394 research outputs found
Model-based dependability analysis : state-of-the-art, challenges and future outlook
Abstract: Over the past two decades, the study of model-based dependability analysis has gathered significant research interest. Different approaches have been developed to automate and address various limitations of classical dependability techniques to contend with the increasing complexity and challenges of modern safety-critical system. Two leading paradigms have emerged, one which constructs predictive system failure models from component failure models compositionally using the topology of the system. The other utilizes design models - typically state automata - to explore system behaviour through fault injection. This paper reviews a number of prominent techniques under these two paradigms, and provides an insight into their working mechanism, applicability, strengths and challenges, as well as recent developments within these fields. We also discuss the emerging trends on integrated approaches and advanced analysis capabilities. Lastly, we outline the future outlook for model-based dependability analysis
A synthesis of logic and bio-inspired techniques in the design of dependable systems
Much of the development of model-based design and dependability analysis in the design of dependable systems, including software intensive systems, can be attributed to the application of advances in formal logic and its application to fault forecasting and verification of systems. In parallel, work on bio-inspired technologies has shown potential for the evolutionary design of engineering systems via automated exploration of potentially large design spaces. We have not yet seen the emergence of a design paradigm that effectively combines these two techniques, schematically founded on the two pillars of formal logic and biology, from the early stages of, and throughout, the design lifecycle. Such a design paradigm would apply these techniques synergistically and systematically to enable optimal refinement of new designs which can be driven effectively by dependability requirements. The paper sketches such a model-centric paradigm for the design of dependable systems, presented in the scope of the HiP-HOPS tool and technique, that brings these technologies together to realise their combined potential benefits. The paper begins by identifying current challenges in model-based safety assessment and then overviews the use of meta-heuristics at various stages of the design lifecycle covering topics that span from allocation of dependability requirements, through dependability analysis, to multi-objective optimisation of system architectures and maintenance schedules
Model Based Mission Assurance: NASA's Assurance Future
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) is seeing increased application in planning and design of NASAs missions. This suggests the question: what will be the corresponding practice of Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)? Contemporaneously, NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evaluating a new objectives based approach to standards to ensure that the Safety and Mission Assurance disciplines and programs are addressing the challenges of NASAs changing missions, acquisition and engineering practices, and technology. MBSE is a prominent example of a changing engineering practice. We use NASAs objectives-based strategy for Reliability and Maintainability as a means to examine how MBSE will affect assurance. We surveyed MBSE literature to look specifically for these affects, and find a variety of them discussed (some are anticipated, some are reported from applications to date). Predominantly these apply to the early stages of design, although there are also extrapolations of how MBSE practices will have benefits for testing phases. As the effort to develop MBMA continues, it will need to clearly and unambiguously establish the roles of uncertainty and risk in the system model. This will enable a variety of uncertainty-based analyses to be performed much more rapidly than ever before and has the promise to increase the integration of CRM (Continuous Risk Management) and PRA (Probabilistic Risk Analyses) even more fully into the project development life cycle. Various views and viewpoints will be required for assurance disciplines, and an over-arching viewpoint will then be able to more completely characterize the state of the project/program as well as (possibly) enabling the safety case approach for overall risk awareness and communication
Characterizing the Identity of Model-based Safety Assessment: A Systematic Analysis
Model-based safety assessment has been one of the leading research thrusts of
the System Safety Engineering community for over two decades. However, there is
still a lack of consensus on what MBSA is. The ambiguity in the identity of
MBSA impedes the advancement of MBSA as an active research area. For this
reason, this paper aims to investigate the identity of MBSA to help achieve a
consensus across the community. Towards this end, we first reason about the
core activities that an MBSA approach must conduct. Second, we characterize the
core patterns in which the core activities must be conducted for an approach to
be considered MBSA. Finally, a recently published MBSA paper is reviewed to
test the effectiveness of our characterization of MBSA
The xSAP Safety Analysis Platform
This paper describes the xSAP safety analysis platform. xSAP provides several
model-based safety analysis features for finite- and infinite-state synchronous
transition systems. In particular, it supports library-based definition of
fault modes, an automatic model extension facility, generation of safety
analysis artifacts such as Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) and Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) tables. Moreover, it supports probabilistic evaluation
of Fault Trees, failure propagation analysis using Timed Failure Propagation
Graphs (TFPGs), and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). xSAP has been used in several
industrial projects as verification back-end, and is currently being evaluated
in a joint R&D Project involving FBK and The Boeing Company
Architecture Level Safety Analyses for Safety-Critical Systems
The dependency of complex embedded Safety-Critical Systems across Avionics and Aerospace domains on their underlying software and hardware components has gradually increased with progression in time. Such application domain systems are developed based on a complex integrated architecture, which is modular in nature. Engineering practices assured with system safety standards to manage the failure, faulty, and unsafe operational conditions are very much necessary. System safety analyses involve the analysis of complex software architecture of the system, a major aspect in leading to fatal consequences in the behaviour of Safety-Critical Systems, and provide high reliability and dependability factors during their development. In this paper, we propose an architecture fault modeling and the safety analyses approach that will aid in identifying and eliminating the design flaws. The formal foundations of SAE Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) augmented with the Error Model Annex (EMV) are discussed. The fault propagation, failure behaviour, and the composite behaviour of the design flaws/failures are considered for architecture safety analysis. The illustration of the proposed approach is validated by implementing the Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA) system. The Error Model Annex (EMV) is guided with the pattern of consideration and inclusion of probable failure scenarios and propagation of fault conditions in the Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA). This helps in validating the system architecture with the detection of the error event in the model and its impact in the operational environment. This also provides an insight of the certification impact that these exceptional conditions pose at various criticality levels and design assurance levels and its implications in verifying and validating the designs
Model-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security:Survey and Identification of Gaps
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing
Formal Verification and Validation of AADL Models
International audienceSafety-critical systems are increasingly difficult to com- prehend due to their rising complexity. Methodologies, tools and modeling formalisms have been developed to overcome this. Component-based design is an im- portant paradigm that is shared by many of them
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