4,329 research outputs found

    Classified Stable Matching

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    We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences over the other side. An institute classifies the applicants based on their research areas (or any other criterion), and, for each class, it sets a lower bound and an upper bound on the number of applicants it would hire in that class. The objective is to find a stable matching from which no group of participants has reason to deviate. Moreover, the matching should respect the upper/lower bounds of the classes. In the first part of the paper, we study classified stable matching problems whose classifications belong to a fixed set of ``order types.'' We show that if the set consists entirely of downward forests, there is a polynomial-time algorithm; otherwise, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a stable matching. In the second part, we investigate the problem using a polyhedral approach. Suppose that all classifications are laminar families and there is no lower bound. We propose a set of linear inequalities to describe stable matching polytope and prove that it is integral. This integrality allows us to find various optimal stable matchings using Ellipsoid algorithm. A further ramification of our result is the description of the stable matching polytope for the many-to-many (unclassified) stable matching problem. This answers an open question posed by Sethuraman, Teo and Qian

    Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm

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    Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas

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    This paper considers matching problems with individual/regional minimum/maximum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of strategyproof mechanisms that take such quotas into account. We first show that without any restrictions on the regional structure, checking the existence of a feasible matching that satisfies all quotas is NP-complete. Then, assuming that regions have a hierarchical structure (i.e., a tree), we show that checking the existence of a feasible matching can be done in time linear in the number of regions. We develop two strategyproof matching mechanisms based on the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), which we call Priority List based Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (PLDA-RQ) and Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (RSDA-RQ). When regional quotas are imposed, a stable matching may no longer exist since fairness and nonwastefulness, which compose stability, are incompatible. We show that both mechanisms are fair. As a result, they are inevitably wasteful. We show that the two mechanisms satisfy different versions of nonwastefulness respectively; each is weaker than the original nonwastefulness. Moreover, we compare our mechanisms with an artificial cap mechanism via simulation experiments, which illustrate that they have a clear advantage in terms of nonwastefulness and student welfare

    Matchings with lower quotas: Algorithms and complexity

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    We study a natural generalization of the maximum weight many-to-one matching problem. We are given an undirected bipartite graph G=(A∪˙P,E)G=(A∪˙P,E) with weights on the edges in E, and with lower and upper quotas on the vertices in P. We seek a maximum weight many-to-one matching satisfying two sets of constraints: vertices in A are incident to at most one matching edge, while vertices in P are either unmatched or they are incident to a number of matching edges between their lower and upper quota. This problem, which we call maximum weight many-to-one matching with lower and upper quotas (WMLQ), has applications to the assignment of students to projects within university courses, where there are constraints on the minimum and maximum numbers of students that must be assigned to each project. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the complexity of WMLQ from the viewpoints of classical polynomial time algorithms, fixed-parameter tractability, as well as approximability. We draw the line between NPNP-hard and polynomially tractable instances in terms of degree and quota constraints and provide efficient algorithms to solve the tractable ones. We further show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time for instances with bounded treewidth; however, the corresponding runtime is exponential in the treewidth with the maximum upper quota umaxumax as basis, and we prove that this dependence is necessary unless FPT=W[1]FPT=W[1]. The approximability of WMLQ is also discussed: we present an approximation algorithm for the general case with performance guarantee umax+1umax+1, which is asymptotically best possible unless P=NPP=NP. Finally, we elaborate on how most of our positive results carry over to matchings in arbitrary graphs with lower quotas

    Envy-free Matchings with Lower Quotas

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    While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is a relaxation of a stable matching preserving a kind of fairness property. In this paper, we investigate the existence of an envy-free matching in several settings, in which hospitals have lower quotas. We first provide an algorithm that decides whether a given HR-LQ instance has an envy-free matching or not. Then, we consider envy-freeness in the Classified Stable Matching model due to Huang (2010), i.e., each hospital has lower and upper quotas on subsets of doctors. We show that, for this model, deciding the existence of an envy-free matching is NP-hard in general, but solvable in polynomial time if quotas are paramodular

    Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability for Lower-Quotas : A Parameterized Perspective

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    We consider the problem of assigning agents to resources under the two-sided preference list model with upper and lower-quotas on resources. Krishnaa et al. [17] explore two optimality notions for this setting -- envy-freeness and relaxed stability. They investigate the problem of computing a maximum size envy-free matching (MAXEFM) and a maximum size relaxed stable matching (MAXRSM) that satisfies the lower-quotas. They show that both these optimization problems cannot be approximated within a constant factor unless P = NP. In this work, we investigate parameterized complexity of MAXEFM and MAXRSM. We consider several parameters derived from the instance -- the number of resources with non-zero lower-quota, deficiency of the instance, maximum length of the preference list of a resource with non-zero lower-quota, among others. We show that MAXEFM problem is W [1]-hard for several interesting parameters and MAXRSM problem is para-NP-hard for two natural parameters. We present kernelization results and FPT algorithms on a combination of parameters for both problems.Comment: 14 pages, 2 figures. fullpage used, improved presentation of results, stronger kernelization result for MAXRS
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