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Lower bounds for the stable marriage problem and its variants
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, n men and n women each ranks members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable marriage is a complete matching M = {(m_1, w_i_1), (m_2, w_i_2), ..., (m_n, w_i_n)} such that no unmatched man and woman prefer each other to their partners in M.A pair (m_i, w_j) is stable if it is contained in some stable marriage. In this paper, we prove that determining if an arbitrary pair is stable requires Ω(n^2) time in the worst case. We show, by an adversary argument, that there exists instances of the stable marriage problem such that it is possible to find at least one pair that exhibits the Ω(n^2) lower bound.As corollaries of our results, the lower bound of Ω(n^2) is established for several stable marriage related problems. Knuth, in his treatise on stable marriage, asks if there is an algorithm that finds a stable marriage in less than Î(n^2) time. Our results show that such an algorithm does not exist
Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences
of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for
producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences
that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique
involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game.
We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results
can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences
Stable marriage with general preferences
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our
model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of
arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This
generalization is practically well-motivated, and as we show, encompasses the
well studied hard variant of stable marriage where preferences are allowed to
have ties and to be incomplete. As a result, we prove that deciding the
existence of a stable matching in our model is NP-complete. Complementing this
negative result we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the above decision
problem in a significant class of instances where the preferences are
asymmetric. We also present a linear programming formulation whose feasibility
fully characterizes the existence of stable matchings in this special case.
Finally, we use our model to study a long standing open problem regarding the
existence of cyclic 3D stable matchings. In particular, we prove that the
problem of deciding whether a fixed 2D perfect matching can be extended to a 3D
stable matching is NP-complete, showing this way that a natural attempt to
resolve the existence (or not) of 3D stable matchings is bound to fail.Comment: This is an extended version of a paper to appear at the The 7th
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2014
A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take
steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only
steps in the average case (with women and men). In
1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a
model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole
input. A partial negative answer was given by Ng and Hirschberg, who showed
that queries are required in a model that allows certain natural
random-access queries to the participants' preferences. A significantly more
general - albeit slightly weaker - lower bound follows from Segal's general
analysis of communication complexity, namely that Boolean queries
are required in order to find a stable marriage, regardless of the set of
allowed Boolean queries.
Using a reduction to the communication complexity of the disjointness
problem, we give a far simpler, yet significantly more powerful argument
showing that Boolean queries of any type are indeed required for
finding a stable - or even an approximately stable - marriage. Notably, unlike
Segal's lower bound, our lower bound generalizes also to (A) randomized
algorithms, (B) allowing arbitrary separate preprocessing of the women's
preferences profile and of the men's preferences profile, (C) several variants
of the basic problem, such as whether a given pair is married in every/some
stable marriage, and (D) determining whether a proposed marriage is stable or
far from stable. In order to analyze "approximately stable" marriages, we
introduce the notion of "distance to stability" and provide an efficient
algorithm for its computation
The exchange-stable marriage problem
In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriage (SM) and stable roommates (SR) problems and their variants. In such instances we consider a stability criterion that has recently been proposed, that of <i>exchange-stability</i>. In particular, we prove that ESM â the problem of deciding, given an SM instance, whether an exchange-stable matching exists â is NP-complete. This result is in marked contrast with Gale and Shapley's classical linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching in an instance of SM. We also extend the result for ESM to the SR case. Finally, we study some variants of ESM under weaker forms of exchange-stability, presenting both polynomial-time solvability and NP-completeness results for the corresponding existence questions
Hard variants of stable marriage
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfield and Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Knuth, Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, vol. 10, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 1997), partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem, partly because of the elegance of the associated structures and algorithms, and partly because of important practical applications, such as the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, J. Political Economy 92(6) (1984) 991) and similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the first comprehensive study of variants of the problem in which the preference lists of the participants are not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. We show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a number of these variants are hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast to the case where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem instance may admit stable matchings of different sizes. In this setting, examples of problems that are hard are: finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, determining whether a given pair is stableââeven if the indifference takes the form of ties on one side only, the ties are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2; and finding, or approximating, both an `egalitarian' and a `minimum regret' stable matching. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm for the problems of finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size. We also discuss the significant implications of our results for practical matching schemes
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