14,477 research outputs found
A Formal Approach to Cyber-Physical Attacks
We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to
reason about Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus
on %a formal treatment of both integrity and DoS attacks to sensors and
actuators of CPSs, and on the timing aspects of these attacks. Our
contributions are threefold: (1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model
both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of
cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we formalise how to
estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the success chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions
and results by means of a non-trivial engineering application
Securing Real-Time Internet-of-Things
Modern embedded and cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous. A large number of
critical cyber-physical systems have real-time requirements (e.g., avionics,
automobiles, power grids, manufacturing systems, industrial control systems,
etc.). Recent developments and new functionality requires real-time embedded
devices to be connected to the Internet. This gives rise to the real-time
Internet-of-things (RT-IoT) that promises a better user experience through
stronger connectivity and efficient use of next-generation embedded devices.
However RT- IoT are also increasingly becoming targets for cyber-attacks which
is exacerbated by this increased connectivity. This paper gives an introduction
to RT-IoT systems, an outlook of current approaches and possible research
challenges towards secure RT- IoT frameworks
Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems
SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to
network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network
anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command
sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we
present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that
are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the
communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a
fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking
manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages
generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while
causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human
actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing,
the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain
legitimate.
We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our
local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a
commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool,
that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause
the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured
with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML)
we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all
successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout
and possible equipment damage
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability
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