Simulation Based Study of Safety Stocks under Short-Term Demand Volatility in Integrated Device Manufacturing.

© IEOM Society InternationalA problem faced by integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) relates to fluctuating demand and can be reflected in long-term demand, middle-term demand, and short-term demand fluctuations. This paper explores safety stock under short term demand fluctuations in integrated device manufacturing. The manufacturing flow of integrated circuits is conceptualized into front end and back end operations with a die bank in between. Using a model of the back-end operations of integrated circuit manufacturing, simulation experiments were conducted based on three scenarios namely a production environment of low demand volatility and high capacity reliability (Scenario A), an environment with lower capacity reliability than scenario A (Scenario B), and an environment of high demand volatility and low capacity reliability (Scenario C). Results show trade-off relation between inventory levels and delivery performance with varied degree of severity between the different scenarios studied. Generally, higher safety stock levels are required to achieve competitive delivery performance as uncertainty in demand increases and manufacturing capability reliability decreases. Back-end cycle time are also found to have detrimental impact on delivery performance as the cycle time increases. It is suggested that success of finished goods safety stock policy relies significantly on having appropriate capacity amongst others to support fluctuations

On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution

Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism when the bidding space has a finite grid. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that there always exists a "high price equilibrium" which can be considered "the intuitive solution" (an agent with the highest valuation wins the auction bidding at the second-highest valuation). Although there might be other "low price equilibria", we also show that when there are two bidders "the intuitive solution" is the unique limiting equilibrium when the grid size goes to zero and ties are randomly broken.First-price auctions; undominated Nash equilibria.

TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS

We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock's proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestant's efforts. The family is characterized by a parameter representing how sensitive the outcome is to contestants' efforts. It encompasses as polar cases the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Equilibria have a close relationship to those of the (deterministic) all-pay auction and important properties of the latter hold for the serial contest, too.rent-seeking, (non-) deterministic contest, contest success function, all-pay auction, rent dissipation, exclusion principle, preemption effect, cap, campaign contributions.

TOPS RESPONSIVENESS, STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND COALITION FORMATION PROBLEMS

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this mechanism, to be called tops covering, is strategy-proof even if the core is not a singleton. Furthermore, we also find out that the tops covering mechanism is the only strategy-proof mechanism that always selects stable allocations.Coalition Formation; Stability; Strategy Proofness.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payos are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which armative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing armative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a classical auction format.Procurement Auction; Armative Action

- THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN HIRING PROCEDURES FOR JOB MARKETS

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are implemented.job matching markets, mechanism design

ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value.(non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions.

On Integration Policies and Schooling

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (stable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.Integration Policy; School Allocation; Affirmative Action

Affirmative Action and School Choice

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (equitable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale’s Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.Integration Policy; School Allocation; Affirmative Action