Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting in Practice: the use of vVote in the Victorian State Election

The November 2014 Australian State of Victoria election was the first statutory political election worldwide at State level which deployed an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system in polling places. This was the first time blind voters have been able to cast a fully secret ballot in a verifiable way, and the first time a verifiable voting system has been used to collect remote votes in a political election. The code is open source, and the output from the election is verifiable. The system took 1121 votes from these particular groups, an increase on 2010 and with fewer polling places

Comparing "challenge-based" and "code-based" internet voting verification implementations

Internet-enabled voting introduces an element of invisibility and unfamiliarity into the voting process, which makes it very different from traditional voting. Voters might be concerned about their vote being recorded correctly and included in the final tally. To mitigate mistrust, many Internet-enabled voting systems build verifiability into their systems. This allows voters to verify that their votes have been cast as intended, stored as cast and tallied as stored at the conclusion of the voting period. Verification implementations have not been universally successful, mostly due to voter difficulties using them. Here, we evaluate two cast as intended verification approaches in a lab study: (1) "Challenge-Based" and (2) "Code-Based". We assessed cast-as-intended vote verification efficacy, and identified usability issues related to verifying and/or vote casting. We also explored acceptance issues post-verification, to see whether our participants were willing to engage with Internet voting in a real election. Our study revealed the superiority of the code-based approach, in terms of ability to verify effectively. In terms of real-life Internet voting acceptance, convenience encourages acceptance, while security concerns and complexity might lead to rejection

Electis.app White Paper

The Electis voting App (Electis.app) is a web application built using Django and ElectionGuard SDK). The latter comes with homomorphic encryption and end-to-end verifiable proof of ballots and tally (initially designed for US election machines. In addition, Electis.app relies on the Tezos blockchain to generate proof of the election via a smart contract. Finally, it uses IPFS decentralized storage to share the proof and ballots with voters to allow them to verify the election was not violated. This document dives into the overall architecture of the e-voting platform and discusses the application'sapplication's key features and how the election is decentralized

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Online Voting System based on Image Steganography and Visual Cryptography

This paper discusses the implementation of an onlinevoting system based on image steganography and visualcryptography. The system was implemented inJava EE on a web-based interface, with MySQL databaseserver and Glassfish application server as thebackend. After considering the requirements of an onlinevoting system, current technologies on electronicvoting schemes in published literature were examined.Next, the cryptographic and steganography techniquesbest suited for the requirements of the voting systemwere chosen, and the software was implemented. Wehave incorporated in our system techniques like thepassword hashed based scheme, visual cryptography,F5 image steganography and threshold decryptioncryptosystem. The analysis, design and implementationphase of the software development of the votingsystem is discussed in detail. We have also used aquestionnaire survey and did the user acceptance testingof the system

An Efficient E2E Verifiable E-voting System without Setup Assumptions

End-to-end (E2E) verifiability is critical if e-voting systems are to be adopted for use in real-world elections. A new E2E e-voting system doesn't require additional setup assumptions and uses conventional cryptographic building blocks

Mind the Gap: Individual- and universal-verifiability plus cast-as-intended don\u27t yield verifiable voting systems

We show that verifiable voting systems require a security notion beyond individual- and universal-verifiability plus cast-as-intended