Cognitive science and the cultural challenge

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111778/1/soca12120.pd

Two paradigms for religious representation: The physicist and the playground

In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. I conclude by suggesting some approaches to empirically testing our views

Explaining the Existential: Functional Roles of Scientific and Religious Explanation

Questions about the origins of life and the universe seem to call out for explanation, with science and religion offering candidate answers. These answers clearly differ in content, but do they also differ in psychological function? In Study 1 (N=501) participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk rated scientific and religious answers to existential questions on dimensions related to epistemic functions (e.g., “This explanation is based on evidence”) as well as moral/social/emotional functions (e.g., “If everyone believed this, the world would be a more moral place”; “This explanation is comforting”). For non-religious participants, only scientific explanations were assigned high values along epistemic dimensions; For religious participants, only religious explanations were assigned high values along non-epistemic dimensions. In Study 2 (N=130), priming a non-epistemic need boosted religious participants’ evaluation of the quality of religious (vs. scientific) explanations. These findings shed light on the functions of scientific and religious cognition and raise new questions about explanatory co-existence and the origins of religious belief

How psychological dispositions influence the theology of the afterlife

Humans across cultures have formulated rich views about what happens after death, including reincarnationist beliefs and beliefs in an afterlife. Theologians further develop and elaborate these views. Recent work in the cognitive science of religion suggests that afterlife beliefs are caused by psychological dispositions that are a stable part of human cognition. For instance, humans intuitively conceptualize themselves and others as composed of material and nonmaterial parts, which facilitates the idea that physical death is not the end of personhood. In this paper, we explore how psychological dispositions influence theological views of the afterlife, focusing on Mormon theology

Energia Vital e Vida Após a Morte: Implicações Para a Ciência Cognitiva da Religião

Literature investigating people’s concepts of supernatural agency (such as ghosts and deities) points to an intuitive theory of mind underlying such ideas, however, recent studies suggest that intuitive ideas over vital energy could also be involved. The present paper focuses on examining the culture and development of people’s conceptions on vital energy. A search was made using the keyword vital energy targeting literature from Anthropology, Psychology and Cognitive Science. A literature review over this topic was made yielding reflections over the development of vital energy concepts. Results suggest that an intuitive biology, grounded on ideas of biological energy (vital energy), may underlie an understanding of soul, spirit, and supernatural energy. Future empirical studies should target the development of vital energy intuitive theories with different age ranges and cultures.La literatura que investiga las opiniones de la gente sobre agentes sobrenaturales apunta a una teoría de la mente intuitiva detrás de esas ideas, sin embargo, estudios recientes sugieren la presencia de teorías intuitivas acerca de energía vital detrás de estos conceptos. Este artículo se centra en el análisis de la cultura y el desarrollo de las concepciones sobre energía vital. Se realizó una búsqueda bibliográfica con la palabra clave vital energy revisando literatura procedente de Antropología, Psicología y Ciencias Cognitivas. Se realizó una revisión sobre el tema con consideraciones sobre el desarrollo de las concepciones de energía vital. Los resultados muestran que una biología intuitiva, basada en las ideas de energía biológica (energía vital), puede ser la base de una comprensión del alma, el espíritu y el poder sobrenatural. Futuros estudios empíricos deben investigar el desarrollo de teorías intuitivas sobre energía vital con poblaciones de diferentes edades y culturas.A literatura que investiga conceitos acerca de agentes sobrenaturais apontam para uma teoria da mente intuitiva por trás de tais ideias, no entanto, recentes estudos sugerem a presença de teorias intuitivas acerca da energia vital subjacentes de tais conceitos. O presente artigo centra-se na análise da cultura e desenvolvimento das concepções das pessoas sobre a energia vital. Foi feita uma busca bibliográfica utilizando a palavra-chave vital energy, revisando literatura oriunda da Antropologia, Psicologia e Ciência Cognitiva. Em seguida, foi feita uma revisão sobre o tema tecendo considerações acerca do desenvolvimento das concepções das pessoas sobre a energia vital. Resultados apontam que uma biologia intuitiva, baseada em ideias de energia biológica (energia vital), pode ser a base de uma compreensão de alma, espírito e energia sobrenatural. Estudos empíricos futuros devem investigar o desenvolvimento de teorias intuitivas sobre energia vital com populações de diferentes faixas etárias e culturas

Cognitive science and the naturalness of religion

Cognitive approaches to religious phenomena have attracted considerable interdisciplinary attention since their emergence a couple of decades ago. Proponents offer explanatory accounts of the content and transmission of religious thought and behavior in terms of underlying cognition. A central claim is that the cross-cultural recurrence and historical persistence of religion is attributable to the cognitive naturalness of religious ideas, i.e., attributable to the readiness, the ease, and the speed with which human minds acquire and process popular religious representations. In this article, we primarily provide an introductory summary of foundational questions, assumptions, and hypotheses in this field, including some discussion of features distinguishing cognitive science approaches to religion from established psychological approaches. Relevant ethnographic and experimental evidence illustrate and substantiate core claims. Finally, we briefly consider the broader implications of these cognitive approaches for the appropriateness of ‘religion’ as an explanatorily useful category in the social sciences

Din Tabiidir

Despite its considerable intellectual interest and great social relevance, religion has been neglected by contemporary developmentalpsychologists. But in the last few years, there has been an emerging body of research exploring children’s grasp of certainuniversal religious ideas. Some recent findings suggest that two foundational aspects of religious belief – belief in divine agents,and belief in mind–body dualism – come naturally to young children. This research is briefly reviewed, and some future directionsare discussed.Dikkate değer entelektüel ilgi alanı ve geniş sosyal yaygınlığına rağmen, din, çağdaş gelişim psikologları tarafından ihmal edilmiş durumdadır. Fakat son yıllarda, çocukların belli bazı evrensel dini fikirlere ilişkin kavrayışlarını araştıran, yeni ortaya çıkan bir yığın araştırma gün yüzüne çıkmış durumdadır. Bazı yeni bulgular, dini inancın iki kurucu nitelikteki bakış açılarının –ilahi aracılara/faktörlere inanç ve ruh beden düalizmine inanç- küçük çocuklara doğal bir şekilde geldiğini iddia etmektedirler. Bu araştırmada bunlar kısaca gözden geçirilip bunlara ilişkin geleceğe yönelik öneriler tartışılmaktadır

Οι πεποιθήσεις των παιδιών για τη μετά θάνατον ζωή: Επισκόπηση της σύγχρονης έρευνας

Στόχος της παρούσας εργασίας είναι να κάνει μια επισκόπηση πρόσφατων ερευνών που μελέτησαν τις μεταθανάτιες πεποιθήσεις των παιδιών. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η επισκόπηση επικεντρώνεται στα ακόλουθα ερωτήματα: (α) Από ποια ηλικία αρχίζει να αναπτύσσεται η πίστη των παιδιών στη μετά θάνατον ζωή και πώς αυτή αλλάζει με την πρόοδο της ηλικίας; (β) Είναι η πίστη των παιδιών στη μετά θάνατον ζωή αποτέλεσμα ενός διαισθητικού δυϊσμού οντοτήτων, περιορισμών του ανθρώπινου γνωστικού συστήματος ή αποτέλεσμα της θρησκευτικής κατήχησης και άλλων κοινωνικο-πολιτισμικών επιρροών; Τέλος, η εργασία επιχειρεί μια κριτική συζήτηση των σχετικών ερευνητικών ευρημάτων και των προοπτικών που ανοίγονται για την μελλοντική έρευνα.This paper reviews recent studies investigating children's afterlife beliefs. In doing so, the paper concentrates on the following questions: (a) At what age do children begin to believe in the afterlife and what is the developmental course of their beliefs? (b) Is children's belief in the afterlife grounded on a common-sense dualism; is this belief related to constraints of the human cognitive system; or is it the consequence of religious indoctrination and other socio-cultural influences? Finally, the paper attempts a critical discussion of the research findings, and discusses the prospects for future research

Taking people seriously (the 2015 Robert H. Layton Lecture)

Taking the people we study seriously has resurfaced in recent years as a core aim of the ethnographic and anthropological endeavor. In this lecture, I present my way of taking people (i.e., my Vezo friends in a fishing village in Madagascar) seriously. For me, this involves understanding the multiple sources of their knowledge and the different ways of knowing that they mobilize in particular contexts and for particular purposes, at different ages, and fueled by different kinds of experience and cognitive resources. The argument is developed on the basis of empirical material that draws on an ongoing interdisciplinary collaboration between anthropologists and cognitive psychologists

To Believe is Not to Think: A Cross-Cultural Finding

Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the US, Ghana, Thailand, China, and Vanuatu. Participants everywhere routinely used different verbs to describe religious versus matter-of-fact beliefs, and they did so even when the ascribed belief contents were held constant and only the surrounding context varied. These findings support the view that people from diverse cultures and language communities recognize a difference in attitude type between religious belief and everyday matter-of-fact belief