role in migration and/or mate choice patterns. However, replications and extensions of this study are needed and must carefully consider how ancestry/race is assessed

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Gender and preferences at a young age: evidence from Armenia

We look at gender differences in competitiveness, risk preferences and altruism in a large sample of children and adolescents aged 7 to 16 in Armenia. Post-Soviet Armenia has few formal barriers to gender equality but is also characterized by a patrilineal kinship system and traditional gender roles. In contrast to research conducted in Western countries, we find that girls increase their performance more than boys in response to competition in a running task. We find no gender differences in the other three tasks we explore: skipping rope, a mathematical task, and a verbal task. We also find no difference in the willingness to compete in either the mathematical or the verbal task. In line with previous research, we find that boys are less altruistic and more risk taking than girls, and that the latter gap appears around the age of puberty

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Predicting replicability—Analysis of survey and prediction market data from large-scale forecasting projects

The reproducibility of published research has become an important topic in science policy. A number of large-scale replication projects have been conducted to gauge the overall reproducibility in specific academic fields. Here, we present an analysis of data from four studies which sought to forecast the outcomes of replication projects in the social and behavioural sciences, using human experts who participated in prediction markets and answered surveys. Because the number of findings replicated and predicted in each individual study was small, pooling the data offers an opportunity to evaluate hypotheses regarding the performance of prediction markets and surveys at a higher power. In total, peer beliefs were elicited for the replication outcomes of 103 published findings. We find there is information within the scientific community about the replicability of scientific findings, and that both surveys and prediction markets can be used to elicit and aggregate this information. Our results show prediction markets can determine the outcomes of direct replications with 73% accuracy (n = 103). Both the prediction market prices, and the average survey responses are correlated with outcomes (0.581 and 0.564 respectively, both p < .001). We also found a significant relationship between p-values of the original findings and replication outcomes. The dataset is made available through the R package “pooledmaRket” and can be used to further study community beliefs towards replications outcomes as elicited in the surveys and prediction markets

The emergence of inequality in social groups: network structure and institutions affect the distribution of earnings in cooperation games

From small communities to entire nations and society at large, inequality in wealth, social status, and power is one of the most pervasive and tenacious features of the social world. What causes inequality to emerge and persist? In this study, we investigate how the structure and rules of our interactions can increase inequality in social groups. Specifically, we look into the effects of four structural conditions—network structure, network fluidity, reputation tracking, and punishment institutions—on the distribution of earnings in network cooperation games. We analyze 33 experiments comprising 96 experimental conditions altogether. We find that there is more inequality in clustered networks compared to random networks, in fixed networks compared to randomly rewired and strategically updated networks, and in groups with punishment institutions compared to groups without. Secondary analyses suggest that the reasons inequality emerges under these conditions may have to do with the fact that fixed networks allow exploitation of the poor by the wealthy and clustered networks foster segregation between the poor and the wealthy, while the burden of costly punishment falls onto the poor, leaving them poorer. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence that inequality is affected by reputation in a systematic way but this could be because reputation needs to play out in a particular network environment in order to have an effect. Overall, our findings suggest possible strategies and interventions to decrease inequality and mitigate its negative impact, particularly in the context of mid- and large-sized organizations and online communities

Cruel to be kind but not cruel for cash : harm aversion in the dictator game

People regularly take prosocial actions, making individual sacrifices for the greater good. Similarly, people generally avoid causing harm to others. These twin desires to do good and avoid harm often align, but sometimes they can diverge, creating situations of moral conflict. Here, we examined this moral conflict using a modified dictator game. Participants chose how much money to allocate away from a recipient who was designated as an orphan, creating a sense of harm. This money was then reallocated to either the participant or a charity. People were strongly prosocial: they allocated more money away from the orphan for charity than for themselves. Furthermore, people left more money with the orphan when the harm was framed as a means (taking) than as a side effect (splitting). As is predicted by dual-process theories of moral decision making, response times were longer with the take action and were positively correlated with the amount taken from the orphan. We concluded that just as people take positive actions for the greater good, they are similarly more willing to cause harm when it benefits others rather than themselves