Diplomatic Challenges and Opportunities of the Pan-Arab Games

학위논문(석사) -- 서울대학교대학원 : 사범대학 체육교육과,글로벌스포츠매니지먼트전공, 2021.8. 마리아.Like many aspects in Arab history, public diplomacy in general and sport diplomacy specifically has tended to remain isolated from broader trends in recent history and the social sciences and specifically from the uprising study of sport diplomacy. This thesis aims to clarify the ways sport diplomacy is used by Arab countries through sporting events, and explains the influence of the pan-Arab Games on the diplomatic relation between these countries through examining the diplomatic challenges for the games and the future opportunities of the proposed next Pan-Arab Games in Iraq, to better diplomatic relationships between these countries. Using in-depth interviews to gather data, and through a purposeful sampling technique, high-ranked participants in positions at Arab National Olympic Committees of the last five countries that hosted the Pan-Arab Games were selected for interviews. The findings showed a clear contradiction between using inter-Arab sporting events to promote Pan-Arab ideology (Arab unity); and individual state interests. For Arab countries, the most used sport diplomacy mechanisms are in favor of individual state interests, whereas other mechanisms have the potential to regain trust and create a state of peace between conflicting countries in the region. The lack of credibility in countries proposing to host the games and the political differences that cause conflicts and instability in the region that were reflected in protests or boycotts of the games are the perceived challenges by participants, to any diplomatic scopes behind hosting the games. As for a Pan-Arab tournament hosted by Iraq, findings showed that with proper marketing the country can boost its economy and bring together the different factions of the Iraqi society around the goal of delivering a well-organized tournament which is expected to help improve or reinvent the image of Iraq into a safe, developed sporting powerhouse. A matter that would create a platform of reconciliation and cohesion for the games to create a legacy of a country that brought back the games to the scene ant their origins.아랍 역사의 다양한 측명을 보았을 때 공공 외교을 포함한 스포츠 외교는 최근 사회과학의 분야에서의 연구 진행이 고립되어 있거나 활발히 이루어지고 있지 않는 경향을 보이고 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 스포츠 이벤트를 통해 아랍 국가들이 스포츠 외교 방법을 살펴보고 Pan-Arab Games의 외교적 위기 및 기회를 검토하여 아랍 국가 간의 외교 관계에 미치는 영향을 설명하는 것을 목적으로 하고 있다. 또한 이라크에서 앞으로 열리는 Pan-Arab Games의 외교적 관계와 방향에 대한 논의를 하고자 한다. Purposeful sampling을 통해 심층면담에 참여할 연구참여대상을 선정하였으며 자료를 수집을 했다. Pan-Arab Games를 주최 한 마지막 5개 국가의 아랍 국가 올림픽위원회 직위의 고위 위원을 연구참가자 선정했다. Pan-Arab 이데올로기 (아랍 통일)를 촉진하기 위해 아랍 간 스포츠 이벤트는 이용하는 관계의 모순적인 모습이 나타났다. 가장 많이 사용되는 스포츠 외교 메커니즘은 각 국가의 이익을 추구하는 반면 신뢰를 회복하고 지역 내 분쟁 그리고 국가간에 평화 상태를 만들 수 있는 잠재력을 가지고 있다는 참여대상자들의 의견도 있었다. 스포츠 이벤트 개최를 제안한 국가의 신뢰 부족, 시위 또는 불매 운동에 반영된 지역의 갈등과 불안정을 야기하는 정치적 차이는 이벤트를 개최하는 과정에 겪게 될 수 있는 어려움으로 인식하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구에 따르면 Pan-Arab Games의 경우, 각 지역의 특색에 알맞은 마케팅 방향을 통해 국가가 경제적으로 활성화되고 개선에 도움이 될 것으로 예상되는 조직적 개최를 목표로 삼고다. 또한 이라크의 이미지를 안전하고 발전된 스포츠 강국으로 재창조할 수 있는 기회와 가능성에 대해 논의를 했으며 이벤트를 통해 국가의 유산을 유지하고 화해와 결속의 장으로 발전할 수 있는 측면도 제시되었다.CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Study Background 1 1.2 Purpose of the Research 6 1.3 Research Questions 6 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7 2.1 Historical Framework 7 2.1.1 The Arab World 7 2.1.2 Arab National Olympic Committees 7 2.1.3 The Pan-Arab Games 9 2.1.4 Significant Cases 13 a. 50s-60s 14 b. 70s-80s 15 c. 90s-Present 15 2.1.5 Pan-Arabism 18 2.2 Conceptual Framework 21 2.2.1 Sport Diplomacy 21 2.2.2 Categories of Sport Diplomacy 24 a. Sport as a Tool for Diplomacy 25 b. Sport as Diplomacy 28 2.2.3 Mechanisms of Sport Diplomacy 33 a. Image-Building 34 b. Building a platform for dialogue 36 c. Creating a platform for new legislation and agreements 37 d. Providing legitimacy 38 e. Trust-building 39 f. Reconciliation, integration, and anti-racism 40 g. State-controlled propaganda 42 h. Sport ambassadors 43 CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS 46 3.1 Qualitative Research Approach 46 3.2 Participant Selection 47 3.3 In-Depth Interviews 48 3.4 Data Collection 50 3.5 Data Analysis 51 3.6 Strategies for Validating Findings 53 CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 54 4.1 Theme Identification 55 4.2 Research Findings 56 4.2.1 Promoting Arab Unity 56 a. Developing a diplomatic discourse channel 57 b. Fostering peace 59 4.2.2 Individual State Concerns 64 a. Development of Sports 66 b. Creating new or changing perceptions 74 4.2.3 The credibility of the Games 84 4.2.4 Political Differences 87 a. A platform for protest and expressing disapproval 87 b. The political instability of the region 90 4.2.5 The next Games: a tool to improve Iraq's status 95 a. Reinventing Iraq's image 95 b. The national development of Iraq 97 4.2.6 The next Games: a platform for reconciliation and cohesion between Arab countries 98 CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 105 5.1 Discussion 107 5.1.1 Sport Diplomacy Mechanisms Used by Arab Countries Through Sporting Events 107 5.1.2 Diplomatic Challenges for The Pan-Arab Games 113 5.1.3 The proposed Iraq Pan-Arab Games influencing future opportunities to better relations between Arab countries 118 5.2 Limitations and Future Implications 121 5.3 Conclusion 122 REFERENCES 124 APPENDIX 1 134 APPENDIX 2 137 국 문 초 록 140석

Qualitative Analysis of Concurrent Mean-payoff Games

We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a fundamental objective, namely, mean-payoff objective, where a reward is associated to each transition, and the goal of player 1 is to maximize the long-run average of the rewards, and the objective of player 2 is strictly the opposite. The path constraint for player 1 could be qualitative, i.e., the mean-payoff is the maximal reward, or arbitrarily close to it; or quantitative, i.e., a given threshold between the minimal and maximal reward. We consider the computation of the almost-sure (resp. positive) winning sets, where player 1 can ensure that the path constraint is satisfied with probability 1 (resp. positive probability). Our main results for qualitative path constraints are as follows: (1) we establish qualitative determinacy results that show that for every state either player 1 has a strategy to ensure almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-2 strategies, or player 2 has a spoiling strategy to falsify almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-1 strategies; (2) we present optimal strategy complexity results that precisely characterize the classes of strategies required for almost-sure and positive winning for both players; and (3) we present quadratic time algorithms to compute the almost-sure and the positive winning sets, matching the best known bound of algorithms for much simpler problems (such as reachability objectives). For quantitative constraints we show that a polynomial time solution for the almost-sure or the positive winning set would imply a solution to a long-standing open problem (the value problem for turn-based deterministic mean-payoff games) that is not known to be solvable in polynomial time

Randomness for Free

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a) partial-observation (both players have partial view of the game); (b) one-sided complete-observation (one player has complete observation); and (c) complete-observation (both players have complete view of the game). On the basis of mode of interaction we have the following classification: (a) concurrent (both players interact simultaneously); and (b) turn-based (both players interact in turn). The two sources of randomness in these games are randomness in transition function and randomness in strategies. In general, randomized strategies are more powerful than deterministic strategies, and randomness in transitions gives more general classes of games. In this work we present a complete characterization for the classes of games where randomness is not helpful in: (a) the transition function probabilistic transition can be simulated by deterministic transition); and (b) strategies (pure strategies are as powerful as randomized strategies). As consequence of our characterization we obtain new undecidability results for these games

Discounting in Games across Time Scales

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model hierarchical and sequential decision making under uncertainty across different time scales. We show the existence of pure memoryless optimal strategies for both players and an ordered field property for such games. We show that if there is only one player (Markov decision processes), then the values can be computed in polynomial time. It follows that whether the value of a player is equal to a given rational constant in two-level discounted games can be decided in NP intersected coNP. We also give an alternate strategy improvement algorithm to compute the value

Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach

We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by nondeterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify. Here, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game to synthesise, in a Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for the delayed-signalling game

The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem.Comment: 20 page

Optimal Strategies in Infinite-state Stochastic Reachability Games

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from this subclass, and second, these games are strongly determined. The subclass is defined by the property that the set of all values can only have one accumulation point -- 0. Our results nicely mirror recent results for finitely-branching games, where, on the contrary, Player Min always has optimal strategies. However, our proof methods are substantially different, because the roles of the players are not symmetric. We also do not restrict the branching of the games. Finally, we apply our results in the context of recently studied One-Counter stochastic games

Termination Criteria for Solving Concurrent Safety and Reachability Games

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety objective to stay forever in a given set of states, and its dual, the reachability objective to reach a given set of states. We present in this paper a strategy improvement algorithm for computing the value of a concurrent safety game, that is, the maximal probability with which player~1 can enforce the safety objective. The algorithm yields a sequence of player-1 strategies which ensure probabilities of winning that converge monotonically to the value of the safety game. Our result is significant because the strategy improvement algorithm provides, for the first time, a way to approximate the value of a concurrent safety game from below. Since a value iteration algorithm, or a strategy improvement algorithm for reachability games, can be used to approximate the same value from above, the combination of both algorithms yields a method for computing a converging sequence of upper and lower bounds for the values of concurrent reachability and safety games. Previous methods could approximate the values of these games only from one direction, and as no rates of convergence are known, they did not provide a practical way to solve these games