Standardized field testing of assistant robots in a Mars-like environment

Controlled testing on standard tasks and within standard environments can provide meaningful performance comparisons between robots of heterogeneous design. But because they must perform practical tasks in unstructured, and therefore non-standard, environments, the benefits of this approach have barely begun to accrue for field robots. This work describes a desert trial of six student prototypes of astronaut-support robots using a set of standardized engineering tests developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), along with three operational tests in natural Mars-like terrain. The results suggest that standards developed for emergency response robots are also applicable to the astronaut support domain, yielding useful insights into the differences in capabilities between robots and real design improvements. The exercise shows the value of combining repeatable engineering tests with task-specific application-testing in the field

Why it is important to build robots capable of doing science

Science, like any other cognitive activity, is grounded in the sensorimotor interaction of our bodies with the environment. Human embodiment thus constrains the class of scientific concepts and theories which are accessible to us. The paper explores the possibility of doing science with artificial cognitive agents, in the framework of an interactivist-constructivist cognitive model of science. Intelligent robots, by virtue of having different sensorimotor capabilities, may overcome the fundamental limitations of human science and provide important technological innovations. Mathematics and nanophysics are prime candidates for being studied by artificial scientists

Non-human Intention and Meaning-Making: An Ecological Theory

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019. The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97550-4_12Social robots have the potential to problematize many attributes that have previously been considered, in philosophical discourse, to be unique to human beings. Thus, if one construes the explicit programming of robots as constituting specific objectives and the overall design and structure of AI as having aims, in the sense of embedded directives, one might conclude that social robots are motivated to fulfil these objectives, and therefore act intentionally towards fulfilling those goals. The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of this description of social robotics on traditional notions of intention and meaningmaking, and, in particular, to link meaning-making to a social ecology that is being impacted by the presence of social robots. To the extent that intelligent non-human agents are occupying our world alongside us, this paper suggests that there is no benefit in differentiating them from human agents because they are actively changing the context that we share with them, and therefore influencing our meaningmaking like any other agent. This is not suggested as some kind of Turing Test, in which we can no longer differentiate between humans and robots, but rather to observe that the argument in which human agency is defined in terms of free will, motivation, and intention can equally be used as a description of the agency of social robots. Furthermore, all of this occurs within a shared context in which the actions of the human impinge upon the non-human, and vice versa, thereby problematising Anscombe's classic account of intention.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?

With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people” or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like “person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents

Algorithms and graphic interface design to control and teach a humanoid robot through human imitation

Projecte fet en col.laboració amb l'Institut de Robòtica i Informàtica IndustrialGiven that human-like robots are finding their place in different areas of our world, research is being carried out in order to improve human-robot interaction. Humanoid robots not only require a human appearance but also require human-like movements. Along these lines we present this project which tries to give a solution to the question of human to robot arm mapping with the objective to control in real time and to teach a robot by imitation. For the technical implementation we have worked with a SR3000 ToF camera to sense the human movements which allows us to perform a markerless arm tracking based on proximity information. The robot used is a Robotis Bioloid; still, the software has been designed to be adapted with few modifications to other robots having similar arm structures

NeuroPod: a real-time neuromorphic spiking CPG applied to robotics

Initially, robots were developed with the aim of making our life easier, carrying out repetitive or dangerous tasks for humans. Although they were able to perform these tasks, the latest generation of robots are being designed to take a step further, by performing more complex tasks that have been carried out by smart animals or humans up to date. To this end, inspiration needs to be taken from biological examples. For instance, insects are able to optimally solve complex environment navigation problems, and many researchers have started to mimic how these insects behave. Recent interest in neuromorphic engineering has motivated us to present a real-time, neuromorphic, spike-based Central Pattern Generator of application in neurorobotics, using an arthropod-like robot. A Spiking Neural Network was designed and implemented on SpiNNaker. The network models a complex, online-change capable Central Pattern Generator which generates three gaits for a hexapod robot locomotion. Recon gurable hardware was used to manage both the motors of the robot and the real-time communication interface with the Spiking Neural Networks. Real-time measurements con rm the simulation results, and locomotion tests show that NeuroPod can perform the gaits without any balance loss or added delay.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TEC2016-77785-

Humans, Neanderthals, robots and rights

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots.Peer reviewe