Biological functions of CDK5 and potential CDK5 targeted clinical treatments.

Cyclin dependent kinases are proline-directed serine/threonine protein kinases that are traditionally activated upon association with a regulatory subunit. For most CDKs, activation by a cyclin occurs through association and phosphorylation of the CDK\u27s T-loop. CDK5 is unusual because it is not typically activated upon binding with a cyclin and does not require T-loop phosphorylation for activation, even though it has high amino acid sequence homology with other CDKs. While it was previously thought that CDK5 only interacted with p35 or p39 and their cleaved counterparts, Recent evidence suggests that CDK5 can interact with certain cylins, amongst other proteins, which modulate CDK5 activity levels. This review discusses recent findings of molecular interactions that regulate CDK5 activity and CDK5 associated pathways that are implicated in various diseases. Also covered herein is the growing body of evidence for CDK5 in contributing to the onset and progression of tumorigenesis

Valuations of ‘Sustainably Produced’ Labels on Beef, Tomato, and Apple Products

This study evaluates consumer perceptions of what “sustainably produced†food labels imply and estimates corresponding demand for products carrying these labels. Results suggest that the typical U.S. consumer is not willing to pay a positive premium for beef, tomatoes, or apple products labeled as “sustainably produced.†Demand is particularly sensitive to inferences consumers make regarding what a “sustainably produced†food label implies. Suggestions for future work and implications of standardizing the definition of sustainability are provided.consumer perceptions, credence labeling, production practices, sustainable, U.S. consumer demand, willingness to pay, Marketing,

An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This holdout problem is a common feature of the land-assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land. We use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi-person groups, complementary exchanges, and holdout externalities. The results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution, number of bargaining periods, and cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is, on average, a payoff-improving strategy for responders. Both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi-period bargaining treatments relative to single-period treatments, but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly. Nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi-period treatments, leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single-period treatments, both with and without delay costs. [excerpt

Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in Ultimatum Games

This paper uses responder pre-commitment and the Jungian theory of mental activity and psychological type, as measured by the widely-used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one design requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one design includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. In general, we find behavior in our experiment to be consistent with hypotheses based on theoretical underpinnings of the MBTI and its descriptions of psychological type.

Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence

Across many forms of rent seeking contests, the impact of risk aversion on equilibrium play is indeterminate. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality, but are typically not isomorphic under other risk preferences. The pattern of individual play across our contests is not consistent with a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for any distribution of risk preferences. We show that replacing the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept with the quantal response equilibrium, along with heterogeneous risk preferences can produce equilibrium patterns of play that are very similar to the patterns we observe.rent seeking, experiments, risk aversion, game theory

The Effects of Task, Task Mapping, and Layout Space on User Performance in Information-Rich Virtual Environments

How should abstract information be displayed in Information-Rich Virtual Environments (IRVEs)? There are a variety of techniques available, and it is important to determine which techniques help foster a user’s understanding both within and between abstract and spatial information types. Our evaluation compared two such techniques: Object Space and Display Space. Users strongly prefer Display Space over Object Space, and those who use Display Space may perform better. Display Space was faster and more accurate than Object Space for tasks comparing abstract information. Object Space was more accurate for comparisons of spatial information. These results suggest that for abstract criteria, visibility is a more important requirement than perceptual coupling by depth and association cues. They also support the value of perceptual coupling for tasks with spatial criteria

Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects\u27 choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects\u27 ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects\u27 decisions are consistent with Rawls\u27 (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects\u27 choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls\u27 concept of distributive justice. Veiled individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized. [excerpt