The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries

We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.pure and impure public goods, technical and socially constructed nonexcludability, property rights, coalition formation, free-riding, bioeconomic model, shared fish stocks, regional fisheries management organizations.

Game theory

game theory

On the convergence of autonomous agent communities

This is the post-print version of the final published paper that is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2010 IOS Press and the authors.Community is a common phenomenon in natural ecosystems, human societies as well as artificial multi-agent systems such as those in web and Internet based applications. In many self-organizing systems, communities are formed evolutionarily in a decentralized way through agents' autonomous behavior. This paper systematically investigates the properties of a variety of the self-organizing agent community systems by a formal qualitative approach and a quantitative experimental approach. The qualitative formal study by applying formal specification in SLABS and Scenario Calculus has proven that mature and optimal communities always form and become stable when agents behave based on the collective knowledge of the communities, whereas community formation does not always reach maturity and optimality if agents behave solely based on individual knowledge, and the communities are not always stable even if such a formation is achieved. The quantitative experimental study by simulation has shown that the convergence time of agent communities depends on several parameters of the system in certain complicated patterns, including the number of agents, the number of community organizers, the number of knowledge categories, and the size of the knowledge in each category

Using reputation and adaptive coalitions to support collaboration in competitive environments

Internet-based scenarios, like co-working, e-freelancing, or crowdsourcing, usually need supporting collaboration among several actors that compete to service tasks. Moreover, the distribution of service requests, i.e., the arrival rate, varies over time, as well as the service workload required by each customer. In these scenarios, coalitions can be used to help agents to manage tasks they cannot tackle individually. In this paper we present a model to build and adapt coalitions with the goal of improving the quality and the quantity of tasks completed. The key contribution is a decision making mechanism that uses reputation and adaptation to allow agents in a competitive environment to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions, not only its composition, but also its number, i.e., how many coalitions are necessary. We provide empirical evidence showing that when agents employ our mechanism it is possible for them to maintain high levels of customer satisfaction. First, we show that coalitions keep a high percentage of tasks serviced on time despite a high percentage of unreliable workers. Second, coalitions and agents demonstrate that they successfully adapt to a varying distribution of customers' incoming tasks. This occurs because our decision making mechanism facilitates coalitions to disband when they become non-competitive, and individual agents detect opportunities to start new coalitions in scenarios with high task demand. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The first author thanks the grant Formación de Profesorado Universitario (FPU), reference AP2010-1742. Arcos and Rodriguez-Aguilar thank projects COR (TIN2012-38876-C02-01/02) and Generalitat of Catalunya (2014 SGR-118). Work supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Galician Regional Government under agreement for funding the Atlantic Research Center for Information and Communication Technologies (AtlantTIC)Peer Reviewe

One for all, all for one---von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto

Applications of the maximin criterion extend beyond economics to statistics, computer science, politics, and operations research. However, the maximin criterion---be it von Neumann's, Wald's, or Rawls'---draws fierce criticism due to its extremely pessimistic stance. I propose a novel concept, dubbed the optimin criterion, which is based on (Pareto) optimizing the worst-case payoffs of tacit agreements. The optimin criterion generalizes and unifies results in various fields: It not only coincides with (i) Wald's statistical decision-making criterion when Nature is antagonistic, (ii) the core in cooperative games when the core is nonempty, though it exists even if the core is empty, but it also generalizes (iii) Nash equilibrium in $n$-person constant-sum games, (iv) stable matchings in matching models, and (v) competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium satisfies the optimin criterion in an auxiliary game

Policy change and learning: Implementing EU environmental policies affecting agriculture

This thesis aims to show whether and how the implementation of the EU environmental policy could be improved through policy learning. The results are based on two case studies: the development of agri-environmental policy in Finland and the implementation of the Water Framework Directive(WFD)in Ireland. The institutional analysis shows that the institutional structures changed due to the membership: the formal structures changed almost overnight and, as a result of increased cross-sectoral cooperation and policy learning, the informal structures also changed. The implementation of agri-environmental policy was studied in one administrative region, namely Uusimaa, located in southern Finland. The adaptation of EU environmental policies is an interesting research topic, not only because of the policy process itself but also because of the actors and context involved

The promise of community-based participatory research for health equity: a conceptual model for bridging evidence with policy.

Insufficient attention has been paid to how research can be leveraged to promote health policy or how locality-based research strategies, in particular community-based participatory research (CBPR), influences health policy to eliminate racial and ethnic health inequities. To address this gap, we highlighted the efforts of 2 CBPR partnerships in California to explore how these initiatives made substantial contributions to policymaking for health equity. We presented a new conceptual model and 2 case studies to illustrate the connections among CBPR contexts and processes, policymaking processes and strategies, and outcomes. We extended the critical role of civic engagement by those communities that were most burdened by health inequities by focusing on their political participation as research brokers in bridging evidence and policymaking