Is It Real, or Is It Randomized?: A Financial Turing Test

We construct a financial "Turing test" to determine whether human subjects can differentiate between actual vs. randomized financial returns. The experiment consists of an online video-game (http://arora.ccs.neu.edu) where players are challenged to distinguish actual financial market returns from random temporal permutations of those returns. We find overwhelming statistical evidence (p-values no greater than 0.5%) that subjects can consistently distinguish between the two types of time series, thereby refuting the widespread belief that financial markets "look random." A key feature of the experiment is that subjects are given immediate feedback regarding the validity of their choices, allowing them to learn and adapt. We suggest that such novel interfaces can harness human capabilities to process and extract information from financial data in ways that computers cannot.Comment: 12 pages, 6 figure

Moral Cleansing and Moral Licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Property rights and loss aversion in contests

We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on contest outcomes. We study three situations: in “gain” two players start with no prize and make sunk bids to win a prize; in “loss” both the players start with prizes and whoever loses the contest loses their prize; and in “mixed” only one player starts with a prize that stays with him if he wins, but is transferred to the rival otherwise. Since the differences among the treatments arise only from framing, the expected utility and the standard loss aversion models predict no difference in bids across treatments. We introduce a loss aversion model in which the property rights are made salient, and as a result the reference point varies across treatments. This model predicts average bids in descending order in the loss, the mixed, and the gain treatment; and higher bids by the player with property rights in the mixed treatment. The results from a laboratory experiment broadly support these predictions. There is no significant difference in bids in the loss (gain) treatment and bids by property rights holder (nonholder) in the mixed treatment. A model incorporating both loss aversion and social preferences explains this result

Arboreal twig-nesting ants form dominance hierarchies over nesting resources.

Interspecific dominance hierarchies have been widely reported across animal systems. High-ranking species are expected to monopolize more resources than low-ranking species via resource monopolization. In some ant species, dominance hierarchies have been used to explain species coexistence and community structure. However, it remains unclear whether or in what contexts dominance hierarchies occur in tropical ant communities. This study seeks to examine whether arboreal twig-nesting ants competing for nesting resources in a Mexican coffee agricultural ecosystem are arranged in a linear dominance hierarchy. We described the dominance relationships among 10 species of ants and measured the uncertainty and steepness of the inferred dominance hierarchy. We also assessed the orderliness of the hierarchy by considering species interactions at the network level. Based on the randomized Elo-rating method, we found that the twig-nesting ant species Myrmelachista mexicana ranked highest in the ranking, while Pseudomyrmex ejectus was ranked as the lowest in the hierarchy. Our results show that the hierarchy was intermediate in its steepness, suggesting that the probability of higher ranked species winning contests against lower ranked species was fairly high. Motif analysis and significant excess of triads further revealed that the species networks were largely transitive. This study highlights that some tropical arboreal ant communities organize into dominance hierarchies

Qualitative Research: Methods and Methodology

This entry provides an overview of qualitative LGBTQ research. It begins by mapping out the qualities and character of studies that use this approach with particular attention to psycho-social research. It then highlights how reflexivity, the iterative process of self-identity making, has informed qualitative research, influencing both understandings of sexualities and also the underlying methodologies and research methods used. Finally, it considers how “the everyday” and a practices approach have generated significant insight on the materialities (lived experiences) and emotionality in qualitative research on LGBTQ lives

More than Words: Communication in Intergroup Conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies the problem of collective action. We observe the effect of different communication structures on collective action in the context of finitely repeated intergroup conflict and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflicts.Communication, Conflict, Experiment, Rent-seeking