A two‐step authentication framework for Mobile ad hoc networks

The lack of fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks causes nodes to rely more heavily on peer nodes for communication. Nevertheless, establishing trust in such a distributed environment is very difficult, since it is not straightforward for a node to determine if its peer nodes can be trusted. An additional concern in such an environment is with whether a peer node is merely relaying a message or if it is the originator of the message. In this paper, we propose an authentication approach for protecting nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using several authentication protocols are analyzed. Protocols based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques are presented and their performance is evaluated through analysis and simulation

A Lightweight and Attack Resistant Authenticated Routing Protocol for Mobile Adhoc Networks

In mobile ad hoc networks, by attacking the corresponding routing protocol, an attacker can easily disturb the operations of the network. For ad hoc networks, till now many secured routing protocols have been proposed which contains some disadvantages. Therefore security in ad hoc networks is a controversial area till now. In this paper, we proposed a Lightweight and Attack Resistant Authenticated Routing Protocol (LARARP) for mobile ad hoc networks. For the route discovery attacks in MANET routing protocols, our protocol gives an effective security. It supports the node to drop the invalid packets earlier by detecting the malicious nodes quickly by verifying the digital signatures of all the intermediate nodes. It punishes the misbehaving nodes by decrementing a credit counter and rewards the well behaving nodes by incrementing the credit counter. Thus it prevents uncompromised nodes from attacking the routes with malicious or compromised nodes. It is also used to prevent the denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The efficiency and effectiveness of LARARP are verified through the detailed simulation studies.Comment: 14 Pages, IJWM

Multifold node authentication in mobile ad hoc networks

An ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined infrastructure to keep the network connected. Nodes communicate amongst each other using wireless radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. In this article we propose a multifold node authentication approach for protecting mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using multiple authentication protocols are analysed. Such protocols, which are based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques, are presented through proofs and simulation results

Two‐Step Authentication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The lack of fixed infrastructure in ad hoc networks causes nodes to rely more heavily on peer nodes for communication. Nevertheless, establishing trust in such a distributed environment is very difficult, since it is not straightforward for a node to determine if its peer nodes can be trusted. An additional concern in such an environment is with whether a peer node is merely relaying a message or if it is the originator of the message. In this paper, we propose an authentication approach for protecting nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using several authentication protocols are analyzed. Protocols based on zero knowledge and challenge response techniques are presented and their performance is evaluated through analysis and simulation

Layered security design for mobile ad hoc networks

When security of a given network architecture is not properly designed from the beginning, it is difficult to preserve confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation in practical networks. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc networks rely on individual nodes to keep all the necessary interconnections alive. In this article we investigate the principal security issues for protecting mobile ad hoc networks at the data link and network layers. The security requirements for these two layers are identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using multiple lines of defense against malicious attacks are discussed

Detecting unauthorized and compromised nodes in mobile ad hoc networks

Security of mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) has become a more sophisticated problem than security in other networks, due to the open nature and the lack of infrastructure of such networks. In this paper, the security challenges in intrusion detection and authentication are identified and the different types of attacks are discussed. We propose a two-phase detection procedure of nodes that are not authorized for specific services and nodes that have been compromised during their operation in MANET. The detection framework is enabled with the main operations of ad-hoc networking, which are found at the link and network layers. The proposed framework is based on zero knowledge techniques, which are presented through proofs

Scalable and Secure Multicast Routing for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks

Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are decentralized and autonomous communication systems: They can be used to provide connectivity when a natural disaster has brought down the infrastructure, or they can support freedom of speech in countries with governmental Internet restrictions. MANET design requires careful attention to scalability and security due to low-capacity and error-prone wireless links as well as the openness of these systems. In this thesis, we address the issue of multicast as a means to efficiently support the MANET application of group communication on the network layer. To this aim, we first survey the research literature on the current state of the art in MANET routing, and we identify a gap between scalability and security in multicast routing protocols–two aspects that were only considered in isolation until now. We then develop an explicit multicast protocol based on the design of a secure unicast protocol, aiming to maintain its security properties while introducing minimal overhead. Our simulation results reveal that our protocol reduces bandwidth utilization in group communication scenarios by up to 45 % compared to the original unicast protocol, while providing significantly better resilience under blackhole attacks. A comparison with pure flooding allows us to identify a practical group size limit, and we present ideas for better large-group support

Security Verification of Secure MANET Routing Protocols

Secure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) routing protocols are not tested thoroughly against their security properties. Previous research focuses on verifying secure, reactive, accumulation-based routing protocols. An improved methodology and framework for secure MANET routing protocol verification is proposed which includes table-based and proactive protocols. The model checker, SPIN, is selected as the core of the secure MANET verification framework. Security is defined by both accuracy and availability: a protocol forms accurate routes and these routes are always accurate. The framework enables exhaustive verification of protocols and results in a counter-example if the protocol is deemed insecure. The framework is applied to models of the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) and Secure OLSR protocol against five attack vectors. These vectors are based on known attacks against each protocol. Vulnerabilities consistent with published findings are automatically revealed. No unknown attacks were found; however, future attack vectors may lead to new attacks. The new framework for verifying secure MANET protocols extends verification capabilities to table-based and proactive protocols

Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are some text overlaps with the previous submissio