Security Attack Models for Split Manufacturing of Integrated Circuits

Split manufacturing of integrated circuits reduces vulnerabilities introduced by an untrusted foundry by manufacturing only a part of design at an untrusted high-end foundry and the remaining part at a trusted low-end foundry. Unfortunately, a naïve spilt manufacturing alone does not ensure security. An attacker can use proximity attack to undermine the security offered by split manufacturing. However, this attack is applicable only to hierarchical designs. We propose a physical attack model for split manufacturing for industry-standard/ relevant flattened designs. Our attack uses heuristics of physical design tools, which outperform previous attack. We also develop a logic-aware physical attack considering logic redundancy, which identifies incorrect connections effectively. The effectiveness of proposed techniques is demonstrated by simulations on benchmark circuits. Our attack success rate is ~10× that of the proximity attack; our attack predicts 80% of the missing BEOL connections correctly, while the proximity attack predicts only 8% for flattened designs

Scalable algorithms for software based self test using formal methods

textTransistor scaling has kept up with Moore's law with a doubling of the number of transistors on a chip. More logic on a chip means more opportunities for manufacturing defects to slip in. This, in turn, has made processor testing after manufacturing a significant challenge. At-speed functional testing, being completely non-intrusive, has been seen as the ideal way of testing chips. However for processor testing, generating instruction level tests for covering all faults is a challenge given the issue of scalability. Data-path faults are relatively easier to control and observe compared to control-path faults. In this research we present a novel method to generate instruction level tests for hard to detect control-path faults in a processor. We initially map the gate level stuck-at fault to the Register Transfer Level (RTL) and build an equivalent faulty RTL model. The fault activation and propagation constraints are captured using Control and Data Flow Graphs of the RTL as a Liner Temporal Logic (LTL) property. This LTL property is then negated and given to a Bounded Model Checker based on a Bit-Vector Satisfiability Module Theories (SMT) solver. From the counter-example to the property we can extract a sequence of instructions that activates the gate level fault and propagates the fault effect to one of the observable points in the design. Other than the user supplying instruction constraints, this approach is completely automatic and does not require any manual intervention. Not all the design behaviors are required to generate a test for a fault. We use this insight to scale our previous methodology further. Underapproximations are design abstractions that only capture a subset of the original design behaviors. The use of RTL for test generation affords us two types of under-approximations: bit-width reduction and operator approximation. These are abstractions that perform reductions based on semantics of the RTL design. We also explore structural reductions of the RTL, called path based search, where we search through error propagation paths incrementally. This approach increases the size of the test generation problem step by step. In this way the SMT solver searches through the state space piecewise rather than doing the entire search at once. Experimental results show that our methods are robust and scalable for generating functional tests for hard to detect faults.Electrical and Computer Engineerin