302 research outputs found
A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts
This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email.
The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework
A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts
This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs
with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and
criticisms are most welcome via email.
Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter-
ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an
agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional
formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make
probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires
empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced
by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits
generally requiring direct probability assignments testiïżœed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human
agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying
on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and
the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is
a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure)
expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents'
credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be
possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend
judgement
A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts
This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs
with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and
criticisms are most welcome via email.
Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter-
ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an
agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional
formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make
probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires
empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced
by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits
generally requiring direct probability assignments testiïżœed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human
agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying
on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and
the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is
a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure)
expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents'
credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be
possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend
judgement
A Probabilistic Modelling Approach for Rational Belief in Meta-Epistemic Contexts
This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and criticisms are most welcome via email.
The text introduces the conceptual (internalism, externalism), quantitative (probabilism) and logical perspectives (logics for reasoning about probabilities by Fagin, Halpern, Megiddo and MEL by Banerjee, Dubois) for the framework
Neural representation in active inference: using generative models to interact with -- and understand -- the lived world
This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active
inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves
into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy
between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy).
The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to
navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different
living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those
that support action-perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and
imagination; namely, from "explicit" models that entail variables for
predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people - to
"action-oriented models" that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how
generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and
the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an
agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper
concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and
the development of advanced cognitive abilities - and the gradual transition
from "pragmatic" to "detached" neural representations. The analysis on offer
foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive
processes and the evolution of neural representation
Semantic Responsibility
In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic
responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to
the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve
the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind
of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to
correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of
belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly
encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make
those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation
projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual
content of perceptual experiences
Emotional eloquence : the argument from pathos in deliberation
The argument from pathos is one of the three normative modes of persuasion in deliberation. The argument from pathos in deliberation serves six functions. It serves as a perceptual capacity; it is a constituent element of deliberative judgment: it communicates importance: it is a powerful motivator: it serves several aesthetic functions, and it is expressive. An examination of the cognitive structure of the emotions reveals the epistemic potential of the emotions. The success conditions necessary for an emotion to grasp its object yields three epistemic results. The apprehension of particular object of an emotion confers salience: the formal object names a quality that conceptually relates the emotion to a normative principle, and the propositional object provides the connection to semantic matters. The semantic properties of emotional language help structure and determine the sophistication of oneâs emotional responses
The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability
Application of the doctrine of entity criminal liability, which had only a thin tort-like rationale at inception, now sometimes instantiates a social practice of blaming institutions. Examining that social practice can ameliorate persistent controversy over entity liability\u27s place in the criminal law. An organization\u27s role in its agent\u27s bad act is often evaluated with a moral slant characteristic of judgments of criminality and with inquiry into whether the institution qua institution contributed to the agent\u27s wrong. Legal process, by lending clarity and authority, enhances the communicative impact, in the form of reputational effects, of blaming an institution for a wrong. Reputational effects can flow through to individuals in ways that reduce probability of future wrongdoing by altering individual preferences and forcing reevaluation and reform of institutional arrangements. Blame and utility are closely connected here: the impulse to blame organizations and the beneficial effects of doing so both appear to depend on the degree of institutional influence on the agent.
These insights imply that the doctrine should be tailored, unlike present law, to more fully exploit criminal law\u27s expressive capital by selecting cases according to entity blameworthiness. Barriers to describing the phenomenon of organizational influence and culture prevent discovery of a first-best rule of institutional responsibility. A second-best step would be to enhance the existing doctrine\u27s examination of agent mens rea, to impose fault only if the agent acted primarily with the intent to benefit the firm
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