16 research outputs found

    The Complexity of the Homotopy Method, Equilibrium Selection, and Lemke-Howson Solutions

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    We show that the widely used homotopy method for solving fixpoint problems, as well as the Harsanyi-Selten equilibrium selection process for games, are PSPACE-complete to implement. Extending our result for the Harsanyi-Selten process, we show that several other homotopy-based algorithms for finding equilibria of games are also PSPACE-complete to implement. A further application of our techniques yields the result that it is PSPACE-complete to compute any of the equilibria that could be found via the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm, a complexity-theoretic strengthening of the result in [Savani and von Stengel]. These results show that our techniques can be widely applied and suggest that the PSPACE-completeness of implementing homotopy methods is a general principle.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figure; to appear in FOCS 2011 conferenc

    An Empirical Study of Finding Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

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    While there have been a number of studies about the efficacy of methods to find exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, there has been little empirical work on finding approximate Nash equilibria. Here we provide such a study that compares a number of approximation methods and exact methods. In particular, we explore the trade-off between the quality of approximate equilibrium and the required running time to find one. We found that the existing library GAMUT, which has been the de facto standard that has been used to test exact methods, is insufficient as a test bed for approximation methods since many of its games have pure equilibria or other easy-to-find good approximate equilibria. We extend the breadth and depth of our study by including new interesting families of bimatrix games, and studying bimatrix games upto size 2000Ă—20002000 \times 2000. Finally, we provide new close-to-worst-case examples for the best-performing algorithms for finding approximate Nash equilibria

    Constant Rank Bimatrix Games are PPAD-hard

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    The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-00, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for constant rank games, and asked if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute an exact NE. Adsul et al. (2011) answered this question affirmatively for rank-11 games, leaving rank-2 and beyond unresolved. In this paper we show that NE computation in games with rank ≥3\ge 3, is PPAD-hard, settling a decade long open problem. Interestingly, this is the first instance that a problem with an FPTAS turns out to be PPAD-hard. Our reduction bypasses graphical games and game gadgets, and provides a simpler proof of PPAD-hardness for NE computation in bimatrix games. In addition, we get: * An equivalence between 2D-Linear-FIXP and PPAD, improving a result by Etessami and Yannakakis (2007) on equivalence between Linear-FIXP and PPAD. * NE computation in a bimatrix game with convex set of Nash equilibria is as hard as solving a simple stochastic game. * Computing a symmetric NE of a symmetric bimatrix game with rank ≥6\ge 6 is PPAD-hard. * Computing a (1/poly(n))-approximate fixed-point of a (Linear-FIXP) piecewise-linear function is PPAD-hard. The status of rank-22 games remains unresolved

    The Simplex Algorithm is NP-mighty

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    We propose to classify the power of algorithms by the complexity of the problems that they can be used to solve. Instead of restricting to the problem a particular algorithm was designed to solve explicitly, however, we include problems that, with polynomial overhead, can be solved 'implicitly' during the algorithm's execution. For example, we allow to solve a decision problem by suitably transforming the input, executing the algorithm, and observing whether a specific bit in its internal configuration ever switches during the execution. We show that the Simplex Method, the Network Simplex Method (both with Dantzig's original pivot rule), and the Successive Shortest Path Algorithm are NP-mighty, that is, each of these algorithms can be used to solve any problem in NP. This result casts a more favorable light on these algorithms' exponential worst-case running times. Furthermore, as a consequence of our approach, we obtain several novel hardness results. For example, for a given input to the Simplex Algorithm, deciding whether a given variable ever enters the basis during the algorithm's execution and determining the number of iterations needed are both NP-hard problems. Finally, we close a long-standing open problem in the area of network flows over time by showing that earliest arrival flows are NP-hard to obtain

    A Generalized Training Approach for Multiagent Learning

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    This paper investigates a population-based training regime based on game-theoretic principles called Policy-Spaced Response Oracles (PSRO). PSRO is general in the sense that it (1) encompasses well-known algorithms such as fictitious play and double oracle as special cases, and (2) in principle applies to general-sum, many-player games. Despite this, prior studies of PSRO have been focused on two-player zero-sum games, a regime wherein Nash equilibria are tractably computable. In moving from two-player zero-sum games to more general settings, computation of Nash equilibria quickly becomes infeasible. Here, we extend the theoretical underpinnings of PSRO by considering an alternative solution concept, α\alpha-Rank, which is unique (thus faces no equilibrium selection issues, unlike Nash) and applies readily to general-sum, many-player settings. We establish convergence guarantees in several games classes, and identify links between Nash equilibria and α\alpha-Rank. We demonstrate the competitive performance of α\alpha-Rank-based PSRO against an exact Nash solver-based PSRO in 2-player Kuhn and Leduc Poker. We then go beyond the reach of prior PSRO applications by considering 3- to 5-player poker games, yielding instances where α\alpha-Rank achieves faster convergence than approximate Nash solvers, thus establishing it as a favorable general games solver. We also carry out an initial empirical validation in MuJoCo soccer, illustrating the feasibility of the proposed approach in another complex domain

    Unit vector games

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    McLennan and Tourky (2010) showed that “imitation games” provide a new view of the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with the Lemke–Howson algorithm. In an imitation game, the payoff matrix of one of the players is the identity matrix. We study the more general “unit vector games”, which are already known, where the payoff matrix of one player is composed of unit vectors. Our main application is a simplification of the construction by Savani and von Stengel (2006) of bimatrix games where two basic equilibrium-finding algorithms take exponentially many steps: the Lemke–Howson algorithm, and support enumeration

    The Complexity of All-switches Strategy Improvement

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    Strategy improvement is a widely-used and well-studied class of algorithms for solving graph-based infinite games. These algorithms are parameterized by a switching rule, and one of the most natural rules is "all switches" which switches as many edges as possible in each iteration. Continuing a recent line of work, we study all-switches strategy improvement from the perspective of computational complexity. We consider two natural decision problems, both of which have as input a game GG, a starting strategy ss, and an edge ee. The problems are: 1.) The edge switch problem, namely, is the edge ee ever switched by all-switches strategy improvement when it is started from ss on game GG? 2.) The optimal strategy problem, namely, is the edge ee used in the final strategy that is found by strategy improvement when it is started from ss on game GG? We show PSPACE\mathtt{PSPACE}-completeness of the edge switch problem and optimal strategy problem for the following settings: Parity games with the discrete strategy improvement algorithm of V\"oge and Jurdzi\'nski; mean-payoff games with the gain-bias algorithm [14,37]; and discounted-payoff games and simple stochastic games with their standard strategy improvement algorithms. We also show PSPACE\mathtt{PSPACE}-completeness of an analogous problem to edge switch for the bottom-antipodal algorithm for finding the sink of an Acyclic Unique Sink Orientation on a cube
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