500,723 research outputs found
Money, moral transgressions, and blame
Two experiments tested participants' attributions for others' immoral behaviors when conducted for more versus less money. We hypothesized and found that observers would blame wrongdoers more when seeing a transgression enacted for little rather than a lot of money, and that this would be evident in observers' hand-washing behavior. Experiment 1 used a cognitive dissonance paradigm. Participants (N = 160) observed a confederate lie in exchange for either a relatively large or a small monetary payment. Participants blamed the liar more in the small (versus large) money condition. Participants (N = 184) in Experiment 2 saw images of someone knocking over another to obtain a small, medium, or large monetary sum. In the small (versus large) money condition, participants blamed the perpetrator (money) more. Hence, participants assigned less blame to moral wrong-doers, if the latter enacted their deed to obtain relatively large sums of money. Small amounts of money accentuate the immorality of others' transgressions
How To Gain Idaho Citizenship
The conversation arose early morning as all my morning coworkers were strolling in to start their day and a coworker who I though was too young to drive told me that she had in fact drove herself to work. I asked her how old you have to be to drive In Utah and she said 16 and I said, I’d been driving for a year and a half at that point in Idaho. They all gave a sigh of humor and then asked if you really have to be 14.5 years old to start driving. I said yeah, and if you think that’s ridiculous you should hear what we have to do to get Idaho citizenship. I thought quickly and then said, “yeah, to get Idaho citizenship you have to eat a raw potato like an apple. We are the potato state.” My coworkers chuckled in disbelief and I asked if they though it was kidding, I kept up the lie the rest of the summer and the following year senior coworkers would tell the new people that’s how you got your Idaho citizenship and I backed them up on it
The effects of cheating on deception detection during a social dilemma
Research by social psychologists and others consistently finds that people are poor at detecting attempted deception by others. However, Tooby and Cosmides (cognitive psychologists who favor evolutionary analyses of behavior) have argued and shown that humans have evolved a special “cognitive module” for detecting cheaters. Their research suggests that people are good at detecting cheating by group members. These two literatures seem to be at odds with one another. The hypothesis of this research was that when participants are told a lie by a fellow group member whose attempted deception involves cheating on a task that affects their outcomes, they will be good at detecting deception. In this experiment, participants played blackjack in groups using a social dilemma paradigm. Participants’ outcomes were either interdependent or independent with a confederate’s outcomes. It was predicted that participants whose outcomes were interdependent with the confederate would be better at detecting deception by the confederate than those participants whose outcomes were independent from the confederate’s outcomes. Results indicate that when judging other participants’ lies interdependent players were more successful at deception detection than independent players but were not more sensitive to the lies. This effect may be driven by the truth bias, people assume that their interaction partners are truthful which would explain why sensitivity measures (which remove response biases) did not show the hypothesized effect. Independent players were not more successful or sensitive when judging the confederate’s lies. The failure to find the hypothesized effect may be due to methodological factors. Both participants heard may have had their cheating detection modules activated when hearing the instructions for the experiment which implied that cheating could occur. Overall success rates support this idea because they were significantly higher than success rates reached by most deception detection research (50%) which may be indicative that both participants cheating detection modules were active. Results also indicate that as the number of lies told increases overall success decreases but success at detecting lies and sensitivity increase. Thus the more lies that are told the better people are at catching them
Deception and self-awareness
This paper presents a study conducted for the Shades of Grey EPSRC research project (EP/H02302X/1), which aims to develop a suite of interventions for identifying terrorist activities. The study investigated the body movements demonstrated by participants while waiting to be interviewed, in one of two conditions: preparing to lie or preparing to tell the truth. The effect of self-awareness was also investigated, with half of the participants sitting in front of a full length mirror during the waiting period. The other half faced a blank wall. A significant interaction was found for the duration of hand/arm movements between the deception and self-awareness conditions (F=4.335, df=1;76, p<0.05). Without a mirror, participants expecting to lie spent less time moving their hands than those expecting to tell the truth; the opposite was seen in the presence of a mirror. This finding indicates a new research area worth further investigation
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The truth-telling motor cortex: Response competition in M1 discloses deceptive behaviour
Neural circuits associated with response conflict are active during deception. Here we use transcranial magnetic stimulation to examine for the first time whether competing responses in primary motor cortex can be used to detect lies. Participants used their little finger or thumb to respond either truthfully or deceitfully regarding facial familiarity. Motor-evoked-potentials (MEPs) from muscles associated with both digits tracked the development of each motor plan. When preparing to deceive, the MEP of the non-responding digit (i.e. the plan corresponding to the truth) exceeds the MEP of the responding digit (i.e. the lie), whereas a mirror-reversed pattern occurs when telling the truth. This give away response conflict interacts with the time of stimulation during a speeded reaction period. Lies can even activate digit-specific cortical representations when only verbal responses are made. Our findings support neurobiological models which blend cognitive decision-making with motor programming, and suggest a novel index for discriminating between honest and intentionally false facial recognition
State College Times, November 3, 1931
Volume 20, Issue 8https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/12694/thumbnail.jp
State College Times, November 3, 1931
Volume 20, Issue 8https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/12694/thumbnail.jp
State College Times, November 3, 1931
Volume 20, Issue 8https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/12694/thumbnail.jp
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