21 research outputs found
Efficient Public Trace and Revoke from Standard Assumptions
We provide efficient constructions for trace-and-revoke systems with public traceability in the black-box confirmation model. Our constructions achieve adaptive security, are based on standard assumptions and achieve significant efficiency gains compared to previous constructions.
Our constructions rely on a generic transformation from inner product functional encryption (IPFE) schemes to trace-and-revoke systems. Our transformation requires the underlying IPFE scheme to only satisfy a very weak notion of security -- the attacker may only request a bounded number of random keys -- in contrast to the standard notion of security where she may request an unbounded number of arbitrarily chosen keys. We exploit the much weaker security model to provide a new construction for bounded collusion and random key IPFE from the learning with errors assumption (LWE), which enjoys improved efficiency compared to the scheme of Agrawal et al. [CRYPTO'16].
Together with IPFE schemes from Agrawal et al., we obtain trace and revoke from LWE, Decision Diffie Hellman and Decision Composite Residuosity
Order-Revealing Encryption and the Hardness of Private Learning
An order-revealing encryption scheme gives a public procedure by which two
ciphertexts can be compared to reveal the ordering of their underlying
plaintexts. We show how to use order-revealing encryption to separate
computationally efficient PAC learning from efficient -differentially private PAC learning. That is, we construct a concept
class that is efficiently PAC learnable, but for which every efficient learner
fails to be differentially private. This answers a question of Kasiviswanathan
et al. (FOCS '08, SIAM J. Comput. '11).
To prove our result, we give a generic transformation from an order-revealing
encryption scheme into one with strongly correct comparison, which enables the
consistent comparison of ciphertexts that are not obtained as the valid
encryption of any message. We believe this construction may be of independent
interest.Comment: 28 page
A Concise Bounded Anonymous Broadcast Yielding Combinatorial Trace-and-Revoke Schemes
Broadcast Encryption is a fundamental primitive supporting sending a secure message to any chosen target set of users.
While many efficient constructions are known, understanding the efficiency possible for an ``Anonymous Broadcast Encryption\u27\u27 (ANOBE), i.e., one which can hide the target set itself, is quite open. The best solutions by Barth, Boneh, and Waters (\u2706) and Libert, Paterson, and Quaglia (\u2712) are built on public key encryption (PKE) and their ciphertext sizes are, in fact, times that of the underlying PKE (rate=). Kiayias and Samary (\u2712), in turn, showed a lower bound showing that such rate is the best possible if is an independent unbounded parameter. However, when considering certain user set size bounded by a system parameter (e.g., the security parameter), the problem remains interesting. We consider the problem of comparing ANOBE with PKE under the same assumption. We call such schemes Anonymous Broadcast Encryption for Bounded Universe -- AnoBEB.
We first present an AnoBEB construction for up to users from LWE assumption, where is bounded by the scheme security parameter. The scheme does not grow with the parameter and beat the PKE method. Actually, our scheme is as efficient as the underlying LWE public-key encryption; namely, the rate is, in
fact, and thus optimal. The scheme is achieved easily by an observation about an earlier scheme with a different purpose.
More interestingly, we move on to employ the new AnoBEB in other multimedia broadcasting methods and, as a second contribution, we introduce a new approach to construct an efficient ``Trace and Revoke scheme\u27\u27 which combines the functionalites of revocation and of tracing people (called traitors) who in a broadcasting schemes share their keys with the adversary which, in turn, generates a pirate receiver. Note that, as was put forth by Kiayias and Yung (EUROCRYPT \u2702), combinatorial traitor tracing schemes can be constructed by combining a system for small universe, integrated via an outer traceability codes (collusion-secure code or identifying parent property (IPP) code). There were many efficient traitor tracing schemes from traceability codes, but no known scheme supports revocation as well. Our new approach integrates our AnoBEB system with a Robust IPP code, introduced by Barg and Kabatiansky (IEEE IT \u2713). This shows an interesting use for robust IPP in cryptography.
The robust IPP codes were only implicitly shown by an existence proof. In order to make our technique concrete, we propose two explicit instantiations of robust IPP codes. Our final construction gives the most efficient trace and revoke scheme in the bounded collusion model
Making Collusion-Secure Codes (More) Robust against Bit Erasure
A collusion-secure code is called robust if it is secure against erasure of a limited number of undetectable bits, in addition to collusion attacks under Marking Assumption. In this article, we propose the first general conversion method of (non-robust) -secure codes to robust -secure codes. Also, the same method amplifies robustness of given robust -secure codes. By applying our conversion to -secure codes given by Nuida et al. (AAECC 2007), we present robust -secure codes with code length of order with respect to . This code length improves preceding results by Sirvent (WCC 2007) and by Boneh and Naor (ACM CCS 2008) and is close to the one by Billet and Phan (ICITS 2008), although our construction is based on a weaker assumption than those preceding results. As an application, applying our resulting code to construction by Boneh and Naor also improves their traitor tracing scheme against imperfect decoders in efficiency of both key sizes and pirate tracing procedure
Optimization techniques and new methods for boradcast encryption and traitor tracing schemes
Ankara : The Department of Computer Engineering and the Graduate School of Engineering and Science of Bilkent University, 2012.Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Bilkent University, 2012.Includes bibliographical refences.In the last few decades, the use of digital content increased dramatically. Many
forms of digital products in the form of CDs, DVDs, TV broadcasts, data over
the Internet, entered our life. Classical cryptography, where encryption is
done for only one recipient, was not able to handle this change, since its direct
use leads to intolerably expensive transmissions. Moreover, new concerns
regarding the commercial aspect arised. Since digital commercial contents are
sold to various customers, unauthorized copying by malicious actors became
a major concern and it needed to be prevented carefully. Therefore, a new
research area called digital rights management (DRM) has emerged. Within
the scope of DRM, new cryptographic primitives are proposed. In this thesis,
we consider three of these: broadcast encryption (BE), traitor tracing (TT),
and trace and revoke (T&R) schemes and propose methods to improve the performances
and capabilities of these primitives. Particularly, we first consider
profiling the recipient set in order to improve transmission size in the most
popular BE schemes. We then investigate and solve the optimal free rider
assignment problem for one of the most efficient BE schemes so far. Next, we
attempt to close the non-trivial gap between BE and T&R schemes by proposing
a generic method for adding traitor tracing capability to BE schemes and
thus obtaining a T&R scheme. Finally, we investigate an overlooked problem:
privacy of the recipient set in T&R schemes. Right now, most schemes do not
keep the recipient set anonymous, and everybody can see who received a particular
content. As a generic solution to this problem, we propose a method
for obtaining anonymous T&R scheme by using anonymous BE schemes as a
primitive.Ak, MuratPh.D
Accountability for Misbehavior in Threshold Decryption via Threshold Traitor Tracing
A -out-of- threshold decryption system assigns key shares to parties so that any of them can decrypt a well-formed ciphertext. Existing threshold decryption systems are not secure when these parties are rational actors: an adversary can offer to pay the parties for their key shares. The problem is that a quorum of parties, working together, can sell the adversary a decryption key that reveals nothing about the identity of the traitor parties. This provides a risk-free profit for the parties since there is no accountability for their misbehavior --- the information they sell to the adversary reveals nothing about their identity. This behavior can result in a complete break in many applications of threshold decryption, such as encrypted mempools, private voting, and sealed-bid auctions.
In this work we show how to add accountability to threshold decryption systems to deter this type of risk-free misbehavior. Suppose a quorum of or more parties construct a decoder algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext and outputs the corresponding plaintext or . They sell to the adversary. Our threshold decryption systems are equipped with a tracing algorithm that can trace to members of the quorum that created it. The tracing algorithm is only given blackbox access to and will identify some members of the misbehaving quorum. The parties can then be held accountable, which may discourage them from selling the decoder in the first place.
Our starting point is standard (non-threshold) traitor tracing, where parties each holds a secret key. Every party can decrypt a well-formed ciphertext on its own. However, if a subset of parties collude to create a pirate decoder that can decrypt well-formed ciphertexts, then it is possible to trace to at least one member of using only blackbox access to the decoder . Traitor tracing received much attention over the years and multiple schemes have been developed.
In this work we develop the theory of traitor tracing for threshold decryption, where now only a subset of or more parties can collude to create a pirate decoder . This problem has recently become quite important due to the real-world deployment of threshold decryption in encrypted mempools, as we explain in the paper. While there are several non-threshold traitor tracing schemes that we can leverage, adapting these constructions to the threshold decryption settings requires new cryptographic techniques. We present a number of constructions for traitor tracing for threshold decryption, and note that much work remains to explore the large design space
On Cryptographic Building Blocks and Transformations
Cryptographic building blocks play a central role in cryptography, e.g., encryption or digital signatures with their security notions. Further, cryptographic building blocks might be constructed modularly, i.e., emerge out of other cryptographic building blocks. Essentially, one cryptographically transforms the underlying block(s) and their (security) properties into the emerged block and its properties. This thesis considers cryptographic building blocks and new cryptographic transformations
Recommended from our members
Privacy and the Complexity of Simple Queries
As both the scope and scale of data collection increases, an increasingly large amount of sensitive personal information is being analyzed. In this thesis, we study the feasibility of effectively carrying out such analyses while respecting the privacy concerns of all parties involved. In particular, we consider algorithms that satisfy differential privacy [30], a stringent notion of privacy that guarantees no individual’s data has a significant influence on the information released about the database. Over the past decade, there has been tremendous progress in understanding when accurate data analysis is compatible with differential privacy, with both elegant algorithms and striking impossibility results. However, if we ask further when accurate and computationally efficient data analysis is compatible with differential privacy then our understanding lags far behind. In this thesis, we make several contributions to understanding the complexity of differentially private data analysis: We show a sharp upper bound on the number of linear queries that can be accurately answered while satisfying differential privacy by an efficient algorithm, assuming the existence of cryptographic traitor-tracing schemes. We show even stronger computational barriers for algorithms that generate private synthetic data—a new database that consists of “fake” records but preserves certain statistical properties of the original database. Under cryptographic assumptions, any efficient differentially private algorithm that generates synthetic data cannot preserve even extremely simple properties of the database, even the pairwise correlations between the attributes. On the positive side, we design new algorithms for the widely-used class of marginal queries that are faster and require less data. Computational inefficiency is not the only barrier to effective privacy-preserving data analysis. Another potential obstacle is that many of the existing differentially private algorithms do not guarantee privacy for the data analyst, which would lead researchers with sensitive or proprietary queries to seek other means of access to the database. We also contribute to our understanding of privacy for the analyst: We design new algorithms for answering large sets of queries that guarantee differential privacy for the database and ensure differential privacy for the analysts, even if all other analysts collude.Engineering and Applied Science
A Security Analysis of Some Physical Content Distribution Systems
Content distribution systems are essentially content protection systems that protect premium multimedia content from being illegally distributed. Physical content distribution systems form a subset of content distribution systems with which the content is distributed via physical media such as CDs, Blu-ray discs, etc.
This thesis studies physical content distribution systems. Specifically, we concentrate our study on the design and analysis of three key components of the system: broadcast encryption for stateless receivers, mutual authentication with key agreement, and traitor tracing. The context in which we study these components is the Advanced Access Content System (AACS). We identify weaknesses present in AACS, and we also propose improvements to make the original system more secure, flexible and efficient