2,706 research outputs found
Neural signatures of strategic types in a two-person bargaining game
The management and manipulation of our own social image in the minds of others requires difficult and poorly understood computations. One computation useful in social image management is strategic deception: our ability and willingness to manipulate other people's beliefs about ourselves for gain. We used an interpersonal bargaining game to probe the capacity of players to manage their partner's beliefs about them. This probe parsed the group of subjects into three behavioral types according to their revealed level of strategic deception; these types were also distinguished by neural data measured during the game. The most deceptive subjects emitted behavioral signals that mimicked a more benign behavioral type, and their brains showed differential activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left Brodmann area 10 at the time of this deception. In addition, strategic types showed a significant correlation between activation in the right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups. The neurobehavioral types identified by the game raise the possibility of identifying quantitative biomarkers for the capacity to manipulate and maintain a social image in another person's mind
A Test of Rank-Dependent Utility in the Context of Ambiguity
Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily concentrated on decision under risk (probability triangles). The literature suggests, however, that ambiguity is one of the main causes for deviations from expected utility (EU). This article investigates the descriptive performance of rank-dependent utility (RDU) in the context of choice under ambiguity. We use the axiomatic difference between RDU and EU to critically test RDU against EU. Surprisingly, the RDU model does not provide any descriptive improvement over EU. Our data suggest other framing factors that do provide descriptive improvements over EU
Continuum time limit and stationary states of the Minority Game
We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for
the continuum time limit of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of
the Minority Game can be understood by a careful theoretical analysis of such
equations. In particular, i) we confirm that the stationary state properties
are given by the ground state configurations of a disordered (soft) spin
system; ii) we derive the full stationary state distribution; iii) we
characterize the dependence on initial conditions in the symmetric phase and
iv) we clarify the behavior of the system as a function of the learning rate.
This leaves us with a complete and coherent picture of the collective behavior
of the Minority Game. Strikingly we find that the temperature like parameter
which is introduced in the choice behavior of individual agents turns out to
play the role, at the collective level, of the inverse of a thermodynamic
temperature.Comment: Revised version (several new results added). 12 pages, 5 figure
Self-control in decision-making involves modulation of the vmPFC valuation system
Every day, individuals make dozens of choices between an alternative with higher overall value and a more tempting but ultimately inferior option. Optimal decision-making requires self-control. We propose two hypotheses about the neurobiology of self-control: (i) Goal-directed decisions have their basis in a common value signal encoded in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and (ii) exercising self-control involves the modulation of this value signal by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to monitor brain activity while dieters engaged in real decisions about food consumption. Activity in vmPFC was correlated with goal values regardless of the amount of self-control. It incorporated both taste and health in self-controllers but only taste in non–self-controllers. Activity in DLPFC increased when subjects exercised self-control and correlated with activity in vmPFC
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The martyrdom effect : when pain and effort increase prosocial contributions
Most theories of motivation and behavior (and lay intuitions alike) consider pain and effort to be deterrents. In contrast to this widely held view, we provide evidence that the prospect of enduring pain and exerting effort for a prosocial cause can promote contributions to the cause. Specifically, we show that willingness to contribute to a charitable or collective cause increases when the contribution process is expected to be painful and effortful rather than easy and enjoyable. Across five experiments, we document this “martyrdom effect,” show that the observed patterns defy standard economic and psychological accounts, and identify a mediator and moderator of the effect. Experiment 1 showed that people are willing to donate more to charity when they anticipate having to suffer to raise money. Experiment 2 extended these findings to a non-charity laboratory context that involved real money and actual pain. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the martyrdom effect is not the result of an attribute substitution strategy (whereby people use the amount of pain and effort involved in fundraising to determine donation worthiness). Experiment 4 showed that perceptions of meaningfulness partially mediate the martyrdom effect. Finally, Experiment 5 demonstrated that the nature of the prosocial cause moderates the martyrdom effect: the effect is strongest for causes associated with human suffering. We propose that anticipated pain and effort lead people to ascribe greater meaning to their contributions and to the experience of contributing, thereby motivating higher prosocial contributions. We conclude by considering some implications of this puzzling phenomenon. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Learning to coordinate in a complex and non-stationary world
We study analytically and by computer simulations a complex system of
adaptive agents with finite memory. Borrowing the framework of the Minority
Game and using the replica formalism we show the existence of an equilibrium
phase transition as a function of the ratio between the memory and
the learning rates of the agents. We show that, starting from a random
configuration, a dynamic phase transition also exists, which prevents the
system from reaching any Nash equilibria. Furthermore, in a non-stationary
environment, we show by numerical simulations that agents with infinite memory
play worst than others with less memory and that the dynamic transition
naturally arises independently from the initial conditions.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure
Comonotonic Independence: The Critical Test between Classical and Rank-Dependent Utility Theories
This article compares classical expected utility (EU) with the more general rank-dependent utility (RDU) models. The difference between the independence condition for preferences of EU and its comonotonic generalization in RDU provides the exact demarcation between EU and rank-dependent models. Other axiomatic differences are not essential. An experimental design is described that tests this difference between independence and comonotonic independence in its most basic form and is robust against violations of other assumptions that may confound the results, in particular the reduction principle and transitivity. It is well known that in the classical counterexamples to EU, comonotonic independence performs better than full-force independence. For our more general choice pairs, however, we find that comonotonic independence does not perform better. This is contrary to our prior expectation and suggests that rank-dependent models, in full generality, do not provide a descriptive improvement over EU. For rank-dependent models to have a future, submodels and choice situations need to be identified for which rank-dependence does contribute descriptively
The Mythology of Game Theory
Non-cooperative game theory is at its heart a theory of cognition, specifically a theory of how decisions are made. Game theory\u27s leverage is that we can design different payoffs, settings, player arrays, action possibilities, and information structures, and that these differences lead to different strategies, outcomes, and equilibria. It is well-known that, in experimental settings, people do not adopt the predicted strategies, outcomes, and equilibria. The standard response to this mismatch of prediction and observation is to add various psychological axioms to the game-theoretic framework. Regardless of the differing specific proposals and results, game theory uniformly makes certain cognitive assumptions that seem rarely to be acknowledged, much less interrogated. Indeed, it is not widely understood that game theory is essentially a cognitive theory. Here, we interrogate those cognitive assumptions. We do more than reject specific predictions from specific games. More broadly, we reject the underlying cognitive model implicitly assumed by game theory
Expression of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 and 2 and Anti-Tubulogenic Activity of Protease-Activated Receptor 1 in Human Endothelial Colony-Forming Cells
Endothelial colony-forming cells (ECFCs) are obtained from the culture of human peripheral blood mononuclear cell (hPBMNC) fractions and are characterised by high proliferative and pro-vasculogenic potential, which makes them of great interest for cell therapy. Here, we describe the detection of protease-activated receptor (PAR) 1 and 2 amongst the surface proteins expressed in ECFCs. Both receptors are functionally coupled to extracellular signal-regulated kinase (ERK) 1 and 2, which become activated and phosphorylated in response to selective PAR1- or PAR2-activating peptides. Specific stimulation of PAR1, but not PAR2, significantly inhibits capillary-like tube formation by ECFCs in vitro, suggesting that tubulogenesis is negatively regulated by proteases able to stimulate PAR1 (e.g. thrombin). The activation of ERKs is not involved in the regulation of tubulogenesis in vitro, as suggested by use of the MEK inhibitor PD98059 and by the fact that PAR2 stimulation activates ERKs without affecting capillary tube formation. Both qPCR and immunoblotting showed a significant downregulation of vascular endothelial growth factor 2 (VEGFR2) in response to PAR1 stimulation. Moreover, the addition of VEGF (50–100 ng/ml) but not basic Fibroblast Growth Factor (FGF) (25–100 ng/ml) rescued tube formation by ECFCs treated with PAR1-activating peptide. Therefore, we propose that reduction of VEGF responsiveness resulting from down-regulation of VEGFR2 is underlying the anti-tubulogenic effect of PAR1 activation. Although the role of PAR2 remains elusive, this study sheds new light on the regulation of the vasculogenic activity of ECFCs and suggests a potential link between adult vasculogenesis and the coagulation cascade
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