Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or players need to establish connectivity with the root. The social optimum is the Minimum Steiner Tree. We are interested in situations where the designer has incomplete information about the input. We propose two different models, the adversarial and the stochastic. In both models, the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying metric but the requested subset of the players is not known and is activated either in an adversarial manner (adversarial model) or is drawn from a known probability distribution (stochastic model). In the adversarial model, the designer's goal is to choose a single, universal protocol that has low Price of Anarchy (PoA) for all possible requested subsets of players. The main question we address is: to what extent can prior knowledge of the underlying metric help in the design? We first demonstrate that there exist graphs (outerplanar) where knowledge of the underlying metric can dramatically improve the performance of good network design. Then, in our main technical result, we show that there exist graph metrics, for which knowing the underlying metric does not help and any universal protocol has PoA of $\Omega(\log k)$, which is tight. We attack this problem by developing new techniques that employ powerful tools from extremal combinatorics, and more specifically Ramsey Theory in high dimensional hypercubes. Then we switch to the stochastic model, where each player is independently activated. We show that there exists a randomized ordered protocol that achieves constant PoA. By using standard derandomization techniques, we produce a deterministic ordered protocol with constant PoA.Comment: This version has additional results about stochastic inpu

Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements

We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)$ for complement-free (i.e., subadditive) valuations. Prior to our work, no non-trivial upper bound on the PoA of single bid auctions was known for valuations exhibiting complements. We introduce a hierarchy over valuations, where levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree of complementarity, and the PoA of the single bid auction degrades gracefully with the level of the hierarchy. This hierarchy is a refinement of the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy [FFIILS15], where the degree of complementarity $d$ is captured by the maximum number of neighbors of a node in the positive hypergraph representation. We show that the price of anarchy of the single bid auction for valuations of level $d$ of the hierarchy is $O(d^2 \log(m/d))$, where $m$ is the number of items. We also establish an improved upper bound of $O(d \log m)$ for a subclass where every hyperedge in the positive hypergraph representation is of size at most 2 (but the degree is still $d$). Finally, we show that randomizing between the single bid auction and the grand bundle auction has a price of anarchy of at most $O(\sqrt{m})$ for general valuations. All of our results are derived via the smoothness framework, thus extend to coarse-correlated equilibria and to Bayes Nash equilibria.Comment: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computatio

Algorithmic Graph Theory

The main focus of this workshop was on mathematical techniques needed for the development of efficient solutions and algorithms for computationally difficult graph problems. The techniques studied at the workshhop included: the probabilistic method and randomized algorithms, approximation and optimization, structured families of graphs and approximation algorithms for large problems. The workshop Algorithmic Graph Theory was attended by 46 participants, many of them being young researchers. In 15 survey talks an overview of recent developments in Algorithmic Graph Theory was given. These talks were supplemented by 10 shorter talks and by two special sessions

Proceedings of the 8th Cologne-Twente Workshop on Graphs and Combinatorial Optimization

International audienceThe Cologne-Twente Workshop (CTW) on Graphs and Combinatorial Optimization started off as a series of workshops organized bi-annually by either Köln University or Twente University. As its importance grew over time, it re-centered its geographical focus by including northern Italy (CTW04 in Menaggio, on the lake Como and CTW08 in Gargnano, on the Garda lake). This year, CTW (in its eighth edition) will be staged in France for the first time: more precisely in the heart of Paris, at the Conservatoire National d’Arts et Métiers (CNAM), between 2nd and 4th June 2009, by a mixed organizing committee with members from LIX, Ecole Polytechnique and CEDRIC, CNAM

Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'09)

The Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS) is held alternately in France and in Germany. The conference of February 26-28, 2009, held in Freiburg, is the 26th in this series. Previous meetings took place in Paris (1984), Saarbr¨ucken (1985), Orsay (1986), Passau (1987), Bordeaux (1988), Paderborn (1989), Rouen (1990), Hamburg (1991), Cachan (1992), W¨urzburg (1993), Caen (1994), M¨unchen (1995), Grenoble (1996), L¨ubeck (1997), Paris (1998), Trier (1999), Lille (2000), Dresden (2001), Antibes (2002), Berlin (2003), Montpellier (2004), Stuttgart (2005), Marseille (2006), Aachen (2007), and Bordeaux (2008). ..

05361 Abstracts Collection -- Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks

From 04.09.05 to 09.09.05, the Dagstuhl Seminar 05361 ``Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available

Designing Networks with Good Equilibria under Uncertainty

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of $k$ terminal vertices or players needs to establish connectivity with the root. The social optimum is the minimum Steiner tree. We study situations where the designer has incomplete information about the input. We propose two different models, the adversarial and the stochastic. In both models, the designer has prior knowledge of the underlying graph metric, but the requested subset of the players is not known and is activated either in an adversarial manner (adversarial model) or is drawn from a known probability distribution (stochastic model). In the adversarial model, the goal of the designer is to choose a single, universal cost-sharing protocol that has low Price of Anarchy (PoA) for all possible requested subsets of players. The main question we address is, to what extent can prior knowledge of the underlying graph metric help in the design? We first demonstrate that there exist classes of graphs where knowledge of the underlying graph metric can dramatically improve the performance of good network cost-sharing design. For outerplanar graph metrics, we provide a universal cost-sharing protocol with constant PoA, in contrast to protocols that, by ignoring the graph metric, cannot achieve PoA better than $\Omega(\log k)$. Then, in our main technical result, we show that there exist graph metrics for which knowing the underlying graph metric does not help and any universal protocol has PoA of $\Omega(\log k)$, which is tight. We attack this problem by developing new techniques that employ powerful tools from extremal combinatorics, and more specifically Ramsey theory in high-dimensional hypercubes. Then we switch to the stochastic model, where the players are activated according to some probability distribution that is known to the designer. We show that there exists a randomized ordered protocol that achieves constant PoA. If, further, each player is activated independently with some probability, by using standard derandomization techniques, we produce a deterministic ordered protocol that achieves constant PoA. We remark that the first result holds also for the black-box model, where the probabilities are not known to the designer, but she is allowed to draw independent (polynomially many) samples. Read More: https://epubs.siam.org/doi/10.1137/16M109669