74 research outputs found

    Avionics-based GNSS integrity augmentation performance in a jamming environment

    Get PDF
    Intentional and unintentional radiofrequency interference (i.e., jamming) can result in degraded navigation accuracy or complete loss of the GNSS signal tracking. Jammers can be classified into three broad categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum Jammers(SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ). In recent years, a number of effective jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression) techniques have been developed for military GNSS applications and some of them are envisaged to be used for civil purposes (e.g., terrorist attacks). The synergies between these jamming detection techniques and our newly developed Avionics-Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system are investigated in this paper. In particular, GNSS vulnerability to NBJ, SSJ and WGJ types of jamming is analytically described in terms of Jamming to Signal (J/S) tracking thresholds and the models for calculating the minimum acceptable aircraft-to-jammer ranges are presented. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed ABIA architecture is capable of performing jamming detection and avoidance when GNSS is considered as the primary source of navigation data

    Cooperative Interference Detection, Localization, and Mitigation in GNSS

    Get PDF
    Due to the low cost of GNSS receivers and their consequent diffusion, a wide range of location-aware applications are arising. Some of these applications are critical and have strict requirements in terms of availability, integrity and reliability. Examples of critical applications are precision landing and en-route navigation in air transportations; automated highways and mileage-based toll in road transportations; search and rescue in safety of life applications. A failure in fulfilling one or more requirements of a critical application may have dramatic consequences and cause serious damage. One of the most challenging threats for critical GNSS application, is represented by interference. In particular, jamming devices, operating inside GNSS bands, are easily and cheaply purchasable on the Internet. These devices transmit disturbing signals with the aim of preventing the correct operations of GNSS receivers. In order to satisfy the requirements of critical applications, it is necessary to promptly detect, localize and remove such interfering sources. Moreover, it is important to characterize the interfering signals in order to develop interference avoidance and mitigation techniques that ensure robustness of GNSS receivers to interference. This thesis studies the problem of interference in GNSS, from a cooperative perspective

    Radio Frequency Interference Impact Assessment on Global Navigation Satellite Systems

    Get PDF
    The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen of the EC Joint Research Centre (IPSC-JRC) has been mandated to perform a study on the Radio Frequency (RF) threat against telecommunications and ICT control systems. This study is divided into two parts. The rst part concerns the assessment of high energy radio frequency (HERF) threats, where the focus is on the generation of electromagnetic pulses (EMP), the development of corresponding devices and the possible impact on ICT and power distribution systems. The second part of the study concerns radio frequency interference (RFI) with regard to global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). This document contributes to the second part and contains a detailed literature study disclosing the weaknesses of GNSS systems. Whereas the HERF analysis only concerns intentional interference issues, this study on GNSS also takes into account unintentional interference, enlarging the spectrum of plausible interference scenarios.JRC.DG.G.6-Security technology assessmen

    ๋‹ค์ค‘ ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์˜ ์œ„์„ฑํ•ญ๋ฒ•์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ ๊ฒ€์ถœ ๋ฐ ์œ„์น˜์ถ”์ • ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•

    Get PDF
    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ๊ธฐ๊ณ„ํ•ญ๊ณต๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2015. 2. ๋ฐ•์ฐฌ๊ตญ.์œ„์„ฑํ•ญ๋ฒ•์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์€ ์ธ๊ณต์œ„์„ฑ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ์ „ํŒŒํ•ญ๋ฒ•์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž์˜ ์œ„์น˜ ๋ฐ ์‹œ๊ฐ์„ ์ •๋ฐ€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ธก์ •ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์–ด ๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๋ฟ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฏผ์ˆ˜๋ถ„์•ผ์—์„œ ๊ด‘๋ฒ”์œ„ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ™œ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜ ์•ฝ 2๋งŒํ‚ฌ๋กœ๋ฏธํ„ฐ ์ƒ๊ณต์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ๋„๋‹ฌํ•˜๋Š” ์œ„์„ฑํ•ญ๋ฒ•์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์„ธ๊ธฐ๋Š” ์žก์Œ ๋ ˆ๋ฒจ ์ดํ•˜์ด๋ฏ€๋กœ ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ์— ์ทจ์•ฝํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๋‹จ์ ์ด ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ํฌ๊ฒŒ ์ž์—ฐ์ ์ธ ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ์™€ ์ธ์œ„์ ์ธ ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋ถ„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ, ๊ทธ ์ค‘์—์„œ ์ธ์œ„์ ์ธ ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ํŠน์ • ๋ชฉ์ ์— ์˜ํ•ด์„œ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์— ์•…์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์ฃผ๋ฏ€๋กœ ์ด์— ๋Œ€์‘ํ•˜๋Š” ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ํ•„์š”ํ•˜๋‹ค. ์ธ์œ„์ ์ธ ์ „ํŒŒ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ์žฌ๋ฐ, ๋ฏธ์ฝ”๋‹, ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋กœ ๋‚˜๋ˆŒ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ณ  ์ด์ค‘์—์„œ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ์‹ค์ œ ์œ„์„ฑํ•ญ๋ฒ•์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๊ทธ๋Œ€๋กœ ๋ชจ์‚ฌํ•˜์—ฌ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹œํ‚จ ํ›„์— ์ž˜๋ชป๋œ ํ•ญ๋ฒ•ํ•ด๋ฅผ ์œ ๋ฐœ์‹œํ‚ค๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ์ดˆ๋ž˜ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋Œ€์‘๊ธฐ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ๋‹ค์ค‘ ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์—์„œ ํ•ญ๋ฒ•ํ•ด ํ’ˆ์งˆ์„ ๊ฐ์‹œํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๊ฒ€์ถœํ•˜๊ณ  ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์ง„ํ–‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๊ฒ€์ถœํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ๊ฒ€์ถœ ํŒŒ๋ผ๋ฏธํ„ฐ ๋ฐ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•๋“ค์ด ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ ์ตœ๊ทผ ๋ช‡ ๋…„ ๋™์•ˆ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฐ€ ํ™œ๋ฐœํžˆ ์ง„ํ–‰๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ํฌ๊ด„์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒ€์ถœํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ์ด๋ฏธ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ณ ์ •๋œ ์œ„์น˜์˜ ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์—์„œ ์ ์‘ ํŽ˜์ด๋”ฉ ์นผ๋งŒ ํ•„ํ„ฐ์˜ ํŽ˜์ด๋”ฉ ํŒฉํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฒ€์ถœ ํŒŒ๋ผ๋ฏธํ„ฐ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•œ ๊ฒ€์ถœ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ ์†Œ๊ฐœํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋•Œ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ ์‹œ๋‚˜๋ฆฌ์˜ค๋ฅผ ๋ชจ์‚ฌํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ทธ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ๋žจํ”„ ๋ฐ”์ด์–ด์Šค ํ˜•ํƒœ์˜ ์˜์‚ฌ๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ ์˜ค์ฐจ๋กœ ๋ชจ๋ธ๋ง ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ด์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ํŽ˜์ด๋”ฉ ํŒฉํ„ฐ ๋ณ€ํ™”๊ฐ’์„ ์ •๋Ÿ‰์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๊ณ  ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ ๊ฒ€์ถœ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์ž„๊ณ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์„ค์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ์ตœ์ข…์ ์œผ๋กœ ํŽ˜์ด๋”ฉ ํŒฉํ„ฐ๋กœ ์นผ๋งŒ ๊ฒŒ์ธ์„ ์กฐ์ ˆํ•จ์œผ๋กœ์จ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์˜ํ–ฅ์„ ์™„ํ™”์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ํšจ๊ณผ๋„ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ฌ๋‹ค. ์•ž์—์„œ ์„ค๋ช…ํ•œ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ ๊ฒ€์ถœ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ํŒ๋‹จํ•˜๋ฉด ๋‹ค์ค‘ ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ์—์„œ์˜ ์ธก์ •์น˜๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ธฐ๋งŒ์‹ ํ˜ธ์›์˜ ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋œ๋‹ค. ์ „ํŒŒ๊ฐ„์„ญ์›์˜ ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ์ธก์ •์น˜์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ถ„๋ฅ˜๋˜๋Š”๋ฐ ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š” ์ฃผ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ์„ ๊ธฐ์ค€์œผ๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ฐ ๊ธฐ์ค€๊ตญ์—์„œ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๋œ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์„ธ๊ธฐ์ฐจ์ด๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ, ์ด๋•Œ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์„ธ๊ธฐ ์ธก์ •์น˜๋กœ C/No๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์˜€๊ณ  ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ์œ„ํ•ด ์ „ํŒŒ์†์‹ค๋ชจ๋ธ์€ COST231-Walfisch-Ikegami ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ์‡„๋ฅผ ๊ณ„์‚ฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ ๊ฒ€์ถœ ๋ฐ ์œ„์น˜์ถ”์ • ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•์€ ๊ฐ๊ฐ ๊ฐ„๋‹จํ•œ ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ์„ฑ๋Šฅ์„ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ์ฑ„๋„๋ณ„ ์˜์‚ฌ๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ ์ด์ƒ์„ ๊ฒ€์ถœํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์œผ๋ฏ€๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ž์˜ ์œ„์น˜๊ฐ€ ๊ณ ์ •๋œ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ๋ฌด๊ฒฐ์„ฑ ๊ฐ์‹œ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๊ธฐ๋Œ€๋œ๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ ์ถ”๊ฐ€์ ์ธ ํ•˜๋“œ์›จ์–ด๋‚˜ ๋ณต์žกํ•œ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ๊ตฌํ˜„์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์•„ ์‹ค์šฉ์ ์ธ ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ์œ ์šฉํ•  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๊ธฐ๋Œ€๋œ๋‹ค.The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is a radio navigation system using satellites and has been widely used by both military and civilian systems since it can provide an accurate position and timing information to users. However, the strength of the GNSS signal on the users receiver is weak since GNSS satellites are approximately 20,000 Km away and transmit several watts of signal power such that at the ground level. Therefore, GNSS signal is quite vulnerable to different types of interference. Interference signals can be categorized as unintentional and intentional. Intentional interference, such as jamming, meaconing, and spoofing, are specifically designed with malicious intention to deny or mislead GNSS receivers, thus they are serious threat to GNSS applications. Among them, spoofing is much more dangerous since it is designed to mislead their target receiver that is not aware of the attack and this can lead to disastrous consequences in scores of applications. Therefore, in this thesis, a detection and localization method for GNSS spoofing signal based on multiple base stations has been researched for monitoring the quality of navigation solutions. There are various spoofing detection methods according to detection parameters and spoofing scenarios. The related researches have been actively performed for recent years. In this thesis, GNSS spoofing detection method based on adaptive fading Kalman filter is proposed to detect spoofing signal and the fading factor of the filter is used as a detection parameter. In order to detect spoofing signal regardless of spoofing scenarios, the proposed method is based on multiple base stations whose locations are fixed and already known. The effect of the spoofing is modeled by the ramp type bias error of the pseudorange to emulate smart spoofer. In addition, the change of the fading factor according to ramp type bias error is quantitatively analyzed and the detection threshold is established to detect spoofing signal by analyzing the change of the error covariance. The proposed method also has an effect on spoofing mitigation by adjusting the Kalman gain of the filter. If spoofing signal is detected by using the proposed method, spoofing localization method based on multiple base stations is performed to estimate spoofing location. There are various localization methods according to measurements. However, in this thesis, spoofing location is estimated by differential received signal strength (DRSS) method because of simplicity and efficiency. The carrier to noise ratio (C/No) measurement characterizes the received signal strength (RSS), therefore, the difference of the C/No between main station (MS) and each base station (BS) is used as measurement for DRSS method. In addition, the Cost231-Walfisch-Ikegami model is applied as path-loss model for calculating signal attenuation. To verify the performance analysis of the proposed spoofing detection and localization method, simple simulations are implemented, respectively. This method can be applied for integrity monitoring algorithm in case of fixed user because it can detect abnormal pseudorange of each channel. In addition, this method is expected to be easily applied to practical system because they do not need to additional hardware and realization of complex algorithm.Abstract i Contents iv List of Figures vi List of Tables vii Chapter 1.Introduction 1 1.1 Motivation and Background 1 1.2 Objectives and Contributions 2 1.3 Organization 2 Chapter 2. GNSS Intentional Interference 4 2.1 Introduction 4 2.2 Jamming 5 2.3 Meaconing 8 2.4 Spoofing 11 Chapter 3. Spoofing Detection Method 13 3.1 Introduction 13 3.2 Adaptive Fading Kalman Filter 15 3.2.1 Backgroud 15 3.2.2 Adaptive Fading Factor 17 3.2.3 Parameter Analysis 21 3.3 Simulation 25 Chapter 4. Spoofing Localization Method 34 4.1 Introduction 34 4.2 DRSS Method 35 4.3 Simulation 38 Chapter 5. Conclusions 43 Bibliography 45 ๊ตญ๋ฌธ์ดˆ๋ก 51Maste

    Interference Mitigation and Localization Based on Time-Frequency Analysis for Navigation Satellite Systems

    Get PDF
    Interference Mitigation and Localization Based on Time-Frequency Analysis for Navigation Satellite SystemsNowadays, the operation of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) is imperative across a multitude of applications worldwide. The increasing reliance on accurate positioning and timing information has made more serious than ever the consequences of possible service outages in the satellite navigation systems. Among others, interference is regarded as the primary threat to their operation. Due the recent proliferation of portable interferers, notably jammers, it has now become common for GNSS receivers to endure simultaneous attacks from multiple sources of interference, which are likely spatially distributed and transmit different modulations. To the best knowledge of the author, the present dissertation is the first publication to investigate the use of the S-transform (ST) to devise countermeasures to interference. The original contributions in this context are mainly: โ€ข the formulation of a complexity-scalable ST implementable in real time as a bank of filters; โ€ข a method for characterizing and localizing multiple in-car jammers through interference snapshots that are collected by separate receivers and analysed with a clever use of the ST; โ€ข a preliminary assessment of novel methods for mitigating generic interference at the receiver end by means the ST and more computationally efficient variants of the transform. Besides GNSSs, the countermeasures to interference proposed are equivalently applicable to protect any direct-sequence spread spectrum (DS-SS) communication

    Signal processing techniques for GNSS anti-spoofing algorithms

    Get PDF
    The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) usage is growing at a very high rate, and more applications are relying on GNSS for correct functioning. With the introduction of new GNSSs, like the European Galileo and the Chinese Beidou, in addition to the existing ones, the United States Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS, the applications, accuracy of the position and usage of the signals are increasing by the day. Given that GNSS signals are received with very low power, they are prone to interference events that may reduce the usage or decrease the accuracy. From these interference, the spoofing attack is the one that has drawn major concerns in the GNSS community. A spoofing attack consist on the transmission of GNSS-like signals, with the goal of taking control of the receiver and make it compute an erroneous position and time solution. In the thesis, we focus on the design and validation of different signal processing techniques, that aim at detection and mitigation of the spoofing attack effects. These are standalone techniques, working at the receiverโ€™s level and providing discrimination of spoofing events without the need of external hardware or communication links. Four different techniques are explored, each of them with its unique sets of advantages and disadvantages, and a unique approach to spoofing detection. For these techniques, a spoofing detection algorithm is designed and implemented, and its capabilities are validated by means of a set of datasets containing spoofing signals. The thesis focuses on two different aspects of the techniques, divided as per detection and mitigation capabilities. Both detection techniques are complementary, their joint use is explored and experimental results are shown that demonstrate the advantages. In addition, each mitigation technique is analyzed separately as they require specialized receiver architecture in order to achieve spoofing detection and mitigation. These techniques are able to decrease the effects of the spoofing attacks, to the point of removing the spoofing signal from the receiver and compute navigation solutions that are not controlled by the spoofer and lead in more accurate end results. The main contributions of this thesis are: the description of a multidimensional ratio metric test for distinction between spoofing and multipath effects; the introduction of a cross-check between automatic gain control measurements and the carrier to noise density ratio, for distinction between spoofing attacks and other interference events; the description of a novel signal processing method for detection and mitigation of spoofing effects, based on the use of linear regression algorithms; and the description of a spoofing detection algorithm based on a feedback tracking architecture

    Modes dรฉgradรฉs rรฉsultant de l'utilisation multi constellation du GNSS

    Get PDF
    Actuellement, on constate dans le domaine de la navigation, un besoin croissant de localisation par satellites. Apres une course a l'amelioration de la precision (maintenant proche de quelques centimetres grace a des techniques de lever d'ambiguite sur des mesures de phase), la releve du nouveau defi de l'amelioration de l'integrite du GNSS (GPS, Galileo) est a present engagee. L'integrite represente le degre de confiance que l'on peut placer dans l'exactitude des informations fournies par le systeme, ainsi que la capacite a avertir l'utilisateur d'un dysfonctionnement du GNSS dans un delai raisonnable. Le concept d'integrite du GNSS multi-constellation necessite une coordination au niveau de l'architecture des futurs recepteurs combines (GPS-Galileo). Le fonctionnement d'un tel recepteur dans le cas de passage du systeme multi-constellation en mode degrade est un probleme tres important pour l'integrite de navigation. Cette these se focalise sur les problemes lies a la navigation aeronautique multiconstellation et multi-systeme GNSS. En particulier, les conditions de fourniture de solution de navigation integre sont evaluees durant la phase d'approche APV I (avec guidage vertical). En disposant du GPS existant, du systeme Galileo et d'un systeme complementaire geostationnaire (SBAS), dont les satellites emettent sur des frequences aeronautiques en bande ARNS, la question fondamentale est comment tirer tous les benefices d'un tel systeme multi-constellation pour un recepteur embarque a bord d'un avion civil. En particulier, la question du maintien du niveau de performance durant cette phase de vol APV, en termes de precision, continuite, integrite et disponibilite, lorsque l'une des composantes du systeme est degradee ou perdu, doit etre resolue. L'objectif de ce travail de these est donc d'etudier la capacite d'un recepteur combine avionique d'effectuer la tache de reconfiguration de l'algorithme de traitement apres l'apparition de pannes ou d'interferences dans une partie du systeme GNSS multiconstellation et d'emettre un signal d'alarme dans le cas ou les performances de la partie du systeme non contaminee ne sont pas suffisantes pour continuer l'operation en cours en respectant les exigences de l'aviation civile. Egalement, l'objectif de ce travail est d'etudier les methodes associees a l'execution de cette reconfiguration pour garantir l'utilisation de la partie du systeme GNSS multi-constellation non contaminee dans les meilleures conditions. Cette etude a donc un interet pour les constructeurs des futurs recepteurs avioniques multiconstellation. ABSTRACT : The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has defined the concept of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which corresponds to the set of systems allowing to perform satellite-based navigation while fulfilling ICAO requirements. The US Global Positioning Sysem (GPS) is a satellite-based navigation system which constitutes one of the components of the GNSS. Currently, this system broadcasts a civil signal, called L1 C/A, within an Aeronautical Radio Navigation Services (ARNS) band. The GPS is being modernized and will broadcast two new civil signals: L2C (not in an ARNS band) and L5 in another ARNS band. Galileo is the European counterpart of GPS. It will broadcast three signals in an ARNS band: Galileo E1 OS (Open Service) will be transmitted in the GPS L1 frequency band and Galileo E5a and E5b will be broadcasted in the same 960-1215 MHz ARNS band than that of GPS L5. GPS L5 and Galileo E1, E5a, E5b components are expected to provide operational benefits for civil aviation use. However, civil aviation requirements are very stringent and up to now, the bare systems alone cannot be used as a means of navigation. For instance, the GPS standalone does not implement sufficient integrity monitoring. Therefore, in order to ensure the levels of performance required by civil aviation in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity of service and availability, ICAO standards define different systems/algorithms to augment the basic constellations. GPS, Galileo and the augmentation systems could be combined to comply with the ICAO requirements and complete the lack of GPS or Galileo standalone performance. In order to take benefits of new GNSS signals, and to provide the service level required by the ICAO, the architecture of future combined GNSS receivers must be standardized. The European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Working Group 62, which is in charge of Galileo standardization for civil aviation in Europe, proposes new combined receivers architectures, in coordination with the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA). The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the efforts made by the WG 62 by providing inputs necessary to build future receivers architecture to take benefits of GPS, Galileo and augmentation systems. In this report, we propose some key elements of the combined receivers' architecture to comply with approach phases of flight requirements. In case of perturbation preventing one of the needed GNSS components to meet a phase of flight required performance, it is necessary to be able to switch to another available component in order to try to maintain if possible the level of performance in terms of continuity, integrity, availability and accuracy. That is why future combined receivers must be capable of detecting the impact of perturbations that may lead to the loss of one GNSS component, in order to be able to initiate a switch. These perturbations are mainly atmospheric disturbances, interferences and multipath. In this thesis we focus on the particular cases of interferences and ionosphere perturbations. The interferences are among the most feared events in civil aviation use of GNSS. Detection, estimation and removal of the effect of interference on GNSS signals remain open issues and may affect pseudorange measurements accuracy, as well as integrity, continuity and availability of these measurements. In literature, many different interference detection algorithms have been proposed, at the receiver antenna level, at the front-end level. Detection within tracking loops is not widely studied to our knowledge. That is why, in this thesis, we address the problem of interference detection at the correlators outputs. The particular case of CW interferences detection on the GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 OS signals processing is proposed. Nominal dual frequency measurements provide a good estimation of ionospheric delay. In addition, the combination of GPS or GALILEO navigation signals processing at the receiver level is expected to provide important improvements for civil aviation. It could, potentially with augmentations, provide better accuracy and availability of ionospheric correction measurements. Indeed, GPS users will be able to combine GPS L1 and L5 frequencies, and future GALILEO E1 and E5 signals will bring their contribution. However, if affected by a Radio Frequency Interference, a receiver can lose one or more frequencies leading to the use of only one frequency to estimate the ionospheric code delay. Therefore, it is felt by the authors as an important task to investigate techniques aimed at sustaining multi-frequency performance when a multi constellation receiver installed in an aircraft is suddenly affected by radiofrequency interference, during critical phases of flight. This problem is identified for instance in [NATS, 2003]. Consequently, in this thesis, we investigate techniques to maintain dual frequency performances when a frequency is lost (L1 C/A or E1 OS for instance) after an interference occurrence
    • โ€ฆ
    corecore