Propositional semantics for default logic

We present new semantics for propositional default logic based on the notion of meta-interpretations - truth functions that assign truth values to clauses rather than letters. This leads to a propositional characterization of default theories: for each such finite theory, we show a classical propositional theory such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between models for the latter and extensions of the former. This means that computing an extension and answering questions about coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment are reducible to propositional satisfiability. The general transformation is exponential but tractable for a subset which we call 2-DT which is a superset of network default theories and disjunction-free default theories. This leads to the observation that coherence and membership for the class 2-DT is NP-complete and entailment is co-NP-complete.Since propositional satisfiability can be regarded as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), this work also paves the way for applying CSP techniques to default reasoning. In particular, we use the taxonomy of tractable CSP to identify new tractable subsets for Reiter's default logic. Our procedures allow also for computing stable models of extended logic programs

09351 Abstracts Collection -- Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction

From 23.08. to 27.08.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09351 ``Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction \u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available

A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent

Undecidability in Epistemic Planning

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) provides a very expressive framework for multi-agent planning that can deal with nondeterminism, partial observability, sensing actions, and arbitrary nesting of beliefs about other agents’ beliefs. However, as we show in this paper, this expressiveness comes at a price. The planning framework is undecidable, even if we allow only purely epistemic actions (actions that change only beliefs, not ontic facts). Undecidability holds already in the S5 setting with at least 2 agents, and even with 1 agent in S4. It shows that multi-agent planning is robustly undecidable if we assume that agents can reason with an arbitrary nesting of beliefs about beliefs. We also prove a corollary showing undecidability of the DEL model checking problem with the star operator on actions (iteration)