The Driving Philosophers

We introduce a new synchronization problem in mobile ad-hoc systems: the Driving Philosophers. In this problem, an unbounded number of driving philosophers (processes) access a round-about (set of shared resources organized along a logical ring). The crux of the problem is to ensure, beside traditional mutual exclusion and starvation freedom at each particular resource, gridlock freedom (i.e., a cyclic waiting chain among processes). The problem captures explicitly the very notion of process mobility and the underlying model does not involve any assumption on the total number of (participating) processes or the use of shared memory, i.e., the model conveys the ad-hoc environment. We present a generic algorithm that solves the problem in a synchronous model. Instances of this algorithm can be fair but not concurrent, or concurrent but not fair. We derive the impossibility of achieving fairness and concurrency at the same time as well as the impossibility of solving the problem in an asynchronous model. We also conjecture the impossibility of solving the problem in an ad-hoc network model with limited-range communication

The Driving Philosophers

We introduce a new synchronization problem in mobile ad-hoc systems: the Driving Philosophers. In this problem, an unbounded number of driving philosophers (processes) access a round-about (set of shared resources organized along a logical ring). The crux of the problem is to ensure, beside traditional mutual exclusion and starvation freedom at each particular resource, gridlock freedom (i.e., cyclic waiting chain amongst processes). The problem captures explicitly the very notion of process mobility and the underlying model does not involve any assumption on the total number of (participating) processes or the use of shared memory, i.e., the model conveys the ad-hoc environment. We present a generic algorithm that solves the problem in a synchronous model. Instances of this algorithm can be fair but not concurrent, or concurrent but not fair. We derive the impossibility of achieving fairness and concurrency at the same time as well as the impossibility of solving the problem in an asynchronous model. We also conjecture the impossibility of solving the problem in an ad-hoc network model with limited-range communication

FYS: Ethics And Technology (PHIL 07/CPSC 15) Syllabus

There has been an accelerated shift in the influence of computing technology and the use of algorithms in our daily lives. With this technology comes serious ethical questions. Philosophers are often well-equipped to wrestle with ethical questions, but less well-equipped to wrestle with questions of technology itself. Computer scientists are well-equipped to deal with the problems and challenges of technology, but less well-equipped to deal with the ethical problems and challenges that technology can pose. In this co-taught course, we bring together the two fields to address ethical questions involving social media, data mining, self-driving cars, artificial intelligence, and other topics

The Evolving Philosophical Stance of Richard Wagner and the Effects on His Female Characters from Senta to Kundry

This bibliography analyzes the multiple effects of the philosophers Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the works of Richard Wagner. By analyzing the contradictions of these philosophers and the different manifestations of their ideas in the different works of Wagner, it is easy to see which philosopher held the greatest hold on Wagner at a certain time. Wagner marries the philosophies of Hegel and Schopenhauer despite the fact they considered themselves to be on polar opposites of the philosophical spectrum. However, asceticism and a quest for purity ultimately seem to be the driving forces behind Wagner’s operas and depictions of women in his operas

Specialisation, Interdisciplinarity, and Incommensurability

Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and not as the overcoming of some sort of incommensurable divide. This article provides a comprehensive evaluative examination of the relations between specialisation, interdisciplinarity, and incommensurability. Its aim is to defend the relevance of incommensurability to both specialisation and interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it aims at correcting the tendency, common among many philosophers, to regard incommensurability in a restrictive manner - such as, for example, as an almost purely semantic issu

Philosophical Foundations of Wisdom

Practical wisdom (hereafter simply ‘wisdom’), which is the understanding required to make reliably good decisions about how we ought to live, is something we all have reason to care about. The importance of wisdom gives rise to questions about its nature: what kind of state is wisdom, how can we develop it, and what is a wise person like? These questions about the nature of wisdom give rise to further questions about proper methods for studying wisdom. Is the study of wisdom the proper subject of philosophy or psychology? How, exactly, can we determine what wisdom is and how we can get it? In this chapter, we give an overview of some prominent philosophical answers to these questions. We begin by distinguishing practical wisdom from theoretical wisdom and wisdom as epistemic humility. Once we have a clearer sense of the target, we address questions of method and argue that producing a plausible and complete account of wisdom will require the tools of both philosophy and empirical psychology. We also discuss the implications this has for prominent wisdom research methods in empirical psychology. We then survey prominent philosophical accounts of the nature of wisdom and end with reflections on the prospects for further interdisciplinary research

Philosophical expertise under the microscope

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence

Moral Luck and The Unfairness of Morality

Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent’s control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a good or bad person, and flourishing

A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet

The Philosopher as Moral Activist: A Call for Ethical Caution in Publication

It is normal to think that philosophers’ first dedication is to the truth. Publishers and writers consider ideas and papers according to criteria such as originality, eloquence, interestingness, soundness, and plausibility. I suggest that moral consequence should play a greater role in our choices to publish when serious harm is at stake. One’s credence in a particular idea should be weighed against the potential consequences of the publication of one’s ideas both if one turns out to be right and if one turns out to be wrong. This activist approach to philosophical writing combines moral concern with epistemic humility