Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome as well as a disagreement outcome: the interpretation is that the latter results if the compromise outcome is not accepted. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We present a characterization with an axiom of Independence ofNon-Utopia Information as the main condition.mathematical economics;

Information aggregation with continuum of types

We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota

Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues

This paper analyzes the problem of aggregating individual judgments over two interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference which is state-dependent, but they hold private information about what the state might be. I assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and I want to determine voting rules which induce an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. Interconnectedness may lead to private information that is inconsistent with the state, which leads to the impossibility of efficient information aggregation. Once I introduce the possibility of abstention, the negative conclusion no longer prevails and there is always a voting rule which aggregates information efficiently. I obtain a similar positive result when I rule out the possibility of inconsistent private information. I analyze the situations in which such rules exist whenever necessary, as well as the nature of these rules

Eksik turnuvalardan seçim yapmak

35 pagesEksik turnuvalar sonlu kümeler üzerindeki asimetrik ikili bagıntılardır. Tamamlanmıs asimetrik ikili bağıntı olan turnuvalar ve turnuva çözümleri literatürde kapsamlı bir sekilde incelenmistir. Bu çalismada eksik turnuvaların yapısı incelenmis, ve üç önemli turnuva çözümü- Schwartz (1972), Miller (1977) tepe döngüsü; Fishburn (1977), Miller (1977), Miller (1980) kaplanmamıs elemanlar kümesi; Copeland (1951) çözümü- eksik turnuvalara adapte edilmistir. Tepe döngüsü karakterize edilmis ve kaplanmamıs elemanlar kümesi ile Copeland çözümünün karakterizasyonu incelenmistir.By incomplete tournaments, we mean asymmetric binary relations over finite sets. Tournaments, which are complete and asymmetric binary relations, and tournament solutions are exhaustively investigated in the literature. We introduce the structure of incomplete tournaments, and we adapt three solution concepts -top cycle of Schwartz (1972), Miller (1977); uncovered set of Fishburn (1977), Miller (1977) and Miller (1980), Copeland solution of Copeland (1951)- established for tournaments to incomplete tournaments. We axiomatize top-cycle, and investigate the characterization of the uncovered set and the Copeland solution

A contest success function for networks

This paper models conflict as a contest within a network of friendships and enmities. We assume that each player is either in a friendly or in an antagonistic relation with every other player and players compete for winning by exerting costly efforts. We axiomatically characterize a success function which determines the win probability of each player given the efforts and the network of relations. In an extension, we allow for varying intensities of friendships and enmities. This framework allows for the study of strategic incentives and friendship formation under conflict as well as the application of stability concepts of network theory to contests

Information aggregation with a continuum of types

We study the problem of designing a voting rule which makes voting by cutoff strategies efficient for settings where voters have state-dependent common preferences over and vote on accepting or rejecting an issue but hold private information in the form of continuous types about the true state. We show that such rules only exist under a restrictive condition on the model parameters

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota