Happiness, Morality, and Game Theory

Non-cooperative Games, Happiness, Morality.

Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

Capitalism and Economic Growth: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

Why has capitalism prevailed as an institution in promoting economic growth despite its apparent unfairness? In this paper, we argue that within a neoclassical framework, capitalism is fairer compared to collectivism due to the absence of a rationally acceptable collective solution. This is demonstrated using a dynamic game with a vote-maximizing government(G) and profit-maximizing representative firm(F). In this GF game, collectivism or cooperation between the players appears to trump capitalism at the aggregate level. Developing countries operating below the steady state may be better off cooperating as they will enjoy positive long term economic growth and profit growth once their capital stock exceeds the steady state level. But this requires them to sacrifice short term growth and possible inequity as the firm's profits grow. Developed countries operating above the steady state will find the cooperative solution attractive since both economic growth and profit growth will be positive. So, from an aggregate level, collectivism or cooperation performs better than capitalism. However, a fair imputation of cooperative or collective solutions which is rationally acceptable for all players does not exist. In every stage of development, the firm always finds it rationally unacceptable to cooperate because the profits earned by the firm under the feedback Nash equilibrium always dominate the profits under cooperation. On the other hand, the government only finds the cooperative solution to be rationally acceptable when the economy is above the steady state. Hence, collectivist cooperation between the government and the firm are not rationally acceptable for both and a fair equilibrium cannot be attained with collectivism.Fairness; Dynamic Games; Economic Growth; Capitalism

Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper

Beyond foraging: behavioral science and the future of institutional economics

Institutions affect economic outcomes, but variation in them cannot be directly linked to environmental factors such as geography, climate, or technological availabilities. Game theoretic approaches, based as they typically are on foraging only assumptions, do not provide an adequate foundation for understanding the intervening role of politics and ideology; nor does the view that culture and institutions are entirely socially constructed. Understanding what institutions are and how they influence behavior requires an approach that is in part biological, focusing on cognitive and behavioral adaptations for social interaction favored in the past by group selection. These adaptations, along with their effects on canalizing social learning, help to explain uniformities in political and social order, and are the bedrock upon which we build cultural and institutional variability