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# EMOTIONAL ELOQUENCE: THE ARGUMENT FROM PATHOS IN DELIBERATION

by

Mark R. Armstrong

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Faculty of The Graduate School at
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
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

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The argument from pathos is one of the three normative modes of persuasion in deliberation. The argument from pathos in deliberation serves six functions. It serves as a perceptual capacity; it is a constituent element of deliberative judgment; it communicates importance; it is a powerful motivator; it serves several aesthetic functions, and it is expressive.

An examination of the cognitive structure of the emotions reveals the epistemic potential of the emotions. The success conditions necessary for an emotion to grasp its object yields three epistemic results. The apprehension of particular object of an emotion confers salience; the formal object names a quality that conceptually relates the emotion to a normative principle, and the propositional object provides the connection to semantic matters. The semantic properties of emotional language help structure and determine the sophistication of one's emotional responses.

The relational potential inherent in the evaluative and causal beliefs that constitute the emotions not only help to organize one's emotional repertoire, it also provides fertile opportunities for persuasion. These relationships are dynamic, and they are manifested in one's integrity. This relational potential also manifests itself in the various persuasive strategies open to the writer.

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APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

And yet it is this emotional power that dominates the court,
it is this form of eloquence that is the queen of all.

- Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* VI. ii. 4

Of the three modes of persuasion identified by Aristotle, logos, ethos and pathos, pathos stands as the least understood and most controversial. The psychological and empirical claim that emotion is a power in rhetoric has never been doubted. The kind and nature of that power is, however, a crucial issue for rhetoric. Aristotle's belief that pathos is a mode of persuasion implies that the passions and emotions are subject to and capable of rational and normative justification. Yet an explanation of that possible justification has not been forthcoming. Despite its power and importance, the complex region of argumentation we call the argument from pathos remains largely unmapped territory. Curiously, we repeatedly advert to its importance, and in the course of diverse kinds of analysis (for instance, stylistic, semantic and cultural analysis) we mention and note the variety of its manifestations. Yet we do little to analyze how 'it' functions or what its role is.

The reasons for our analytical reticence may be individually diverse, but they arise ultimately from two features of the traditional approaches to argumentation. The first feature is methodological: our theoretical preoccupation with highly general activities, like the nature of deliberation

or the scope of public discourse, as well as the role of general concepts like 'good', 'right', 'power', and 'freedom' has allowed us to push this inquiry into the periphery. The reasons for this are obvious: if we concern ourselves with matters of highly general articulation, we will find little to say about the emotions because they cannot be found there. The search for necessary or sufficient conditions within a discourse aim differs markedly from an examination of the highly particular and frequently circumstantial features that affect the argument from pathos. The analytical techniques traditionally deployed to explain the conduct of discourse are imprecise tools to explain the functional roles inherent in emotional persuasion.

The second feature counsels a cautionary sense of prudence. The terrain is so vast and its functioning is so protean that we find the subject to be not only daunting but also humbling. The terrain is daunting because the conceptual and practical problems that cry for explanation lie on the frontiers of many of the concepts that we use to make sense of our experiences. Two brief examples may illustrate this problem. One commonly held belief about the emotions is that the emotions are subjective. The emotions of distress share a painful apprehension of a present and apparent evil. Yet the phenomenological experiences of brooding, annoyance and torment differ significantly. While we may use the felt quality of an experience to identify the presence of that emotion, the felt quality is never a condition sufficient to explain that emotion. The idea of the subjective is also invoked to explain the relativity of the emotions. Relativity appeals to the idea that what we perceive emotionally is subject to the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of the perceiver. Since that apparatus varies somewhat from person to person,

emotional experience is said to be subjective. Although this is true, such an account tells only part of the story. The properties and qualities present in the object of the emotion help determine what is perceived. An account of the complexities of the multiple interactions between the perceiver's perceptual capacities and the object must consider and involve several senses of the objective as well (de Sousa 150-156). The perplexing complexities that arise in trying to explain the nature of emotional experience must be explained, and this attempt runs the risk of making wrong guesses as well as offering incomplete accounts of how they are to be understood.

Emotional persuasion has always been suspect. The potential for manipulation is ever present; and the potential for deception, both of others and oneself, is likewise present. Understanding how such machinations are effected is, certainly, an important task. It is not, however, the task of this study. To be able to say how such acts of persuasion are pernicious and illegitimate will not, by implication, explain how such persuasion can be legitimate. This dissertation will explore several justificatory issues important to the argument from pathos; in particular, it will explain how the argument from pathos in deliberation is and can be a normatively legitimate form of persuasion.

What we call the emotions are a set of complex interactions. Some of these interactions involve neurological and hormonal changes in the body and the brain. These changes can also produce further physiological effects (e.g., trembling, crying, a change in coloration, etc.) as well. The emotions are also complex patterned responses of occurrent and dispositional feelings, thoughts and judgments that can, in turn, lead to further behavioral

responses. In this study I will not be concerned with the biological dimensions of the emotions nor will I be concerned with questions about sexuality and identity. Both issues are obviously fascinating and important in their own rights, but they are not the subject of study here.

I will be concerned with those aspects of the emotions that are, in principle, under some voluntary control. Any argument claiming the normative status of this form of argumentation must, at the least, be concerned with these aspects of the emotions. I will be concerned with those emotions that help us to have an appropriate regard for the good of others and oneself in deliberative contexts. Even here I must be selective; I have, for example, also excluded the important issues of the appetitive desires. But this demarcation requires a qualification. What is vaguely, if accurately, called the 'emotionality' of the emotions is presupposed in all that I argue for. Neither the emotions nor the argument from pathos can be reduced to the mere articulation of the constituent beliefs and judgments operating there. The affective dimension of the emotions can be forgotten only at the peril of rhetorical failure. Emotional persuasion capitalizes on the inherent potentialities present in the emotions that can be actualized.

The emotions have four dimensions present in their structures that can be voluntarily controlled. I will pose them initially as observations; each will be argued for throughout. First, the emotions and passions are not blind surges of affect. Emotions are cognitive; they are structured and partially constituted by certain beliefs. Obviously, these beliefs need not be consciously present in an emotional episode. By itself, this claim does not imply that these beliefs are true or even reasonable for an emotion to be identified. If I am

angry with John because I believe he insulted me, and that belief turns out to be false, my emotion, as long as I don't know that belief is false, will still be anger. A minimal criterion for an emotion's rationality requires that the beliefs which constitute it must be true. While the truth of these beliefs is necessary for an emotion to be rational, their presence is not a sufficient condition for rationality.

Second, these beliefs are, typically, highly evaluative. These beliefs are concerned with what we desire and what we fear, with what brings pleasure or delight as well as what brings pain or distress. Furthermore, these evaluative beliefs have objects; they point to what the emotion is directed towards, or what it is about, or is undergone for some end. But these evaluations also involve judgments about the person experiencing them. Parents who are proud of their child's accomplishments have the child as their object, but the character of the pride they feel is defined by their relationship to the child. That one's emotional responses and reactions involve some relationship is one of the commonplaces in explaining the emotions. Yet the idea of relationship is but one manifestation of the broader idea of one's characteristic stance towards an object. When two people view the same event and say, "That's pathetic," they can mean two entirely different things. 'Pathetic' is a rough synonym for 'pitiable'; it is also an adjective meaning 'miserably inadequate'. The first sense suggests that the person judging the event is sympathetic; the latter stance is contemptuous.

Taken together, these two claims, that emotions are grounded in belief and that they are evaluative, are crucially important. Our emotions can be assessed as rational or irrational. The beliefs which serve as the basis for an

emotion may also be independently judged as true or false. It is important to recognize that 'rational' is ambiguous here. 'Rational' can and is being used here in its descriptive sense; that is, emotions are either 'cognitive' or 'non cognitive'. We must also use 'rational' in its normative sense; that is, conforming to some normative view of the right way to reason (Nussbaum, *Therapy* 80-81). For the argument from pathos to be judged a proper mode of persuasion the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for both senses of 'rational' must be explained. Not surprisingly, the nature of, and the relationship between, these two notions of rationality and the emotions has become recently the subject of inquiry for both psychologists and philosophers.[1] Importantly for this exploration, they were the concern of many ancient thinkers as well, particularly Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and the Stoics.[2] Long neglected, their accounts of the passions are a significant contribution to our understanding of these questions. In fact, I agree with Martha Nussbaum's judgment that their accounts are, in some areas, superior to any contemporary account of these questions (Nussbaum, *Therapy* chapters 9 and 10). Their accounts are powerful, in large part, because they were concerned with those aspects of the emotions that impinge on questions of choice and decision, issues central to deliberation. We can no longer afford to ignore their significant contributions to understanding these questions.

Third, the emotions are causally complex. We are most familiar with the ways extrinsic events can elicit an emotional response, but this is only one facet of a causal explanation. The beliefs and judgments that structure the emotions are dynamic. Once an emotion is elicited, its internal potential moves it to completion. In some cases, this process can be cognitively controlled and

even arrested. If I fear that my child was hurt in a bus crash, that fear will probably end when I discover the child is safe. But this is not always the case. When we learn that our anger is not justified we find, often enough, that we are still rankled or frustrated. The capacity for emotions to persist and even transform themselves is a testament to this internal dynamic. It also suggests that our occurrent emotions often involve more central and stable aspects of our characters or identities. Our emotions can be governed by our dispositions, virtues, vices, sentiments, traits and temperament. These deeper dimensions of one's character not only govern the occurrent emotions, they help to ground them. Robert Gordon notes, with good reason then, that the emotions have *causal depth* (1). The dynamics that make up the causal depth of the emotions is fertile ground for effecting emotional persuasion.

We also must recognize that these three observations lead to another complexity. Even if one's beliefs are true and justify experiencing an emotion of a certain sort, it still may not be appropriate to either display or act on that emotion. Fear in the face of objective danger may be rational, but when courage is called for, neither displaying that fear nor acting on it is appropriate. This observation points to a final observation. The emotions form a part of our conduct and the question of what is appropriate, requisite or deserved, with their normative satisfaction conditions, become crucial issues here. This concern with action is presented as a problem arising about the particular case because deliberation is so concerned. While I have posed this final consideration this way, it invokes more universal concerns. When Socrates announces at the end of Book I of the *Republic* that "it is no chance matter we are discussing, but how to live," he articulates what is, most

probably, the most basic practical problem each of us faces (352d). One common, broad and provisional distinction we draw in answering this question is that between the good life and the happy life. While the domains of these two categories share considerable overlap, the distinction tries to capture the difference between moral and rational or prudential considerations that must be brought to bear in answering this question. Obviously, the life and the expression of the emotions are deeply involved in the ethical concerns of our lives, and they are deeply involved in the satisfaction of the kinds of lives we choose to live.

Although it is brief, Aristotle's analysis of the argument from pathos remains one of the most sophisticated. Aristotle employed a functional explanation to account for the change in judgment that passions effect in the audience. In Book II of the *Rhetoric* he argues:

> The emotions [*pathe*] are those things through which, by undergoing changes, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites. There is need to divide the discussion of each into three headings. I mean, for example, in speaking of anger, what is their *state of mind* when people are angry and against *whom* are they usually angry, and for what sort of *reasons*; for if we understood one or two of these but not all, it would be impossible to create anger in someone. (1378a 20-27)

Aristotle's explanation of emotional persuasion involves a three-fold analysis: a discussion of one's state of mind, a discussion of pertinent considerations about the agent or object towards whom or what the emotion is directed, and an explanation of the role of reasons present in the emotion.

Aristotle's account emphasizes the psychological stance of the audience. That state of mind, the audience's 'reason-state'-- that is, the psychological and causal dimension of an emotion named by terms like 'wanting', 'fearing', and 'desiring'-- is also necessary for explaining the logical form of emotional argumentation. To successfully affect the deliberative decision, the argument from pathos must effectively direct the audience's reason-state that forms a part of the targeted emotion towards its appropriate object so that the argument will serve its designated role or function. The argument from pathos does not, strictly speaking, target the emotion itself; rather, the argument from pathos evokes the object of the emotion, or it targets the causal and evaluative reasons affecting one's appraisal of that object in order for that emotion to successfully serve its role for the sake of the deliberative aim of the essay.

## The Six Roles of Emotion in Deliberation

There are at least six ways in which the emotions serve as a part of deliberation. Some emotions are important in deliberation because they make certain features of the deliberative situation salient. The beliefs which ground and individuate the emotion make us sensitive to features in a problem that otherwise would remain obscure. This perceptual role is closely allied to the second role the emotions can play: emotions form a part of deliberative judgment. They alter judgments in kind or by degree. This role manifests itself in several ways. Emotions like trust and mistrust can ground a deliberative judgment. The judgmental component in the emotion itself can also correspond to the deliberative judgment. Indignation felt on behalf of another is a defiant protest which defends a value that has been violated.

Other emotions help define our stance towards a situation. For instance, we can feel sympathy for a friend who rightfully regrets some action. The third way the emotions play a crucial role may be characterized as a feature of engagement. We care about what is important to us. This line of inquiry is intimately related to ethics. When we focus on the role of the emotions we see the generative power of concepts like care, concern, love and friendship. If, as I. A. Richards claimed, attitudes are incipient actions, then they are closely related to the fourth role that the emotions can play. The emotions and the passions are crucial determinants in motivation. Aristotle argued that *boulesis* and *orexis* are rational forms of desire. He is also not alone in arguing that other forms of motivation, notably the appetites, fear and *thumos* (roughly damaged *amour propre*), are subject to normative considerations.

The first four claims for the roles the emotions can play deal with the practical and the moral dimensions of the emotions and experience. Significantly, the roles the emotions play and the significance they carry are not limited to operations in these spheres. The emotions participate in and form a part of the aesthetic dimension of our lives. It is not just that pity and fear form a part of our understanding of classical tragedy, although that is an important part of the life of the emotions. The sometimes vague but important connection between the fine and the good is bridged by the emotions. The concept most often invoked here is that of decorum. The importance of the aesthetic dimension of the pleasurable and the painful in moral education has long been a psychological fact that moral theorists must give an account of.

Finally, the emotions are important because they express attitudes. The tone and tenor of an intentional action is frequently an important feature to

consider when assessing the character of that action. This idea is most apparent when the tone is inappropriate or untoward in some way. To express gratitude grudgingly, to keep an important and moral promise unwillingly or reluctantly, to say 'no' to a simple and reasonable request churlishly, are all aspects of actions that deserve evaluation. It is important to remember that the expression of these attitudes is an important vehicle for creating a sense of ethos.

Obviously, there are conceptual overlaps in these claims. The perceptual capacity influences judgment and is present in our responsive sensitivity to the feelings and needs of others. In principle, our judgment grounds the expression of attitudes, and the expression of attitudes is guided in part by aesthetic considerations. The aesthetic, particularly the idea of decorum, is governed by what we care about. Obviously, some of the strategic possibilities and problems inherent in each of these roles has long been recognized by rhetoricians in the past.

## The Plan of This Treatise

This study will explore in detail several of the six roles of emotion in deliberation. I will explore the role of salience by identifying and explaining the satisfaction conditions necessary for this perceptual capacity to function cognitively. I will also explore some of the roles emotion serves in deliberative judgment. These two functions are obviously important in their own right, but they are also prior to the other roles that emotion can play in deliberation. They are prior in two ways. First, they are prior in importance. Second, they are prior as a matter of procedural protocol in deliberation, and this claim does not preclude the real possibility that they are absent in cases of

bad practical reasoning. In fact, this observation will, on occasion, explain how such reasoning is deficient. The interdependence of these functions can be illustrated by recognizing that while judgment is prior to questions of importance and motivation, it is through these other two functions that judgment is made clear.

To achieve these goals, we must understand in more detail how these six functions operate in the deliberative search. The remainder of **Chapter I** will sketch a model of deliberation, and I will briefly indicate how these six functions operate in deliberation.

In **Chapters II** and **III,** I will explore in more detail each of the six functions of pathos in deliberation. I will discuss the roles of emotional perception and judgment in **Chapter II**. Many emotions are perceptual sensitivities that often serve as the starting point for our deliberations because we find that emotion salient. Yet perception and salience are subject to an important consideration. We perceive a situation from a certain point of view. One's role, or more broadly, one's sense of agency, crucially affects our capacity for emotional perception. The rest of the chapter will focus on the complexities of emotional judgment and the several persuasive methods that are available to affect those judgments. The issues of judgment will be presented within the framework of the five formal patterns that all emotional arguments participate in.

In **Chapter III** I will discuss the four remaining functions: importance, motivation, aesthetic consideration and the expressive potential inherently present. Like the account of judgment, I will also discuss the various methods we have to affect these functions rhetorically. The role of

importance often manifests itself through the strategies of amplification, but the crucial principle that makes its use clear is that of priority. Questions of motivation will lead to an investigation of the role of the emotions in more complex psychological states. I will discuss two ways emotions can be involved in more complex psychological states.

**Chapters IV, V** and **VI** will explore the formal and pragmatic conditions which must be satisfied if an emotion is to serve a legitimate role in deliberation. To accomplish this I will argue that certain classes of emotions serve deliberative ends, that these emotions are capable of achieving salience, and that the problems of relativity and point of view inherent in emotional perception can be adequately dealt with.

If the emotions tell us something about the world, they do so through what is called *salience*. Salience is the discovery of the internal relations of those beliefs, evaluations, desires and fears that constitute the emotion and which appropriately map onto the deliberative situation. If the emotions do tell us something about the world, then we must identify and explain the necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain for an emotion to serve this function. This will require a detailed examination of the conceptual and causal relations between an emotion and its objects. A case for this kind of objectivity must, obviously, be made. This exploration will be the first task of **Chapter IV**.

The investigation into the objects of the emotions will lead to two other issues. The cognitive structure of the emotions will help explain the semantics of adjectival expressions involving emotion terms. The nature of *propositional*

*objects*, the objects of expression of emotional states, will lead to a discussion of attitudes; and this discussion will set the stage for **Chapter V**.

In **Chapter V** I will argue that we have two classes of emotions that are important to deliberation. The first class, called the deliberative emotions, is central to this task and they share four properties. First, these emotions are constituted by beliefs and evaluations that are capable of comprehending both the actions of agents and their characters. Second, these particular evaluations are in part governed by and explained through what is called the *formal object* of that emotion. A formal object of an emotion is integral to the concept of each emotion. It is the evaluative category that makes the emotion rationally intelligible. The formal objects of the deliberative emotions are those which are bound to the well-being and destinies of communities and individuals. Third, the deliberative emotions are members of families of governing sentiments, dispositions or virtues. The fact of this positioning is crucial for understanding the persuasive possibilities present for each emotion. Fourth, these emotions are particular responses to deliberative situations and are compatible with other allied deliberative emotions. The second class of emotions is simpler in structure and work in concert with the deliberative emotions. Finally, in this chapter I will explore these conditions by examining a group of four emotions--pity, indignation, fear and anger--which we frequently experience as part of our response to deliberative situations where harm and the questions of merit and desert are involved. This analysis will include a discussion of how the deliberative emotions are causally coordinated, and the chapter will conclude with a discussion of some

of the persuasive techniques involved in arousing or extinguishing anger as an important deliberative emotion.

Yet we must also explain how the problems of relativity and point of view of those in the deliberative situation work with and modify this objectivity for salience to be achieved. **Chapter VI** will address both problems by exploring the several strategies we have for producing emotional arguments. I will explore six strategies in this chapter.

We have lived far too long in ignorance about this complex and pervasive mode of persuasion. This study is an attempt to reveal some of those conditions and principles which govern this vital dimension of persuasion.

**An Aristotelian Conception of Deliberation**

Of the several vibrant theories of deliberation and practical reasoning commanding attention today, the Aristotelian conception is certainly one of the strongest. Part of its strength is acknowledged in the fact that many of Aristotle's arguments and insights are shared by rival conceptions, both ancient and modern. A clear example of this may be found in the work of the Stoics. While the Stoics take issue with many of Aristotle's arguments, they frequently do so in the context of accepting other arguments out of which the point of disagreement has arisen. For instance, Seneca disagrees with Aristotle's understanding of the role of anger in life. As Martha Nussaum argues, the reader of *de Ira* will proceed through two of the three books which comprise the work before any points of philosophical disagreement arise between the Stoic and Aristotelian conception of that emotion. (*Therapy* 402-438). Contemporary explorations by ethical philosophers who loosely are called realists acknowledge their debt to Aristotle. The work of writers like

John McDowell, Mark Platts and Martha Nussbaum, for instance, build on specific arguments first offered by Aristotle.[3] In particular, many of Aristotle's ideas concerning the emotions and the idea of pathos continue to articulate the directions of inquiry we currently take in trying to understand this diffuse area of concern.

The catholic quality of an Aristotelian conception of rationality is strengthened by a second crucial feature inherent in this approach. Aristotle advocated a practical and empirical procedure of inquiry that is sufficiently general and inclusive so that no possible approach is excluded from the beginning of that inquiry. The strengths of this procedure have been advocated by diverse thinkers. Henry Sidgwick advocated this procedure in *The Methods of Ethics*, and more recently John Rawls recommended its adoption in *A Theory of Justice*.[4] As we recognize today, no starting point for this inquiry is entirely neutral; to use a current metaphor, there is no archimedean starting point (Williams, *Ethics* 22-29). Yet Aristotle's starting point has proved not only resilient, it has also proved to be as, if not more, inclusive than its rivals.

Finally, the Aristotelian conception offers a sophisticated conception of the deliberative agent in ways that articulate the relationships between how we feel and respond to how we think and judge. Aristotle offers a compelling account of the relationship between virtue and reason, the passions and reason, and the virtues and the passions that cannot be ignored.

Despite the power of his insights, there is much in Aristotle's conception that remains obscure. We are fortunate that Aristotle has had such able scholars in this century to explicate, comment upon, and interpret his

writings. The first major exploration of his conception of deliberation was done by D. J. Allen.[5] But the seminal exploration of Aristotle's conception of deliberation in this century is widely accepted to be "Deliberation and Practical Reason" by David Wiggins (215-238). Wiggins begins by questioning several of Allen's interpretative judgments concerning several passages in Books III and VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Through exegesis, illuminating paraphrase and interpretation, Wiggins clarifies many confusing features of Aristotle's discussion of deliberation. He concludes his analysis with a discussion of seven features that define the character of Aristotelian deliberation. I want to draw on those final insights to help characterize the role of the emotions in deliberation.

This task of articulation will also involve using the conceptual distinctions recently articulated by Lawrence Blum. In his recent work, *Moral Perception and Particularity*, Lawrence Blum argues that a particular act of moral perception and judgment involves seven analytically distinct steps or stages (30-61). Blum's account is relevant and useful for three reasons. First, he is concerned with providing a conceptual account of the phenomena of moral perception and its relationship to moral judgment, both of which are central concerns of deliberation. Second, his explanation of these phenomena is formal in nature; it is successful to the extent that it makes clear those steps which any normative theory must give substance to. Finally, the six functions I am exploring participate in and help inform those stages. His formal account will help locate these six functions and the potential roles the emotions play in deliberation.

Ordinary deliberation is not, typically at least, a matter of technical calculation of probabilities toward some determinant outcome, nor is it predominantly the instantiation of some rule or principle in a particular situation. Deliberation often begins with the question, "What shall I do?" and demands a search for an answer or response to a particular situation or context. We face a problem or an opportunity. We are presented, tacitly at least, with a choice. This choice implies the possibility of a decision and decisions have aims and ends. Neither means-end reasoning nor rule-case reasoning can proceed until we are able to articulate what the aim of deliberation in this situation should be (Wiggins 230-231). They are, in fact, processes that occur much later in the deliberative search.

Lawrence Blum offers a more accurate description of the opening stage of deliberation. He discerns seven steps or stages in moral perception and judgment. The first stage involves "the accurate recognition of a situation's features" (58). We take a situation to be of a certain character and describe it so. Frequently, several properties of the situation elicit an emotional response. We may experience an emotion of delight or distress if we are attending to the problem in the present tense. Yet we may also initially attend to the prospects suggested by the situation; we can sense something desiderative or fearful in the implicit choice to be made. In either case, the emotional perception serves as a starting point for our deliberations. When we see the deliberative situation in terms of some emotion, the features of the situation are made salient. Second, we recognize those features as having a certain kind of significance. The two stages may be thought of as the two components of moral or practical perception, but they are distinct. To

perceive another person as suffering, for example, is to characterize it a certain way, but to see that suffering as morally significant is an exercise in judgment. The first two roles that emotions play in deliberation are a functional part of this broader perceptual capacity (Blum 58).

The third and fourth stages concern the matter of whether someone should become engaged in the situation. Stage three involves the raising of the question whether to become involved or not. It is tempting to characterize this step as a choice between passivity or engagement, but it is not as simple as this (Blum 58). We find situations where we are too remote from the problem to do any good. We also find situations troubling, yet we also recognize that our own involvement would just make the matter worse. Furthermore, we may discover that we have identified the relevant concern in a certain deliberative situation, yet we are unable to find any acceptable way to address that concern. One can, quite rationally, will the end without willing the means (Wiggins 232-233). We can do this because deliberation is Janus-faced. We not only look forward toward the end, discovering possible ways to attain that goal; we also look backward from the point of view of the end itself to test whether a proposed means adequately satisfies the end in all relevant aspects.

Stage four occurs when we judge whether or not we should, in fact, take action. But the wants and desires of the deliberating agent are not 'given'. No theory of practical reasoning can be viewed as adequate if it takes the wants and concerns of a deliberating agent as a closed and complete system. We cannot assume these concerns are closed, in part, because the wants and goals of the individuals deliberating are presupposed by but not expressed in, their reasoning. We often revise our desires and wants within the processes of

deliberation. We also cannot make this assumption because it is of the essence of deliberation that these concerns make competing and inconsistent claims (Wiggins 231-232). Inconsistent desires are not like inconsistent beliefs. With inconsistent beliefs we reject the one that is false and, as it were, move on. To reject one desire in favor of another does not entail the elimination of the rejected desire. Our emotions obviously play important roles here. That which engages our attention is that which we find important in some way. Care, concern, compassion and pity all invest a situation with significance.

The emotions that involve one's agency share four characteristics that help to explain their roles here. These emotions have desiderative, fearful or evaluative conditions in the forms of beliefs, attitudes and judgments. These beliefs comprehend their objects, that is, the relevant features of the deliberative situation, and they evaluative comprehend the actions and characters of agents. The specific beliefs that constitute the emotion fall under an evaluative category, called the formal object of the emotion. The formal object of the emotion conceptually links the beliefs within the emotion to other kinds of judgments (Lyons, *Emotion* 100). Since the emotions do not occur in isolation, they serve as signs of deeper dispositions, traits and virtues, and these more stable aspects of character become activated. Finally, these deeper aspects of character make coordinate the range and types of emotions that one is capable of experiencing. We may experience several emotions that are compatible with our sense of agency and the deliberative situation.

Likewise, decisions to act or not are bound to issues of motivation and the perception of future goods or harms are understood, in part at least, as what is desirable or fearful (Blum 58-59). We also recognize that there are

different kinds of goods, extrinsic and intrinsic goods, instrumental and final goods, and so on. And within these kinds of goods there is a plurality of objects and activities which exemplify that kind of good. Furthermore, such concerns may themselves be subject to change and alteration as imagination and reflection play upon the possibilities, wants and desires found in the deliberative context. This is so because an activity may be good in different ways according to different contexts and aims.

In essence, deliberation is a search for what qualifies as an adequate and realizable specification of what would satisfy the want that animated that act of deliberation. The fifth stage requires that we select or make articulate that principle or maxim which is applicable (Wiggins 234, Blum 59). The task of finding an adequate specification led Aristotle to deploy the metaphor of aiming, of hitting the target, as an apt characterization of deliberation as a *zetesis*, a search. This stage is important. Offenses and harms, for example, are usually analyzable under several different principles. When we encounter suffering we may recognize that several possible principles can come into play. The rule, "Alleviate suffering," may invoke two further principles. We may consider the principle of beneficence which demands that we do good for another, or we may consider the principle of nonmaleficence which demands that we refrain from harming another.

The indeterminate character of our values and goals expressed in deliberation is constitutive of our human freedom and, for finite mortals facing an indefinite number of contingencies with limited powers of prediction and imagination is constitutive of practical rationality itself (Wiggins 233). Selecting a principle which best governs the situation is,

obviously, a crucial task. The sixth stage is that which determines what act best instantiates the principle selected in stage five (Blum 60). Stages five and six have been called 'specification,' the process by which principles are brought to bear on a situation, and it includes the tasks of coordinating the relevant applicable norms that articulate various levels of generality and particularity.[6]

There are two sets of operations working here and both use spatial metaphors. When expressed as a metaphor, specification lies at the opposite end of a 'vertical' continuum from abstraction. Our specifications are further enhanced by considering what is relevantly similar and different in related situations. The continuum of similarity and analogy can be posed as a 'horizontal' axis intersecting the vertical one.[7]

One's specification of an act for the chosen end must satisfy several conditions. When we specify an action we make substantive qualification to the application of the principle covering the end that is chosen. For example, one must will the conditions necessary for achieving that end. If good health is my chosen end then I must exercise regularly, eat a proper diet, and get adequate rest; each of these conditions are necessary for attaining good health. What is necessary for obtaining a goal is not the same as what is sufficient to bring about the end. there are occasions where we must create those conditions that are sufficient to bring about the goal. It is common in the final minutes of close basketball games to foul the opposing team's worst foul shooter. The trip to the foul line is made necessary by the rules but it is also a (usually) sufficient means to regain possession of the ball. Finally, and crucially for the argument from pathos in deliberation, there must be a

motivation to bring about the specified action. One's motivation to bring about the principle must transfer to the specified action which instantiates it.

The capacities inherent in our characters that govern our occurrent emotions are also described in terms of a spatial metaphor. The capacities within one's character or identity may be seen as a set of formal and causal relationships that is visualized in terms of a sphere. The closer one places a capacity near the core of the sphere, the more central that capacity is in one's character. We perceive the features of a deliberative situation and those perceptions are evaluated and made significant and thus activate deeper aspects of one's character. Through the offices of specification these evaluations move 'outward' and are given their particular emotional motivation and expression. Significantly, these deeper judgments can revise our emotional repertoire towards the situation and specify a new occurrent emotion that is requisite for the situation.

Wiggins argues that Aristotle's *phronimos*, the individual of practical wisdom, is that person who can bring to bear on a deliberative situation the greatest number of relevant concerns commensurate with the importance of the context (233). The question of what counts as the best practical syllogism is not a question of numerical superiority of concerns, nor is it simply a question of the unconditional acceptability of its major premise. The best practical syllogism is evaluated for its adequacy to the situation. He suggests that there is an instructive analogy here with an important distinction made by Donald Davidson. There is a crucial difference between a judgment of probability taken in relation to judgments of probability relative to evidence,

and a decision, taken in relation to judgments of the desirability of an action, relative to such and such contextual facts. As Wiggins argues:

> inasmuch as the [practical] syllogism arises in a determinate context, the major premise is evaluated not for its unconditional acceptability, nor for its embracing more considerations than its rivals, but for its adequacy to the situation. It will be adequate for the situation if and only if circumstances that could restrict or qualify it and defeat its applicability at a given juncture do not in the practical context of this evidence obtain. (233-234)

This issue of adequacy implies a further conceptual consequence about the nature of deliberation. Wiggins argues that the goals and concerns of deliberating agents may be diverse and incommensurable in such a way that they need not constitute any sort of a basis for a psychological or empirical theory capable to make prediction possible. This inability is not a failure of giving an account of deliberation. The task of providing a perspicuous account of deliberation is not measured by predictive prowess; rather, it has as its subject the decision processes which are constantly deployed and redeployed on new situations and cast back over old ones (Wiggins 234). This adequacy is grounded in one's sense of 'reflective equilibrium', a concept first developed by John Rawls (54). In extreme cases, what is adequate will manifest itself as an issue of integrity.

The final stage concerns how best to perform the action selected (Blum 60). What would count as a successful act must include not only the end towards which the act aims to achieve, it also includes the manner in which the act will be carried out. The manner of one's expression, its tone and the

perspective indicated by one's attitudes are important here. The ancient idea of decorum is, clearly, one of the governing principles in this step.

The Argument From Pathos as a Dispositional Strategy

The experience of the emotions is largely a temporal matter. This temporal fact can be exploited as a matter of timing one's appeal. More precisely, we can say that this sense of timing, joined with the strategic function inherent in an emotion's point, affords the writer with opportunities to localize and target the type of appeal made and thus direct its intended effect at crucial points within a piece of deliberative discourse. In fact, the possibilities inherent in the argument from pathos help determine the dispositional strategies a writer can utilize. By examining the opportunities inherently present at different stages of an essay, one can see how each functions individually and how they can combine collectively in an essay.

The classical rhetoricians saw the possibilities inherent in the argument from pathos as dispositional strategies. Yet the classical discussions of arrangement are dense and conflicting. Their conflict is instructive because their accounts differ, in large part, over the role of pathos in deliberation. They were correct on one point, however. The argument from pathos occurs in stages and these particular stages have operational goals.

Aristotle argued, for instance, that two elements are essential for persuasion. One must state the issue (*prothesis*) and one must provide arguments for it and against the opposite claim (*pisteis*). An introduction and conclusion frame these two essential parts, making a total of four elements. Not surprisingly, different rhetorical occasions call for different dispositional strategies. This practical necessity led to further subdivisions of the parts of a

speech. Quintilian argued that there were five parts: *exordium, partitio, confirmatio, refutatio,* and *peroratio*. The anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* claimed there were six elements: *exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, refutatio, peroratio*. The different classifications of the parts of a speech were theoretical responses to account for the possibility of complications inherent in the issue at hand and the subsequently increased possibilities for pathos to work in deliberations.

The complications and further possibilities they found in actual discourse cannot be explained, however, by further subdividing the speech into smaller discrete operations. To do so is to confuse the function of the argument in question with its operation. Furthermore, they did not recognize that the different principles that govern these operations differ according to the aim of the discourse and canons of reasonableness that are relevant to that aim. The aim of an epideictic speech on the fourth of July which appeals to the audience's patriotism will differ markedly from the aim of a political advertisement on the radio which also appeals to the audience's sense of patriotism. What counts as a 'reasonable' patriotic inference in each will differ as the aims differ. The aim of the deliberative search will govern, in part, what satisfaction conditions must be met. These satisfaction conditions are usually formulated as rules. The rules governing the Socratic elenchos are designed to secure presumptive knowledge, while the rules that govern Aristotelian dialectic are designed to move us beyond presumption towards first principles. The principles governing satisfaction produce commitment rules and canons of relevance, as well as specifying how informative a piece of discourse should be. The satisfaction conditions sufficient to justify a

deliberative decision to take a certain course of action may differ from an inquiry and a critical discussion. These canons of reasonableness are subject to further qualification. Because deliberation is particular, the role of the participants becomes important. Many of the premises that make up individual arguments from pathos are presumptions. These premises must be acceptable to the author and the audience who are deliberating.

Both classical and contemporary rhetoricians agree on the functions and possibilities present in the introduction. The classical rhetoricians split the opening stage, conventionally called the introduction, into two parts, the *exordium* and the *narratio*. A successful *exordium* must satisfy three aims. The foremost task is to establish good will. Deliberation has trust as a necessary condition for its operation; and trust, in part, is a reliance on another's good will. There are four sources out of which this good will may be established: from the character of the author, from the character of the author's opponents, from the audience, and from the issue itself. Second, the author must make the audience attentive to what will follow. Attentiveness can be achieved typically through the novelty of the issue, by emphasizing its importance, by showing it is of concern to all, or by the fact that it is incredible. Finally, the *exordium* must make the audience receptive to the issues to be argued for. These three tasks should be thought of as necessary preparatory conditions for any type of deliberation. It is important to note that the three types of appeals made here are to those governing dispositions or attitudes that should operate in all acts of deliberation. They work to incline the audience towards the aim of the work.

The *narratio* sets forth the history of the problem. While there are many ways to achieve this purpose, the most straightforward way is by simply setting forth the facts, usually in a way that excites the expectations of the audience; it may be achieved by beginning with a digression, in a way which gives the impression that the digression itself has been forced on the writer by the force of some emotion; or through the use of some analogy or apt quotation, the significance of which will be coordinate with the problem at hand. A digression will succeed if the audience's impression of the focus of the emotion working on the author in that digression is, or can be seen to be, directed in the same way towards some related feature of the deliberative situation. The function of this strategy is expressive. An analogy will work if the focal property in the analogous situation is the same as that in the deliberative situation to which it refers. The property denoted in the analogous situation not only refers to that property; the analogous situation also serves as an exemplar of that property. Thus, the act of reference exemplifies the property, making it relevant to the deliberative situation. The function of this strategy is perceptual. Finally, a successful *narratio* will display three qualities: brevity, clarity and plausibility.

All deliberation arises from a problem, a question or controversy to be resolved. Because what is at issue has two sides, the issue must be clarified so that the goal of the deliberation can be understood. This is the task of the *partitio*. The conceptual nature of the dispute determines what sort of obligations the writer has to satisfy. In a criminal court case, for example, the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. The defense does not have to prove the defendant

innocent; it has to demonstrate reasonable doubt, a lesser burden of proof. When the obligation of one participant in a dispute is greater for one than the other we have *asymmetrical* obligations. In civil cases, typically, the level of obligation is the same for both parties. In a show cause hearing for nonsupport, the custodial parent must show that the defendant was and is capable of meeting the contractual obligations of the custody agreement. The defendant must show that the conditions for legal obligation do not obtain or that that he or she cannot be expected to meet those obligations. The persuasive obligations for both participants are *symmetrical*: the plaintiff must prove the opposite thesis of the defendant and the defendant must prove the opposite thesis of the plaintiff (Walton *Informal Logic* 11-12).

When the obligations are symmetrical, the claims are strongly opposed; when the obligations are asymmetrical, the claims are weakly opposed. Strong opposition carries the commitment of proving the opposite thesis; weak opposition carries the obligation of questioning and testing each particular claim, but it does not require proving the opposite thesis. The distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical persuasive obligations becomes important when an author considers what sorts of cognitive attitudes can and should come into play and how those attitudes can be aroused. The cognitive attitudes of doubt and skepticism will serve as a useful example. In an asymmetric dispute, the party with the lesser burden of proof can target a local skepticism against the opposition's argument; doubts can be specific. In symmetrical disputes the use of doubts and skeptical arguments are, by themselves, insufficient; they must be counterbalanced by arguments that

build confidence or enhance trust in the positive argument propounded (Walton, *Informal Logic* 12-13).

Logically, the claim that is made can be expressed positively or negatively. A positive claim can be formulated as "It is the case that X," and negative claims can be formulated as "It is not the case that X." Claims can be singular, only one claim is advanced; or they may be complex, when more that one claim is advanced. For example, if someone were to argue against current welfare system he or she may claim, "The welfare system doesn't work; it doesn't encourage a work ethic, and it doesn't foster a sense of self-worth." The claim is complex, more than one thesis is advanced; but the claim is unmixed, all the claims are asserted in the same form. If the claim were phrased, "The welfare system doesn't work; it encourages laziness, and it doesn't foster a sense of self-worth," we say the claim is complex and mixed; the logical form of the claims differ (Walton *Informal Logic* 12-13).

The observations just made may seem too obvious to require mentioning, but they have important implications for the argument from pathos. Complex claims allow one the possibility to target specific emotions for each of the claims individually. A claim that concerns a present evil will have the emotions from the genus of distress as possible candidates; a claim concerning a present good will have emotions from the genus of delight as possible candidates; a claim concerning a future apparent evil will have emotions from the genus of fear as candidates; and a claim concerning a future good will have emotions from the genus of desires as candidates. Furthermore, a claim that is advanced affirmatively carries a different tenor from one advanced negatively. Emotions are also comprehended in terms of their contraries; by

examining the persuasive strength of a possible emotion and its contrary in terms of the claim and the deliberative aim of the essay one can make an informed choice. Complex, mixed claims will take advantage of the persuasive possibilities afforded by the respective strengths of the emotions linked to those claims.

The opportunity to sequence and build on the emotions evoked with the exploration of each successive claim becomes a real possibility. We also recognize that the arguments advanced in deliberation can be divided into those that directly confirm the thesis and those that refute or undermine the arguments of the rival position. While the satisfaction conditions necessary for the argument from pathos to work will be discussed in detail later, it will be helpful to make several brief observations now. Emotional appeals that form a part of one's argument must conform to some principle of relevance; as a normative matter we do not want irrelevancies and premature closure to influence a deliberative decision. This relevance is complicated by the fact that these arguments are, as a matter of logic, weak; they typically participate in fallible reasoning because they are based on presumptions. Fallibility is not always the crucial issue when we consider these arguments. The questions of one's agency, one's ability to respond, and the manner of that response, are crucial issues to be clarified as a part of the satisfaction conditions that govern the normative use of the argument from pathos.

The agreement on the functions of the conclusion, like the lore concerning introductions, has remained stable for centuries. We should strive to do four things in a conclusion: We should inspire the audience with a favorable opinion of ourselves and an unfavorable opinion of our opponents.

We should amplify the force of the points made earlier and diminish the force of the points made by the opposition. We should arouse the appropriate emotion in our audience. We should enumerate in summary fashion our arguments and facts. As these recommendations suggest, the emotional appeal that forms a part of one's conclusion is a matter of timing one's climax. The issue of trust, begun in the introduction, comes to its climax as the bridge that joins the several appeals of pathos made throughout the essay and the ethos the author has created. The audience will feel that trust as result of the author's candor and fidelity to the audience's well-being. These two conditions are constituent parts of the virtue of honesty. Both candor and fidelity will be experienced as a part of the author's emotional appeals. Amplification of one's own points can be achieved in various ways, but it is necessary to invest one's expression of that position with the importance it deserves. This may be achieved through register by matching the level of one's diction to the gravity of the situation, or it may be achieved through figurative resources of language. Perhaps the most obvious use of emotional appeal in a conclusion is an appeal that affects the temper of one's audience. In his famous "blood, toil, tears and sweat" speech to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940, Churchill could count on the *ad populum* appeal in the face of the evil of the Nazi threat to arouse his audience. Although these are the most obvious types of emotional appeals that appear in a conclusion, they are the ones most fraught with danger. As Cicero sardonically notes, we should save these direct emotional appeals for the end because nothing dries faster than the tears of sympathy.

We can now turn to the six functions that the emotions serve to see in more detail how they work.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER I

[1] This issue has been the subject of much recent inquiry. Several crucial arguments debunking the importance of 'feelings', necessary for making way for the cognitive issues can be found in Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949) chap. IV. One of the most important and pathbreaking studies of the cognitive nature of the emotions in this century is Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). Robert Solomon offers an exciting, if controversial, view of the emotions in *The Passions* (Garden City, N Y: Anchor P, 1976). The next major and quite clear study is William Lyons, *Emotion* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1980). An important collection of essays, some of which bear on this topic is Amelie Rorty ed., *Explaining Emotions* (Berkeley: U of Calif P, 1980). Two powerful studies appeared in the same year: Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge: MIT O, 1987); and, Robert M. Gordon, *The Structure of Emotion* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987.

[2] See, for example, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford UP, 1991) Book II; all subsequent references will be to this text and they will be made to the Bekker numbers in the text. While Cicero makes useful observations in his rhetorical works, these comments are enhanced by his other writings, especially, *Tusculan Disputations* trans, J. E. King (London: Harvard UP, 1927); Cicero, *On Duties* M. T. Griffin ed. E. M. Atkins trans. (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991). Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* trans. H. E. Butler 4 vols. (London: Harvard UP, 1920). A.A. Long and D. N. Sedley eds. and trans., *The Hellenistic Philosophers* vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987) 410-423. The standard collection of observations on Stoic passion theory is Johannes von Arnim ed., *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* vol. 3 ( Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964) 94-133.

[3] See for example, John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," ; Mark Platts, *Ways of Meaning* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) 243-264. Martha Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge* (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 54-105.

[4] See Henry Sidgwick, "Preface to the Sixth Edition," in *The Methods of Ethics* 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett P, 1981) xvi-xxiii; and John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971) 46-53; Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, 23-29, 50, 172-174.

[5] D. J. Allen's contributions are important and significant. See for example, "Aristotle's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," *Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy*, Brussels, August 20-26, 1953 12 (Amsterdam 1953): 120-127.

[6] Perhaps the most detailed discussion of 'specification' is by Henry Richardson, *Practical Reasoning About Final Ends* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1995) 69-88.

[7] The idea is implicit throughout Aristotle's *Topics*; the idea of the vertical continuum for abstraction is discussed by Richardson 245.

# CHAPTER II

## PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT

> The passions are the only orators who always convince. They have a kind of natural art with infallible rules; and the most untutored man filled with passion is more persuasive than the most eloquent orator without.
>
> La Rochefoucauld

When we deliberate well we bring to bear all of the relevant concerns commensurate with the importance of the situation. These relevant concerns frequently include emotional considerations. In this chapter and the next I will explore the six broad ways in which the emotions function in good deliberation. In this chapter I will focus on the emotions as perceptual sensitivities and as constituent elements of judgment. In some cases I will explore the conditions necessary for that function to have persuasive force; in others I will explore various ways these functions operate as sufficient conditions to effect the writer's persuasive end.

Before turning to these interdependent functions, I need to make two observations. The first observation is a commonplace about emotional persuasion. Emotional persuasion works in two possible ways. A writer can *evoke* an emotion. Evocation can be explained in terms of spech act theory. Evocation requires a deliberate illocutionary act that produces a particular perlocutionary effect. Evocation produces that perlocutionary effect whose achievement is direct in the sense that the audience need not be consciously aware of the author's explicit intention to play on the targeted emotion. The power inherent in the emotion is such that it can affect the audience's

sensibilities directly. The functions of perception, judgment and motivation are evocative strategies of persuasion. An emotional argument's perlocutionary effect can also be *expressive*. An expressive effect is one where the audience is conscious of some aspect of the manner of the appeal. The audience recognizes that some persuasive resource--meaning, tone, syntax, illocutionary force or the locution itself--is consciously used. The devices that help comprise figurative language, particularly the schemes, are expressive in this sense. Matters dealing with the writer's sense of agency, decorum and attitudes are, typically, expressive functions of the argument from pathos. The techniques of emotional expression are successful when the writer's intentions and judgment are represented through language so that the audience can evaluate those manifestations as signs of the writer's ethos.

In order to be able to generate a set of topics, whether they are principles or tactical maneuvers, one must be able to specify the success conditions necessary for an appeal to work, and one must be able to specify the satisfaction conditions that guarantee that the appeal is normatively appropriate. We know, as a formal matter, that every instance of an argument from pathos can be described in one of four ways. An argument can be successful or unsuccessful. The criterion of success names those conditions which must obtain if the argument is to be efficacious. We also know that an argument can work, in the sense that it produces the desired end, but we may also recognize that the argument is not normatively satisfactory. An argument can be satisfactory if it meets the truth conditions or some set of normative conditions that make the appeal legitimate.

Third, it is possible for an argument to be normatively legitimate and thus satisfactory but also be unsuccessful; it fails to produce its desired end. Finally, we can have an argument that is both unsatisfactory and unsuccessful. This failure can occur in one of two ways. An argument may not succeed because it is unsatisfactory, and an argument may fail independently of the fact that it is unsatisfactory.

The Success Conditions Necessary for an Emotional Appeal

An argument from pathos is *successful* if it meets four necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient to make the argument efficacious. First, an argument is successful if the targeted emotion serves its intended function in terms of the deliberative aim. We judge these arguments in terms of their effects. The content of the appeal must be rationally related to the deliberative aim. Emotions have identificatory and causal beliefs and evaluations that structure them. The identificatory beliefs pick out the relevant properties; the causal beliefs cause us to undergo the emotion. It is tempting, but mistaken, to think that the success of an appeal corresponds to the arousal of the causal beliefs present in the cognitive structure of the targeted emotion thereby eliciting the emotion. In this case, 'success' means efficacious causation through this belief; thus, the satisfaction conditions would correspond to the identificatory beliefs that cause one to focus on the relevant properties of its object. 'Satisfaction' would obtain if the identificatory beliefs appropriately map onto the deliberative situation. While these two conditions must obtain for an appeal to be successful, this account does not explain how an emotional appeal works. This idea fails because none of the functions that the emotions serve in a deliberative search correspond to

such a conceptual division of an emotion. Furthermore, an emotional appeal is successful if it attains its *formal object.* The formal object of an emotion is the evaluative category in the form of a description that justifies the selection of the particular properties of the actual object of the emotion. The evaluation present in the formal object of the particular emotion must serve the intended function of the argument which is defined in terms of the deliberative aim. The higher order evaluation in the emotion's formal object also allows one to more adequately judge the content of the appeal. The beliefs and judgments operating at both levels within the targeted emotion are necessary for that end to be served.

We not only judge these arguments by their effects, the author's purpose in using the targeted emotion must match its function. This condition is required because there must be a connection between the author's purpose and the argument's function. We do not want an argument's success to be a matter of accident. An argument's perlocutionary effect must be attributable to the argument's content. Yet it is not enough to say that an argument is relevant to the situation for it to be successful; this condition is necessary because we need to be able to explain an argument's success. Overdetermination, the explanatory embarrassment of having more than one acceptable account of an effect, must be avoided.

Although we have described the roles of the emotions within the deliberative search as serving some function, it is a commonplace of every discussion of this form of argumentation to recognize that a successful appeal depends on timing. The notion of timing can be refined in two ways. Timing manifests itself as a dispositional strategy; successful, overt appeals usually

occur as a part of the conclusion. Quintilian was the first, I believe, to argue that the ground for an overt appeal must be carefully prepared. The audience must be prepared for the use of the emotional appeal. Thus, the audience must also be disposed to experience and accept the emotional appeal, and this happens when their attention, interest and sensitivities have been directed towards the targeted emotion. The third condition necessary for an emotional appeal to be successful is the necessary exercise of these preparatory conditions. The first condition addresses the cognitive and evaluative content of the appeal: the second condition addresses the need for its strategic use to be intelligible; the third condition prepares the audience for the appeal.

Finally, what I want to suggest here is that there must be an economy of effort in the argument that is related to its effect. An argument must be just as strong as it need be to achieve its aim. The extent to which an appeal is relevant will correspond to the extent of effort that is required to process it is small. The idea here is related to Paul Grice's cooperative principles of quantity and manner, but the relation of effort specified is one of the necessary conditions for establishing the logical relevance of the appeal (Grice, *Logic and Conversation* 28; Sperber and Wilson 125).

We can now turn to a discussion of the success and satisfaction conditions necessary for the emotions to serve as a perceptual capacity and for an emotion to be an element of judgment.

## Emotion as a Perceptual Capacity

First, some emotions, like compassion, pity and concern, serve a *perceptual* role in deliberation.[1] These emotions make us sensitive to certain features of the particular deliberative situation by focusing on the relevant

properties possessed by the objects of our concern. These properties are targeted through the act of emotional perception and are brought into relief. Pity, for example, focuses on the properties of significant and undeserved misfortune. This perceptual sensitivity inherent in the cognitive structure of the emotion itself enables us to discern what is salient. Salience is achieved when some feature of the deliberative situation is understood in terms of the requisite emotion.

Some perceptual matters deliver themselves to us. Imagine that a student comes to your office to explain why he doesn't have his essay. The tale is told the first time complete with facts and details. A question is asked. The student's intentions are rehearsed. A second comment is made and the student tells the tale a third time. Here the question of feelings arise. Is it regret, embarrassment, or disappointment he feels? We sense that the student's feelings don't fit the situation, and there is something here we mistrust. Since there are no feelings to suppress in the relating of facts, and we have, since childhood, considerable practice in manipulating expressions between apparent and actual intention, nothing appears amiss in the first two accounts of the problem. It is, however, difficult to suppress an actual emotion or to simulate the appropriate emotion, either of which are necessary for the third account to be successful. Such simulation is difficult to achieve because the ability to express and recognize the emotions is natural and prelinguistic. Candor is the spontaneous, frank, and open expression of one's emotions. As such, candor is an emotional quality that is difficult to dissemble. We sense that the student is lying about his paper. In this case, the sensitivity we experience is grounded in the emotion of trust. The emotion of trust grounds

the relationship, and a deviation from those expectations which are grounded in another's good will generates the perception of mistrust.

On other occasions the exercise of the perceptual capacity is dynamic. Imagine that it is the first week of school. Your daughter, a first grader, boards the overcrowded school bus with her first art project, a paper puppet, an accomplishment of which she is proud. Two fourth grade boys take the puppet, play with it mockingly and shred it before her. She is devastated and angry. The comfort and sympathy we express as parents is cued in part by the emotions of our daughter; the anger we feel on her behalf is likewise governed in part by her own. To respond properly we must understand not only the facts of the situation but also the significance those facts hold for our daughter. The parent's sensitivity to the situation is dynamic; the parent's specific perceptions change as the girl works through the implications of her emotional response to the situation.

These two examples reveal the two functions of salience in an occurrent setting. First, the deliberative problem is discerned, initially at least, in terms of an emotional perception. We begin to see what is at stake, and to do this we must be able to perceive sensitively the situation in all of its particularity. These emotions concentrate and direct the mind's attention. Second, salience serves as one of the starting points for deliberation. The perception implies, however vaguely, that there is some opportunity for acting for good or for ill in this situation.

But the starting point is affected by another consideration. In both cases the perceptions are directed, in part, by the role the perceiver plays. The example involving the first grader is instructive. Significantly, one need

not be a parent to share the perceptions in this case. Cruelty and injustice are the subjects of moral judgment, and if a child relates this story and resentment is felt on the girl's behalf it is because we believe that no one should be treated this way. If, however, you are the girl's parent and anger is felt, it is because *this* person, *my* child, should not be treated this way. If the story concerns a child you know and is related second hand, anger or resentment may be felt. But if the story concerns a child not known to you and is heard second hand, then the emotion of indignation will be experienced on the child's behalf. The relationship specifies which retributive emotion will be felt.

The teacher example reveals a different aspect of how role can affect perception. As Lawrence Blum argues, teachers serve a role characterized by a set of obligations and permissions that apply to *anyone* serving that role. These obligations exist independently of the personality and interests of the individual occupying that role. Although those expectations are objective they do not extend to everyone, they only apply to persons occupying that role. Thus, a teacher's individual perceptions will be filtered through those commitments and obligations. Many choose an occupation because the commitments, obligations and ideals that role embodies speak specifically to the individual. These people have chosen a *vocation*. A vocation is a role where one feels a greater sense of moral force in the obligations than one simply occupying a role.[2] A vocation also differs from a role in that the individual's well-being is partly constituted by successfully exemplifying the excellences of that role ("Vocation" 173-197). Roles are species of the genus of relationships and these include familial relationships (father, mother, child, brother, sister and so on) as well as friendships. Our perceptions can also be

communally based. Robert E. Lee fought for the South because he saw himself as a Virginian first and an American second. Communal identifications are not just geographic; they can be political, ideological, religious and racial.

When the features of a deliberative situation become salient, they do so through what we take to be our relevant sense of agency relative to the situation. This sense of agency is, in part, characterized by our sense of identity; and that sense of agency further characterizes us as an individual, as a moral agent, or as acting from some role or relationship or through an identificational sense of membership. Thus our perceptions, judgments and motivations may emanate from a personal sense of the good or from an impersonal sense of duty.

Furthermore, our perceptual capacities are not limited temporally. Frequently, part of the deliberative search requires us to reflect on what has gone before. Regret, with its use of counterfactual considerations, is past looking. Reflection, along with reasoning and imagination, has long been recognized as a relevant consideration in deliberation. Through our reflections the present and the future (within the scope of our deliberative aim) should 'fit' with what has gone before. In fact, we find ourselves in deliberative situations where our discernment of the particular situation matches our considered judgments concerning the governing principles that should apply there. This match is discovered through the processes of critical reflection and self examination where we test both the particular perceptions and the larger principles that are relevant. John Rawls has argued that we can give a name to the correctly discerned and desired end of the deliberative search, a search that includes such reflections. 'Reflective equilibrium' is that

state one reaches "after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or he has held fast to his original convictions" (48). I am, clearly, only mentioning this crucial idea here. Different aspects of it will be argued for in each subsequent chapter.

On occasion, however, we find that there is a mismatch between the particular and the universal. Significantly, the emotions can play one of two roles here. While both beliefs and emotions are intentional, the structure of intentionality in the emotions is not the same as the structure of intentionality in one's beliefs. Changes in the structure of this intentionality in the emotions do not immediately follow changes in the structure of our beliefs. Emotions possess a kind of tenacity and inertia that beliefs lack. When we revise our beliefs about some principle, the emotions linked to those beliefs resist immediate revision. Quite generally, what now looks fair may still feel foul. Conversely, a change in the intentional set of the emotions can precede a change in our beliefs. What now feels fair may still look foul. While these general characterizations are, I believe, correct, achieving a state of reflective equilibrium in an occurrent setting is highly individual. Some of these individual features can be illustrated by the deliberations of Huck Finn.

Huck Finn's decision to steal Jim out of slavery is a particular illustration of how salience can operate reflectively. Huck begins his deliberations with an evaluation concerning Jim's plight, "Once I said to myself it would be a thousand times better for Jim to be a slave at home where his family was, as long as he'd *got* to be a slave." Predicting what Miss Watson's and the community's emotional responses to Jim would be, Huck immediately

decides against this. Miss Watson's anger and disgust towards Jim's conduct would lead her to sell him down the river. Society would despise Jim for being ungrateful, and this judgment would have deleterious consequences for his daily equanimity. Huck posits these emotional responses as reasons, and they are reasonable ones. They are reasonable inferences for two reasons. Miss Watson's anger and the community's hatred are intelligible because we can *expect* that sort of a response *from* members of a slave society. What they expect is governed by what they would appeal to to justify those emotions. For example, when someone commits a sin or a crime, say, there are certain emotional responses that are considered appropriate. These emotions are appropriate, in part, because they help to organize or disrupt our experience of that situation. Emotions not only guide our experience, they constrain us in ways that are seen as helpful to ourselves or to society. But we also know that their appropriateness is also governed by the truth or rightness of the beliefs which ground the response. A false or wrong belief is still a belief. As we know, Huck will deny the propriety of society's response.

Huck feels the force of these expectations when he considers how his own participation will be viewed. He characterizes those judgments in terms of the response he is expected to feel:

> It would get all around, that Huck Finn helped a nigger to get his freedom; and if I was to ever see anybody from that town again, I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots for shame. That's just the way: a person does a low-down thing and then he don't want to take no consequences of it.
> Thinks as long as he can hide it, it ain't no disgrace. (281)

Huck's thinking is governed by what is expected. Actually, his thinking is deeper than his expressed reasons. He confuses two kinds of expectation. He conflates the conduct he knows society expects *from* him with what he thinks society expects *of* him.

Fearing that people like him go to hell, Huck decides to pray; but he cannot pray. That Huck cannot be a hypocrite is evidence of the honesty of his moral center. Huck then writes to Miss Watson. He sits thinking,

> --thinking how good it was all this happened so, and how near I come to being lost and going to hell. And went on thinking. And got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before me, all the time, in the day, and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a floating along, talking, and singing, and laughing. But somehow I couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n, stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see how glad he was when I come come back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the swamp, up there where the feud was; and such-like times; and would always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old Jim had in the world, and the *only* one he's got now; and then I happened to look around and see that paper. (282-283)

The character of Jim and his future is made salient in these reflections. Huck finds that the fate of his friend is more important than what he takes to be society's principles. The moment of deliberative decision has arrived:

> It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a trembling, because I got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself:
>
> "All right, then, I'll *go* to hell" --and tore it up. (283)

Huck decides to save his friend, believing that he has yielded to emotional and moral weakness. His decision is actually an act of moral and emotional defiance. It is an act of emotional defiance because he refuses to submit to the emotional double standard that requires that compassion for slaves be morally discounted.

The perceptual capacity inherent in the emotions actually involves two steps. First, the emotions in question are a form of perceptual sensitivity. Feelings and emotions are intentional perceptual capacities that inform and affect the character of good action. To see that a friend needs kindness, for example, is to perceive the situation via the feelings of friendship long before any articulated inference is expressed. In fact, the inference is informed by the feelings which help to direct the thought. To help a friend without any feelings at all would be to perform an act that is less praiseworthy than one done with sympathy. The emotions, in this sense, deliver what is salient to us. The beliefs and judgments in the emotions make us sensitive to and help us to recognize the important features of the situation. Second, these beliefs help us to assess the actual significance of those features (Blum, *Moral Perception* 58).

The explanatory challenge here is not to show that this capacity functions in these two ways; rather, the challenge lies in giving an account detailed enough to explain the complexities of what is at work here. There is a skeptical challenge whose answer reveals much of what is at stake here. Just as visual perception can be subject to hallucinations, say, emotional perception may be subject to the charge of projection. What we experience, it is said, are not the properties of the situation; rather, they are reflections and echoes of our own desires, fears, pleasures and pains. It is possible for one to

project an emotion onto a situation because this perceptual functioning depends on the antecedent structure of the beliefs and evaluations that make up the emotion. Perception is a kind of impulse whose good functioning depends on both the structure which articulates the perceived situation and the actual features to be perceived. They are potential forms of awareness that can be actualized through our own agency. We must also, therefore, be able to account for the problem of relativity. People's perceptual equipment, both physical and emotional, are in various states of health and working order. Perspective is the idea that we stand in relation to situations. Our distance from, as well as our familiarity with the situation, our depth of insight, and our attitudes all inform our perspective of the deliberative situation.

A practical insight of deliberative judgment will necessarily involve the emotions because a full recognition of the deliberative situation will be constituted not only by an appropriate response (which includes the feelings), but the discernment of a particular situation will also be guided, in part, by emotional and imaginative perception (Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge* 78-79). To use a visual metaphor, these feelings provide depth of field; without them what we could see would be flat, and flatness has the tendency to distort the image or the appearance. Emotion, along with reason, renders our perception stereoscopic in a way that either without the other would not be. Furthermore, we have a certain power here; the ability to be affected by some experiences and to be resistant to others is the capacity to be discriminatingly receptive and resistant.[3]

## Emotion and Judgment

Salience is achieved when we see the deliberative situation in terms of the judgment of some emotion. One sees the situation as having significance of a certain sort. If the situation is significant in the right way or to the right degree, this judgment leads the deliberator to consider whether it is possible to act or not; if it is possible to act, then the agent judges whether one should act or not. Deliberative discourse has an analogous set of choices. If the situation has salience, the writer considers first whether it is possible to and then whether one should deploy an argument from pathos.

One of the central commonplaces common to all theories of the passions is that one's emotions involve evaluative responses to situations that are conceptually distinct from, yet related to, the evaluations that motivate us to act for some end. To experience an emotional response like pity, exhilaration or jealousy is to be affected in some way, and this is qualitatively different from the desiderative power of emotions like anger, hatred and wrath. 'Being affected' and 'doing' are contraries, and they admit of degrees. This distinction is plain enough, but there are further distinctions within the domain of 'being affected' that need to be made if we are to understand its persuasive potential.

The global or holistic theories of the emotions proffered at different times in the history of western thought have taken this distinction as a starting point. These theories tend to group themselves into causal explanations and classificatory schemes. Aristotle and Aquinas, for example, explained the emotions in terms of their causes; and this approach led them, as it does all others offering a causal explanation, into pairing particular emotions with their contraries. Spinoza also offered a causal account. He

argued that there are three primitive passions--desire, joy and sadness. All of the other passions are complications of these three, and they are comprehended, in part, through their contraries. The heuristic power of conceiving the particular emotions in terms of their contraries was and is a powerful insight into the possibilities of persuasion.

In *A Treatise of Human Nature* David Hume divides the passions into two classes, the direct and the indirect passions. More recently, Robert Gordon offered another two-fold classificatory scheme; there are the factive emotions and the epistemic emotions. Perhaps the most sophisticated, modern classificatory scheme of emotion types is that offered by three psychologists, Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore and Allan Collins in *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (chapter 2). They argue that there are three major aspects of the world: events, agents and objects. We can focus on the consequences of events as they affect others or ourselves. Consequences for others are judged desirable or not. Consequences for ourselves focus on our relevant or irrelevant prospects. Actions focus on ourselves or others as agents. The judgments here focus on attributions of character or on matters of well-being. Objects are comprehended in terms of their power to attract. As admirable as this scheme is, and it is a powerful conceptual tool, it ignores crucial aspects of the role of time in the emotions, and it obscures issues of voluntary control in the desires as well as the causal dynamics present within the emotional episode. These problems make their model unsuitable for rhetorical analysis.

We need a scheme that emphasizes the cognitive structure of the emotions, what is voluntary in the emotional experience, and the causal dynamics of the emotional episode. The Stoics offer a classificatory scheme

that is theoretically powerful and is also directed at those dimensions of the emotions that are of direct concern for deliberation and rhetorical analysis. Yet the term 'Stoic' has long been linked with their philosophical therapies for the emotions. Actually, we must remember that the Stoic analysis of the emotions pursues two theoretical concerns. They were interested in the psychology of the emotions, and they were interested in developing philosophical therapies for those emotions. We may accept their analysis, or parts of it, without having to accept their therapies.

The Stoics took the distinction of being affected and doing from Aristotle and made a signal contribution to our understanding of the passions. They argued that we can make a four-fold classification of the passions. There are four basic passions: desire, fear, pleasure (or delight), and pain (or distress). 'Desire' names the most general impulse of appetition for future and apparent goods; 'fear' names the most general impulse to avoid future and apparent evils. The category of 'desire' includes such emotions as anger and its relatives, sexual desire, love, hatred, and spiritedness, among others. The category of 'fear' includes emotions like dread, hesitation, timidity, shame, panic, hysteria, and agony. 'Pleasure' (or delight) and 'pain' (or distress) name impulses of expansion or contraction in the soul (*pneuma*) (Long and Sedley 410-411). Pleasure includes such emotions as enchantment, enjoyment, rapture, malice and schadenfreude. Pleasure is an emotional state whose term is used descriptively; the moral rightness of the pleasure is distinct from one's experience of it. Pain includes grief, envy, jealousy, sorrow, depression, anguish, exasperation and vexation.[4] The emotions of delight are inherently good. An inherent good is one whose experience of or the contemplation of its

object is rewarding in itself. Conversely, the emotions of distress are inherently evil. One's experiences of these emotions, considered in isolation, have no rewarding characteristics; they are painful.

Their descriptions of the passions reveal three aspects of these emotions. The Stoics described these emotions phenomenologically, and these descriptions correspond closely to what we currently call affective reactions. Like the Stoics, we commonly describe our emotional responses in terms of physical states. Depression is a pain "which weighs one down." Exasperation is a pain "which crowds one and makes one short of room" (Diogenes Laertius 7. 111-112). It is important to emphasize that classical Greek and Latin, like current English, use 'pleasure' and 'pain' to refer to both bodily sensations and emotional states. They, like us, were not concerned with the physical; rather, they were concerned with the classes of emotions called delight and distress. Second, they describe these emotions as cognitive evaluations of those objects which are valuable to us. Our emotions are directed at the goods in our lives whose voluntary control is problematic.

Finally, they are concerned with the internal dynamics of the emotion. An emotion is an impulse, possessing its own internal motivational aim. Although each impulse is a kind of motivation, the particular impulses vary widely. These impulses are partially understood temporally. Anger has a definite starting point, and it culminates in the act of retribution. Its temporal manifestation suggests that it is a kind of performance. Love, on the other hand, is a state. It is continuative, not performative. The emotions of delight are temporally indexed to the present moment. While this is not problematic, reflection on the emotions of distress suggests potential problems. Guilt, for

example, is problematic. It is tempting to think of guilt as a temporal counterpart to anger. We may think that the climactic point in guilt is the act that initiates the emotional episode. It is, thus, past looking; but this notion overlooks two features of the emotion. If I feel guilt in a deliberative context, it is this present tense impulse that is important. If we are to focus on what is voluntary, we must be concerned with our present condition and the actions open to us. Second, we are concerned with the reparative potential in the emotion, not the destructive power that is there. The normative dimension of the emotion is prior in importance to its potentially crippling power.

Both Aristotle and the Stoics argued that desire and fear are primary passions; pleasure and pain are subordinate to them. Desires and fears are directed at getting or avoiding the apparent goods in question; in fact, they are defined by reference to the agent's expectations. Desires and fears are also primary because they can strategically influence the content and character of one's deliberative decision. Pleasure and pain follow as a result of the success or failure of the primary passions. Their asymmetric relationship can be explained by borrowing a distinction in speech act theory. The primary and secondary passions have different directions of fit. The aims of our desires and fears work to fit the world to our minds; the aims of the emotions in the classes of delight and distress work to fit the mind to the world (de Sousa 163).

The decision whether to deploy an emotional appeal or not depends in part on the character and agency of one's audience, and it depends on the nature of the situation. Questions relating to one's audience will be discussed in Chapter VI; I will consider several issues concerning the deliberative situation now.

Five Formal Patterns of Emotional Persuasion

When we deliberate about decisions that admit the use of the argument of pathos, we recognize that there are, broadly speaking, two types of deliberative situations that invite this form of argument. We can be concerned with a future good or harm, or we can be concerned with a problem that is now before us. This temporal division of problems corresponds to the temporal division that classifies the passions. Yet that correspondence is not, by itself, sufficient to explain the use of an emotional appeal. If we think of a deliberative decision as a mere choice between some claim and its contradictory (and some situations are of this sort), then the argument from pathos will not occur. The argument from pathos depends on the presence of some uncertainty that is inherently present in the deliberative situation, and this uncertainty is usually sufficient to warrant the use of an emotional appeal.

The domain of the objects of one's desires and fears are obviously large. We want many things. We want to perform certain actions. These may be seen as achievements: I want to build a tree house; I want to keep my promise; I want revenge. They may be seen as activities: I want to exercise regularly; I want to be healthy; I want to teach. The objects of one's desires can also be a mental state: I want to be amused, feel safe, be happy. Because the mental states that one desires are achieved through performances or activities, one can stack, so to speak, the desires that one has relative to the deliberative aim.

When we are concerned with a future good or harm the argument from pathos can be represented most clearly as a series of formal patterns that exploit the asymmetric relationship between the primary passions of desire

and fear and the secondary passions of delight and distress. Each pattern selects one emotion to serve as the dominant vehicle of persuasion and which will license the use of other emotions to situate and make articulate the dominant emotion. The secondary emotions that accompany the primary passions serve two possible functions. The secondary emotion can psychologically prepare the audience for the dominant emotion, and this is often effected through the techniques of surprise or foreshadowing. A secondary emotion, governed by the contemplated success or failure of the aim of the dominant desire or fear, will follow the dominant passion as a result. For example, longing is a desiderative emotion which, when its object is successfully achieved, is pleasurable. Some desires, however, are not pleasurable. Indignation, for example, is a painful desiderative emotion. Its success produces a sense of satisfaction, but that satisfaction is not experienced as pleasurable, and indignation's failure to achieve its object is painful.

When a primary emotion is targeted as the dominant emotion its prospective success or failure will produce a pleasurable or painful emotion as a result. One can focus on the consequences of acting on a desire by imagining a felicitous conclusion, producing an emotion of delight. Conversely, the prospect of a failed desirable end can be made salient through an emotion of distress that will undermine the expectations inherent in that desire. In cases involving fear, for example, one can strengthen one's resolve by focusing on a decision that will negate the harm that produces the fear and thus produce a pleasurable result. By focusing on this felicitous consequence one can strengthen the attitudes and judgments that justify belief in the proposed action in order to counter the force of the fear. Conversely, one can

strengthen the threat of a harm by focusing on the attainment of an unwanted result which is made salient through an emotion of distress. Similarly, one can undermine the belief in a proposed action in fearful situation by focusing on a painful emotion that will make salient the consequences of a possible failed action.

While the need to use an emotion as a preparatory condition depends on the deliberative situation, the choice of the desire or fear and its result is necessary and usually sufficient for the appeal's success. Thus we have four possible patterns:

1. Desire + a pleasurable emotion
2. Desire + a painful emotion
3. Fear + a painful emotion
4. Fear + a pleasurable emotion

Two observations deserve mention. First, the uncertainty inherent in deliberative situation licenses the choice of the prospective resultant emotion. The targeted resultant emotion will depend on the causal efficacy of the antecedent desire or fear and can affect its motivational strength. Second, when we focus on the desiderative or the fearful we are making, broadly speaking, a motivational argument; yet we can also focus on the rightness or qualitative worth of the desire and this is a matter of justification.

We also deliberate about problems that are present before us, and this presents us with the fifth formal pattern.[5] The fifth pattern utilizes the emotions concerned with a present evil, for example, pity, regret, guilt or shame. The emotions of distress are important because their invocation will imply, as a consequence, the presence of some higher order desiderative or

fearful attitude that can occur as a consequence. We use these emotions of distress in one of two ways. Pity and compassion communicate what is significant about the deliberative situation, and the character of our actions will be specified through that salience. We can also use these emotions prospectively to foresee the adequacy of our proposed actions. Regret, for example, is concerned with judgments about what we have done or failed to do where some standard of rightness or goodness has not been met or was violated in some way. By examining the contemplated action as if were completed and seeking instances where regret may be felt, the deliberating agent can more adequately assess the proposed action.

Significantly, these patterns of salience or prospect share the formal qualities of theses discussed in the introduction. Theses are simple or complex, mixed or unmixed. The patterns of desire + delight, and fear + distress work with complex and unmixed theses; the patterns of desire + distress and fear + delight work with complex and mixed theses. Prospective emotional arguments typically correspond to simple theses. By discerning the persuasive potential inherent in each emotional structure relative to one's aim and audience, the writer can see what opportunities for persuasion are potentially present in that case.

The formal patterns also structure the potential ways one can deploy counter arguments. If an opponent deploys the pattern of desire + pleasure one has three possible lines of counter argument. First, one can deny that the desire will be successful. Acting on this desire will lead to failure; the unhappy result will be painful. Second, one can deny that the targeted desire is the right one, and this denial yields two options. We should fear our

prospects because something harmful will actually result; or, third, while we should fear these prospects, we can overcome the danger one's opposition has not seen and produce a felicitous result. The choice of any of these patterns, likewise yields the other three patterns as possible lines of counter argument.

In cases involving the prospective emotions of distress, three possible lines of counter argument are also open. First, one can accept that opposition's salient emotion but deny the efficacy or propriety of the consequent attitude. One can deny that the emotion is in fact salient, offer another and still accept their consequent attitude, which will be better situated in light of one's own sense of salience. Finally, one can deny the salient emotion and the consequent attitude or action and offer in its stead a wholly new pattern in its place.

## Reasons To Act and Reasons For Acting

The emotions central to deliberative judgment (emotions such as grief, anger, regret, fear and pity) contain beliefs and evaluations *which act as reasons* and posit value or worth to certain external goods in our lives. An emotion like pity, for example, has three beliefs. We pity individuals who have suffered significant misfortune, and we recognize that misfortune is undeserved. These two beliefs are called identificatory beliefs. These beliefs pick out and make salient the relevant properties of the object of the emotion. They are, obviously, subject to judgment. We evaluate the object to determine whether the properties so identified are, in fact, the actual properties of the object. The third belief necessary for pity requires us to see that the situation we have focused on is also possible for us. This belief is a casual belief; it triggers the emotion.

Our desires and fears have two kinds of beliefs and evaluations that structure them. Let us assume, for example, that John is afraid to drive to work in the snow. There are two kinds of reasons operating in one's fears. John can be afraid because these driving conditions are usually hazardous, or he can be afraid because he doesn't want to have an accident. The hazardous conditions and the possibility of an accident are *epistemic* reasons for being afraid. He can also be afraid because he doesn't *want* to have an accident or to risk an injury. These are *attitudinal* reasons (Gordon 75-76).

The identificatory and epistemic beliefs that help structure the emotions are forms of judgment; and those constituent beliefs and evaluations may serve, along with other judgments, like probability, plausibility and so on, as matter leading to the deliberative decision, the conclusion of our search. The beliefs which constitute the emotion may be judged true or false; it is descriptive matter whether these beliefs properly map onto their objects. These (true) beliefs that form a part of the emotion itself can serve as shared presumptions between the author and the audience. When we identify the relevant property of a particular object of an emotion, that property becomes the object of some normative evaluation. Significantly then, the evaluations that structure the emotion can be assessed for their normative status.[6]

The causal beliefs in our emotions, however, are a bit more complex than I have just distinguished them. Broadly speaking, these causal beliefs and attitudinal evaluations can present themselves in one of two ways.

These causal beliefs can be 'reason states' which are understood as 'wanting', 'fearing', desiring', and so on. Or, they can be understood as the contents of those states, one's intentions, desires, goals, and so forth. Reason

states differ from the latter. Reason states are psychological and causal; the latter are the abstract contents of those states and are justificational in nature. The goods that are the objects of the emotions may be individuals or groups of people, states like wonder, performances like racing, or activities like friendship that are necessary for and constitutive of our well-being. Significantly, we sometimes find that the opportunity to participate in these goods and the exercise or supervision of them lies outside our control. We grieve for the loss of a friend; we regret failed or lost opportunities for effective or proper action, and we pity the undeserved and significant misfortune of others. This issue of vulnerability is crucial to the deliberative emotions because it helps to explain the conceptual relationship between the two kinds of reasons operating in these emotions.

There are three claims being made here. First, we have reasons *to* act; a reason *to* act refers to and derives its content from the normative rightness or wrongness (as in envy) of the emotion. These reasons are, in principle, agent-neutral; they are reasons for anyone. Second, the normative nature of a judgment indicates the importance of the good at stake. But not all reasons involving importance are normative in the public sense just mentioned. Our judgment can be made relative to our sense of agency in the deliberative situation. The relativized reasons are reasons *for* acting. Finally, a reason *for* acting refers to and exemplifies the reason state; it is a causal reason (Audi 16). We commonly call this one's motivation.

Quintilian recognized the interdependence of these three elements and argued for the efficacy of pathos as part of one's proof. He observes:

> Proofs, it is true, may induce the judges to regard our case as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal to .the emotions will do more, for it will make them wish our case to be the better. And what they wish, they will also believe. (Book VI II 5)

Quintilian does not have in mind here a 'readiness to believe', which is a preparatory condition for good deliberation. He is thinking about reason states, and he argues that emotion used this way has the ability to forestall good judgment. No one will deny that the emotions can induce premature closure, but we must also recognize that emotional appeals that involve causally efficacious reason states may also be used legitimately. Attitudes of approval and disapproval, for example, are often reason states; and the judgments of approbation and disapprobation that arise from the sentiments are also reason states. In one way, the danger of premature closure in persuasion is a local, albeit important, concern. To focus too closely on this problem is to ignore a larger issue crucial to good deliberation. Each of us is, in some important sense, responsible for one's character. The question is not whether part of one's character and emotional life is within one's control; the question of responsibility turns on whether one has taken the responsibility to cultivate the dispositions that constitute who one is.

Desiderative and Fearful Judgments

The successful evocation of a desire requires an understanding of the structural complexity of those desires. In his recent essay, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Harry Frankfurt argues convincingly that persons have desires or wants working at two levels (5-20). We have first order and second order desires. First order desires can be expressed by the

statement, "A wants to X," where X stands for doing an action. The statements, "Joe wants to eat a sandwich," "Sally wants to read *Mansfield Park*," and "Sam wants a little night life," are examples of first order desires.

Obviously, there are occasions when we want the first order desire to be satisfied, just as there are occasions when we don't want the first order desire to be satisfied. To explain this common occurrence we need only to recognize that another desire is present in the emotion. Frankfurt calls these 'second order desires'. A second order desire can be expressed by the phrase, "X wants to want to X." A second order desire makes its first order counterpart intelligible. Yet the domain of second order desires is large. We can meaningfully say that "A wants to want to X" in four contexts:

1. when A does something else;
2. when what motivates A is, in fact, something else;
3. when what motivates A is this desire; and
4. when A will, in fact in the future, be motivated by this desire.

Frankfurt's interest in his essay lies in with the character of those second order volitions that, in fact, lead to action.

There are, in all, four possible relationships between first and second order desires that are relevant to understanding the argument from pathos. A person can have a first order desire to do some action and not want that desire satisfied. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which this situation can occur. We can have two emotions towards the same situation and the desires present in those emotions conflict. When the desires present in two emotions cannot both be satisfied, then those desires are *conflicted*. Conflicted desires are like inconsistent beliefs in that they arise from some contingent matter of

fact. If I want to be famous and I want to retain my privacy, then my desires are conflicted. When, however, the two desires within one emotion are at loggerheads, then the desiderative wants are *conflicting*. Second order desires can explain conflicting desires. If I am on a diet and have the desire to graze in the refrigerator (my first order desire) I don't want that desire acted on. My not wanting the first order desire acted on is my second order desire. The second order desire is successful when it effectively blocks my acting on my first order appetitive desire.

The case of resisting temptation to cheat on my diet suggests a second kind of relationship between first and second order desires. A continent action is one where we do the right thing but we do it for the wrong reason. A high school student is tempted to cheat but doesn't want to, not because she knows cheating is wrong, but rather, because she fears she will get caught. Not cheating is the right action, but we can fault her refraining because she does it for the wrong reason. Continent behavior recognizes that one's second order desires may be causally efficacious yet normatively deficient. Conversely, incontinent behavior and akratic action require an explanation of how one can knowingly do what is wrong. Second order desires can be practically successful without being normatively satisfactory.

Third, there are important situations where one wants to understand and evaluate the second order desire of another person. That is, we want to understand the desires of another in the sense that we want to know what it means to have that desire, but we do not, in any way, want to act on that desire. The psychological analysis of literary characters, for example, presupposes this capacity; and it is almost certainly a practical necessity for good

psychological counseling. The interest and power of empathy as a conceptual tool rests in the exercise of this capacity; and it is this capacity which makes it possible for someone to feel sympathy for others who are, at least partly, responsible for the plight they are in.

Finally, a person can have a first order desire and want that desire to be satisfied. In this case, the second order desire is the agent's *effective* desire. More precisely, A wants her will to be X, or she wants her desire to be the desire that will move her to do X. An *effective* second order desire is what the agent wants to want.

The second order volitions or judgments can be qualitatively assessed in separate but related ways. First, the outcomes of those judgments can be qualitatively evaluated. Quite simply, the outcome must fit the deliberative aim. One must remember, however, that just as manufacturers must have tolerances of fit for the goods they manufacture, our outcomes have tolerances of fit that work with the deliberative aim. Not every problem possesses an ideal solution. Moreover, one can evaluate the volition by seeing whether acting on that judgment is directly or indirectly self-defeating.

The outcome itself can be assessed for the kind of good that is aimed for. The success and satisfaction conditions for moral goods, for example, differ from those for nonmoral goods. Furthermore, nonmoral goods can be ranked. Utility goods like efficiency and expediency are less valuable than extrinsic goods. Extrinsic goods are necessary or sufficient means to intrinsic goods. Exercise is an extrinsic good because it is conducive to health, an intrinsic good. We pursue intrinsic goods for their own sake; they are good in and of themselves. Some goods, like knowledge, health and happiness, are not only

intrinsic goods; they are contributory goods as well. Contributory goods are constituent elements in a good life.

The example of the high schooler who declines to cheat but does so for the wrong reason points to the second kind of qualitative judgment. The character of second order volitions can be evaluated for the worthiness of that particular motivation. While continent action is qualitatively preferable to incontinent action, virtuous action is more praiseworthy than continent action. Our motives can be judged in terms of degree; our motives can be more or less noble or base, wise or foolish, just or unjust, and so on.

It is this kind of qualitative judgment that is explored in the Anglo Saxon poem, *The Battle of Maldon.* The Vikings have come to raid a coastal village and the local defense force is on the beach to resist them. When asked to surrender, Birhtnoth, the local leader, refuses. Birhtnoth's motivation springs from a sense of honor, but he desires glory through his refusal and the consequent fight that will ensue. Glory is proportional to the risks taken and the recognition of this fact motivates him to make the rash and foolish decision to allow the raiders to cross the bridge. He dies as a result. Both the outcome of his decision and his particular motivation can be evaluated. Birhtwold, on the other hand, knows that he and the remaining fighter are doomed; but he decides to continue fighting. We judge Borhtwold not on the certain outcome of his decision; we judge him on the nobility of his motivation which is expressed in his final exhortation to his men, "purpose shall be the firmer, heart the keener, courage shall be the more, as our might lessens."

## Fear

The argument from pathos that involves one's fears arises out of the uncertainty surrounding the potential harm to one's good. The uncertainty and motivational direction fit partially structure this form of the argument from pathos. In *The Structure of Argument* Robert Gordon argues that our deliberations about fear have the logical form of conditional or hypothetical arguments (75-76). Imagine that while taking a walk in the park a large, menacing dog steps into John's path and begins to snarl. John feels fear. The situation that elicits fear may be expressed as a conditional argument: if the dog attacks, then I (John) will be hurt. Of course, John may act out of fear by panicking and trying to run away, but that is not his only course of action. John may act otherwise because he feels fear. Thus, he wishes that the dog not attack him because if the dog attacks him, he will be hurt. The wish that articulates one's fear may be expressed positively or negatively. On occasion, the positive expression of a wish will indicate a relative degree of confidence that the agent has in the face of that harm. If the wish is expressed negatively, it will express one of two degrees of modal strength. One can say that X should not happen; or one can say that X should not exist, or that it should never happen. The judgment that one should not drink sour milk name something that should not happen. The judgment that child molestation should never happen is a much stronger claim.

The focus of one's wish will depend on the kinds of reasons operating in it. Being hurt is an epistemic reason; John may also have as a reason an attitudinal judgment that he doesn't want to be hurt. The epistemic reason allows the agent to specify a desired outcome that will prevent the harm from

occurring. Epistemic reasons are expressions of judgment; they invite questions concerning the reasonableness, degree of harm, probability or likelihood of the prospective harm. The attitudinal reason provides the agent with the motivation to act on that desire. In any event, one is uncertain about the dog's intentions. John assesses this uncertainty in light of his desire to not be hurt. His desire that it not be the case that 'if the dog attacks, I will be hurt,' (ie., not (if p, then q)) leads to a belief that some action, staring down the dog say, will bring about this desire. The ability to see that some specified desired outcome is possible allows the agent to act from fear; it allows us, in short, to act deliberately. We then decide to take that course of action.

## Expectation

Both desires and fears involve one's expectations, and the nature of that expectation is a matter that affects the kinds of judgments that can be used as a matter for persuasion. Expectation is a judgment about the likelihood of a future action or event. It is usually grounded in a judgment about a causal condition (either necessary or sufficient) that will bring about that future state. That judgment may be grounded in convention, presumption, some criterion of reasonableness, or a normative principle. Expectation is also relational. Our sense of agency is seen as causally involved in the attainment of that state. In *The Faces of Injustice*, Judith Shklar argues that much of the conceptual structure of 'expectation' can be revealed through its grammar (89). We expect *that* something will happen because it has happened that way in the past and should do so in the future. This predictability can be one of cause and effect. More often however, the expectation is the product of statistical frequency. Insurance companies, for example, use actuarial tables

to set their rates. These statistical frequencies license causal regularities in nature and in society. We expect *that* it will be colder in the winter than in the summer. There are also causal regularities in social life, and these can be sociological or psychological in nature. Finally, we exercise the abilities to plan and schedule our lives, and these capacities add immensely to the predictive accuracy of our judgments.

We also have expectations from or of each other. As Shklar says, "we expect fairness *from* our elected officials, fidelity *from* our friends, and the delivery of goods and services *from* those we have paid for them. We feel betrayed, not just upset, when these expectations are not met" (Shklar 89). The phrase, 'what we expect *of* another', names a normative obligation defined by the role that individual is serving, and that expectation can differ from what we expect *from* that person. To expect something *from* another can refer to that normative expectation or to some predictable response. The gulf between these two kinds of expectation can be made more emotionally vivid by the suddenness or the surprising nature of that breach. We can also build tension through foreshadowing.

## Aspect

The character of one's second order desire, the nature of one's expectation, and the prospective success or failure of attaining one's desires or avoiding what is fearful are partially governed by the role that time plays in one's desires and fears. This role of time is distinct from the issue of timing one's appeal. The intentional content of the desire or fear makes it intelligible and, in some cases, appropriate. With acute insight, Ronald de Sousa argues that the intentional content of an occurrent desire has a *temporal aspect*, and

this temporal aspect will explain a crucial part of the nature of that desire's content (208-215). Aspect does not refer to the onset or completion of a desire which is, in principle, a datable event in the past, present or future. The temporal aspect refers to how the desire is envisaged in time. de Sousa identifies three conditions concerning the role of time in one's desires. The first condition concerns how time affects how the desire manifests itself as a part of one's character. The second condition explains how time operates in and thus affects the focus of one's desires. The third condition identifies the category under which the object of the desire is to be understood (212).

de Sousa argues that we can begin to understand this temporal aspect by looking its grammatical counterpart. 'Aspect' is a feature of the grammar of our language. Events can be envisaged in one of four ways: as continuous, punctual, perfect, and frequentive. 1) An event may be viewed as occurring through a period of time. Time is the *continuous* aspect of Mary's kindness in the statement, "Mary is kind." 2) An event can have a specific temporal location. The statement, "and on the third day He rose again from the dead," has the *punctual* aspect. 3) An event that can be considered complete, finished or accomplished can be expressed through the *perfect* aspect. The perfect aspect is accompanied by the imperfect and both can be used with the past, present and future tenses. "I had finished the test five minutes before you asked," "I have finished the test in the time allowed," and "I will have finished the test before you return" are typical examples. 4) Finally, we have events or actions that take place frequently or habitually. "He runs," or "I swim each week" are examples of the *frequentive* aspect (208-210).

We commonly differentiate our desires by saying that some are dispositional while others are occurrent. Like events, one's dispositional desires have temporal aspects. Love has, standardly, a *continuous* aspect. Dispositional liabilities like irascibility and fickleness are *frequentive*. Occurrent desires are viewed as *punctual* or *perfect* (de Sousa 210). The role of temporal aspect also explains the transformation of some emotions into others. Jealousy is often a *frequentive* emotion; certain conditions can turn it into spite. Likewise envy can be transformed into malice. Importantly, the failure of an important *punctual* desire to have its purpose completed may transform itself into a desire that is *frequentive*. Repeatedly failed resentments may transform themselves into *ressentiment*.

de Sousa argues that the aspectual dimension of time plays two roles in how we experience occurrent desires. There is a temporal dimension in the focus of our desires, and there is a temporal dimension attached to the focal property of the desired object. We can view the focus of our desires by differentiating between immediate and time-indexed desires. Some occurrent desires are immediate. When my five year old says, "I want a cookie," his desire is immediate. He wants the cookie right away, and he believes that getting the cookie will satisfy his desire. Other desires are time-indexed. Time-indexed desires are understood in reference to some particular time (de Sousa 210). When we tell a student, "I want that paper finished by noon tomorrow," the success conditions for the object of the desire has a specifiable temporal location. More importantly, we can intend to realize these kinds of desires; they are subject to planning and execution. The focal property of the

object has, in principle, some feature of time or timing that is relevant for making the object intelligible.

The desire targets an object that should be, potentially, a satisfying event. We can explain how the object of a desire participates in the satisfaction of that desire by borrowing a set of distinctions proposed by Aristotle. In the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle draws distinctions among states, achievements and activities. Being phlegmatic, temperamental or irascible are states; they are viewed as passive. Winning a race, building a house, and writing a novel are achievements; seeing, contemplating and playing are activities. Achievements have starting points and specifiable ends; they can be completed, but they are only achievements at the moment of successful completion. Activities and states, on the other hand, can last for periods of time, but they have no precise point of completion. Every actual object of a desire will fall into one these three categories (de Sousa 212).

States can be experienced in all four aspects. The continuous aspect can be illustrated by, "I want to be feeling amused;" the punctual aspect, "I want to be amused (at some precise moment in the future);" the perfect, "I wanted to have been amused;" and the frequentive, "I want to be amused often." Activities can be experienced in all four aspects. The continuous aspect can be illustrated by "I want to be cycling;" the punctual, "I want to ride my bike;" the perfect, "I want to have had my bike ride;" and the frequentive, "I want to ride (daily, weekly, regularly, etc.). Achievements can experienced in three aspects. It is not possible to view an achievement in the continuous aspect. The punctual aspect can be illustrated by, "I want to finish this essay (at time T);" the perfect aspect, "I want to have finished this essay (at time T);" and the

frequentive, "I want to have finished all of my essays (in a timely manner, etc.)" (de Sousa 213-215).

de Sousa's analysis of aspect clarifies many confusing issues concerning the relationship between desiring and the object desired. It also provides a heuristic for quickly comprehending that relationship. One can construct a simple table by placing the aspects on the horizontal axis and the three categories in the vertical column. Sentence frames will quickly test the nature of the satisfaction sought for the desire targeted and one can which resultant emotions will fit which aspect. But perhaps its stronger use lies in avoiding one dimension of the so-called hedonistic paradox: satisfaction to be got must be forgot. When we directly pursue pleasure we often fail to attain it. By recognizing the actual category where the object of desire resides, one recognizes the manner in which that satisfaction will occur, and the writer can better target one's desiderative appeal.

## Delightful and Distressing Judgments

If we can target the requisite subordinate passion (or passions) appropriate to the relevant desire or fear directed at the matter at hand, we will achieve an important part of the task of articulating how pathos is achieved. We have already mentioned two uses for the secondary emotions. They may be used to create preparatory conditions for a targeted desire or fear, and they follow a desire or fear as resultant emotions. In fact, we have a class of occurrent emotions that we use to these ends. We possess a large group of anthropocentric emotional terms that can be explained as property-response pairs.[7] (See Table 1.)

For a joke to be amusing, someone must be amused by it. For the garbage to be disgusting, someone must feel disgusted in or by its presence. The property-response paired emotions can be identified by a simple grammatical test. All the verbals can take 'to' and all the verbs can take 'by'. We do not use these property terms (appalling, startling, etc.) independently of the responses they evoke. The conceptual relationship that operates between the primary and secondary passions make a difference to the qualitative character of the whole emotional episode we experience. That evocation is a crucial event when the writer wants the audience to commit to a particular reason in an emotional argument.

TABLE 1

PROPERTY-RESPONSE PAIRS

Pain or Distress

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| aggravated | discomforted | flustered | revolted |
| agitated | discomposed | frightened | scared |
| alarmed | disconcerted | frustrated | shocked |
| annoyed | discouraged | horrified | sickened |
| appalled | disgusted | infuriated | startled |
| beguiled | disheartened | irritated | stultified |
| bewildered | dismayed | loathed | stupefied |
| bored | distracted | mystified | surprised |
| confounded | distressed | nauseated | troubled |
| confused | disturbed | perplexed | unnerved |
| daunted | embarrassed | perturbed | upset |
| discomfited | exasperated | puzzled | vexed |

Pleasure or Delight

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| amused | contented | fascinated | pleased |
| aroused | delighted | funny | ravished |
| beguiled | diverted | gladdened | satisfied |
| bewitched | engaged | gratified | surprised |
| captivated | engrossed | heartened | tantalized |
| charmed | enticed | inspired | thrilled |
| comforted | exhilarated | interested | touched |

Second, we can use these emotions to further refine our apprehension and judgment, and these enhancements are partially internal to the perceptions of the participants. We can do this because we can judge the propriety of one half of the pair in terms of the other. Suppose a mother and child witness a shopper slip on the floor of the market. The child is amused and the mother is embarrassed by her child's reaction. In the car (if she can wait that long) the mother discusses what things are and are not amusing as well as what caused her embarrassment. Through this conversation the mother hopes to improve the child's ability to discriminate what is amusing from what is embarrassing for another. The mother's success also depends on the potential further enhancement of the domain of these terms.

The juxtaposition of an object's properties against one's psychological response is not the only way to control the judgments here. We can have emotions about our emotions. In his first inaugural address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt argued that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. In a similar way, we can enjoy being frightened at the movies, or we may find that we are too afraid of being afraid. We are dismayed by our jealousy. All too frequently, we regret becoming angry. Part of the practical wisdom inherent in our proverbs exploits this kind of relationship. Proverbs frequently express the relationship between a second-order emotion and its target. The proverb, "The fear of death is to be more dreaded that death itself," works through comparison and degree. The proverb, "If you fear to suffer you suffer from fear," is an example of antanaclasis that exploits a central ambiguity in emotional experience. We suffer the emotions; they happen to us; but we also allow ourselves to undergo (suffer) them through the values

and choices we make that affect the formation of our characters. When an emotion is used this way it is called a second-order emotion (Rorty, *Explaining Emotions* 126). A second-order emotion exploits the attitudinal stance of one emotion to affect the judgments in the targeted emotion. The technique is simple but effective.

Furthermore, we experience the particular emotions found in the genera of delight and distress in different degrees of vividness. An emotion is vivid in one of two ways. Being 'peeved' is less intense affectively than feeling 'wrath'. Being 'excited' is more intense that feeling 'amused'. Vividness refers to the felt intensity of the emotional episode. Eighteenth century writers recognized this when they refer to the 'lively passions'. Yet the degree of intensity, the quality of the felt response, is distinct from an emotion's degree of strength, the power of an emotion to make itself cognitively present in our perceptions and judgments.

An emotion's intensity, its phenomenologically presented agitation or turbulence, is an important facet of one's affective experience. Certainly, emotional experiences are often recognized by their affective tone, and they can be marked off from one another by the relative degree of pleasure or pain they contain. The degree of an emotion's intensity is a function of its focus, that part of the emotion that turns the mind towards the object. Strength is a judgment about the evaluative significance of the properties of the object that the emotion focuses on. I want to argue that, from the point of view of persuasive potential, an emotion's strength is what matters.

When we say that one acts *out of* fear we suggest that fear has overcome that individual, yet we can also say that one acts *from* fear (Gordon 77). It is

this capacity that allows us to say that fear has the ability to concentrate the mind, and that it does so through the strength of our judgment about the prospect of a future evil. The pleasurable and painful feelings that are a part of many emotions are an aesthetic result of the dynamics operating in the emotion. While they can be powerful, they are, at best, unreliable. The pleasure one derives in anger from imagining a future act of retaliation is, certainly, ambiguous. The pleasure felt in schadenfreude is no justification for experiencing the emotion. More to the point, however, is an idea first suggested by Gilbert Ryle. Curiosity, for example, is an emotion that inclines us to act in certain ways. Yet curiosity does not have occurrently felt qualities that tell us we are curious nor do they appear when we act from curiosity (93-98). When we refer to the strength of an emotion we may refer to its causal ability to incline us to act in a certain way, and that capacity can be evaluated for its propriety, which involves a judgment about the object's significance.

The Stoics rightly recognized the importance of an emotion's strength and made it a criterion in the definitions of the passions of delight and distress. Andronicus, a fourth century Greek anthologist, reports that "distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it is right to be contracted. "Pleasure "is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it is right to be swollen" (Long and Sedley 411) We need not accept the Stoic's evaluation that distress and pleasure are categorically irrational. There is, certainly, a danger here; but they confuse an intrinsic judgment about an experience's propriety with its aesthetic function.

The Stoics recognized another dimension of the emotional episode that has profound implications for persuasion involving the emotions of delight and distress. They called the pleasure and pain that we feel 'fresh' when that opinion has a certain kind of force for the agent. This freshness is usually thought of as temporal. In *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero offers an especially clear discussion of freshness when he argues that:

> distress is the idea of a present evil with this implication in it, that it is a duty to feel distress. An addition to this definition is rightly made by Zeno, namely that this idea of a present evil is a 'fresh' one. This word, however, his followers interpret to mean that not only, according to their view, is that 'fresh' which has taken place a short time previously, but that so long as the imagined evil preserves a certain power of being vigorous and retaining so to speak it greenness, it is termed 'fresh.' For instance, the famous Artemisia, wife of Mausolus, King of Caria, who built the celebrated monument of Helicarnassus, lived in sorrow all her days and wasted away under its enfeebling influence. The idea of sorrow was 'fresh' for her every day, and this idea only ceases to be termed 'fresh' when it has withered away by length of time. (3. 74-75

While 'freshness' has temporal limits, it refers to the vigor of the evaluations that form a part of that emotion and are experienced as pain or pleasure.

Grief is the emotion most frequently used in both ancient and modern discussions to explain the idea of freshness. When we grieve over someone close to us who has died, we recognize that the fact of the death is only a small part of the grief. Someone of central importance, someone irreplaceable, is gone. Grief is the tumult we experience because all of the hopes and desires bound to that person are upset. The freshness of grief manifests itself as the evaluative belief that this death is a present evil. The loss has cognitive and evaluative implications that affect our judgment. The cognitive implications,

drawn from different parts of our lives, are those that affect our possibilities for a flourishing life. Thus, the propositions of what this loss entails are a part of our grief, and their perceived presence determines the strength of our grief (Nussbaum *Therapy* 375).

Over time, the keenness and tumult of the loss lessens. Martha Nussbaum offers two interesting explanations for this loss of freshness. Just as memories become vague with the passage of time, the particular value of the lost person becomes vague. When there are no experiences to sustain and nourish the memory of that person, that sense of that person's presence fades for lack of sustenance. The second idea is more complex. Time affords us the opportunity to shift and restructure the values upset by that death. To the extent that we are able to reorder the goods and goals of our lives, the propositions that warrant grief lose their centrality in our thinking. The grief-propositions of that centrality shift their temporal perspective from a present evil to a past tense one (376-377).

The power inherent in an emotion to sustain the impulse of freshness and thus affect the audience's judgment depends on the centrality of the good for one's well-being that is harmed, on the valuational importance of its goodness, and on the internal complexity of the emotion itself. Grief, pity and depression, for example, exhibit all of these criteria. Boredom, stultification and alarm are, by contrast, comparatively simple; and their capacity to sustain a sense of freshness is much weaker. In persuasion, the weakness manifests itself temporally, and it is this empirical observation that led Cicero to counsel orators to place their emotional appeals late in one's discourse.

## Some Methods of Emotional Persuasion

The rhetorical technique of *enargia*, bringing the image before the eyes, works by exploiting one of two features present in the targeted emotion. *Enargia* delivers the impression of a complete description. It is crafted through the careful selection of details, the apt use of repetition, and an artistic revelation of these details through precise timing. Yet *enargia* is more than clear and vivid representation; Quintilian argues that it "thrusts itself upon our notice" (VIII iii 61). When *enargia* is used as a technique to create salience, it exploits the perceptual potentiality of the targeted emotion. The audience focuses on the relevant properties of the object of the emotion so that the situation becomes intelligible. All of the properties necessary for creating salience must be presented, and each detail manifests one of those qualities. The properties necessary for salience are figuratively possessed by the images used. We say these properties are denoted by the predicative form of the emotion term; that is, the image is 'sad', 'pathetic', or 'disgusting'. With good reason, Quintilian recommends that *enargia* used to achieve salience should appear early in a text, usually as a part of the *partitio*. Through the technique of *enargia* the audience sees the deliberative situation, potentially, as a case of pity say, or one calling for anger. The salience achieved through this sort of *enargia* will serve as a starting point for deliberative concern.

*Enargia* can also exploit the 'freshness' of an emotion. 'Freshness' refers to the force of the judgment in that emotion. When *enargia* exploits freshness, it targets the judgment. We not only see the situation as malicious or contemptible say, we contemplate the correctness of evaluating the situation through the judgment inherent in that emotion. The correctness of

that judgment requires a further judgment about its importance or significance. We recognize that a judgment may be correct but peripheral to one's deliberations. When *enargia* is concerned with freshness, it reveals the significance of that emotional judgment to one's deliberative aim. Like its perceptual counterpart, this technique requires the representation of all of the properties necessary for the emotion, but each image not only denotes a necessary property, each property also refers to the particular situation; and the properties selected for representation will be those that are crucial for seeing the significance of the emotion's judgment. With pity, for example, we would focus on the *size* of the misfortune as well as the emphasizing how *undeserved* the misfortune is. This sense of *enargia* can be confused with presumptive persuasive strategies like the ad populum and ad misericordium arguments. While one may use the strategy of *enargia* to create one of these arguments, it is distinct from them. The technique delivers a judgment about the significance of some feature of the deliberative situation that is crucial to the correct deliberative decision.

The significance of an emotion is determined by its *formal object*. Although I will discuss formal objects in Chapter IV, we can say now that the formal object of an emotion is a secondary quality of that object, stated as a description, that must be apprehended as applying to the particular object of the emotion (Kenny 189; de Sousa 341). For example, the formal object of fear is the dangerous; the formal object of shame is truly apprehending oneself in situations of disadvantage as others rightly see us. William Lyons argues that the formal object of an emotion names an "evaluative category under which the appraisal or evaluation of a particular object. . .falls on a particular

occasion"(100). The character of this evaluation bridges the emotion and its object to other appropriate values by providing a sufficient conceptual link between a judgment delivered through an emotion and another kind of judgment. Thus, this technique is also used when some virtue, that has the targeted emotion as a part of its contents, is invoked as part of an agent's proper response to the deliberative goal.

We have seen that these judgments make certain features of the deliberative situation salient and important. A judgment about the importance of the object will, in turn, affect how we perceive the object. A judgment of salience or one concerning the importance of an object can be affected through two other approaches. Emotions have paradigm scenarios. A paradigm scenario is a kind of dramatic scene or image that makes the emotion present for the individual. More precisely, the pattern of beliefs and evaluations intrinsic to the emotion are often exemplified by an image or tableau. Guilt, for example, carries the image of a victim or an enforcer; shame carries the image of a watcher. Like *enargia*, the deliberate use of the imagery suggested by the paradigm scenario of the targeted emotion can help to invoke that emotion. This technique requires, however, an understanding of the audience's emotional sophistication to be effective. Clearly, we experience and understand the emotions at different levels of sophistication. As our understanding of an emotion becomes deeper, we are able to articulate the various attitudes present in the emotion in different ways. Bernard Williams observes that in cases of guilt the attitude of the internalized figure first appears as anger. A primitive understanding of guilt will begin as fear,

fear *at* anger. Fear *of* anger is a later stage of development (*Shame and Necessity* 219).

Paradigm scenarios are causally efficacious because they dramatically enact the several stages present in the impulse of an emotion. An emotion's 'impulse' is its internal motivation and this aspect has a characteristic aim. It orients one's stance to the object. One's stance that is present in the desiderative or fearful emotions moves to shape the world to one's mind. One's stance in the secondary emotions is brought into line with the world. The scenario can be used, obviously, to select or create a narrative of some kind. The internal dynamics of the emotion are effectively depicted through the narrative mode. Most commonly, perhaps, we use these scenarios to structure *exempla*.

Rhetoricians have long recognized the two roles of perception and judgment. When we think of the term, 'argument from pathos', we know that it is a term of convenience. There is, obviously, no single pattern of argument. But we do typically think of a family of strategies and arguments, consciously extant since the classical period, which target specific emotions and incline the audience's feelings more or less directly. More importantly, these strategies work to effect a change in judgment as a consequence of the targeted emotion. Some of these strategies are dispositionally manifested. It has long been a piece of rhetorical lore that one's introduction must serve three functions: to make the audience attentive, to make them well disposed to what will follow, and to establish a sense of good will towards the writer. Each of these inclinations is a device of pathos. Cicero and the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* offer strategies to arouse other specific emotions:

*indignatio* is the arousing of scorn or indignation; *conquestio* is the arousing of sympathy; and *deprecatio* is a plea for pardon, which involves the suspension of the causal role of indignation, anger or blame (*de Inventione* I 100-109; *Herennium* ii 48-49, iv 66). Finally, the discussion of each of these strategies contains detailed advice on how to amplify or diminish the force or significance of the particular beliefs necessary for arousing the targeted emotion. This persuasive task is not so much one of motivation, even though the argument is motivational; these arguments appeal to a judgment about the audience's capacity to act.

We also have a set of argumentative strategies that target classes of emotions or some specific emotion, and these arguments work to alter judgments as a constituent of the emotion. The ad misericordium argument appeals to pity. The ad baculum argument appeals to force hoping to arouse either fear or anger. The ad populum argument appeals to popular sentiments like patriotism. The normative success of these arguments depends, in part, on objective considerations. We can judge whether the particular object of the targeted emotion has the requisite properties or not. We can also judge whether those properties, when present, are relevant or not. Yet these arguments are presumptive.[8] Their pragmatic success depends, in a crucial way, on the beliefs and attitudes of the audience, and these may be false, biased or prejudiced. Even when bias is not an issue, the audience's relationship to the deliberative situation and their possible evaluative or participative role is crucial.

We can critically evaluate presumptive arguments. These arguments are prone to the common fallacy of begging the question by confusing the

strength of the emotion with its justification, or strength can be confused with the fallacy of loaded questions. In his discussion of the *ad misericordium* argument, Douglas Walton argues that there are several factors that we can use to evaluate non fallacious emotional appeals. First, the appeal to pity must be examined in light of the rhetorical aim it is supposed to serve. A charitable appeal differs from a plea for clemency in a court of law. Second, we recognize that the various arguments deployed carry different weights; some arguments are more important than others. An appeal may be central or peripheral. The strength of an appeal is a measure of its potential success, but our evaluation must consider how satisfactory the appeal is. Satisfaction is measured by an argument's relevance. A practical test here involves imagining how difficult it would be to counter the appeal. More peripheral appeals, on the other hand, may be weak arguments, and this weakness may be measured by ranking it against the other more important issues at stake. When the appeal involves an argument from consequences care must be taken to insure that the appeal cannot be counterbalanced by considering opposite consequences. The final consideration is related to the first one. The need for enough information to evaluate the relevance of an emotional appeal carries with it an expectation for openness (Walton, *Place of Emotion* 141-142). An emotional appeal that is tacitly open to full public scrutiny as opposed to a private mailing from an interest group carries greater ethical force.

Finally, the role of trust is crucial for deliberation. Trust involves reliance on someone, but it is more than mere confidence. Trust is a reliance placed in someone's good will, good judgment, and good decision. Thus, trust entails granting liberty of action to another. The trust we place in another's

good will and judgment has a double focus. We trust them not only to do the right or good action, we trust them to not misuse the liberty accorded them. Trust or mistrust, then, grounds deliberative judgment.[9]

Two Questions of Explanation

The attempt to offer a theoretical explanation of how the passions and the emotions work rhetorically (and what the satisfaction conditions actually are) has been more speculative. Although it is brief, Aristotle's analysis remains one of the most sophisticated. Aristotle employed a functional explanation to account for the change in judgment that passions effect in the audience. The functioning of an emotion is explained through a three-fold analysis: a discussion of one's state of mind, a discussion of pertinent considerations about the agent towards whom the emotion is directed, and an explanation of the role of reasons present in the emotion. Aristotle is concerned with the relationship between reason states and reasons in occurrent settings. But he is also concerned with what the occurrent emotions and emotional states say about the agents involved. The emotions are (fallible) signs of one's character and, as such, point to the voluntary aspects of one's character that can affect decision. He is only concerned with the operation of particular emotions.

Writing in the eighteenth century, George Campbell attempted in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* to identify those general conditions or circumstances which instrumentally operate on the passions. Passions are, for Campbell, reason states. While their force is causal, the passions are, he argues, amenable to normative judgments that will evaluate the significance of these passions as well as determine their significance. He identified probability,

plausibility, importance, temporal proximity, place, the persons involved, and the interest in the consequences as relevant conditions (77-90). His brief discussion is an important contribution for three reasons. First, he saw the possibility of offering a set of necessary conditions that would explain the successful use of the argument from pathos regardless of the emotion in question. Second, his causal explanation allowed reasons to serve an important role in the presence of reason states. Finally, he saw that the passions themselves were crucially important. In fact, he argues that the passions are causally involved with what he took to be our inherent concerns, self preservation, benevolence and sympathy.

Campbell's claim that there are passions that embody or express our inherent concerns and are, thus, fundamental is his most daring claim. I want to suggest that there is one passion that may, in principle, serve an executive function within an agent's capacity to deliberate. When we deliberate we try to give particular answers to the more basic question of how to live. Deliberation is a process grounded in, guided by, and giving substance to our hopes. The general object of hope is a good life. Hope can be both the ground for our judgments and an emotion. As an emotion it is the rational expectation and confidence that one's life will be as rich and fulfilling as possible. Hope is the judgment that grounds the particular desires and ends that comprise that life. Hope, in this sense, is the discernment of an actual pattern or plot present in the aims and ends of one's life that will help bring about that good life.[10] The particular object of hope is that good end, expressed as a decision, that forms the conclusion of the deliberative search.

But the end of our deliberations are not always hopeful. In a particular situation the deliberative judgment we make may or may not recommend itself to an overt course of action. Often enough we judge a situation as wrong or unfortunate but any possible action we could take would only make matters worse. Other situations are judged wrong but are seen as having nothing to do with oneself. Our sense of agency or our willingness to engage in some kind of response is influenced greatly by the importance of the situation or the principles at stake.

## Conclusion

The name, 'the argument from pathos', is a term of convenience. It refers to a coordinated set of strategies that may be used evocatively or expressively to achieve one's deliberative aim. The 'argument from pathos' is actually a complex pattern of interdependent functions that exploit the cognitive structures of the emotions as well as the inner dynamics of the emotional episode.

When we deliberate we begin, typically, with a problem; and the nature of that problem can be apprehended through the perceptual sensitivities of some emotion. That initial perception serves as the starting point for the several roles that emotion can serve in deliberation. In deliberative discourse this capacity for sensitive appraisal is enhanced by the traditional preparatory functions of one's introduction. Attentiveness serves an obvious operational role; being well-disposed prepares the audience's emotional stance, making them receptive to what will follow. But the establishment of good will helps to create trust, and trust is the ground of good communal deliberation.

Emotional salience, the process whereby we discern a particular feature of the deliberative situation in terms of some emotion, can be achieved through *enargia.* But salience involves two other functions. We perceive the problem from some point of view, and point of view is one dimension of deliberative agency. A judgment of salience also implies that there is some choice for good or ill that can be made. In deliberative discourse, this choice is conventionally presented in the thesis, and the emotional pattern of the argument from pathos to be deployed will be coordinate with the thesis. This emotional pattern utilizes the asymmetric and intrinsic connection between the primary emotions in the classes of desires and fears and the secondary emotions in the classes of delight and distress.

The choice of the thesis and emotional pattern reflects the writer's appraisal of the deliberative situation, but one's choice also depends on the nature of the persuasive conflict. Obviously, we can and do disagree with others in deliberation. These conflicts are called *symmetric* when the persuasive obligations of the participants are the same; a conflict is *asymmetric* when the persuasive obligations of the participants differ. If one intends to argue the opposite these of her opponent the positions are strongly opposed. When one merely needs to raise doubts or questions about the opposition's thesis, but does not need to prove its opposite, then they are weakly opposed. It is tempting to think that this set of distinctions will map onto the emotional patterns in deliberation.

They do not map this way. The persuasive obligations just distinguished invoke necessary conditions that conceptually demarcate one's commitments. In deliberation, the emotional patterns use two sets of satisfaction conditions

which jointly map the targeted emotions onto the world. What I have in mind here can be explained by borrowing a distinction from speech act theory. The primary and secondary emotions have different directions of fit. The aims of our desires and fears work to fit the world to our minds; the aims of the emotions in the classes of delight and distress work to fit the mind to the world. The pattern we find most appropriate will be the one that best fits the situation, and the 'best fit' will be determined by judging the sufficient conditions for the emotions that ground that fit.[11] Those sufficient conditions will be evaluated through the offices of the audience's reflective equilibrium, and the executive emotion governing this equilibrium is deliberative hope.

The writer typically targets one emotion for its persuasive potential to serve as the keystone of the total emotional appeal. If the deliberative problem is in the present then the writer targets one of the secondary emotions. When the problem is in the future, the writer targets a primary emotion or chooses a secondary emotion that will be used prospectively. In either case the writer must consider the deliberative aim as well. When matters of interpretation are the crucial issue one can target a secondary emotion. When questions of worth or action are crucial, the primary emotions of desire and fear become prominent. And in all cases, the nature of the good in question becomes a matter for persuasive appeal. Thus, the particular emotion to be targeted for its persuasive appeal will be chosen, in part, by its fit with the deliberative situation. Yet this choice also depends on one's audience. Because emotional persuasion is particular, the writer needs to understand the audience's role in the deliberative situation. The nature of this role may be impersonal or personal, or this role may be one of judge or active

participant. Their potential for possible action and the kinds of agency open to them are further considerations that must be assessed in determining the nature of one's appeal.

These complex considerations will determine the kind of appeals that are available to the writer, their potential force, as well as offering indications about their most efficacious timing. These considerations can be translated into the success conditions that are sufficient for the appropriate use of evocative strategies like *enargia, exempla*, and presumptive arguments as well as for the appropriate use of the several expressive strategies open to the writer.

## ENDNOTES CHAPTER II

[1] On the perceptual role of the emotions see, Martha Craven Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge* (New York: Oxford UP, 1990) 75-82. Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character* (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 28-49. Nancy Sherman, "The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality," *Identity, Character, and Morality* , ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie O. Rorty (Cambridge: MIT P, 1990) 149-70. Lawrence Blum, "Moral Perception and Particularity," *Moral Perception and Particularity* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1994) 30-61. Onora O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," *Morality and Universality* (Boston: D Reidel P, 1985) 159-186.

[2] I have used Lawrence Blum's choice of terminology with 'role'; but I recognize that it is inadequate for these brader senses of agency. First, we comprehend different aspects of our identity through a wide variety of concepts: character, persona, self, personality, presence and so on. Second, the very notion of a 'public self' with its social, cultural and ethical 'roles' has undergone many transformations in history. Some crucial dimensions are discussed in Aristotle's *Politics*; many of the complexities are explored in Plutarch's *Lives*, as well as in Cicero, Tacitus Seneca. These ideas were transformed by several Florentine intellectuals--notably Francesco Guicciardini and Nocolo Machiavelli.

[3] On the role of the metaphor of seeing, see Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character* (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 44-50. On the idea of emotion as power see, L. A. Kosman, "Being Properly Affected," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley: U of Calif P, 1980) 107.

[4] In Books III and IV of *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero offers what is perhaps the most detailed list of the passions that the Stoics were concerned with. Richard Henry presents in tabular form all of the passions discussed in Book IV 5 in his 1905 Latin edition of the text. I reprint this list in a modified form:

Desire (*libido, epithumia*); its opposite is rational longing

| | |
|---|---|
| anger | *ira* |
| irascibility | *excandescentia* |
| hatred | *inimicitia* |
| personal enmity | *odium* |
| contentiousness | *discordia* |
| insatiability | *indigentia* |
| longing | *desiderium* |

Diseased Cravings (*morbi, nosemata*)

| | |
|---|---|
| avarice | *avaritia* |
| lust for fame | *gloriae cupiditas* |
| ambition | *ambitio* |
| fixation on women | *mulierositas* |

Vicious Habits (*aegrotationes, arrostemata*)

| | |
|---|---|
| lasciviousness | *pervicacia* |
| gourmandism | *ligurritio* |
| alcoholism | *vinolenia* |
| finickiness | *cuppedia* |

Fear (*metus, phobos*); its opposite is prudence

| | |
|---|---|
| indecisiveness | *pigritia* |
| shamefacedness | *pudor* |
| terror | *terror* |
| timidity | *timor* |
| trembling | *pavor* |
| hysteria | *exanimatio* |
| nervousness | *conturbatio* |
| faintheartedness | *formido* |

Aversions (*offensiones, proskopai*)

| | |
|---|---|
| misogyny | *odium mulierum* |
| misanthropy | *odium generis humani* |
| inhospitality | *inhospitalitas* |

Pleasure (*laetitia, hedone*); its opposite is joy

| | |
|---|---|
| malice | *malevolentia* |
| rapture | *delectio* |
| ostentation | *iactatio* |

Distress (*aegritudo, lupe*)

| | |
|---|---|
| envy | *invidentia* |
| competitiveness | *aemulatio* |
| jealousy | *obtrectatio* |
| pity | *misericordia* |
| torment | *angor* |
| mourning | *luctus* |
| dolefulness | *maeror* |
| sense of tribulation | *aerumna* |
| mental anguish | *dolor* |
| lamentation | *lamentatio* |
| brooding | *sollicitudo* |
| annoyance | *molestia* |
| disquiet | *adflictio* |
| hopelessness | *desperatio* |

[5] We do not deliberate when things are going well in the present and for the foreseeable future; hence, there is no formal pattern for the species of delight.

[6] Actually, there are justificatory questions operating at two levels. The first level concerns whether the beliefs and judgments properly fit the situation towards which they are directed. This presupposes that a more fundamental question has been answered. Is the emotion in question itself justified as a feature of judgment? For a discussion of the latter sort of question as it relates to pity see, Martha Craven Nussbaum, "Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism," *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's* Genealogy of Morals ed. Richard Schacht (Los Angeles: Univ of Calif P, 1994) 139-167.

[7] An informative discussion of these emotions can be found in David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" *Needs, Values, Truth* ( Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 185-214.

[8] These arguments and the issues or relevance and presumption are usefully explored in Douglas Walton, *The Place of Emotion in Argument* (University Park: Penn State UP, 1992).

[9] For an interesting and insightful discussion of the nature of trust see, Annette Baier, *Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994).

[10] I am indebted to John Kekes for the insight that hope is temporal, that it is a part of the plot of our lives. See, *Facing Evil* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990) 28.

[11] I am reasonably certain that it is a matter of sufficient conditions here. Is it, however, a matter of two sets of sufficient conditions, one for the targeted desire or fear and one for the targeted secondary emotion? This answer has the advantage of accounting for the fact that we can get one emotion right and one wrong, both right, or both wrong. This possibility highlights the relational power of the argument from pathos. Or, is there just one sufficient condition that is transitive for the pattern as a whole? The argument from pathos is judged by how well it maps onto the world. This possibility judges the cumulative power of pathos. Near misses count in horseshoes, but not in emotional persuasion. Or, is it a case where two sufficient conditions are thus jointly necessary? This approach makes the satisfactory use of the argument from pathos depend on its pragmatic success conditions. 'Necessary' here means causal necessity.

# CHAPTER III

## IMPORTANCE, MOTIVATION, THE AESTHETIC AND THE EXPRESSIVE

Be careful of what you wish for: you
just might get what you wish for.
-American proverb

When one reflects on the nature of deliberative decision, it appears to be self-evident that we, in fact, do what we have the most reason to do. It appears plausible to express the claim this way because we want to capture both the psychological and the normative nature of deliberative decision. The six functions of emotional persuasion can be seen as the potential ways this form of persuasion makes articulate the accuracy of this claim. In this chapter I will continue the exploration of these six functions by exploring the importance of what we care about, several issues of motivation, the aesthetic dimension of the emotions, and the expressive capacities of emotional experience that are open to rhetorical emphasis. Before proceeding with those issues we need to explore a moment what is implied by this general claim. By doing so, I hope to better situate the exploration of these particular issues.

The claim that what we do is what we have the most reason to do appears to be strong because it is a formal and categorical claim. Its formal nature avoids the problems of substantive content at this level of articulation. Thus, the question of mistaken belief and self defeating principles do not arise. The categorical nature of the claim appears to be broad enough to account for a broad range of psychological explanations. The distinction between conscious

and unconscious reasons and motivations, for example, can be easily accommodated.

Yet the claim is problematic at this formal level. One simple and extremely common explanation of this claim deserves comment. It is tempting to look at the chosen deed as conclusive evidence for the claim. Imagine that Marge is a teacher and mother. She has (good) reasons to teach well, and she has (good) reasons to care for her children. One day she faces a conflict between these two aims in her life. She has an important presentation at work that will advance her career, but shortly before the presentation she learns that one of her children has become painfully ill. According to this explanation she will do that action according to that which she has the most reason to do. She decides to care for the child. Two of her friends, John and Jane, discuss her decision:

Jane: Why did Marge do what she did?
John: She had the most reason to do it.
Jane: How do you know?
John: Look, she did it didn't she?

John argues that what Marge does is what she has the most reason to do. What is actually claimed is that she has the most reason to do what she has the most reason to do. The claims are logically substitutable; and hence, the argument is circular.

A tautologous 'explanation' is, obviously, unacceptable. Part of the plausibility of this claim comes from the fact that we have aims. Some of our aims are final aims. Final aims are normative claims of practical rationality, and they can be expressed formally. The desire to be rational, for example, is a

formal aim of this sort. I want to suggest that one final aim is sufficiently general to be present in the various substantive theories of practical rationality. The philosopher Derek Parfit argues that this aim can be expressed as a want:

> Each person wants his or her life to go as well as possible.[1]

This aim is present in the various ideals of eudaimonia as it is made substantive in the classical world; it is present in the ideals of self-fulfillment, self-actualization or self-mastery; and it is present in deontological or consequentialist moralities. Furthermore, every substantive theory of practical rationality must offer some explanation of the roles the emotions must play in that theory. That necessity can be felt by posing a simple thought experiment. What would someone be like who had no faculty of the emotions at all? Any answer would recognize that the emotions are necessary for practical rationality to function at all. Although I will make substantive claims that are compatible with various substantive theories, I will restrict my discussion of these functions of emotional persuasion to those issues that are compatible with matters of the formal aim.

**The Importance of What We Care About**

The third area in which the emotions play a role in deliberation concerns the importance of what we care about.[2] What we care about is a fundamental concern of our lives. As Plato has Socrates declare at the end of Book I of the *Republic*, "It is no chance matter we are discussing, but how one should live." To ask 'what is important' is not always to ask 'what is important to us' nor is it always to ask 'what we care about'. Certainly, things that are

fundamental are important because they are primary. In short, we have needs. Some needs are objective; we cannot do without these goods without being seriously harmed.[3] We need air to breathe, adequate nutrition, and water to drink. We still need these goods even when we have them; need does not always imply a lack of what is necessary. Justice, liberty, wisdom and courage have long been viewed as important in this sense.

But not all important things are fundamental in this sense. We care, sometimes deeply, about things that are not primary; but are, nonetheless, those interests, projects and concerns that guide and shape our conduct. People care deeply about different matters; some care about family honor; others, their research projects or winning yacht races. 'Importance' is a relational term. Obviously, one can and should ask questions about the relative or absolute value of the object deemed important, and these are proper and pertinent questions.

We should also recognize that part of the justification for caring about something lies in the activity of caring itself. A crucial part of our assessment here can be found by asking whether a person is justified in *making* something important to him by caring about it.[4] The durative power of caring, being devoted to, loving, or being interested in some activity or value raises an important question about the role of these emotions in that activity. Do we care about X because it is important, or is X important because we care about it? If something is valuable because we care about it we can confuse the telos or purpose of that value with the expression of that care or concern. Yet these emotions should not be viewed essentially as a means to a desired end. They constitute, in some significant way, a part of the importance of what we

deem valuable. On certain occasions, 'caring' or 'loving' may name a specific intention or motivation. But the idea of 'caring about something' is also distinct from it. If I care about two important and conflicting goals and choose one over the other, my care for the unchosen goal is not diminished by acting on my intention. 'Caring for something', in this sense, is desiderative; but the specific intention of caring is only an instantiation or manifestation of the larger concern. That is, the emotion of caring provides a partial ground for the desire we choose to act on. It provides the psychological and conceptual 'bridge' between the particular desire and what is important. We desire it because we care about it, and we care about it because it is important to us. Resolving the partial circularity of this conception is a crucial question for giving a complete account of this aspect of our emotional life.

Pride is one of the emotions self-assessment; it helps to coordinate the relationship between what we desire and those things we care about. Because a part of pride directs its attention to the relationship between the object and our evaluation of ourselves as agents, it will illustrate some of these complexities. To be proud may or may not involve having proud feelings. We can feel proud without being proud of anything in particular during that felt experience. To be a 'proud man' is to possess certain character traits. It is not just a sense of confidence in one's abilities; it is a sense that one is worthy in some respect. There may be a tendency in this individual to think that if he had to accept help from another would be to admit that he was deficient in some way. To be a proud man in this sense is to take pride in one's pride. Second, we can take pride in an accomplishment, skill or practice. One can be proud of having walked the Appalachian Trail nonstop; one can be proud of

one's skill at golf, or be proud of one's ability to read poetry with discrimination. That we are responsible for the achievement, skill or practice grounds our pride. Third, we can be proud *of* something or take pride *in* something. People are proud of many things: their homes, cars, boats, children, their community, their heritage and their nation. To take pride in one's home, for example, is to take pride in the fact that one owns it or is responsible for some property of the home (its beauty, say). What we must be sure about is the belief that we have the right property (being the homeowner) or having caused the property of the object we take pride in (decorating the house).[5] Fourth, 'proud' and 'proudly' can describe an action or gesture. Here the bearing or manner of expression carries the mark of pride, and we are licensed to draw an inference from the behavior to the emotion.[6]

One often suggested contrary for 'pride' is 'humility'. When we look for the contraries to these uses of 'proud' we find some slippage. A proud man differs from a humble one by a measure of degree between the two. But while we say we are *proud of* something we cannot say we are *humble of* something.[7] The corresponding state would be one of shame, remorse, regret, or possibly guilt, but not one of humility. If we find we cannot perform a skill or practice to our satisfaction, the corresponding state may be one of humility; but that self valuation depends on other factors in addition to one's failure at competence. The failure may produce embarrassment, shame or regret. The failure may result in a determination to overcome the defect, borne in the confidence that one can achieve the requisite level of skill; and this response implies a pride in one's abilities, not a sense of humility. Finally, one's

gestures and actions need not carry any implication of one's self valuation. In fact, the mark of pride may serve as an indication of some insecurity on the part of the individual who feels it necessary to manifest such a self judgment.

## Amplification

What we care about helps define our sense of agency in a deliberative situation. When we judge that we can act, we work to specify a course of action to take. Our emotions thus help guide us in determining not only what is important, but also help us discern what is the appropriate course of action to take. This sense of propriety is not only moral, it is aesthetic as well. The classical rhetoricians recognized the persuasive potential inherent in the issue of importance and offered several strategies to achieve this purpose.

Aristotle argues that the topic of magnitude is one of the three topics common to all discourse. In deliberative discourse, for example, what is good is, pro tanto, more valuable than what is advantageous. The topic of magnitude provides those dialectical and ethical principles through whose appeal we can see the proportionate worth of compared goods. The several arguments in Plato's *Gorgias* that explicate the Socratic Proportion, for example, invoke these principles. The topic of magnitude is also closely related to the strategies of amplification and attenuation.

The strategies of amplification and attenuation are those that strengthen or diminish the importance of an idea, argument or object. Yet the history of amplification is confusing and confused. In fact, T. V. F. Brogan warns that any discussion of amplification must explain the source of these confusions that have grown up with its use (Brogan and Halsall 66-67). Amplification can name the commonplaces of the epideictic genre, or it can

name the principles of *inventio* that govern its use. The blurring of these two uses is implicit in Aristotle. As Aristotle says, amplification can be form of praise. Praise shows superiority and superiority is one form of the honorable (1368a 25-28). When we praise something we commend it. Yet to commend something is distinct from showing the ground for that praise. Clearly, to the extent that one's praise cannot be justified one runs the risk of confusing the intensity of one's belief *in* something with the strength for one's belief *that* something is good. To really, really, really believe that health is good does not affect the truth value of the claim. To manipulate the intensity of one's belief in something is to affect one's adherence to that belief, but it does nothing to justify it. But amplification does not, standardly, work to affect intensity. To try to locate the source of the confusion in the distinction between the intensity of one's belief or desire as opposed to the strength of one's belief or desire is to mislocate the source of our explanatory problems.[8] That this, manifestly, is not the problem can be seen by looking at Cicero's arguments.

Cicero recognizes the two-fold thrust of amplification in *De Oratore* when he argues that "the highest distinction of eloquence consists in amplification by means of ornament, which can be used to make one's speech not only increase the importance of the subject and raise it to a higher level, but also to diminish and disparage it" (III xxvi 104). Later in the same discussion, Cicero approves of Antonius' earlier discussion of laudation and censure, arguing, "for nothing is more effective for the development and amplification of a speech than to be able to use both of these [laudation and censure] in the fullest abundance" (III xxvii 105). Praise and blame, laudation and censure do not target qualitatively different parts of the emotional

experience; rather, they target different aspects of the same experience. Amplification has two modes of achievement. It serves an expressive function when it is achieved through praise or blame. It also serves and evocative function when it works to affect a cognitive judgment about the importance of something.

Both the expressive and evocative functions of amplification influence the strength of one's judgment in the importance of what is at stake, but they have different pragmatic goals. The expressive use works to affect the audience's attitudes towards something. The evocative use works to ground the audience's judgment in the importance of something. The expressive and evocative functions also target different aspects of the emotional experience. The expressive targets the focus of the audience's emotions; it directs or orients their reason states. Praise and blame animate and direct the attitude of caring towards the object of that praise. The evocative function targets the reasons for the audience's judgment about its importance. In short, we care about something because it is important. To see that importance allows the focus of the emotion to enlarge or shrink itself to the appropriate degree.

In *De Oratore* Cicero notes that the techniques of amplification common to the epideictic aim can also be used with deliberative discourse. Praise and blame presuppose an argument from degree. Praise assumes that the good in question is good; blame assumes that the evil in question is evil. Praise and blame invoke a sufficient condition that differentiates the choice of goods or evils that are contemplated. An act of laudation, for example, can distinguish the desirable from the praiseworthy. David Hume champions this distinction

in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* when he discusses the sentiment of approbation. He also follows Cicero here when he argues:

> that the sentiment of approbation, which those accomplishments produce, besides its being *inferior*, is also somewhat *different* from that, what attends the virtues of justice and humanity. But this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under different classes and appellations. The character of CAESAR and that of CATO, as drawn by SALLUST, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest and most limited sense of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces love; the other, esteem: the one is amiable, the other awful: We should wish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be ambitious of in ourselves. (101)

Hume's argument is revealing. While appealing to a sufficient condition within a class of judgments, it links the precise judgment with a certain sort of motivation. The causal role of the audience's reason state is inclined towards a practical aim. In a similar vein, we find more praiseworthy those traits that are beneficial to others over those traits useful to oneself. Mercy, justice, courage and fidelity are more praiseworthy than amiability, prudence, endurance and reliability. Censure works in a similar way. It is an attack against vices or offenses which must go unanswered or are unanswerable. Blame succeeds when it targets a vice that has an ideal type. One may also heighten the harms of vicious states by contrasting them with the virtues that serve as their contraries. Irascibility can be contrasted with gentleness; shamelessness, with modesty; cunning with wisdom, and so on.

Quintilian formalized the methods for heightening the importance of an issue. He argues that we possess four principle methods of amplification: *augmentation, comparison, reasoning*, and *accumulation*. Quintilian's methods of *inventio* are not to be confused with the techniques of copia. Copia strives

for profluence, and profluence is not importance. *Augmentation* works by adding words, phrases or clauses that incrementally heighten the importance of an object by leading the argument to a climactic level. Climactic gradation can be enhanced by further controlling the pace of the phrasing involved. One may also present the issue as already being at the superlative level, only to superimpose a still higher degree. His fourth tactic involves claiming that it is impossible to conceive of a superlative condition beyond the one attained. *Comparison* seeks to manipulate the argument from degree within the genus in which the object is found. We saw this tactic earlier with the distinction between the desirable and the praiseworthy. What Quintilian calls *reasoning* is the use of arguments in such a way as to lead the audience to draw further inferences when the facts of the stated argument are joined with other arguments offered elsewhere in the text. *Accumulation* names the use of those schemes of repetition that work to focus the audience's attitude on its object in such a way as to reveal its importance (Quintilian VIII. iv. 1-27).

## Priority

The strategies of amplification and, in fact, the whole issue of importance is governed by the topical principle of *priority*. The notion of priority is ancient and complex. I first saw the importance of priority as a topical principle for rhetoric in Paul Grice's discussion of its explanatory potential in the formation of concepts (Grice, "Reply to Richards" 92-93). His discussion of priority depends heavily on those of Aristotle. I have followed Terence Irwin's discussion of the concept of priority in his work, *Aristotle's First Principles.*

The concept of priority can be invoked in a wide variety of contexts and deployed in towards different ends. Perhaps the simplest use of the idea of priority is with members in a series. *Spatial* priority allows us to say, "Joe is second in line and Jack is fifth in line," and "Richmond is closer to Washington D. C. than Raleigh is." *Temporal* priority allows statements like "A occurred before B" and "each child has four biological grandparents." We also generalize the notion of priority. Priority of acquaintance partially explains why we move from the familiar to the unfamiliar and from the known to the unknown. This kind of priority also explains our movement from the similar to the dissimilar.

*Natural* priority licenses generalizations like the whole is prior to it parts. Aristotle, for example, uses the concept to justify his claim that the *polis* is prior to the individual. The individual, he argues, is not self sufficient. 'Self sufficient' does not mean here that one is capable of survival; rather, it means, 'able to achieve complete eudaimonia' (Irwin 122-125). The general idea of natural priority can be made more precise. We have cases of *asymmetrical* existential dependence: the existence of B depends on the existence of A, but the converse does not hold. One's rights as a citizen of the U. S. depends on the Constitution, but the rights of the Constitution do not depend on that individual's being a citizen.

Natural priority is closely related to *conceptual* priority. Conceptual or explanatory priority is present when the explanans (the account) is naturally prior to the explanandum (the thing explained) (Grice 93). This is clearly present in cases of asymmetrical explanation: neither A nor B can exist without the other, but the existence of A explains the existence of B, and the

converse does not hold (Irwin 81). Being fully human requires having the capacity for grammar; but having the capacity for grammar is explained by the fact that one is fully human, and one cannot have the capacity without being fully human. We also have *valuational* priority. Health is prior to exercise; exercise, an extrinsic good, is conducive to health, which is an intrinsic good.

There are several ways in which the idea of priority is relevant to emotional persuasion. It is here that Grice's observation about the role of priority in concept formation becomes relevant. Grice argues that the claim that A is prior to B in one dimension of priority may or may not allow for the possibility that B is prior to a in the same or another dimension of priority (93). The accuracy of this claim is demonstrated in the two ways in which priority can operate in the argument from pathos. The first way is comparatively simple, straightforward and, I think, obvious. By manipulating the temporal order of the presentation of beliefs relevant to one's assenting to an emotion, coupled with the matter and manner in which the audience is acquainted with that content, one can successfully arouse, control or dissipate an emotion. Whether the issue of timing or acquaintance is prior will depend on the emotion and the aim in question.

The second way can be illustrated by adapting an example from Grice. The legal concept of guilt is conceptually prior to the moral concept of guilt. But we can view the moral concept of guilt as valuationally prior to the legal concept and argue that the legal concept ought to be couched in terms of the moral concept (93).

## Semantic Depth

Understanding the relationship between priority of acquaintance and conceptual priority is also vital for effecting emotional persuasion. The meanings of emotional terms, like moral terms, have *semantic* depth (Platts 249). When we use emotion terms like pity, anger or compassion, we can do so because we have mastered their standard conditions of use, that is, the publicly accepted and consensual criteria that warrant and govern their use. Richard Arrington argues that because these criteria are the commonly accepted means governing their use, they point to the application of truth conditions for the situation in which the term is used. It may be that the situation does not warrant a judgment that A is angry (A may be irritated instead, say); they give us a purchase on the first step to truth conditions (138-139).

Yet semantic depth is a broader concept that this. Two people can experience the same emotion directed at the same particular object, yet they can view it with different depths of understanding. Each can experience a different depth of understanding, both of the emotion itself and of the object viewed in terms of that emotion. A person may have a grasp of the standard conditions, but that grasp may be shallow or narrow. As we experience life we come to deepen our knowledge of what anger and pity, for example, really are. It is one thing to have a shallow experience of anger; it is quite another to have a shallow knowledge of what anger is (Arrington 138). The task of deepening our understanding of the emotions is not one of reinventing new emotional concepts for ourselves at each new stage of comprehension (these are different conceptions, not different concepts); it is, rather, one of

deepening our knowledge of the public concept which gives us our understanding of each other (Platts 249).

If the conceptual depth of understanding of an emotion differs significantly between an author and the audience the possibility for emotional persuasion is correspondingly constrained. If the author's comprehension is far deeper than that of the audience, for example, the range of reasons available is shrunken and their domain of application is reduced. This phenomenon is a common one. Parents face this with their children; teachers, with their students. The possibilities for persuasion are not, however, eliminated. By knowing at what stage of conceptual sophistication one's audience is, the author can pitch the appeal to the level or to the one which is the next more sophisticated. The possibility of a more complex conception is important epistemically. If there are objective stages of increasing complexity, the grounds for one's appeal are not totally constrained by the limitations, biases and prejudices of one's audience. Whether the stage appealed to is adequate, or appropriate or not, relative to the aim in question, is, in principle, a decidable matter.

## Bootstrapping

Each stage of comprehension carries a different conception of the emotion in question. The conceptual structure of the emotion becomes sophisticated or complex at each successive stage. By understanding how an emotion moves through these stages we can develop a model which explains how an emotion allows itself to become progressively more structured by practical, social and moral concerns.

Although we, as rhetoricians, are not interested in constructing models of the emotions, we are interested in the process that produces these changes. The mechanism or process whereby an emotion becomes more complex (and thus more adequate for its purpose) is called *bootstrapping.* [9] It is important, initially, to distinguish the fact of one's experience from the mechanism that operates within it. There are experiences we undergo whereby we learn that our standing conception falsifies the situation under consideration; and furthermore, we recognize that we are now too experienced or sophisticated to continue to accept this conception as adequate. By reflecting on this event we recognize that what we previously took as the truth of that event is not its explanation at all. Bootstrapping is the cognitive mechanism which provides us with a more adequate conception of the concept in question (Williams, *Shame* 219).

The experiences that occasion bootstrapping may or may not be some adventure or trauma that lies outside the normal course of one's life's events or is life-transforming in the sense that all of one's subsequent life organizes itself around that experience. Significantly, these experiences are viewed from some point of view or through some aspect of it. Our experiences can be seen, for example, as comic, tragic or farcical. *Peripety*, a tragic reversal within one's life, is life changing in this sense. In tragedy, *peripety* is accompanied by the experience of recognition (*anagnorisis*); this recognition refers to the movement from ignorance to knowledge. More precisely, it is the acquisition of knowledge which concerns or affects the success or failure of the characters in that tragedy. Another literary experience related to the idea of recognition is that of epiphany. An epiphany is a symbol of spiritual

moment or state. Although Joyce does not insist on this possibility, an epiphany may be a moment of insight. Bootstrapping may or may not be involved in either kind of experience. Although it is pragmatically related, bootstrapping is conceptually distinct from these kinds of experiences.

Bootstrapping must also be distinguished from another aspect of our emotional experiences. Our emotions are typically comprehended in terms of *paradigm scenarios.* Emotion terms are learned by associating them with and using them to talk about characteristic situations where some or all of the objects of an emotion type are present and where some response, whether of pleasure or distress, desire or fear, are normal. These scenarios are obviously taught through our everyday encounters; but they are also taught through stories, the practices of one's culture and through literature (de Sousa 182). The idea and its consequent pedagogical power have long been recognized. Aristotle, for example, discusses the role of habituation so that one may learn how to be properly affected. What can be taught in and through a scenario depends on the individual's stage of development (de Sousa 183).

Jealousy will serve as a good example to illustrate the idea of a paradigm scenario. Jealousy arises in a very determinant context. In his discussion of this emotion, Daniel Farrell asks us to suppose that at the company Christmas party Joe's wife, Sally, appears to be very interested in Sam. She flirts and teases lightly with him. Joe wants to leave, but his wife wants to stay and visit with Sam who seems to be playing the role of Prince Charming. It is possible that Joe would be jealous in this situation, but he may also be irritated, frustrated or even amused instead. The dramatic situation is not enough, by itself, to trigger the emotion. A scenario refers to the pattern of beliefs, fears

and desires which inform the dramatic situation. The content of the desires and fears can vary. Farrell asks us to consider another example. Joe, pleased with the publication of his new book, is part of a panel discussion at a conference along with Sam. Joe thinks it would be gratifying for the audience to acknowledge some part of his work. The attentions are directed, however, at towards Sam's work and ideas. Joe, the protagonist, is jealous of because a third person, (in this case, Sam) appears to be getting something the protagonist wants from a second person (in this case the audience).

The protagonist in a jealous scenario has rather specific desire and beliefs. In the case of sexual jealousy, the protagonist desires to retain the affections of another and fears that those affections are being given to another. In the case of professional jealousy, the protagonist desires the esteem or admiration, say, of another, but fears that that esteem is being given to another (Farrell 527-529). We internalize the pattern of this scenario; and when that pattern is confronted in life, the emotion can be experienced. But not all situations fit the scenario we have adopted. The resultant dissonance experience can create the impetus for bootstrapping to alter the scenario to encompass new situations.

In his work, *Shame and Necessity*, Bernard Williams discusses how bootstrapping works in the emotions of guilt and shame (219-223). The emotions of guilt and shame have paradigm scenarios, but they are not as determinate as jealousy. Guilt and shame work as they do because each involves an internalized figure. The internalized figure in guilt is a *victim* or an *enforcer*. At its most primitive level guilt presents itself in a certain way. The internalized figure has the attitude of anger and the subject's reaction is

fear. At this primitive level, guilt is fear *at* anger. Fear at anger expresses a consequential relationship. In time, we come to see that we can predict that consequence as following our actual or proposed actions. Fear at anger becomes fear *of* anger. Anger becomes personified at this point. When the enforcer is represented as an authority figure like a parent, this personification licenses the anger to appear as the possibility of a loss of love. As the conditions of anger are explored the internalized figure becomes more abstract. Guilt comes to be experienced as fear of recrimination. This stage of reaction then comes to limit its scope to justified recrimination. As the internalized figure becomes more abstract, the imaginative distance between the victim and the enforcer shrinks so that the enforcer in the emotion is experienced as the moral law, which has become a part of the subject himself.

Shame also involves an internalized figure. The internalized figure is a *watcher* or *witness*. Shame lies in the recognition that we are seen at a disadvantage and this disadvantage is understood as a loss of power. Our consciousness of this loss is, early on, caused by the presence of a witness to the relevant situation. But the witness need not be actually present for shame to be felt. When the witness is literally absent, the sense of loss is still perceived through the eyes of another. The possibility for bootstrapping arises because ethical content can be present in the given situation.

The internalization of the paradigm scenario explains how, in part, the mechanism of bootstrapping can move the individual into a deeper understanding of an emotion and its conceptual complexity. Bootstrapping explains how an individual alters the extension of the term and successively refines the intensional components of the term's meaning.

## Motivation

In the *Elements of Rhetoric* Richard Whately offered a psychological account to explain the relationship between reason and desire. He found that two conditions must be satisfied, "for in order that the Will may be influenced, two things are requisite: (1) that the proposed Object should appear desirable; and (2) that the means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of the object" (Part II chapter 1). It is not hard to see what is attractive in this account. Some form of calculation is possible only when the object is, in principle, attainable. But not all practical arguments depend on antecedent reasons in the way Whately's account suggests. It is one thing when we are hungry to desire fried chicken and know we can buy it at the grocery down the street; it is quite another thing to discover that it will satisfy our hunger because it is on the table before us. Not all satisfaction of desires will be antecedently determined. Whately also gives clear expression to a dominant conception of motivation. A desire is seen as a two-term relation between the agent and what is desired. This relation is explained in terms of an attitude that is present between the agent and the desired object. To explain one's desire is to offer a causal account.

Many of the passions and the emotions are powerful determinants in motivation. At least two classes of emotions, namely, our desires and fears, are so understood because the potential inherent in their aim can move or induce us to act in a certain way. We can define 'motive' as "the deliberate cause or candidate for such a cause for human action" (Lyons 163). The term 'motivation' denotes that set of possible causes of voluntary human behavior (Lyons 163). To ask for a motive is to demand a causal explanation of an action.

It is tempting to think that it is legitimate to ask for a motive only in nonstandard cases. After all, some requests for motives are superfluous (Lyons 163). We do not ask a thirsty runner why she removed the top of her water bottle not because the request is conceptually inappropriate; rather, it is too obvious to warrant such a question. Yet we should not ignore the pragmatics of asking this question. It is reasonable for people ignorant of a particular practice, football say, to ask why the quarterback passed on third and seven. A question concerning motivation in this instance can be an efficient strategy for understanding the strategic possibilities inherent in a particular offense. Likewise, to ask oneself about one's motive is a common initial test of presumptions.

To ask the motive of an action is to request a cause, but not all causal statements name motives. The statement, "Sally fell because she broke her ankle," names a cause that is not a motive. Anthony Kenny argues that we can see the range and vagueness of this concept by recognizing that motive-words can be tentatively located by testing them in sentence frames. Motive words can complete: 1) "She acted out of ___," 2) "___ made him do X," 3) "She did X because she was ___," and 4) "His motive in doing X was ____ ." Some ideas can fill all four frames. Greed, gratitude, ambition, despair, anger, desire and fear, among others, can serve as motives. Carelessness may make me misspell a word, but we do not say that carelessness was the motive of my misspelling (Kenny 85-86). A motive names a sufficient cause; but it is a cause that is, in some important way, deliberate.

The notion of 'deliberate action' is subtle because it does not require that we see motivating reasons as producing satisfaction in any conventional

sense. Suppose that Jane is driving down a steep hill with a deep embankment immediately adjacent to the road. A panel truck is in the opposite lane. Suddenly a deer jumps in front of the car. She can swerve right and drop down the embankment, swerve left and hit the truck, or she can hit the deer. She chooses to hit the deer. She does so *deliberately*, but it is not quite right to say that it was her *intention* to hit the deer. Her intention was to avoid both the truck and the embankment. Nor do we say she hit the deer *on purpose*, if purpose implies some kind of accomplishment or performance. She was not, after all, seeking provender. A motive offers a sufficient cause for an action in the sense that it names a particular kind of reason for that action.

## Motivational Specification

In the Introduction I argued that one of the stages of deliberation involves specifying the action to be taken, and in Chapter II I argued that one's desires have two levels of articulation--first order and second order desires. The second order desire is the agent's *effective* desire, the desire the agent wants to want. For a second order desire to be effective several success conditions have to be satisfied. To claim that the agent wants to want to X implies that the agent is willing to bring that end about. To will to bring the end about is to coherently intend to do so. Immanuel Kant recognized the importance of willing with the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives:

> Who wills the end wills (so far as reason has a decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. So far as willing is concerned, this proposition is analytic: for in my willing of an object as an effect there is already conceived the causality of myself as a working cause--that is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an end the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end.

Actually, the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is only one principle of coherent intending. It takes more than willing the conditions necessary for the end. Onora O'Neill argues that there are at least five other principles that must be observed. It might be helpful to see these principles as the volitional counterpart to the topical principles of *workability* and *feasibility* in policy deliberation. The topics of workability and feasibility work to secure a coherent plan of action to reach a goal; these principles work to guarantee coherent intending.

First, one must intend not only the means necessary, but one must will some *sufficient* means to what is fundamentally intended as well. I could intend to exercise for health, yet not intend to perform specific exercises because no exercise by itself is indispensable to becoming healthy. Second, one must seek to make those necessary or sufficient means available when they are not present. One can coherently intend form one's secondary students to learn to write well but do nothing on the grounds that there are no state approved rhetorics or effective guidelines available for use. Third, one must look not only for the means, but one must also intend all of the necessary and some sufficient components of that end. Fourth, one must see that the specific intentions present in our desire are mutually consistent. Finally, one must see that the specific intentions adopted are consistent with the underlying intentions (O'Neill 169-170).

Certainly, these success conditions are necessary for insuring that a practical desiderative goal will be reached. When we consider the question of desire in deliberation we recognize that a two-term relation is explanatorily

inadequate because it is incomplete. Deliberation is of ends. To explain motivational desire in deliberation we need a three term relation between the agent, what is desired and the sake for which the object is desired.[10] The third element in the relation specifies what kind of desire is present because it makes clear what the choice is for.

We can better understand this three term relation by examining the kinds of desires we have.

## Kinds of Desires

We have already mentioned that our desires and fears name those classes of emotions that can serve as motives for our actions. The term 'desire' names an appetition or striving for an apparent and future good, and 'fear' names the avoidance or shrinking from an apparent and future evil. One venerable way of understanding our desires is by classifying them by their objects. We have desires seeking the satisfaction of our appetites, and there are sexual desires. We also classify desires according to the characteristic quality of their motivations. One's motive may be honorable or dishonorable, noble or base, and so on. Emotions like pride and shame figure prominently here. We have desires for the good, where we are concerned with intrinsic goods like health, justice and courage.

More contemporary classifications of our desires seek to classify them by more formal criteria rather than through their substantive content. We can classify our desires by the character of their reasons. We have subjective desires. Subjective desires can be characterized as preferences; they are those we do not mind thinking of as changing.[11] One must not conflate 'subjective' with 'non cognitive'. Subjective desires can and do have reasons; non

cognitive desires have no reasons.[12] In the previous chapter these reasons were characterized as 'reasons for' acting. The reasons provided for these desires are agent-relative. By this we are claiming that the reason for this desire may not serve as reason for someone else. My reason for acting is tied to my aim; another person may have the same reason if his aim is coincident with mine. If my aim changes my reason disappears.

Subjective desires are contrasted with objective desires. In these cases, the reason for a desire is not tied to any point of view. In the previous chapter these reasons were characterized as public 'reasons to' act. Derek Parfit illustrates this idea by asking us to imagine a case where we claim that there is a reason to alleviate another's suffering.[13] This reason is objective if it is a reason for everyone; that is, if anyone is in a position to relieve that suffering, it is a reason to do so. These reasons are agent-neutral. Objective desires include desires for intrinsic goods, that is, those things which are good in and of themselves; moral goods such as courage, temperance and justice; and inherent goods, those things which are good because the experience of them or the contemplation of them is rewarding in itself. Before turning to the third kind of desire, it will be helpful to make two other points about these two kinds of desires. All reasons are tied to an agent, time and place. Thus, it is possible for two people to share a common aim, but only one of the two is capable of bringing about that aim. This kind of relativity is common to both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons and is no objection to the distinction. Significantly, the second order desires in both subjective and objective desires can be expressed positively or negatively. One can want a first order desire to continue, and one can want a first order desire to end.

Ronald de Sousa argues that there are self-related desires. He argues that these desires have as their aims those things which are necessary for defining who we are, or our self concept will be undermined. The candidates for these desires are important because "of what having the desire means to our self concept."[14] Self-related desires can be objective or subjective. The virtues are objective desires; they desire the good, but they also help to define who one is. One's self-related desires can strive for a demonstrated quality of motivation and performance. This notion is expressed in Shakespeare's *Richard II*:

> The purest treasure mortal times afford
> Is spotless reputation; that away,
> Men are but gilded loam or painted clay.
> A jewel in a ten-times-barred-up chest
> Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast.
> Mine honour is my life; both grow in one;
> Take honour from me, and my life is done.
> (I, 1, 1. 177)

But not all self-related desires are of this sort. Self-related desires are manifested in the passionate pursuits of one's life. People are passionate about many things: birding, running, coin collecting, Elizabethan poetry. These desires are not objective in the sense above. They can be, nonetheless, vital to one's sense of well-being (de Sousa 180). Finally, the formal objects of a pattern of particular desires can be coordinated by an executive self-related desire. Arrogance, vanity and an insensitivity to others can suggest a desire that the sense of one's importance be made manifest and expressed to others.

## The Aristotelian Principle

The concerns, wants, desires and fears involved in deliberation are subject to another condition: the characters of the deliberating agents.

Deliberation is not only practical; it is particular as well. The capacities and abilities of the individuals involved place limitations on each act of deliberation. Questions of physical, emotional and intellectual maturity, education and skills must also be reckoned with. Deliberative discourse involves more than one agent. The potential for cooperation and consensus is juxtaposed to conflicts of need or competitive interests. These contingencies constrain the range of options open to the deliberative search. Finally, the individuals who participate in the deliberative search do so from the point of view of their own conceptions of individual and communal goods. Each deliberative decision is judged for its adequacy in the particular search and for its contribution to one's destiny.

The rational desire to see that the particular deliberative decision contribute to the larger question of how one should live must take into account one general principle concerning human motivation. This principle is implicit in several arguments in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. He argues that virtue is a kind of excellent functioning. What is good in the exercise of the particular virtue at a particular time is what is really good for that individual as an individual. This teleological account has a double perspective. The exercise of the virtues strives for external goods, achievements, successful performances and the like, and they strive for goods internal to the agent. Acting from or through these excellences is constitutive of the practice they form a part of, and these internal goods are only recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question (MacIntyre 188-189). Second, Aristotle argues that the pleasures and enjoyment one experiences are the result of appropriately and successfully exercising our developed capacities.

Finally, he argues that our satisfactions increase as our developed capacities become more adequately developed.

John Rawls argues that there is a principle of motivation that can account for the structure and primacy of our desires and wants. He calls it the Aristotelian Principle, and he defines it as, "other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized" (426). The principle helps to explain several features of human motivation.

First, the Aristotelian Principle provides a strong counter argument to Jeremy Bentham's notorious dictum that pleasure is merely quantitative. If he were right then we would agree that from this standpoint concerning pleasure playing pushpin is no different from playing chess. The principle helps to explain how qualitatively different kinds of pleasures and enjoyments possess different degrees of strength in one's activities. Chess is inherently more rewarding than pushpin because it requires the exercise of more complex and developed capacities. Skills are technical performances; practices are activities that incorporate those skills. To become a sawyer is to possess a technical skill in the accurate cutting of wood; to be a cabinetmaker is to practice a complex set of skills to a more inclusive end, where the attainment of the goal, a cabinet say, is an instantiation of the end of this practice which is rewarding in itself. The practices we participate in are more complex, possess more variety and are more satisfying than the simpler skills that form a part of that practice.

As one's skills and abilities develop and are cultivated, the demand for greater satisfaction in the performance of those abilities develops as well.

Abilities become capacities for the exercise of the practices in which they are performed. This pattern is present in the technical and operational skills we develop, and it is present in our emotional life as well. It is present in our emotional life because one's emotions are interdependent. To see a change in the domain where pity is appropriate is to see a corresponding change in the domain of one's fears. This, in turn, affects the governing attitude of compassion making it more responsive to new situations. The new capacity inherent in the attitude of compassion realigns the other particular emotions coordinated by this emotion. It also works at a deeper level. One's objective desires change in priority as the motivational strength for them becomes more appropriate and thus more realized. One's self-related desires also become situated among the objective desires that we cultivate.

Finally, the Aristotelian Principle helps to causally explain how the emotions can form a part of the virtues as well as the role the emotions play in the formation of that virtue. It also explains the causal role of one's governing emotional dispositions. I will explore these issues in the next two sections. I will discuss the role of fear in courage and then I will discuss several motivational liabilities that many among us are prey to.

## Courage

That the emotions affect our sense of agency can also be understood in terms of the virtues or excellences that we cultivate. Aristotle argues that a virtue is a dispositional state of excellent practical functioning involving decision. These excellences may be ones of intellect or character. Each virtue possesses a distinctive range of actions, motives, feelings and capacities (1105b 20). 'Feelings' denote the appetites, anger, pity, fear and the like; 'capacities'

denote "what we have when we are said to be capable of these feelings" (1105b 25). I want to explore a moment how this 'capacity' changes as we come to acquire a virtue because it has ramifications for the role the emotions have in defining both importance and motivation.

Courage is a virtue manifested in action. Courage is a form of deliberate, practical reasoning occurring in adverse, dangerous and painful circumstances that ends in deliberate, sensible and appropriate moral action intended for some good end (Walton, *Courage* 2, 27). Frequently, what is done in courage is supererogatory. The action is voluntary, and it is neither seen as obligatory nor forbidden. We do not blame as wrong those who don't perform such actions. The act is morally good both in its intended consequences and as an intrinsically valuable action. Finally, the act is done for another's good and it is seen as meritorious (Walton, *Courage* 21). 'Meritorious' carries two implications: the act is morally meritorious, but it is also carries an aesthetic judgment as well. Aristotle's observation that an act of courage is done for the sake of the noble and is thus fine is echoed by Hemingway's characterization of courage as grace under pressure.

The danger and difficulty of the circumstances out of which and through which the courageous deed is performed names one necessary condition for courage. The arguments of Aristotle are helpful here. He argues that courage lies in a mean between the two emotional capacities of fear and rashness that form its extremes.[15] Fear is a deficient state of perception and judgment that apprehends the danger as overwhelming and harmful and thus characterizes our capacity to act as too weak to be effectual. Overcoming one's fear when it is present may be seen as a kind of forbearance and is, thus, like

endurance. A focus on this condition can suggest that courage is a kind of endurance, but as Plato argues, endurance can be foolish.[16] The perceived need to overcome one's fear may manifest itself as a desire to avoid shame. An act done because one believes to not act so would be shameful may appear outwardly as courageous. Shame is an extraordinarily complex emotion and judgment, but the prospect of shame as a motivation fails because the impetus of the desire is grounded in the judgment of others and is not properly self originating.

Similarly, a bold deed done from anger may also outwardly resemble a courageous one, but it is not courageous. Anger is a defiant protest against some act of contempt or belittling. As an emotion of self-assessment, anger is self regarding and thus fails as the proper motivation. Anger fails for another reason. A courageous deed calls for a careful presence of mind. As Douglas Walton puts it, the mind of the courageous person is the eye of the storm (2).

Finally, the courageous action has a morally worthy intention as its good. Courage requires intentional action, and an act of great risk is not, by itself, courageous. Foolish risk taking is not courageous because it follows from the wrong kind of judgment. Temperament names part of our deep seated propensities and traits such as excitability and daring, and these are matters of temperament. An action emanating from bravery does not qualify. If bravery is an innate capacity, people can be more or less brave. Brave deeds are possible for only those who possess it. Unlike bravery, courage can be cultivated. Finally, courage does not arise from a bent for rashness. Rashness is a kind of false judgment that diminishes the risk inherent in the situation by falsely over valuing our capacity to act.

Aristotle claims that the virtues, including courage, can be cultivated. His comments on the habituation of virtue are, however, frustratingly vague. I want to explore for a moment the role of fear in the cultivation of courage because it bears heavily on the question of the importance of emotional perception and judgment. To do this I will adapt and modify an argument made by Eugene Garver about how we acquire virtues to explore the role of the emotions in the virtues. He argues that the acquisition of a virtue requires three stages.[17]

Our popular use of the notion of 'courage' often conflates its meaning with two different concepts. An agent who takes scrupulous care to perform a difficult duty is sometimes called 'courageous'. Whether this judgment is legitimate depends on the supererogatory nature of the act relative to the duty in question as well as the circumstantial difficulty of its performance. More to the point, we sometimes call 'courageous' those acts that are performed in defense of one's self respect or well being. In its simplest conceptual expression, 'courage' in the defense of one's self respect or well being is deemed a valuable technical means to an extrinsic end. The middle schooler facing the bully shaking down kids for their lunch money wants to be left alone. The student who decides to stand up to the bully may reason in one of two ways. The student can say, "If I stand up to the bully tomorrow, I'll get to eat lunch." Here the student sees an individual act of 'courage' as sufficient to end the harassment. The student could also reason, "Standing up to bullies generally works, so tomorrow I'll stand up to him." Here the student sees courage as a likely means to ending harassment. This kind of reasoning involves the instantiation of a principle, a principle inductively arrived at.

The goal in both deliberative scenarios is to be left alone; an act of 'courage' is valuable only as a means to achieve that security.

Similarly, the fear felt by the student is viewed extrinsically (Garver 480). The fear 'happens' to the student; it is externally caused in the way we think that blisters are caused by ill fitting shoes. This stance towards one's emotional state allows the student to consider his fears as controllable by technical means, and the student's deliberative imagination allows him the opportunity to predict what the bully will do to intimidate him and how he can respond. The evaluation of one's fear is limited to its potential role in the performance necessary to achieve this goal. Two further observations need to be made. The misdescription of an act of self respect as an act of courage does not affect the character of how fear is handled. In fact, I think it is probable (but will not argue here) that a strong sense of self respect is a precondition for the capacity to behave courageously.

Let us suppose that the middle schooler fails in the first attempt to stand up to the bully. After a period of anxiety and continued fear, the student decides to stand up again. If the goal in this reassertion is the same as before, then the student's desires remain instrumental. If, however, the goal is to overcome the fear felt; then a new stage has begun, and the process of internalizing the virtue of courage has commenced. The goal in standing up to the bully has ceased to be purely extrinsic, and a new goal has been added. The new goal, controlling one's fear, has become valuable in itself (Garver 480). This new goal is possible because we have self-related desires. Self-related desires are those that are concerned with who we are and who we wish to become. Being fearful is now seen as something we allow ourselves to

experience. As the character of the desire changes, the character of the action changes as well. The difference is most readily apparent in what is found satisfying. In the first stage the student successfully routs the bully *by* acting courageously. The action is a kind of performance. It is the sense of security that is satisfying, not the act of achievement. In the second stage, the student sees that *in* acting courageously two things happen. The bully is routed as a *consequence* of the action, and the student sees that he has overcome his fear as a *result*. Results are intrinsic to an action; consequences are extrinsic. We argued earlier that courageous actions are judged morally good for their intended consequences as well as being intrinsically valuable. This stage makes articulate that distinction, even though it does not specify its content.

Significantly, fear has now become normative at this stage. The psychological state of being fearful is inherently bad; its experience is painful. Fear itself has also changed. It is seen as intrinsically bad because it is, by itself, sufficient to block an intrinsically good state. The normative value of fear changes the normative value of acting courageously. Courage is no longer solely an instrumentally valuable means to success; it is intrinsically valuable because it is sufficient to overcome fear. Acting 'courageously' is now a kind of achievement.

We are now ready to turn to the role of fear in courage. Cowardice is often thought to be the opposite of courage.[18] Cowardice is a failure to overcome one's fears when one believes or knows that the action blocked by that fear ought to be done. This implies that courage must invoke an act where the agent overcomes one's fears. This excludes another class of

supererogatory actions where fear is not present. Are acts of fearlessness that fit the requirements of courage not courageous? Certainly, reckless and foolish acts that have happy outcomes are not courageous; such acts are lucky. But these cases are not the real problem. Fearlessness has two opposites and both are called 'fear'. We can be fearful or fearless when we face a dangerous situation. The circumstances can arouse fear. Courage calls for fortitude in the face of this kind of fear. The corresponding state in fearlessness is characterized as being 'resolute' or 'intrepid'. But we can also experience fear as a part of our deliberations. We fear that we may make the wrong decision. Courage calls for deliberate and careful action and fear here may be felt as an emotion or as a kind of attitudinal judgment. Audacity describes this capacity in a state of fearlessness; composure describes this capacity in courage. Courageous acts display a mastery of these fears, not just a control over them. Fear now constitutes a part of the structure of courage.

## Motivational Disabilities

Not all kinds of motivation are desiderative as has been suggested above. Each of us is prone to susceptibilities or states that are seen descriptively and normatively as liabilities. These qualitative states are 'passive' in the sense that they happen to us. They can manifest themselves in one of two ways. Some are seen as part of our character. Each of us possesses some dispositional habits of temperament or mind that are morally or practically problematic. These dispositional qualities can and do cause harm to others and oneself. These habits are vices. A vice is an unchosen habit. We do not choose to develop the vice, yet we have developed them through the history of the situations we have encountered and through the choices we have made

individually in each of them. Many vices are flaws in one's character. Cruelty, misanthropy, hypocrisy, snobbery, and treachery are common examples.[19]

Others are patterned responses to the conditions of life we all face. Insensitivity is a vice concerning our emotional capacity to recognize how each of us is vulnerable to the fact that the goods of our lives are often only contingently available. Insensitivity implies a lack in the capacity to discern what is salient. The insensitive person may be unkind, mean, uncaring, merciless, unmerciful, unsympathetic, or hardheaded. Insensitivity may also be social or aesthetic. The insensitive person may be unaware, uncultivated, uncultured, unsophisticated, or philistine. Selfishness, in part, is a commitment to expedient means of securing the goods of one's life. The selfish agent's commitment to expediency admits of degrees and takes many objects. The emotional states range widely. The selfish person may be egoistic and self indulgent; greedy, avaricious or grasping; covetous; stingy, ungenerous or uncharitable.[20]

One of the classical senses of *pathe* names the symptomatic manifestations of how we respond to the circumstances we are confronted with. Phobias are clear cases of *pathe* as passive qualities. Many *pathe*, as dispositionally manifested passive qualities, involve the relationship between volition and emotional response. Peevishness, irritability, irascibility and petulance are emotional conditions that its owners are susceptible to in the proper circumstances. Failures of temperance can shade into willfulness. People who are unruly, intractable, willful or headstrong are liable to react in characteristic ways when some authority asserts itself. Not all dispositional

responses of this sort exhibit a fixity of response. Willfulness has as its opposite a failure of resolve. Some people are vacillating, irresolute, faltering, and fickle. While such conduct resembles moods, they are forms of dispositional or habituated reticence occurring at or around the moment of decision. All of these emotions are dispositional in the sense that those who possess these qualities tend to act in predictable ways. While they may be habits of mind or temper, they are not virtues; these qualities are not cultivated for their intrinsic worth. The more common types of these passions are listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1

DISPOSITIONAL LIABILITIES OF WILL AND EMOTION

Failures of Temperance

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| bilious | dyspeptic | irascible | querulous |
| cantankerous | fractious | irritable | quick tempered |
| captious | fretful | malcontented | shrewish |
| choleric | high strung | moody | splenetic |
| contentious | ill natured | peevish | thin skinned |
| churlish | iracund | petulant | waspish |

Willfulness

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| antagonistic | implacable | obstinate | rancorous |
| belligerent | inimical | pervicacious | refactory |
| froward | intractable | pitiless | restive |
| headstrong | merciless | pugnacious | stubborn |
| imperious | mulish | quarrelsome | spiteful |

Failures of Resolve

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| capricious | fickle | inconstant | pixyish |
| desultory | fitful | indecisive | spasmodic |
| diffident | flighty | insecure | unreliable |
| dithering | frivolous | irresolute | unstable |
| faithless | impulsive | mercurial | vacillating |

While they are not cultivated for their intrinsic worth, we have long recognized the causal importance of these central traits of temperament. The literary genre of the 'character' has ancient beginnings. Theophrastus' *Characters* is the earliest example of this genre. Chaucer's character studies in the "General Prologue" in *The Canterbury Tales* are notable examples. Richard Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, La Bruyere's *Les Caracteres*, John Earle's excellent *Microcosmography*, Samuel Butler's *Characters*, and Thackerey's *Book of Snobs* offer a range of this genre. Whether the study presents a psychological type (the pugnacious man) or a social type (the antiquary), the study's success depends on an idea best expressed by C. L Stevenson. Certain traits of temperament, he argues, are magnetic. Just as iron filings align themselves around and towards the poles of a magnet, dependent emotions align themselves in relation to this central trait. Not only does this observation help explain the relationships present between the central emotion and its subordinate emotions, it also helps explain how the subordinate emotions coordinate with each other. This observation helps to explain the degree to which the subordinate emotions depend on the central trait, which in turn explains the degree of freedom a person's emotional response possesses. These central traits have motivational force, sometimes dominatingly so. They are desiderative only in a formal sense. The trait is causally efficacious and the control it exercises over one's other practical judgments provides a simulacra of justification. Kenneth Burke's pentad is a particularly acute heuristic for analyzing these magnetic dispositions.

Often these governing dispositions or traits magnetize the purposes that that individual tries to keep hidden. Like a bar magnet, the trait has two poles.

One pole coordinates the agent's feelings and motivations towards others; the second pole further inclines and directs the motivations in those emotions towards the agent's own purposes. One can use this distinction to differentiate quite similar traits. John Earle's analyses in *Microcosmography*, arguably the finest work in this genre, do just that. We can illustrate this subtlety through an example of his analyses. With acute insight he discerns and articulates, for example, the characters of and the purposes hidden in three closely related character types: the complimental man, the partial man, and the flatterer. All are dishonest individuals who prey on the good will of people who seem to have power and influence. Each judges others for their benevolence; each manipulates language, in particular, praise; and each acts with calculated self interest.

The complimenter is insincere and insubstantial. Amiable in manner and complimentary in praise, his words have no substance. His promises are general and empty. There is no connection between what is spoken and what is meant. Earle argues that "no man gives better satisfaction at the first, and comes off more with the eulogy of a kind Gentleman till you know him better, then you know him for nothing" (38). The partial man is the opposite of a defamer. A defamer speaks ill falsely; the partial man speaks well falsely. He constantly compares people and the weight that tips the scale is his own affection for one over the other. Yet his praise of others is but a vehicle for praise directed at himself. He appears affectionate towards others but only to be esteemed as affectionate. His affection and his praise are used to cozen others (Earle 78-79). The flatterer is one who deceives through seeming affection, calculated attention and manipulative laudation. By praising one's

excess of virtue he seeks that vice "of which he may make use," in order to "possess you from yourself" (Earle 49). Each of these individuals lacks a sense of completeness that is necessary for being a self-sufficient individual. This insufficiency is made up for through the need to ingratiate. In fact, they differ according to the purposes and manner of their ingratiation.

## Motivational Push and Motivational Pull

Throughout the discussion of motivation in this chapter and the previous one, I argued that an understanding of the cognitive structure of the emotion in question will yield possibilities for effecting persuasion. These possibilities were explored through sets of distinctions that specified the relevant causal condition for that part of the emotional experience. These distinctions articulated different kinds of reasons operating in the emotions. Desires, for example, have a dual structure. One's first order desires are governed by one's second order desires. The causally efficacious reason instantiated in the second order desire can be a reason to act or a reason for acting. Thus, these normative reasons can be impersonal or personal. Likewise, we distinguished between the kinds of reasons operating in one's fears. Epistemic reasons appraise what is possible or likely in the situation; and attitudinal reasons focus on the agent's wishes and, thus, on the potential capacity of the agent to act in that situation. The use of second order emotions to evaluate the propriety of the targeted emotion also implicitly draws on the potential capacities of the agent to control or alter one's emotional response.

The distinction between one's voluntary capacity to respond and the possibilities inherent in the situation was further explored in the two previous sections, normatively in the role of fear in courage, and non normatively in

the discussion of the motivational liabilities to purposive action. I employed the metaphor of magnetized dispositions to explain the internal dynamic operating in these liabilities. I want to argue that we need another distinction to account for this operational dynamic that mediates between the object and the agent's implicit capacity to control the emotional experience.

I want to explain this internal dynamic through the introduction of another metaphor, borrowed from Robert Nozick's discussion of moral motivations in *Philosophical Explanations*. He discusses moral motivation in terms of the metaphor of forces that push and pull the agent. I want to expand his discussion of this dimension of motivation in what follows. The impulse present in the motivational aim of an emotion may 'push' us, or it may 'pull' us. Motivational 'pull' refers to those properties or values possessed by the object of the emotion that impel us to attend to and be responsible to or for that object. The (apparent) value of the object focuses our attention and attracts us; it 'pulls' us towards it. The 'push' of an emotion refers to that part of one's own motivation that is grounded in one's sense of appropriate agency, providing a warrant to act on the desire. The normative and appropriate conduct that is an expression of one's agency pushes the agent to act; it licenses the desire by making its motivation an expression of one's sense of worth or value in the deliberative situation.

In the last chapter I argued that one's primary passions and one's secondary emotions of delight and distress have different directions of fit in relation to the world. One's desires and fears work to make the world conform to one's desires or implicit wish in the fear, and one's secondary emotions seek to have the mind conform to the world. Motivational push and pull articulate

how the internal dynamic operating in the targeted emotion works to achieve that strategic direction of fit.

The motivational push of an emotion is more complex than its motivational pull. Push can take several forms. Consider:

1. Jane pushed to win the race
2. Jane pushed to keep up with the leader
3. Jane pushed herself to win the race
4. Jane was pushed too hard by her coach.

The statement, "Jane pushed to win the race," captures the sense that in pushing one exerts oneself. That exertion is a manifestation of one's determination. The statement, "Jane pushed to keep up with the leader," suggests a conscious attempt to impel oneself forward, usually through force of will or persistence. The use of the reflexive pronoun in, "Jane pushed herself to win the race," introduces a further complication that is implicitly present in motivational push. 'Push' here suggests a kind of self determination that allows one to surpass others and, on occasion, oneself.

The sense of self determination is still present, though reactive, when the 'pushing' comes from another. We are able to judge when the condition of 'too hard' in the statement, "Jane was pushed too hard by her coach," by referring to Jane's physical or mental condition. Push here implies the taxing of one's abilities. We may also push another in the sense of testing or taxing one's patience or tolerance. Finally, we use 'push' to express blame, as in "You pushed me too far."

These senses of 'push' imply a kind of determination. When the agent makes a conscious judgment about the character of her sense of agency to be

expressed in action, then self determination comes into play. 'Push' is non-defective when it identifies what is sufficient to make one's agency effective. This sufficient condition is, in principle, under the agent's voluntary control; it is internal to the agent. Determination and a desire to surpass some standard must come from within. More importantly, motivational push requires a judgment or a decision on the part of the agent. Furthermore, I want to suggest that this decision, when it is normative, is a manifestation of the agent's capacity for autonomous action.

Because push and pull are understood as a matter of degree, they can manifest different degrees of strength within the emotion. When the pull of an object is stronger than one's push, then we have a situation where what is (or appears to be) required is greater than what one's own sense of agency involves. If the gap is too great one's motivation can be conflicting. The agent feels compelled to do one thing while being inclined to dome something else. The push of one's motivation may be greater that its pull. This can occur in one of two ways. Workaholics and perfectionists often feel compelled to perform at a level or to an extent that is incommensurate with the worth of the task, but it is also possible for one's push to be greater that one's pull in ways that are praiseworthy. Supererogatory acts involve going beyond what is required or expected. To act with dignity is to have asymmetric judgments about the worth of external goods. A person who acts from a sense of dignity places less value on harms to one's own good than on the value of the harmed goods of another. Finally, it is possible to have the motivational push and pull within an emotion in a dynamic balance. The good or worth of an object is

commensurate with the requisite value within oneself that moves the agent to action. This balance is, for example, one of the hallmarks of acts of integrity.

**The Aesthetic Role of the Emotions in Deliberation**

The fifth observation, that the emotions participate in the aesthetic as well as the moral or practical, makes a family of related claims. The presence of the emotions in our experience of the arts is the most obvious instance of this role. Pity and fear, for example, are emotions crucial for the experience of classical tragedy, and the emotions of wonder and pleasure are bound to our understanding of literary experience as well.[21] In the *Orator* Cicero distinguishes three levels of style and argues that they correspond to the three offices of the orator. The plain style teaches; the middle style pleases; the high style moves us (69, 100-101). Cicero's insight not only articulates the relationship between style and rhetorical aim; it suggests that the emotional significance located here participates in and helps inform our larger practical capacities and ends.

Hermogenes refines and transforms the notion of stylistic levels in the most sophisticated study of style in the ancient world. In his work, *On the Types of Style*, Hermogenes argues that there are twenty ideal stylistic forms or types. Each form is a convergence of three sets of concerns. Each form involves a consideration of the authority of the speaker in relation to subject and audience; a consideration of diction, provenance and tropological techniques appropriate to that authority, subject matter and aim; and a consideration of the tone, the manner of effective expression, relative to that audience and subject. 'Asperity' (*trachytes* ) is a stylistic form used when the author wishes to criticize an opponent who is more important than the author

(26-32). Vehemence (*sphodrotes*) is deployed against an inferior opponent (36-41). Florescence (*akme*) is used to make a criticism, but its attack is less harsh (97-101). Wooten argues that Hermogene's indignation (*barytes*) is reserved for situations where a frank and candid relationship exists between the author and audience ("Introduction" xiv, xvi).

Longinus emphasized a different dimension of the notion of significance when he argued that the experience of 'sublimity' was not primarily a technical achievement but a certain quality present in our aesthetic apprehension of the greatness in literature. The neoclassical period revived the idea of sublimity. Edmund Burke, for example, argued that a proportion of the value accorded to sublimity is found in its capacity to make people more sociable.[22] By the middle of the eighteenth century another (and controversial) concept arose. 'Sensibility' is more than sensitivity, although that is certainly part of the idea here. Sensibility was concerned with the cultivation of certain capacities of awareness. It came to suggest not only a kind of openness to feelings but also the experience of those feelings. The openness to feeling led to considerations of sentiment, the sentimental and sentimentality. The idea continues to have life in this century as a term which bridges the distinction between emotion and reason in judgment without reducing the 'emotional' to the emotive.[23]

We have long recognized that the aesthetic can play a pedagogical role. Pleasure and pain have long been recognized as instrumentally efficacious tools in both the learning process and in the inculcation of virtue. Pleasure works this way because it is a consequential attitude. When we do something because it is right, we also (typically) find pleasure in its rightness. Pleasure

is the instantiation of a standing attitude that one ought to find it satisfactory that doing the right thing is good. Another eighteenth century writer, Adam Smith, made other observations about pleasure that deserve mention. Smith discerned the relationship between what is agreeable and the emotions of pleasure, joy, enjoyment, and fancy. We have already discussed in the previous chapter this part of the aesthetic dimension of emotional experience. Satisfactions are aspectual, and they involve the experiential category under which they fall. We *enjoy* activities which are performed in a certain manner. Some pleasures function as a criterion of success; enjoyment, on the other hand, is continuative. To enjoy some experience is to focus one's attention or pay heed to some dimension of that activity. Enjoyment may also be distinguished from fancy. When we fancy something we have an attitude that is not only prominent as a preference, taste or inclination, that attitude is antecedently present. To enjoy something, however, does not require that the attitude be antecendently present, it only requires a sustained focus of attention. The directed attention helps shape the experience by specifying our relationship to that activity.

In *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* Adam Smith makes three observations on the role of attentiveness in these emotions. He argues that a "mind not ruffled by any violent passions. . . filled with some degree of joy not so great as to withdraw the attention, is that state of mind in which one is most disposed to admiration." Joy, and by extension, the related psychological states are presumptive evidence for certain kinds of evaluations. The second observation he makes assigns further specific, attention directing emotions that will follow from the joy. He observes, "the affection he feels is mixt with

some degree of desire and hope towards the object and this inclines to draw nearer towards it, imagining that coming nearer towards it he will enjoy it greater perfection" (68). The final observation is related to the first. While the persuasive role of joy in the first two instances is evocative, the persuasive role of joy can also be expressive. Not only may we judge the object of joy to be admirable or whatever, we judge the speaker to be agreeable (55). With this insight Smith makes articulate the relationship between the aesthetic role of the emotions of delight and decorum.

Perhaps no idea involving the aesthetic role of the emotions in deliberation is more central than that of decorum. Decorum is one of the four graces of style in classical rhetoric, along with correctness, clarity and ornament. Significantly, decorum is seen as serving an executive role. The aesthetic and formal concerns of the other graces compete for display and their manifestation is judged appropriate or otherwise through the application of the criteria inherent in the idea of decorum. Decorum's function is thus strategic. Propriety and fittingness (both moral and aesthetic) governed one's self dramatization in the rhetorical situation.[24] Significantly, Cicero raises this stylistic grace into an action guiding principle for one's public and private conduct in life. In *De Officiis*, a work on practical ethics, Cicero argues that there are four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, greatness of spirit and decorum.[25] Some of his teaching borders on advice about social manners; he discusses personal appearance, one's house and the art of civilized conversation. Decorum is far more than etiquette, however. Decorum is the strategic manifestation of the virtue of temperance, the expression of one's worthiness (one's *dignitas*) and the seeking of justice and

the avoidance of shame. Decorum is not merely the specification and doing of what is appropriate, although that is a necessary condition; it is what he calls moderateness. Moderateness is a sense of orderliness, the proper act in its proper place. Moderateness is also a sense of opportuneness, which involves a sense of timing. The importance of the virtue of temperance (and its importance in the life of the passions) through the vehicle of decorum is thus given a central role in his view of one's duties.

### The Expressive

The emotions help specify our course of action in one other way. The emotions are naturally expressive, and frequently what is important about the emotions in deliberation is expressive. A doctor who is technically proficient but cold as a lizard may aid a patient's physical condition; but if he fails to show he cares, by failing say, to sympathize, reassure or console the patient when that is warranted, we say that he is unfeeling. The attitudinal aspect of an action, its tone or tenor, can be an important feature for assessment. Part of the task of helping others in professions like medicine, teaching and counseling is to show we care. Yet knowing when and in what manner to be thoughtful, generous or tolerant in our attitudes on a particular occasion can be difficult. We know it not just the expression of an attitude that is requisite here, it is the manner in which we respond to people that is crucial. These nuances are quite subtle. This expressive capability implies a sensitivity to both the psychological cues and social context. The psychological ability to register small differences in tone does not imply the concomitant necessity to overtly react to these differences as a proof of that capacity. The social context

regulates and constrains our responses. Politeness, courtesy and tact are sensitivities no less subtle than being solicitous, considerate or kind.

The rhetorical potential in the expression of emotions and attitudes has, historically, manifested itself as the matter and manner of style. Attitude can be expressed through diction. Connotation, the implications or suggestions evoked by a word, along with register, the level of a word's formality, are obvious devices. Provenance, the collocation of diction and idiom as a characteristic of a particular group, forms another part of one's persuasive arsenal. These devices are some of the resources available to create tone. Tone is the projection of attitude. This quality of a work may be apprehended as the author's intention in writing the work or as the projection of the author's attitude towards the audience itself.

We also recognize that the phonemic, auditory and textural properties of shaped language work to incline an audience's attitudes. These resources are often called, with only partial accuracy, 'non-cognitive' techniques. These techniques are considered non-cognitive because they do not deal directly with issues of propositional content and any conscious judgment about their use is only of secondary importance. They may, however, be called 'cognitive', but only indirectly. The emotions are voluntary to the extent that we can develop cognitive capacities that, in principle, can and do control the attitudes and reason states which are influenced by these techniques. Because our emotions are felt as if they were kinetic experiences, we often discern a formal equivalence between the dynamic properties present in the sound and rhythm of shaped language and the dynamic harmonies and disharmonies of the emotional state. The techniques of sound and rhythm help structure these

phenomenologically apprehended dimensions. Tone-color, the emotional texture of language in discourse, is achieved through the manipulation of the resources of sound. Timbre, the characteristic quality of pitch and stress, is crucial here. Pitch, a musical term indicating the frequency, duration, loudness, and stress of phonemic tones, are comprehended as lying on a series of ascending scales. Alliteration, assonance, and consonance are techniques that exploit the values of pitch.

Classical and Renaissance theorists recognized that certain utterances typically evoked predictable responses in the audience. These schemes and tropes became part of the rhetorical instruction proffered at those times. Oaths (e.g., *orcas*), curses (e.g., *euche*), and imprecations (e.g., *ara*) as well as prayers (e.g., *deeisis*), pledges (e.g., *eustathia*) and wishes (e.g., *optatio*) were performative gestures. Some schemes express a predicational attitude towards the issue at hand. *Aporia* expresses real or feigned doubt about an issue; *antirrhesis* rejects an argument because of its insignificance, and *amphidiorthosis* hedges or qualifies a charge made in anger. Other devices are blatantly ad hominem. *Categoria* reproaches an opponent with his own wickedness, and *sarcasmus* is a bitter taunt.

## Conclusion

One may grant all that I have argued for thus far and still have doubts. We may grant that the argument from pathos names strategies that are judged by their success. Yet, four claims that are necessary for us to be able to say that this form of argumentation is rational has not yet been established.

First, the arguments about the six functions of the emotions in deliberation must be grounded in a formal account of the cognitive structure

of the emotions. A formal explanation of the various objects of an emotion is required if we are to be able to explain how this persuasion works. Second, we may grant that the emotions are purposive, but the nature of that purposiveness has not been established. The emotions must be purposive in ways other than saying they are had for some purpose; we must be able to name which emotions work in deliberation, and we must see in more detail how they work in deliberation. Third, the claim that the judgments inherent in these emotions are coordinate with our other deliberative capacities has not yet been shown for particular deliberative cases. All that has been offered so far is a promissory note. Finally, while some advances into the issue of deliberative agency have been offered, we still lack a perspicuous account of these problems. Nor have we explained how the role of the audience in the deliberative situation determines what arguments may be used and how their uses are justified.

These challenges will be met. I will address the first challenge in the next chapter, the second two challenges in Chapter V, and the final challenge will be addressed in Chapter VI.

## ENDNOTES CHAPTER III

[1] This is the starting point used by Derek Parfit for his study of practical rationality in *Reasons and Persons* 1.

[2] A sensitive introduction to this area of inquiry can be found in Harry Frankfurt, "The Importance of What We Care About," *The Importance of What We Care About* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1988) 80-94.

[3] For a discussion of needs see, David Wiggins, "Claims of Need," *Needs, Values, Truth* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) 1-58; and Garrett Thomson, *Needs* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987). For an Aristotelian discussion of needs see, Martha Craven Nussbaum, "Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 1988.

[4] Frankfurt, "Importance," 93.

[5] This idea is advanced by Donald Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," *Essays on Actions and Events* (New York: Oxford UP, 1980) 277-290.

[6] The distinctions among the types of pride outlined here are more fully discussed in Pall S. Ardall, *Passion and Reason in Hume's* Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1966) chap II.

[7] Ardall, *Passion* 34.

[8] I suspect that this notion appears attractive, initially at least, because of the power of the emotive theory of meaning, popular earlier this century. While I will discuss emotivism later, I can mention several implausible consequences of accepting this view. Importance becomes an expression of preference and it becomes nonrational. Both claims, I argue, are false.

[9] The idea was first introduced by Paul Grice, "Reply to Richards," *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality* ed. Richard Grandy and Richard Warner (New York: Oxford UP, 1986) 93. Its uses have been extended by Bernard Williams and Ronald de Sousa.

[10] The idea here is from Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1140 24ff. The explication of the three term logical analysis of choice is discussed in more detail in Sarah Broadie, *Ethics With Aristotle* (New York: Oxford UP, 1991) 180.

[11] This distinction between subjective and objective desires was first proposed by Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective" *Mortal Questions* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1979) 196-213; it was further developed by Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (New York: Oxford UP, 1984) 143-144, and it was further developed by Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* , 179.

[12] Chaim Perelman conflates these two ideas in his discussion of the emotions and rhetoric in *The New Rhetoric*. Perelman is sensitive in this work to the uses that the emotions can be put in the service of persuasion. He argues, quite reasonably, that emotion plays a crucial role in arguments about morality and values. I want to point out one pernicious error present in his account of emotional persuasion that is all to easy to fall prey to. Perelman's argument depends upon beliefs about the nature of meaning and utterance borrowed from ethical debates early in this century. Perelman accepts the idea of emotivism. Emotivism is the doctrine that denies that there are objective and impersonal moral claims; and furthermore, there cannot be any rational justification to claim that these standards exist.

Emotivism suffers from certain conceptual embarrassments that render it false. First, emotivism argues that moral statements express attitudes. When asked to identify which attitudes are expressed, the emotivist responds that they are feelings of approval and disapproval. Approval can manifest itself several ways, and moral approval is just one kind. For the emotivist to answer this way is to offer a circular argument. Second, emotivism as a theory of meaning fails to distinguish the meaning of a sentence from its use on different occasions. Emotion certainly does play a role, and sometimes a crucial role in how a sentence functions, but that semantic feature is distinct from its meaning, where meaning is concerned with matters of truth or falsehood. Finally, emotivism cannot locate and distinguish between differences in judgment between people. There are, to be sure, differences based on preference, but these differ crucially from reason-based differences of choice. Disagreement in preference is not disagreement in valuation. The criticisms of emotivism can be found in many places. These can be found in MacIntyre, *After Virtue* 11-13.

[13] Parfit, 143.

[14] de Sousa, 179-180.

[15] An excellent discussion of Aristotle's virtue of courage is David F. Pear, "Courage as a Mean," *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* ed., Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: U of Calif P, 1980) 171-187.

[16] Endurance is also confused with the virtue of patience. While courage may involve patience, patience differs from courage. Patience is dispositional in its manifestation; courage is occurrent. Patience is,

standardly, a part of *phronesis*, practical wisdom; courage, on the other hand, is the result of the exercise of practical wisdom.

[17] Eugene Garver, "Aristotle's Genealogy of Morals," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* , 44 (1984) 471-492.

[18] On this complex issue see, Aristotle (1115b 7-19, 1115b34-1116a 7); Georg Henrik von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963) 145-152; and Walton, *Courage* 134-140.

[19] For an interesting and insightful discussion of these and other vices, see Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984).

[20] These vices are profitably discussed in Kekes, *Facing Evil* 71-77.

[21] For a sensitive discussion of wonder see, R. Hepburn, "Wonder," *Wonder and Other Essays* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, 1984) 131-54.

[22] T. V. F. Brogan, Gerald F. Else, and Frances Ferguson, "Sublime," *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* eds. Alex Preminger and T. V. F. Brogan (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) 1230-1233.

[23] Laurence D. Lerner, "Sensibility," *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* 1143-1145. Raymond Williams, "Sensibility," *Keywords* (New York: Oxford UP, 1983) 280-283.

[24] Walter H. Beale, "Decorum," forthcoming.

[25] The discussion of decorum is accorded almost half of Book I (93-151) of *de Officiis* . Matters of etiquette appear in sections 126-40; its relation to justice is in section 99, and orderliness appears in sections 141-44.

# CHAPTER IV

## ON THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE EMOTIONS

> For consider: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?
>
> *Euthyphro* 10a

The deliberative emotions are perceptual sensitivities that make certain features of the deliberative situation salient. To function this way these emotions must actually tell us something about the world. To effect salience the emotion shifts some features of the situation into the background and moves others into focus. By directing our attention, the sensitivity isolates these features, mapping them into a coherent picture of significance. It is tempting but mistaken to think of salience as, essentially, a matter of rearrangement. On this conception, the deliberative situation is viewed as being like the pieces of an unassembled jigsaw puzzle. With a puzzle we have two sets of pre-existing internal relations we can use to assemble the picture. We have the printed image on the face of the puzzle, and we have the geometric shapes of the cut pieces. The task of rearranging a puzzle is, thus, pragmatic.

But deliberation is not an activity of this sort. Deliberative situations do not come pre-made but unassembled. Salience is the discovery of the internal relations of those beliefs, evaluations, desires and fears and their appropriate mapping onto the deliberative situation. Those beliefs and evaluations which constitute the emotion identify the relevant properties present in the

situation. These properties are important because they have evaluative significance. Proper *salience* is achieved when we see that some feature of the deliberative situation is understood in terms of the requisite emotion.

The notion of salience implies that some crucial aspects of emotional experience are objective. Intuitively, we view this capacity as objective because we explain its failures that way. Not all perceptions are veridical. Our view can be blocked or altered by the environment, thus producing a partial picture that is inaccurate. The act of selection can be confused for one of extrapolation. Instead of picking out those features which are relevant, we actually infer or hypothesize about what should be there. Our selection of signs and features can be too selective. Instead of attending to all of the details we choose only a small subset. Our desires and perceptions are interrelated. All too frequently, what we attend to is what we want to attend to; in short, we see what we want to see. Finally, perception can become a matter of habit. If our perceptions in the past have succeeded pragmatically, then we are inclined to trust those pragmatic success criteria in the present instance. While these failures can be explained in terms of objective success conditions, another class of problems may not be so explained.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, many claim (rightly, if vaguely) that emotional experience is, in some important sense, subjective. The issues here are complex, and the growth of the scholarly literature on what is subjective and objective has expanded and altered our understanding of these concepts significantly over the course of the century. In clarifying these concepts we have articulated at least two separate issues which can be confused with the idea of the subjective. First, it is easy to confuse cognitive

and non cognitive experience with objective and subjective experience. We have been and are concerned throughout this study with cognitive experience. Second, we recognize that there are important distinctions to be drawn between what is particular and what is subjective. In clarifying the idea of the particular we will see how and in what ways an emotional experience is objective and how it is subjective.

There are numerous senses of 'subjective' that purport to explain emotional experience. We are concerned at present with only four senses. These four senses of 'subjective' carry no philosophical commitments about the nature of how we experience the world; moral and epistemological objectivists and subjectivists accept these senses as legitimate uses of the term. The first sense of subjective refers to private feelings, usually of an intense or personal nature. No one would deny the existence of these feelings. More importantly, we recognize that there is a crucial difference between the intensity of an emotional episode and its strength, whether strength is construed as the emotion's freshness or its motivational force. The second sense of subjective is contrasted with one sense of objective; 'subjective' refers to illusory experience, and 'objective' refers to veridical experience. 'Subjective' means mistaken. The third sense is a variant on the second. 'Subjective' means we take the figment of a psychological state that purports to be an experience of something as real when it is not; and this is contrasted with another sense of 'objective', that the object is actually there to be experienced. Mirages are subjective in this sense. The fourth sense of 'subjective' refers to some experiences which are denoted in such a way that the explanation of that experience is reciprocal in terms of a property's being

present along with a response in the agent. Neither part of the pair can be explicated without reference to the other. For a joke to be amusing, the person hearing the joke must be amused; and to be amused, in this case, is to find the joke amusing. It is possible to argue that these senses of 'subjective' have objective success conditions.

But demonstrating an explanatory possibility is not as strong as demonstrating a conceptual need for objectivity. The first and fourth senses of subjective are sometimes seen as jointly providing a partial basis for a crude version of subjectivism. This crude subjectivism argues that the collection of mental and emotional states we experience from the inside is the sole or primary point of view from which our well-being is to be understood. According to this view, only states of mind contribute to our quality of life. Something is harmful if it deprives us of a desirable state of mind. Typically, these desirable states are seen in terms of pleasure, happiness and enjoyment. The manifold problems of the inner view are highlighted by Robert Nozick's thought experiment called the experience machine. In his work, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Robert Nozick asks us to:

> Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into the machine for life, preprogramming your life's experiences? If you are worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your life's experiences for, say, the next two years. After two years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, in the tank you won't know that you're there;

> you'll think it's all actually happening. . .Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain because of the few moments of distress between the moment you've decided and the moment you're plugged. What's a few moments of distress compared to a lifetime of bliss (if that's what you choose), and why feel any distress at all if your decision *is* the best one? (42-43)

Nozick argues that surely this sort of offer is unacceptable. First, things other than states of consciousness matter to us. We want to do certain things, not merely have the experience of having done them. The act of doing certain actions explains why we want the experience of doing them. Furthermore, we desire many pleasant things for their own sakes and not simply as a means to that pleasure. One's emotional experiences are bound to their modes of achievement. We want to achieve certain goods that may be seen as performances. Winning a game or a championship, publishing an essay on Montaigne, or building a tree house for one's children are performances in this sense. We also want to achieve certain goods which do not have specifiable achievement dates. The sense of satisfaction that comes from playing chess well or from being an accomplished cabinetmaker, for example, may arise out of the activity of playing chess or successfully exercising the skills necessary for cabinetmaking. The delight felt in specific successful performances is distinct from and subordinate to the satisfactory exercise of these capacities. We also want certain conditions of well-being to be realized. We want to be healthy, we don't want to be subject to cruel misfortune, and we want to act with wisdom. What is desirable in this sense is the satisfactory exercise of those goods seen as activities that contribute to one's well-being.

To reduce the value of the emotions to the experiencing of mental states is to imply that they are valuable in the way tourists tick off the sights they have visited. ("I saw the Coliseum, the Pantheon, and the Vatican, all in two days!") de Sousa rightly points out that to trivialize emotional experience this way is to deny how they function in determining who we are (218-220). We want to be a certain sort of person. As Nozick says, "Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob." It is irrelevant to ask what sort of person someone is lying in a tank; he is not a person in the relevant sense of person. The emotions are crucial in the coordination of as well as one's appraisal of the different *personae* that one's identity consists of. We not only judge people for what they do, we also judge them for who they are. Third, we are limited to man-made reality, no deeper and no more important than that which people can construct (Nozick, *Anarchy* 43-44). To be sure, mental and emotional experiences do matter. Although pleasure, for instance, occurs consequentially, it is not merely a consequent mental state; it qualifies our experience. The emotions, in short, are an integral part of our well-being. They are not, however, something merely added to who we are and what we do.

If these observations are correct, we must be able to meet one other skeptical challenge to the claim that the emotions can tell us something about the world. The emotions are sometimes thought to be the antithesis of rational thought in a very particular way. This antithesis takes the form of a question first posed by Socrates in the *Euthyphro*, "Do we want X because it is good, or is X good because we want it?" The Euthyphro Problem, as it has come to be called, raises several questions about the epistemological status of emotional knowledge, assuming there is any. One could, after all, discuss the propriety of

an emotional expression without having to accept that the cognitive appraisal delivered by that emotion is correct. One could come to know or evaluate the object of that emotion by means other than emotional perception and judgment. The emotion would be epiphenomenal, a secondary and incidental addition to a different process.

If one is to claim that the emotions can serve the cognitive functions of perception and judgment, then one must answer a difficult question: How do the emotions come to 'know' their objects? An answer to this question is offered in the next section. Some of the groundwork for answering this question was laid by Aristotle and the Stoics. David Hume made a singular contribution when he articulated the complexities of the relationships between the causes of an emotion and its object, particularly for the emotions of self assessment. But the greatest advances in analyzing the cognitive structure of the emotions have been made by four scholars in this century. Anthony Kenny contributed greatly to our understanding of these issues in *Action, Emotion and Will.* William Lyons further clarifies several issues concerning the status of an emotion's object in his work, *Emotion*; and Robert Gordon introduces the idea of the propositional object of an emotion in *The Structure of Emotion.* Finally, Ronald de Sousa offers a more complete analysis of these complex interactions in *The Rationality of Emotion.* I draw heavily on their analyses to explain this cognitive structure.

**The Objects of Emotions**

We can begin to see the necessary success conditions for this kind of objectivity by examining the relationships that exist between an emotion and its objects. We say an object is that which the emotion is *about*, directed *at* or

*towards*, concerned *with*, or *that* which the emotion concerns itself. When we speak of the object of an emotion we are referring to one of four possible objects. First, emotions have *particular* objects and these are those particular individuals, situations, or circumstances relevant to the deliberative aim and are either immediately present or in the proximate future. Second, the particular object has some *focal property* that is the *focus* of our attention and serves as a source of motivation within that episode. The several causal conditions that define the relationship between one's focus and the focal property is called the *motivating aspect* of the emotion. This focal property can, in principle, be expressed; and the term, *propositional object*, covers all such objects of expression. The success conditions necessary for an emotion to be appropriate are understood in terms of the emotion's *formal* object, the emotion's evaluative criteria that defines the emotion itself. These criteria help explain the semantics of emotion statements. The focal property can be expressed. The semantics of adjectival constructions derive part of their content from these success conditions, and we use the term *propositional object*, to cover the objects of expression that can be expressed with a that-complement.

## Particular Objects

Emotions have *particular* objects. A particular object is that particular item (a person, situation, state of affairs, thing, attribute, etc.) which serves as the particular focus of that emotional episode. We frequently refer to these objects when we make first person emotion reports, "I love *you*;" when we ascribe emotions to another, "She hates *Joe*;" when we explain our behavior, "I turned *him* in to the IRS because I hate him;" and when we interpret the

behavior of others, "Huck decided to save *Jim* because he loves him." The particular object may be designated in different ways. The reference may use a proper noun, "New York is dangerous," or "Joseph Stalin was cruel." It may be a non-count noun, "Sally hates elevator music," or "His limited intelligence frustrates me." It may be by singular reference, "She is irritating," or "He is boring." Finally, it may involve a definite description, "The theft of the painting upset me," or "The reek in here is horrible."

When an emotion picks out or locates its object, it refers to that object. But that act of reference can go wrong in numerous ways. Suppose I enter the laundry room and find a snake. I fear it because it is within striking distance and I believe it to be a copperhead, although it turns out to be a cottonmouth instead. My fear still has an appropriate object, even though I have misidentified the species of snake. The proximity of the snake *causes* my fear and makes that fear partially intelligible. Even though I am not correct in specifying the exact nature of that danger, the fact that the bite is poisonous consequentially justifies my fear.

A second case reveals more complications. Joe is angry with the person who broke his lawn mower. That the mower is broken precipitates or causes the anger. Yet the anger is directed at someone, and the referent of 'person' in the statement is ambiguous. The statement can mean that Joe is angry with that person, whoever he is, who broke the mower; or more precisely, Joe may believe that his neighbor, Sam, is that person. As in the previous example, Joe may be correct that someone broke the mower, but he may be incorrect in his belief that Sam broke it. Joe's beliefs are, obviously, fallible. But both versions depend on the mower's being *wrongfully* broken by some person.

The belief that the mower was *wrongfully* broken makes the anger's being directed at that person intelligible. If the breakage is the result of some non culpable accident, then the anger fails to be justified because anger requires the act to be intentional. If the mower is broken as a result of metal fatigue, say, then Joe's belief and its object, are illusory.

One's particular object may have too wide a focus. George is unaccountably depressed; everything seems black. Ignoring the question of whether the emotion is pointless, there is a problem with George's ability to give expression to the object of his depression. The objects of George's depression are those things which seem black (Kenny 61). People suffering from phobias experience a similar problem. A phobia is a morbid fear of some object. Hydrophobes, for example, fear water. Yet the hydrophobe cannot focus on an appropriate property of water in each instance which will explain (other than identifying) the causal relationship between the water and the fear felt.

In his study, *Emotion*, William Lyons argues that the particular object of an emotion is understood in terms of two pairs of contrasting criteria. The first pair of criteria concerns the existential status of the object itself; the second pair concerns the relationship between the psychological state and its beliefs comprising the emotion and its object (104-112).[1] A particular object of an emotion can be 'material' or 'intentional'. A material object is one that actually exists; an 'intentional' object lacks actual existence (Lyons 106-109). The gratification I feel eating a second piece of cheesecake has the cheesecake as a material object. If I fear that the snake in the laundry room is dangerous and that snake turns out to be a rattlesnake, then my fear has a material

object. Yet the material object of an emotion need not be made of matter. A person's attitude, an agent's abilities or capacities, and the power of one person over another can be material objects if they exist and are acted on. The term 'material' carries the implication of 'being materialized' (Lyons 107-108).

The particular object of an emotion may also be 'intentional'. The grief we feel at the death of someone we love has a material object; the death is real. But the character of some of the emotions we experience in the face of that death have intentional objects. I still love my father even though I know he is dead. Intentional objects form a part of our aesthetic experience as well. We care about what happens to characters in literature even though we know they don't exist in the same way our friends and family do.

Even though the object is not 'material' in the sense used above, the relationship between the emotions and their objects in the two previous examples are *non-illusory*; we know the existential status of the objects. Yet we also speak of intentional objects to identify another class of objects. If the snake in the laundry room example above turns out to be a hognosed snake that will not bite, then my fear is an intentional one. I have misidentified the object of my fear. The object in this example is *intentional* because the purported relationship between the emotion and its object is not real. The particular object of an emotion is thus further characterized by the relationship between the object and the emotion itself. That relationship can be an illusory or non-illusory one. An illusory object is one the agent takes to be real but is not; a non-illusory object is real (Lyons 109-112).

The distinction drawn between an object's existential status is, thus, a necessary but not sufficient distinction for characterizing the particular

objects of an emotion. Lyons argues that the illusory, non-illusory distinction will help to account for two aspects of the conceptual relationship between an emotion and its object: 1) how we ground an emotion upon those beliefs, and 2) the need to have correct beliefs about the objects of one's emotion (111-112). The grounding of an emotion requires an understanding of the relationship between an emotion's *focus* and *focal property* and the success conditions that must obtain for that relationship to be the *motivating aspect* of that emotion. These conditions are also necessary but not sufficient for one to have correct beliefs about the object of the emotion.

## Focus and Focal Property

When we are confronted with a particular object of an emotion, we typically *focus* on some feature or property of that object. The term, 'focus,' names that directed attention we have towards some (real or illusory) object; it is part of our psychological stance. The 'focal property' is what the emotion picks out about the object; it is a (real or illusory) property of that object (de Sousa 115-117). The property-response emotions are identified by their focal property. To be frustrated is to find something frustrating (the focal property). Suppose Sam is breaking in a new pair of hiking boots. Despite his best precautions, a blister forms on his heel. He becomes irritated. The blister is the material object of his irritation. The soreness of the blister is the focus of his attention. He finds the soreness *irritating*; it is the focal property of the blister.

## Motivating Aspect and Causes

Despite his best efforts to the contrary, Sam is irritated because a sore blister has formed. The because-clause in this statement explains the

relationship between the focus and the focal property. For such an explanation to be successful, the grounds for emotional episode should, if true, be relevant and adequate. Ronald de Sousa suggests that we call the standard case that obtains between the focal property of the object and one's focus the *motivating aspect* of the emotion (116-117). The *motivating aspect* of an emotion has several success conditions that must be met for that object to be non-illusory.

Suppose that a neighbor, burdened with undeserved woes at work, comes home and tries to unlock his front door. The lock is jaded; the key doesn't work. He begins to rail and kick at the door in a rage. The case implicitly carries an important distinction. The cause of the neighbor's rage is not its motivating aspect. The lock is the focus of the rage, and the failure of the key causes or precipitates the rage. Neither, however, qualifies as being the motivating aspect of the rage. What the example does illustrate is that the causal connection between the focal property and the occurrence of the emotion is a *necessary condition* for the former to be a motivating aspect (de Sousa 117). This causal condition has an important corollary. Since we can be mistaken about the causes of our emotions, we have no privileged access to the motivating aspects of our emotions(de Sousa 117).

A motivating aspect of an emotion is rationally related to the emotion it causes. A motivating aspect is *intelligible* if it can serve as the premise of an intelligible inference (de Sousa 118). A person who envies another wants something the envied has. Envy focuses on some attribute that the envier believes that object exemplifies. To envy another's wealth is to want it for the status wealth affords; to covet another's office or honors is to envy the success

of that rival. If Sam envies Joe's wealth, the wealth is the particular object of that envy; but the status that wealth is believed to offer Sam is that envy's focal property. The focus of Sam's envy is made intelligible by the belief that the envied wealth will accord him the status he desires. The case of envy is important because it is *intelligible* even though it is not normatively *legitimate*. Intelligible reasons are like breath. Bad breath does not cease to be breath simply because it stinks. A reason can be intelligible even though it stinks as well.

There is another potential problem that can occur between the focus and property that we must face. Suppose again, that I fear the snake in the laundry room, believing it to be a copperhead. It is, actually, a hognosed snake that will not bite. This case exhibits a causal connection between my focus and the purported object; and it is intelligible, I can give a reason for my fear. The reason, however, is false. The actual state of the world is relevant to the justification of my emotional state. For a focal property to be a motivating aspect, it must be an actual property of the particular object (de Sousa 119-120).

We can classify the particular object of an emotion in four ways. Particular objects are identified by the their existential status: they are either 'material' or 'intentional' objects. These objects can be illusory or non-illusory, yielding:

1. an intentional and illusory object
2. a material and illusory object
3. an intentional and non-illusory object
4. a material and non-illusory object.

Particular objects have some focal property that serves as the focus of the emotional episode. The standard relationship between the focus and the focal property is called the motivational aspect of that emotion. The relationship between an emotion's focus and the focal property is a necessary, but not sufficient, causal condition. Because we can be mistaken about that relationship, our beliefs are fallible. The beliefs which comprise the motivational aspect must be rationally related to the object so that they can serve as inferential reasons which make the belief intelligible. These conditions ground the beliefs about a particular object. For a focal property to be a motivating aspect, it must be an actual property of the particular object of the emotion.

## Formal Objects

The particular objects of envy are many. People envy another's money, status, fame, preferments and opportunities, and so on. Trivially, we can say that anything that is enviable is a possible object of envy. Intuitively we recognize that, although this phrasing is uninformative, a non trivial description of what is 'enviable' would name some general characteristic(s) that makes the use of this emotional term in a particular case appropriate. The *formal object* of an emotion provides this general description.

Anthony Kenny borrows the medieval distinction between material and formal objects of actions and extends it to the emotions, thereby introducing the notion of the *formal object* of an emotion. He begins by arguing that "to assign a formal object to an action is to place restrictions on which may occur as the direct object of a verb describing the action" (189). This restriction, he argues, specifies the emotion's appropriate object. To say, for example, that Joe

envied the fame of his colleague, is fitting if 'fame' is an appropriate object of envy. Conversely, we do not feel joy at our own undeserved misery nor do we take delight in our own chronic physical pain. These characterizations are descriptively inappropriate.

The idea of a formal object is made more precise by William Lyons when he argued that "the formal object of an emotion seems to be the *evaluative* category under which the appraisal of or evaluation of a particular object falls on a particular occasion" (100). The relationship between an emotion and its formal object is a logical one, not a contingent matter of fact. The formal object of envy specifies the qualities that must be present for that emotion to be so evaluated; the formal object of envy is the desirability of some unobtainable good which signifies merit and is enjoyed by another. The formal object of belief is truth; the formal object of a want is desirability (de Sousa 122). The formal object of fear is a future harm or evil, usually seen as destructive or painful. The formal object of pity are those individuals suffering undeserved and significant misfortune. The formal object picks out, at some level of generality, those qualities or properties that can or should be ascribed to the particular object of the emotion.

The nature of the logical relationship between the properties of the formal object and the particular object has been the subject of some speculation. Kenny suggests that the relationship is a semantic one; formal objects are intensional concepts (199-202). Lyons argues that the formal object names an evaluative category which serves as a template for the particular occurrence of the emotion (103). It expresses a non contingent relation between the evaluative category and the concept of the emotion itself.

This idea has one very attractive virtue. It implicitly predicts the locus of the connection between an emotion and other normative ideas, like moral or practical principles.

But one may still object that that the link between the formal object and the particular object is still not clear. How is the evaluative category linked to the particular emotion? de Sousa argues that the notion of appropriateness, mentioned above, is not precise enough. He argues that the formal object of an emotion must help to explain the intelligibility condition discussed earlier. He defines the formal object of an emotion this way:

> For each emotion, there is a second-order property that must be implicitly applied to the motivating aspect if the emotion is to be intelligible. This essential element in the structure of an emotion is its *formal object*. (122)

The properties of a formal object supervene on the first order properties of the particular object. The first order properties are such in virtue of the second order properties of the formal object (de Sousa 122).

## Denominative Meaning Relations

The deliberative emotions are those whose properties are capable of producing salience. Once we have targeted a specific emotion it is necessary to identify that particular property which will achieve this goal or explore the manner in which these psychological states can be described. To describe the situation and appeal to the targeted emotion is to draw on the resources of the language we possess. If the language of the emotions is, as J. L. Austin puts it, "the inherited acumen and experience of many generations" then the distinctions thought necessary will be reflected in the complexity of our

language for the relevant concept (133). These terms are capable of such work because they have semantic depth.

Part of the subtlety of the semantic depth of these terms is reflected in two kinds of meaning relations present in the emotion terms themselves. The paronymous forms of a word provide a kind of schematic of the meaning relations implicit in the concept. (For a discussion of paronymous meaning relations, see Appendix A.) The denominative meaning relations found in the attributive and predicative uses of the adjectival forms of these terms reveal much that is important about the semantic depth of these public concepts.

We commonly use adjectives and adjectival constructions to characterize emotional states, episodes and events. Many of the justificatory issues present in the argument from pathos should be illuminated by an examination of the semantic values present in these constructions. We distinguish adjectival meanings through a series of semantic scales. Adjectives can be noninherent or inherent, stative or dynamic, gradeable or nongradeable. A noninherent adjective modifies a noun by extending the basic sense of the noun. The term, "old," in "an old friend of mine," is a noninherent adjective. An inherent adjective modifies the referent of the noun directly. For example, "old," in the clause, "my friend is old," is inherent. Inherence allows for that characterization to pick out a property of the referent. An adjective may be stative or dynamic. The adjective "tall" in "Sally is tall" is stative. "Irritable" in "he is irritable" is a dynamic adjective. Dynamic adjectives denote qualities that are thought to be subject to control by the agent. They can thus be restricted temporally. Interestingly, dynamic adjectives can also take the imperative mood. Adjectives can also be gradeable or nongradeable; a

gradeable adjective admits of comparison. Nongradeable adjectives do not admit of degrees. "Pregnant" is a nongradeable adjective.

The Predicative Use of Adjectives

Emotional states and events can be expressed predicatively. The predicate can refer to the object it is supposed to be true of. Consider the following situation. Joe has carefully and diligently planned a proposal for a new program at work. During the presentation of his proposal Sam, who is opposed to the idea, contemptuously insults Joe. After blanching momentarily storm clouds form on Joe's brow and his jaw sets. During the break Joe announces to another colleague, "I'll show him." We may say that Joe is angry. When we say this we have chosen the predicate "angry" from a lexical field of predicates. This field includes 'resentful', 'riled', 'irate', 'ireful', 'wrathful', 'raging', 'furious', 'fuming', 'enraged', among others. 'Angry' is a gradeable, dynamic adjective.

Despite its grammatical simplicity, the predicate "angry" is semantically complex. "Angry" is a gradeable adjective; it can take the degree modifiers 'so', 'too' and 'very', among others; and it admits of the positive, comparative and superlative degrees. Although psychological predicates are dynamic adjectives, they share a semantic value with stative adjectives like "tall" "large" and "heavy." Consider the commonly cited example, "Theo is a large flea." If the statement were a one-place predicate then the statement could be analyzed as:

1. Theo is a flea
2. & Theo is large

This analysis is false because fleas are not large. 'Large' is a two-place predicate (Platts 162-163). There is a coordinate in the semantic value of 'large' that allows it to be applied correctly to the individual or object it is predicated of. The application of 'large' is also warranted because its semantic value carries a standard for determining when something is large and when it isn't. This standard is called a *delineation*. The delineation warrants the comparative and superlative uses of larger and largest. It will also warrant the comparative and superlative uses of 'angry' (Larson and Segal 130-131). If Joe responds to Sam and Sam takes offense, we can, in principle, say either that Sam is angrier than Joe or that Joe is angrier than Sam. Stative adjectives like large and heavy are vague, and the standards present in their delineations may be governed by their comparative forms. The comparative form of these adjectives implies some generalized arithmetic scale.[2]

## A Problem with Indexicals?

Although dynamic adjectives are scalar, they seem to work differently. There are two ways in which our construal of the predicate '. . . is angry' differs from the predicate '. . . is large'. The first difference occurs in the use of indexicals. We frequently use emotion statements like "I am bored now," "I feel guilty," "I am grieving," as reports of psychological states. These first person reports differ from third person reports, "He is bored now," and other first person reports stated as a response to the same object. We also use emotion statements interpretatively, as explanations of our conduct. Imagine a situation where John, the grandson of Bill, the man who has raised John, has smothered Bill in an act of euthanasia. When asked, "Why did you smother Bill?" John answers, "Because I love him." We need to be able to explain what

is equivalent and what is different across a range of differing first person and third person reports. In order to know what we can understand about another's boredom, say, requires an explanation of the semantics of indexicals.

The most important study of demonstratives (the pronouns 'this', 'that', the adverbs 'today', 'here', 'now' and others) and indexicals ('I', 'my', 'you', 'here', etc.) is that by David Kaplan.[3] Although his study is detailed, the essence of it can be summarized simply. Kaplan begins by distinguishing between demonstratives and pure indexicals. Demonstratives require an associated demonstration of their referent to be understood. To understand the statement, 'she is angry', requires for comprehension some way in which 'she' is picked out as the referent. A pure indexical ('I', 'here', 'now') is one where the linguistic rules for their use fully determine their referent in each context (Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 489-491). This linguistic fact of the use of indexicals has implications for their senses.

The importance of understanding the semantics of pure indexicals can be shown by considering the following statement, "I am here now." In one sense the statement cannot be false. Whenever and wherever I utter this statement, it will be true. But it is not necessarily true; I could be somewhere other than where I am when I utter it. By understanding the idea of context in the semantics of indexicals we can, he claims, clarify several issues in the logic, semantics and epistemology of demonstratives and indexicals. The solution to the problem raised by the puzzle of "I am here now" lies in clarifying the sense and reference of indexicals. Two kinds of meaning are present in indexicals. Sense, that part of a word's meaning that contributes to a statement's being true or false, is composed of *content* and *character*

(Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 501, 503-506). The content of an expression is always taken with respect to a given context of use. If I say, today, "I am bored now," and tomorrow you utter the same words, what is said is different. Yet, if on the next day I say, "I was bored yesterday," the same content is expressed in different contexts. If I were to say, "Mark Armstrong is bored on November 10, 1994," then the content is the same with respect to all contexts.

Content refers to propositions; character refers to meaning. The character of an expression is that component of sense which determines how the content is determined by the context. The statement, "I am here now," can be understood in light of this distinction. The character of 'I' in this statement determines three features. First, in different contexts, an utterance expresses different contents. Second, the content expressed is a contingent proposition. Third, in all contexts the utterance "I am here now" is a true proposition. Thus, the sentence is analytic; it is true by virtue of its meaning. Character is analytic; propositions are necessary or contingent (Kaplan, "Logic" 84).

We must distinguish between the occurrence of an expression (i.e., the expression and its context) and the utterance of an expression. Utterances are part of our understanding of speech acts; occurrences are sentences in a context and fall under the purview of semantics. We are interested in the first person emotion reports as occurrences. Kaplan argues that "the linguistic conventions which constitute meaning consist of rules specifying the referent of a given occurrence of the word in terms of various features of the context of occurrence" (Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 523). The rules which fix the referent of an indexical do not constitute the content of such an occurrence. They determine the content for a particular occurrence of an

indexical, but they are not a part of the content. That is, they constitute no part of the propositional constituent. But there is another sense of meaning in which two occurrences of the same word or phrase must mean the same (Kaplan, "Demonstratives" 524). It is this sense of meaning that makes first person reports intelligible.

Dynamic Adjectives Used Predicatively

There is another way dynamic adjectives differ from stative ones. Emotion terms used as adjectives belong to that class of dynamic adjectives that describe something's state or condition in terms of some change or operation that induces that condition (Gordon 113). They are, thus, similar to adjectives like 'magnetized', 'soluble', and 'brittle'. Emotional states and events are frequently expressed predicatively: "X is lovable, shameful, pathetic, regrettable, irritating," and so on. The delineation of these terms must pick out the relevant standard, and that standard will vary according to the function of the predicate. The causal complexity inherent in the emotions makes these predicables ambiguous and resolving the ambiguity yields different possibilities of predication. The predicate, "lovable" can refer to:

1. the object (who or what is lovable);
2. that object's propensity or capacity to produce the state;
3. or, that for which it is permissible or appropriate to experience love or regret.

Not all emotional properties that can be predicated this way fill these three roles. "Enviable," "malicious," "malevolent" and "spiteful," for example, can be predicated in the first two ways but not the third. These three conditions of

predication are instantiations of different sets of success conditions necessary for an emotion to be successfully predicated of its object.

To say that "X is enviable" in the first sense is to, initially at least, pick out the particular object of the emotion. As we saw in the discussion of the objects of emotions, the initial act of identification is insufficient for knowing whether the object is the proper one. To say "X is contemptible," that is, X is capable of causing a feeling of contempt (the second sense), is to locate the first causal condition that necessarily exists between the focus of the emotion and the purported focal property of that object. As we saw, that causal condition is, by itself, explanatorily insufficient. If the reasons that ground the emotion are false, then the emotion is irrational. Furthermore, to find an action contemptible is not the same as saying it is contemptuous. If the judgment implied in the contempt is false, then the agent towards whom the emotion is directed may be beyond its effects.

To be able to say "X is contemptible" in the final sense requires that the two sets of conditions be satisfied. First, the reasons that ground the emotion must not only be intelligible, they must be true. Second, the causal relationship between the emotion's focus and the focal property must be an actual property of the object. Finally, the judgment contained in the emotion and directed at the particular object must conform to the emotion's formal object.

Unlike the large flea example above, some predicative adjectival uses are ambiguous. The statement, "Joe is an angry administrator," admits of two possible interpretations. On the first reading we can say,

1. Joe is angry
2. & Joe is an administrator

or we can see 'angry' operating adverbially,

3. Joe administrates angrily.

In the first, co-predicational reading, 'angry' is a predicative adjective; and we say, of Joe, that he is angry. In the second, adverbial reading we say that some aspect of Joe's administrating reveals some quality of anger (Larson and Segal 470-471). We have difference in the mode of predication. The difference in the mode of predication is important because it helps us to locate the 'agency' of the emotion by showing us how the emotion operates on us.

## The Attributive Use of Adjectives

In order to understand the notion of predicate modes we need to examine the attributive uses of adjectives. Grammarians employ a simple initial test for these central adjectives. Attributive adjectives premodify a noun, appearing after a determiner and before the head of a noun phrase (Quirk et al. 402). Typically, attributive constructions will be used in four different contexts. They can describe an action, e.g., "an angry gesture," name an attribute of a person, "a jealous husband;" characterize a feature of an event, "a pathetic, last-minute shot;" or identify a feature of judgment, "a resentful feeling." Significantly, each use is a kind of qualitative judgment, but the specific quality invoked may differ. The phrases, "an angry person," "an angry gesture," "an angry scene," and "an angry response" all appeal to some property of anger that warrants their use, but there is no reason to think that the property appealed to is identical in each use.

The differences in meaning in these related uses can be partially delineated by a procedure first suggested by Aristotle in Book I of the *Topics*. By examining why the contrary of a particular mode of meaning fails we can confirm that the selected mode is correct. The phrase, "Joe bore his sad burdens," suggests weight borne with gravity; its contrary would be "frivolous." A "sad visage" is one that is composed; its opposite would be something like "distraught." A "sad invalid ill three days" suggests something unfortunate or regrettable; "heartening" might be its contrary. To say, "A funeral is a sad day to see old friends," suggests something "miserable" in the circumstances of meeting; "happy" could serve as its contrary. Each sense of "sad" has a different contrary and an explanation of why that word is its contrary helps confirm the particular sense of "sad" (Ross 129).

The use of contraries reveals only a part of the semantic value of these attributive adjectives. In his work, *Portraying Analogy*, J. F. Ross discusses and elucidates a more precise feature of meaning relations that are pertinent here. He argues that adjectival phrases like "angry gesture" and "angry man" have contrast dependent denominations of meaning. As their mode of predication differs so does the meaning of its contrast dependent relatum. Consider the pair "brave man" / "brave deed." If the phrase, "brave man," indicates one's character, then "brave deed" is a characteristic of that character. If the bravery of "brave man" is a characteristic of that man, then a "brave deed" is a manifestation of that characteristic. If the bravery of "brave man" refers to a tendency in his conduct, then "brave deeds" are a habit with him. If "brave deeds" are a habit, then his bravery is a disposition

(Ross 129). The contrast dependent meaning relations revealed in this example are:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. character | characteristic |
| 2. characteristic | manifestation |
| 3. tendency | habit |
| 4. habit | disposition |

Ross lists twelve common contrast dependent relations:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. cause | effect |
| 2. sign | symptom |
| 3. disease | syndrome |
| 4. character | characteristic |
| 5. characteristic | manifestation |
| 6. manifestation | indication |
| 7. activity | capacity |
| 8. activity | proclivity |
| 9. proclivity | tendency |
| 10. tendency | habit |
| 11. habit | disposition |
| 12. disposition | function (129) |

The contrast-dependent relations provide us with a criterion for delineating the semantic value of an attributive adjective. Contrast dependent relations yield a further payoff. If we know that a property is, for example, a characteristic, then we can look to see if there is possibly present some related issue involving character or some further manifestation that will serve as argumentative material. Obviously, the meaning relations do not posit objects, they posit semantic possibilities that serve a heuristic function.

**Propositional Objects**

In an earlier section I argued that the objects of the emotions can be classified as material or intentional and nonillusory or illusory. This fourfold classification was necessary to handle several types of nonexistent objects that

result from misidentification or misdescription. In these cases, either the object was misidentified or the causal conditions were not properly motivating. Crucially, not all misdescriptions will be caught by this division.

One of Robert Gordon's most important insights was the idea that some objects of the emotions can be expressed with a that-clause as the grammatical object of the emotion (46, 66, 122):

1. Joe hopes that he will not forget his lines
2. Joe trusts that he will not forget his lines
3. Joe fears that he will forget his lines
4. Joe is worried that he will forget his lines.

These objects can occur with present tense states as well;

5. Joe regrets that he forgot his lines
6. Joe is ashamed that he forgot his lines.

This grammatical possibility has been named the *propositional object* of an emotion. Yet we also recognize that it is possible to experience worry, for example, without being able to specify what it is that one is worried about. de Sousa argues that the fact that an emotion can be experienced without a specifiable object raises a troubling question about the relationship between an emotion and its propositional object (137).

There are several reasons that account for the variable specificity of an emotion's propositional object. This variability is most easily explained in terms of one's fears. We need to recall two features about one's fears to do this. First, fear has two kinds of reasons operating within its cognitive structure. There are epistemic reasons and there are attitudinal reasons. Propositional objects are more easily expressed as epistemic reasons, and even here there

are degrees of specifiability. If the object of the emotion can be seen as an event or a situation one can, in principle, specify at some time T:

1. the agent of the action,
2. the recipient undergoing the action,
3. the object moved by the action,
4. and the goal or purpose of the action.

This four fold analysis of propositional objects is important for three reasons. First, it provides us with a method of explicating the content of these judgments held towards the propositional object. Second, these criteria pick out those features of the situation that will also possess significance in another evaluative domain, whether it is moral, ethical or practical, so that one's emotional judgments are conceptually related to these other kinds of judgment. Third, the analysis suggests avenues of inquiry into the character of the agent having the judgment. Consider,

Joe is afraid that the storm will destroy his boat.

The agent of his fear is the storm; the boat is the object of the action; the integrity or seaworthiness of the boat is the recipient undergoing the action; and the likely destruction of that vessel is the 'goal' of the storm. The propositional object of an emotion is successful, in part, if the object, event or situation instantiates the formal object of the emotion. Joe's propositional object satisfies that requirement. Yet, we recognize that fears have attitudinal reasons, reasons that motivate the agent. In the boat example, Joe's attitudinal reason may be reasonably inferred from his epistemic reasons; Joe doesn't want his boat destroyed. We can assess the epistemic reasons in a propositional

object for their reasonableness (which invokes the criteria of likelihood, probability, etc.), but that reasonableness also depends on how much weight one should give to the attitudinal reason if the event comes to pass.

Propositional objects may be complete or incomplete. A propositional object is complete if all four characteristics are dealt with. It is incomplete if one or more of the characteristics are absent. Although incomplete expressions are not necessarily defective, they may be. Again, fear is illustrative. The nature and the degree of uncertainty present in the fearful situation can affect one's ability to specify the object propositionally. Consider,

Joe is afraid that Mary will Kiss Sam.

The propositional object names the agent, Mary; it names the recipient, Sam; but the description leaves vague why the kissing is fearful; its purposiveness is not expressed. Crucially, what is missing in the kissing example is a way to assess Joe's attitude towards the kissing. An attitude expresses a relation between the subject and its object, and that relationship will comprehend both the focus of the emotion as a manifestation of that attitude and the intelligibility of focal property of the object relative to the motivational aim of the emotion. An attitude held towards a propositional object is successful if the attitude is appropriate to the object, event or situation it describes; and the property of the object picked out by the attitude instantiates the formal object of the emotion in question (de Sousa 139). These criteria are important in two ways because the relation points in two directions, so to speak. Frequently, what is important about a propositional object is its relation to the situation,

but the agent's relationship to the propositional object is no less important Thus, the appropriateness of the attitude must also comprehend the stance of the subject.

## Attitudes

The appropriateness of one's attitude towards the propositional object, and towards objects in general, is, thus, a crucial issue for persuasive success. Emotional attitudes are significant in two ways. Their use implies a broader conception of the agent's relation to the objects of the emotions; but perhaps more importantly, they suggest an agent's relationship to one's emotions themselves. Emotional attitudes are not well understood. Part of the reason stems from the relative newness of the concept as a conceptual category.

According to the OED, the notion of an 'attitude' emerged in the late seventeenth century. Originally, it denominated the disposition of a figure in painting or statuary. In the early eighteenth century the term came to denominate the posture of the body itself or implying some action or mental state. Recently, the first sense was transferred to refer to the orientation of an airplane or spaceship relative to its direction of travel. The sense of 'attitude' we typically think of emerged in the nineteenth century. The term 'attitude' denominates those durative behaviors and mental states that occurrently represent feelings, emotions and opinions. They may be viewed aspectually as being continuous or frequentive.

If we are to understand the persuasive potential inherent in one's attitudes, the vague notion of an attitude needs to be made more precise. Such an explanatory task is not simple. Emotional attitudes serve pragmatic ends, and these practical functions do not admit of easy explanation. We can,

however, identify four functions that attitudes perform. Most straightforwardly, perhaps, attitudes strive for consistency of response; we want to have the same emotional response to the same kinds of situations that elicit them. We approve or disapprove of people and their actions. We like what we find agreeable, and we dislike what is disagreeable. We enjoy what is pleasant and endure what is not. Conversely, attitudes strive for consistency in motivation. Attitudes help regulate and coordinate the kinds of reasons and intentions that are necessary and sufficient for effective motivation. These attitudinal judgments also offer a partial causal account of the aspectual nature of one's desires. Desires that are frequentive, for example, are agreeable, and we presumptively expect that the agent approves the reasons present in the second order desire.

Third, attitudes work to coordinate one's emotional life in two ways. They categorize one's emotions by evaluative type: emotions are agreeable or disagreeable, approving or disapproving; we like or dislike the object or find the object attractive or repellent, and so on. This higher level judgment stands in an intermediate relationship between the particular emotions and the various virtues as well as the moral and prudential principles that govern one's actions. Many of these attitudes are directed at others, and some are presumptively agent-neutral. Benevolence is an attitude governed by the principle of justice. Gratitude and retribution are contrary attitudes governed by one of the principles of reciprocity. Gratitude returns good for good; retribution, harm for harm. Sympathy and compassion are concerned with issues of non-desert. Some attitudes, though other directed, are personal. We

love our families, and we feel fidelity towards our friends. Finally, some attitudes are directed at oneself or one's well-being.

Fourth, attitudes name one of the crucial agencies of purposive change in one's emotional life and in one's character. This causal agency manifests itself many ways. One common way is through the use of second order emotions. The use of second order emotions, for example, is possible because one has an attitude towards the targeted emotion. A person can regret being afraid, enjoy being titillated, and so on. The first emotion is directed towards the object in question; the second is an emotional evaluation of the appropriateness or propriety of the first. The appropriate attitude selects the second order emotion because that emotion possesses an evaluation that will be causally efficacious; it will change the character of one's affective response.

There are two issues here. We need to distinguish the causal mechanisms operating within and on our emotions from the persuasive techniques that activate or utilize those mechanisms. Although the programs offered by self-help gurus and motivational experts that are now currently popular can be faulted for their narrowness of focus and reductive psychology's, their programs do recognize the importance and efficacy of this function of one's attitudes. Their manuals use exempla and what-if thought experiments to help the user project the consequences of a way of life made possible by altering one's attitudes. The climax of these procedures typically ends with a maxim like, "It is attitude, not aptitude, that will determine the altitude of your life." Obviously, their procedures are productive to the extent that they have translated a causal mechanism into a regimen for change.

Although the individuation of these functions is reasonably clear, the criteria we use to deploy these attitudes are not. Perhaps the greatest impediment we face in clarifying how the attitudes serve these functions comes from the fact that they are dynamic agencies of change in the individual. Attitudes express what we want. When we succeed or fail in satisfying these wants, the attitude itself undergoes changes. Sometimes these changes are subtle; sometimes they are dramatic. In any event, they are comprehended temporally. Throughout our interaction with the object of these attitudes over time, we change as agents and the character of our actions changes as well. Crucially, the attitude itself changes as well. Attitudes are understood as histories within the life of the individual. The narrative character of one's attitudes is related to narrative dimension of emotional experience. As the semantic depth of one's emotional concepts changes, the domain and scope of the relevant attitude changes as well.

I want to suggest that this dynamic operates in two broad ways. Attitudes related to moral principles, for example, are subject to reflection, imagination and reasoning in a way that allows for more or less conscious changes of attitude. Attitudes involving love and hate towards individuals, one's family, one's friends or one's enemies, for example, change in less consciously controllable ways. Love and hate take people as their objects; moral principles comprehend actions and states of character. We change through our dealings with others; they, in turn, change as well, and the attitude itself changes over time. The inner workings of these processes are subtle, and they are less open to conscious reflection than are principles of action.

The dynamic dimension of attitudes is not the only problem one faces in characterizing these relations. To serve the first three functions named above, attitudes categorize the types of experiences one undergoes, and they categorize the emotions themselves. The brief survey of criteria named above suggests that there is no obvious classificatory principle operating here. The emotions are not subject to the same kind of regimentation and voluntary control that moral principles, for example, accept. More importantly, perhaps, attitudes articulate these criteria at different levels of generality. We have noted that the 'general' is opposed to the specific, and it is opposed to the particular.

I want to look at three broad categories of mental experience that involve attitudes. Most generally, we use the word 'attitude' to name states of temperament or dispositions. These general stances stand in relation to particular emotions and they can specify responses to types of situations. Second, we speak of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are typically expressed by statements like, "A (thinks, believes, hopes, fears, etc.) + that-clause." These attitudes are quite specific, and they lie at the opposite end of the spectrum from dispositional or temperamental attitudes. There is a third category of attitudes that are more general than propositional attitudes but less general than temperamental attitudes. The term, 'predicational attitude', names a cognitive and evaluative or affective complex held towards some object.

Attitudes, like the emotions, exhibit dispositional or occurrent manifestations. The dispositional attitudes may exhibit themselves as matters of temperament or as tendencies. Grammatically, dispositional attitudes are

expressed adjectivally. A person's attitude may be optimistic, pessimistic, hopeful, and so on. We can clarify this sense of attitude as a durative state or frame of mind by contrasting it with two related phenomena. A person who subscribes to moral pessimism, say, the belief that nearly everyone, most of the time, does in fact act in what is believed to be his or her self interest, is a pessimist. This individual may or may not, however, have a pessimistic attitude. It is quite possible that this individual has chosen, as a matter of principle, to act in an upright manner, or to ignore the petty and self-destructive behavior of his neighbors, or to resist the negative consequences that such a belief could engender. Whatever attitude the moral pessimist adopts is, in principle, justified by that evaluative belief. The justification of the moral pessimist's attitude is importantly subject to truth conditions.

On the other hand, a person who is pessimistic may, in fact, have a tacit or explicit belief like the moral pessimist; but it is neither conceptually nor causally necessary that he or she do so. A pessimistic attitude is maintained, not because it is true; rather, it is maintained because the agent holding the attitude finds it practically efficacious. We maintain attitudes of this sort not because they are true; we maintain them because they work in practical situations. I suggested earlier that the governing principle of a dispositional attitude like love or hate is what we want or don't want. In this sense, an 'attitude' names a motivational stance. This is, I think, correct, but it is incomplete. Attitudes do indicate motivational stances, but another principle operates within them. Attitudes are also evaluative. The evaluation implicit in an attitude is expressed as an expectation. To be 'pessimistic', for example, is to expect people to act in certain ways. But this expectation is dynamic, it seeks

out features of the relevant situation or the properties of individuals that confirm that expectation.

Individuating the attitude in question from some other feature of the attitude is relevant here. To call someone's attitude 'depressing' is not to name the attitude in question; rather, it is to identify some aspect, an implication or effect perhaps, that evokes the attribution 'depressing'. An attitude that is one of temperament (being phlegmatic, choleric, happy, etc.) expresses a reactive or dispositional relation to the world. It marshals and partially coordinates those relevant aspects of one's character or personality to react to situations. A dispositional attitude may also express an inclination to perform some characteristic action. Attitudes of this sort are like the lens of a camera. A camera lens brings certain features into focus at a certain distance, as well as defining the depth of field. An attitude picks out and brings into focus certain features of a situation, but it can also restrict how deeply or how closely other features of the situation are viewed. What is picked out and what is excluded is warranted on practical or motivational grounds rather than exclusively on epistemic grounds.

To see an attitude as a generalized and practical response warranted on grounds of efficacy makes an attitude resemble other long term tendencies in one's personality or character. A pessimistic attitude, for example, resembles the vices (cruelty, misanthropy, hypocrisy, peevishness, etc.) that people are prey to. A vice is a voluntary but unchosen disposition in someone's character. It is formed as a response to certain conditions in life, conditions like the insufficiency of goods, the indifference of nature, and the propensity for malevolence in man (Kekes 66-83). Attitudes, like vices, are voluntary in

the sense that we have a choice to act otherwise each time an event that can possibly strengthen the attitude in question presents itself. An unwanted attitude, like a vice is unchosen in the sense that we do not and would not consciously choose to develop that trait in our character.

Attitudes of this sort come in different degrees of entrenchment. Deciding how entrenched the localized manifestation of the attitude may be is crucial for determining how one is to make a persuasive appeal in the face of it. Like adjectives, the meaning of these attitudinal terms are contrast dependent. The more common are listed below:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | tendency | proclivity |
| 2. | proclivity | propensity |
| 3. | propensity | inclination |
| 4. | inclination | habit |
| 5. | habit | habitude |
| 6. | habitude | disposition |
| 7. | disposition | virtue |
| 8. | disposition | vice (Ross 129) |

Entrenchment is apprehended through the agent's tone, and that tone magnetizes all of the related attitudinal and emotional manifestations of that entrenched stance.

## Propositional Attitudes

More interestingly for the issue of persuasion, attitudes can be occurrent. Bertrand Russell was the first to notice the philosophical interest of a class of verbs which we now call 'propositional attitudes'. The term 'propositional attitude' is used to cover such mental states and events as to believe, know, hope, fear, regret, infer, think, see, love, hate, expect, want, wish, and the like. Propositional attitude verbs take a that-complement:

John believes that Vesuvius erupted in 79 AD
Hector feared that the thief would steal his computer
Sally hopes that she will be able to have lunch with you next Monday.

In each case, the subject believes-true, fears-true or hopes-true that X, where X stands for the complement. Propositional attitudes form a paradigmatic set, as illustrated in the following example:

I (hope, fear, think, doubt) that the insurance company will renege on its contractual obligations.

The intuitive idea is that the proposition in the that-clause stands in some relation, expressed by the propositional attitude, to the grammatical subject. An expression where one fears-true, hopes-true or expects-true, and the like, implies that there is an object about which people may reasonably disagree, when disagreements arise. The disagreement, if there is one, arises over an intentional state. We evaluate this intentional state in terms of the criteria specified by the formal object that governs the expression of the propositional object. The representational state expressed by the complement is successful if it appropriately instantiates the normative conditions of rationality under which the intentional state of the emotion is evaluated.[4]

In situations where one experiences doubt or hesitation about what is true, one examines, tests or entertains the belief; and these operations can be expressed by "I believe that X." It is possible to entertain a proposition, that is, to one considers whether it is plausible, reasonable, or warranted to believe that X. One cannot, however, entertain an attitude. Beliefs can be hypothetical; emotional attitudes cannot. Of course, one can say, "If X has

attitude Y, then X will want Z," where Z names the desired object. But this is not the kind of conditionalization I have in mind. Bernard Williams illustrates the problem with the example, "If he broke his blasted tricycle again, he'll go without his pocket money" ("Morality and Emotion" 211). The irritation is not cancelled by the conditionalization. de Sousa pushes this idea even farther. He argues that if I express an attitude, I cannot view it hypothetically. I already accept it (157).

Emotional attitudes cannot be expressed as conditionals in the way beliefs can because they contain the element of wanting or not wanting it to be the case that X. To be sure, we do say, "I want to believe that X is true," but this kind of wanting involves a wish that we discover that the facts about the world are other than they appear to be. With emotional attitudes, the wanting involved may different. Emotional attitudes express a relation between subject and object. The characteristics targeted by the attitude are understood in terms of what the subject wants or doesn't want the world to be like. Attitudes like knowing and believing want the truth; hoping, loving and fearing want what is good. When one considers the accuracy of the propositional object of an emotional attitude, the procedure followed is not one of entertaining it; it is a process of discovery.

Consider the case of a doctor diagnosing the medical condition of a friend with the symptoms of a serious illness. The doctor tells a colleague that,

I am afraid that I know what Sally's medical problem is.

Intuitively, we know that the utterance announces the possible discovery of the source of the problem, and it expresses the mental state of the utterer.

Actually, there are two ways in which we can explain the relation between being afraid and knowing:

I am afraid (that I know what Sally's medical problem is),

or it can mean,

I am afraid that I know (what Sally's medical problem is).

In the first case, the doctor discovers that his fears have proved true. It expresses a statement about his own relation of discovering the truth of her condition. In the second case, the doctor expresses a mental state or stance he holds in relation to her condition. Like the first, the second interpretation is a discovery, but it is a discovery about the subject. The second statement is an expression of self discovery; it expresses a judgment about the doctor's own emotional stance towards the object. Emotional attitude statements are particular expressions within the narrative history of that attitude, and the dynamic processes operating there affect the subject in a way that the other propositional attitudes do not. The temporal dynamic can affect the appraisal of the object(s) of that attitude as well. To distinguish these two possible analyses we need to recognize that emotion terms can also express predicational attitudes.

## Predicational Attitudes

Propositional attitudes like 'thinks that', 'hopes that', and 'fears that' play a crucial role in the emotions. There is another class of attitudes that emotions participate in. In her discussion of emotional ambivalence, Patricia Greenspan recently argued that some emotional states express what she calls

*predicational attitudes* (231-234). Ambivalence, the holding of two contrary attitudes towards a common object, is a common enough experience. She asks us to imagine a case where a colleague, whom I like and respect, and I are competing for the same promotion. The colleague wins the promotion. I may have ambivalent emotions towards my colleague's winning that can be expressed:

> I think it is good that she won
> I think it is bad that she won.

If I am expressing a propositional attitude, then the statements would be analyzed:

> I think (it is good that she won)
> I think (it is bad that she won).

This analysis does not capture the notion that it is my attitude, rather than my belief, that is ambivalent. I do not have contrary beliefs; I have contrary attitudes. A more accurate analysis of ambivalence would be:

> I think it is good (that she won)
> I think it is bad (that she won).

After all, what I am expressing with ambivalent feelings are contrary attitudes towards a common object, that she won. More importantly, this contrary attitude expresses a judgment. The statement "I think it is good that she won," is logically equivalent to:

> I think ((that she won) is good).

This logical equivalence turns out to be important for our understanding of the role attitudes and their judgmental stance can take. Judgments within an emotional episode manifest themselves as the belief conditions present themselves. The assent to the success conditions that constitute the emotion are understood temporally.

This assent presents itself as a kind of discovery; we find, see, or learn that we feel X. When we reflect on our emotional state, we find that this assent may be expressed by statements like:

1. I see that I am pained by X (where x stands for some bad thing)
2. I find that I am disturbed by X
3. I find that I am distressed over X
4. I see that I am disappointed by X
5. I find that I am angered by X
6. I find that I am resentful about X
7. I see that I am envious of X
8. I find that I am jealous of X

This attitude expresses a judgment if, like the case of contrary attitudes, the statement can be expressed in the logically equivalent form:

I find ((that X) is painful, disturbing, distressing, disappointing, etc.).

Statements 1 through 4 fit this logical form, but statements 5 through 8 cannot be placed in logically equivalent form. They are causal reports of the emotional state I am experiencing. Statement 5, for example, is equivalent to "I find that X angers me;" statement 6 states that "I find that X makes me feel resentful," and so on. It is the judgment, not the causal force of the episode, that will affect the deliberative judgment in the correct way.

## Conclusion

This chapter began with the claim that the deliberative emotions are sensitivities capable of producing salience. That sensitivity directs the agent's attention to what is significant. But the presence of attitudes that govern these emotions introduces other dimensions to the comprehension of salience. Attitudes categorize emotional experience by situational type and by the kinds of emotions that are relevant to those situations. This process of categorization implies a causal role that attitudes play in the life of the emotions and in determining who we are.

These are complex issues, and they will be explored in the next chapter.

## ENDNOTES CHAPTER IV

[1] Lyons 104-112. The idea that emotions have objects is, of course, an ancient one. The direction of current research has taken its cue from Book II of Hume's *Treatise* . In this century the important research began again with Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). The two most important discussions of this idea are found in Lyons (1980) and Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge: MIT P, 1987) chap 5. I follow the ideas of these two closely in what follows.

[2] For a discussion of the semantic promise, complexities and puzzles involving the use of the comparative form to mark the delineation, see Platts, 174-189.

[3] See, David Kaplan, "On the Logic of Demonstratives," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 8 (1978) 81-98; and David Kaplan, "Demonstratives," *Themes from Kaplan*, ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 481-614.

[4] de Sousa 139.

# CHAPTER V

## HARM AND THE DELIBERATIVE EMOTIONS

> No mortal is there but pain finds him out
> And sickness; many must their children bury,
> And sow fresh issue; death is the end for all;
> In vain do these things vex the race of men,
> Earth must go back to earth: then life by all
> Like crops is reaped. So bids Necessity.
>
> Euripedes, *Hypsopyla*

> [Thrasymachus] was also clever at rousing a crowd to anger and again at soothing its anger by his spells; most powerful was he also in devising and dissipating calumnies, whatever their source.
>
> *Phaedrus* 267c 9

Emotions and attitudes are purposive. As William Lyons points out in his important study, *Emotion*, the idea of 'purposive' is ambiguous; it suggests three different interpretations. First, emotions are 'purposive' in the sense that 'they give rise to purposive behavior'. When fears and desires have appropriate objects, we are properly motivated. Our judgments of approbation and disapprobation are partly constituted by those emotions that help form that judgment. More generally, an emotion directs its focus or attention towards some object, picking out some property for evaluation. When some feature of the deliberative situation is understood in terms of a particular emotion, then we have achieved salience. Second, they are 'purposive' because they can serve some function. They are purposive in the sense that they are useful; they organize or disrupt our experience, and they help constitute what is fitting or inappropriate. In addition to the distinction

between useful and useless emotions operating as a part of our conduct, emotions may be thought of as socially approved or disapproved. The third sense of purposive suggests that emotions are had for some purpose. This final sense implies that the purposes in our emotions are species of manipulation or deception, directed at others or oneself (178). While this can certainly be the case, the families of deception and coercion are not the purpose of this study.

Virtually no one writing on the emotions, ancient or modern, disputes the claim that emotions are purposive. We frequently explain actions with phrases like, "I did it because I wanted to. . .," "They quit because they feared that. . .," or "she brought suit because she was angry that he refused to support the children." This purposiveness is one of the most reputable notions in our commonsense view of the emotions and action. These writers disagree vigorously, however, on the explanatory role this fact plays in a broader theory of action and in a theory of self interest. In his essay, "Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action," Robert Audi usefully summarizes the differences among the three theoretical models we appeal to explain actions.[1] There is the covering law model, where action is explained in terms of a law that covers, in the sense of entailing, the phenomenon to be explained.[2] There is the hermeneutic model, where the central feature of the explanation is "expressing the meaning, for the agent, of the action explained."[3] There is the Aristotelian model, where action is explained in terms of final causes with the agent serving as the efficient cause. Although each theory accepts the different senses of 'purposive' delineated above, each theory differs as to what is explained, and each theory carries different explanatory strengths.

Likewise, the claim that emotions are purposive has ramifications for our notion of rational self interest. Derek Parfit outlines the differences among the three competing theories of rational self interest in *Reasons and Persons* (493-502). Hedonistic theories argue that what is best for someone is what makes his life happiest. Desire-fulfillment theories argue that what is best for someone is what best fulfills his desires. Objective list theories argue that certain things are good or bad for us, whether we want them or not (Parfit 493-495). Certainly, many desires will be shared by the proponents of each of these theories, but the value and importance of these desires will vary with each theory. The role of the desires will differ because those desires will be justified in different ways.

We are concerned in this chapter with the conceptual and pragmatic relationships that exist between the first two interpretations of the claim that the emotions are purposive, and which must be explained as part of any successful theory of action or rational self interest. Fortunately, we do not have to decide which theory is best in either domain in order to proceed with our arguments. Although we are able conceptually to distinguish these two senses of 'purposive', the success conditions that operate under either interpretation work together in the argument from pathos. In this chapter I want to explore the necessary success conditions that must obtain for the argument from pathos to be cognitively purposive.

In Book II of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle uses the two senses of 'purposive' distinguished above to name the elements necessary for emotional persuasion to be successful. He distinguishes three conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient for emotional persuasion to be effected. Emotion produces

changes which affect judgment. The emotion is directed towards some object and that object can be an action, a person, a situation or thing. The state of mind of the agent experiencing the emotion will provide opportunities for persuasion by directing that agent's attention and focus towards some aspect of the situation by controlling the intensity and strength of the episode. Finally, emotions are thought dependent; they are constituted by beliefs and judgments. Comprehending these will lead to an understanding of the kinds of reasons that can be appealed to will affect the success of the appeal.

These success conditions will be explored in four stages. First, I will characterize the two classes of emotions that operate in deliberation. The emotions that function in deliberation are constituted by beliefs and judgments of various sorts, which help characterize the mind of the person experiencing the emotion; and these in turn help explain what sorts of reasons will be efficacious. The discussion of those features present in the deliberative emotions will lead to the second stage of inquiry. There are several success conditions that must be satisfied if an emotion is to tell us something about the world and thus achieve salience. As mentioned above, salience is the condition whereby we understand a deliberative situation in terms of some relevant emotion. Salience is necessary because it is the ground from which the other possible persuasive functions inherent in the argument from pathos grow. Finally, one's possible role in a deliberative situation largely determines what emotional responses are possible and, of those, which are appropriate. Thus, the necessary success conditions for salience must be buttressed by a discussion of point of view and agency. These success conditions are the subject of this chapter and the next. This chapter will

explore which emotions are efficacious in deliberation and for what substantive reasons. The next chapter will discuss point of view.

**The Deliberative Emotions**

At the beginning of Chapter II, I named the four formal success conditions necessary for the argument from pathos to work. It is time now to move beyond formal issues and explore some the substantive issues operating in several particular emotions that are important to deliberation.

Of the several hundred emotions, moods and feelings for which we have names, not all (thankfully) are appropriate candidates for successful use in emotional persuasion.[4] We are limited by an important practical consideration. The practice of emotional persuasion implies that we concern ourselves with only those emotions for which we can exercise some control over the effects sought. Grumpiness, peevishness and insincerity are unmanageable in their effects. Likewise, querulousness, irascibility and dudgeon, for example, can be eliminated because they are either too dispositionally entrenched or because they are chronic susceptibilities in one's character. Others are too remote from deliberative concerns to be of much use; it is difficult to see how the emotions of torpor and lassitude could be utilized. There are two reasons these emotions fail. Each of the emotions just mentioned fails because none gives rise to purposive behavior, and none can be seen as serving the purposes of the people having that emotion.

We have two classes of emotions that meet these two criteria and, in fact, function in the deliberative search. The first class of deliberative emotions are the emotions of self-assessment. With good reason, David Hume characterized these emotions the 'indirect passions' (Book II, Part 1, sections I-

III 275-282). In the class of 'indirect passions' Hume includes pride, humility, shame, vanity, love, hatred, pity, jealousy, malice and generosity. To this list we can add anger, resentment, indignation, envy, sympathy, compassion, regret and grief, among others. His attempt at characterizing these emotions reveals a significant feature of the deliberative emotions. Hume argued that our comprehension of these emotions requires a distinction between that emotion's causes and its object. He also argued that we must both distinguish between and discern the 'connection' between the qualities which occasion that emotion and the person who undergoes that emotion. That is, for the emotion to be present the agent must not only be aware of what causes the emotion, but he must also be aware that it is possessed by or due to the self or another. Baldly stated, a deliberative emotion will have two sets of causes. The first 'cause' names an antecedent event or condition that precipitates the second 'cause'. The second 'cause' is one's assent to a belief or judgment about the antecedent cause. That assent eventuates the emotional episode. Thus, within the set of beliefs and attitudes that structure an emotion one belief is decidedly causal, the assent to which precipitates the emotion. Furthermore, that belief is, in some important way, self referential.

The emotions that comprise the first class are central to deliberative concerns. Its members share four characteristics. First, the emotion takes as its formal object an evaluation of some feature of that experience that is bound to the well-being of communities or individuals. An emotion's formal object is essential to our understanding of the emotion in question because the formal object is that part of the emotion that makes the particular object of an emotional episode rationally intelligible. As we have seen, the formal object of

an emotion names that property or quality present in the emotion's definition which the particular object of each emotional episode must instantiate if the emotion is to be one of that type. Second, these emotions will have desiderative or evaluative conditions which are cognitively manifested in the form of beliefs, attitudes and desires that constitute it, and these conditions are capable of comprehending both the actions of agents as well as their characters. The cognitive structure of four emotions will be discussed below and will serve to illustrate the complexities of these conditions.

Third, the deliberative emotions do not occur in psychological isolation. Over time we experience a broad range of occurrent emotional episodes. While many of these are seen as spontaneous episodes, in the sense that their appearance is not under voluntary control, we recognize that these occurrences can be seen as signs of deeper and more fundamental aspects of our characters. Perhaps the most obvious instance of this fact is the recognition that some emotions are manifestations of traits. For example, if Joe is repeatedly anxious in unfamiliar situations, then Joe is temperamentally anxious. To call someone's temperament irascible or phlegmatic is to say at least two things. First, there is a 'cross-situational consistency' in that person's behavior. A person's behavior is 'cross-situationally' consistent if three conditions are met. Different situations will produce the same emotion if they have common incentives, they provide a range of emotional options as possible responses, and they are relevant to a person's goals. Second, there is a demonstrated stability of temperament of over time.[5] Although these traits are common, traits of temperament are not the only way in which an emotion forms a part of a larger pattern.

An occurrent emotional episode is a determinant of some determinable. Just as pink and scarlet are determinants under the determinable red, resentment and anger are determinants under the determinable called the retributive emotions. The determinable involves the idea of retribution. The retributive emotions are, in turn, determinants under the determinable of the virtue of justice. The determinable is, typically, some disposition, character trait or virtue. The emotion exists as a member of a permanent ordered family with a governing disposition such as temperance, justice and benevolence. Appetitive desires are partially governed by the virtue of temperance. Pity and indignation are informed by a sense of injustice. Compassion, kindness and sympathy are governed by benevolence.

These propensities can also manifest themselves as sentiments. A proud man is one who takes pride in his pride. While the emotion is a fallible sign of some disposition, this disposition, when present, is important because it manifests itself as a kind of attentiveness or propensity to raise questions or animate related concerns. This propensity is recognized by the type of explanation required in giving an account of the particular emotional episode.

Finally, the relevant sentiment, attitude, disposition or virtue, along with the complex belief structure within the deliberative emotions, make it possible to experience a range of *coordinate* emotions. This condition can manifest itself in two ways. First, a deliberative emotion is frequently compatible with other deliberative emotions. A brutal crime, for instance, can produce several emotions simultaneously: pity for its victims, indignation on their behalf, anger or resentment directed at the perpetrators, and horror at the crime itself. Second, while the particular deliberative emotion people

experience may be determined by their roles in the deliberative situation, the evaluative component of these emotions are sufficiently complex to accommodate that fact of perspective without a loss to our persuasive possibilities. That loss is prevented because the coordinate emotions will invoke the relevant moral or practical concept as part of their formal objects.

The deliberative emotions are also compatible with the property-response emotions discussed in the previous chapter. These emotions comprise the second class of emotions that are important to persuasion. One feature of the property-response emotions differs crucially from the deliberative emotions. The deliberative emotions carry some evaluation of the world within the structure of their beliefs. The direction of fit in the deliberative emotions moves from us to the world. The direction of fit in the property-response emotions moves from the world to us. They are important in deliberation because they are instrumentally efficacious. As we have noted earlier, they focus the impetus of the deliberative emotion by inclining one's attention towards one feature of that emotion as opposed to another. When an author creates surprise, for instance, the sense of immediacy carries force. The property-response emotions are, thus, useful matter for producing *enargia*, the power of a passage to make something vivid and immediate; and they provide matter to produce the effect of *amplification*. Amplification is achieved through the successful deployment of tactical arguments that direct and modulate those aspects of the targeted emotion to achieve one's persuasive purpose.

In order to see how these four features manifest themselves we will examine in some detail four emotions (pity, indignation, fear, and anger) that

are important in deliberation. Pity, indignation and anger are emotions concerned with what we think people deserve or fail to deserve. Fear is also important in this area of concern. There are occasions where we can and do fear what we don't deserve, but we can also fear what we do deserve. Fear, however, is important because it stands as a counterpart emotion to pity and functions within the emotion of anger. Initially, each emotion will be discussed individually, and later I will discuss several ways we coordinate them.

## Harm and Four Deliberative Emotions

Many of our emotions are directed at external goods that we place high value on; and, typically, these goods lie beyond our control so that they can be harmed in various ways. These goods can be harmed through human agency. We frequently suffer from limited knowledge, limited intelligence, and limited sympathies. With the case of limited sympathies, for example, we find that agents can be indifferent, malevolent, unfair or deceptive. Significantly, we also find that circumstances can harm those activities and performances which are important to our lives in one of four ways. First, some material resource, instrumental means or capacity necessary for the completion or attainment of that activity can be blocked. The blockage of the resource can be partial so that the end is delayed, constrained or impeded. If the resource, absolutely necessary for that activity, is absent, then the impediment totally blocks the activity. Third, circumstances may harm our activities when they deprive us the very object or end of the activity itself. If the loss of the object is temporary, then the harm is partial. If the loss is permanent or complete, then the harm is total. If we lose a friend, the harm is total and we grieve

(Nussbaum, *Fragility* 327). But partial losses due to circumstances can produce an ancillary harm. While we are not totally prevented from performing the activity, we can be harmed when that impediment prevents us from appreciating the value of what we are doing. Harm itself, and the possibilities for harm, produce many emotions.

While we can understand harm in terms of its extent and formal mode of achievement, we also recognize that harm may be deserved or undeserved. Certainly, many people commit stupid actions and lead foolish or vicious lives and the consequences of their actions catch up to them. But not all harms are deserved. In his important study, *Facing Evil*, John Kekes argues that evil is undeserved harm (4, 50). Some undeserved harms are 'simple'. An act of simple harm, he argues, "is to deprive people of the minimum requirements of their welfare" (51). When the physiological, psychological and sociological matters that constitute part of the minimum requirements of human welfare are damaged simple evil occurs. There are, for example, certain physiological conditions necessary for life. We need, for example, air, water and food. While the specific needs here will vary somewhat from individual to individual, they, along with other physiological conditions, form a core of constant needs shared by all.

Furthermore, we have such psychological capacities as thinking, remembering, imagining wishing and language use that form a port of human nature. These capacities are not exercised in isolation; their expression and functioning are dependent on our families and friends. Much that forms the minimal conditions of our psychological well-being is relational. Social life exists, in part, because it is necessary for satisfying the needs of human

nature. Kekes argues further that "simple harm is caused by frustrating the needs and curtailing the exercise of the capacities" inherent in human nature (53). Premature death, preventable diseases, dismemberment, chronic and lasting pain, prolonged thirst and hunger, and torture, among others, are simple harms. Furthermore, these harms are evil. *Simple evil* "is to cause harm to people who don't deserve it." There are, to be sure, other harms. *Complex evil* "is undeserved harm inflicted on a particular conception of the good life" (53). These conceptions vary historically, culturally and individually. These conceptions go beyond the minimal requirements for avoiding simple harm, but they also presuppose the existence of them.

By examining pity, fear, indignation and anger, emotions which can be precipitated by harm, we see more clearly the nature of the deliberative emotions and what is at stake here.

## Pity

Pity is a deeply important emotion in a variety of contexts, and Aristotle's discussion of it is both important and instructive. He defines pity as "a certain pain at an apparently destructive and painful happening to one who does not deserve it and which the person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this when it is close at hand" (1385b 11-14). For this painful occurrence to qualify as pity three conditions must be met. The first two conditions specify what is at stake and our corresponding beliefs about the situation confirm the presence of those conditions; the third condition entails a causal belief that we see our own possibilities as being like those of the sufferer.

First, the individual pitied is really suffering. The suffering must be significant. We do not pity those who have lost their car keys. Aristotle divides the occasions of suffering with the right degree of magnitude into two causal classes: the painful and the injurious, and substantial damages caused by luck. He cites as typical occasions for pity such conditions as the loss of friends, the loss of effective opportunities for effective action, sickness, old age, impending death, childlessness, the loss of children, and bad children. Two further observations may be made here about the first condition. We can and do have emotional responses to conditions that do not have the requisite magnitude for pity. The responses vary from kindness (an attentive response that pays special attention to the justice of the injured's feelings), to sympathy and on to benevolence. The other observation is only implicit in Aristotle's account. There are individuals who live in privation or penury and do not recognize their condition. Others are so brutalized that they do not recognize that the nature of their condition warrants a sense of suffering. I want to suggest that what we feel here is compassion and not pity. Lawrence Blum argues that in these situations compassion is an attitude requiring a distinction between naming the necessary conditions to identify who or what is an appropriate object for compassion and what the necessary conditions are for compassion to be the dominant emotional response (Blum, "Vocation" 186). Furthermore, many individuals who recognize their situation as potentially piteous frequently find expressions of pity acts of insult. This psychological fact implies an important feature of emotion and judgment. Judgment in the emotion of pity is asymmetric from the point of view of the agent who is suffering and the individual witnessing the agent's suffering.

The second condition for pity requires that the suffering be undeserved. This undeserved suffering appeals to our sense of injustice (85b 24ff). Martha Nussbaum has argued that this condition carries a generalized truth: we are capable of pity only if we believe that there are good people and that they are vulnerable to undeserved misfortune. A cynic, for example, is incapable of experiencing pity because the cynic believes that everyone deserves the suffering they undergo.[6] As Aristotle argues, we typically praise and blame voluntary actions (1109b 30-32). If an action is involuntary because the agent acted from nonculpable ignorance, then the agent deserves pity and indulgence from the pitier. We further recognize that there is an important but elusive connection between desert and autonomous action, between what should be and undeserved harm or undeserved merit. All claims of desert have a common structure; they assert that some person deserves some occurrence or mode of treatment in virtue of some fact about the agent or the situation. These claims have the schematic form, "Agent S deserves treatment X for reason A" (Sher 7). What counts as the reason for desert may differ in detail. It may be some action on the part of the agent or it may be some characteristic or attainment. The idea of desert excludes the arbitrary or unexplainable dimensions of human experience. Pity shares with desert questions of causation, responsibility and innocence.

The sense of injustice may be enough to inspire pity, but Aristotle insists that the pitier also has the belief that one's possibilities are similar to that of the sufferer. Pity has a self-regarding element and thus differs from sympathy, a close relative, in crucial respects. As Aristotle accurately observes, we pity in others what we fear for ourselves. If the pitied individual

is subject to undeserved misfortune then the pitier is likewise vulnerable to chance misfortune. Sympathy, on the other hand, is animated by a broader conception of those who are the target of that emotion. Sympathy requires a more general or universal recognition of one's kinship with undifferentiated humanity. The domain of sympathy is larger because the criterion for membership is more inclusive. Still, the belief which relates oneself to others in sympathy is causal in the same way the corresponding belief in pity is causal. Empathy owes its existence in part to the larger domain that is the concern of sympathy. But empathy also tries to find some imaginative mechanism with the effective power of pity's causal belief. While empathy owes its existence to the power of these emotions it is not an emotion. Empathy is the imaginative projection of oneself into the role of another or the identification with another's thoughts and feelings. Empathy is a developed capacity that is a part of the moral imagination. The self-regarding element that is necessary for sympathy and pity to be what they are is absent from empathy.

The justificatory and causal conditions necessary for pity imply that there are particular contraries to pity. Aristotle argues that pity has two contraries. The causal belief locates the first contrary of pity. We have a corresponding fear concerning our own vulnerability. This is a *causal* contrary. We also have a contrary concerned with the evaluative object of pity. Pity is concerned with undeserved and significant misfortune; indignation is concerned with undeserved and significant good fortune. These emotions will be discussed in the next two sections. Contrary emotions are

important because they reveal the dynamic interplay between the causal and evaluative dimensions operating within the emotion itself.

But we must remember that the genus in which the emotion is one of its species also has contraries. These genera should be thought of as dispositions. We have already noted one pair of contrary dispositions, our desires and fears. But there are also contrary dispositions within the classes of desires and fears. Benevolence, for example, has malevolence as its contrary disposition, and retribution has gratitude as its contrary. We can adopt one of four possible responses to the fact that our lives are subject to misfortune. We can be indifferent, or we can be cynical. We can feel compassion, or we can feel malice. Malice is the contrary of compassion. There will be emotions within the contrary genus that are inversions of their counterparts in the opposite genus.

Compassion has pity as one of its species; malice has contempt as its counterpart emotion. Pity is a painful feeling directed at the significant and undeserved misfortune of others. Contempt is a pleasurable feeling directed at that which is judged unworthy. These pairings can be expressed as an analogy:

pity : compassion : : contempt : malice

Just as fear is the *causal* contrary of pity, pique is a *causal* contrary of contempt. Indignation is the *evaluative* contrary of pity; envy is the *evaluative* contrary of contempt. If pity has fear as its causal contrary, indignation will have a causal contrary as well; that contrary is shame. (I will argue for these contraries in the next section.) Three conditions within the

emotions--significance, the lack of desert, and the strength of the emotion--may be felt as a matter of degree and can also be expressed as analogies:

pity : fear : : contempt : pique

pity : indignation : : contempt : envy

pity : fear : : indignation : shame

The analogies with their multiple scales offer us a way to locate argumentative material, discern significance, and afford us with a powerful method for amplification. Finally, the significance of the harm leads to another pair of contrasted emotions. We reserve the expression 'to feel sorry for' to describe a painful feeling directed at situations where the misfortune is not significant enough to warrant pity. Schadenfreude is a pleasurable feeling directed at the petty misfortunes of others.

The contrary dispositions of compassion and malice suggest that we have two psychological and evaluative levels that we can appeal to. We can address the occurrent emotion or the disposition governing it. Actually, the dispositions of compassion and malice participate in an even higher pair of contrary judgments. The disposition to act compassionately is, itself, grounded in two kinds of judgments: that cases involving such circumstances are undeserved and that compassion is a particular manifestation of the more general disposition to act with benevolence. Benevolence names the determinable that has kindness, generosity, gratitude, humaneness as well as compassion as its determinates. The nature of the nondesert acts as the differentia of compassion under this determinable. Likewise, the disposition of malice is grounded in a judgment that such acts are deserved and that malice is a particular manifestation of the more general disposition to act with

malevolence. Malevolence names the determinable that has meanness, selfishness, ingratitude, hatred as well as cruelty as its determinates.

When an emotion can be made salient at the occurrent level, we have two other psychological levels of increasing generality and which are also under greater voluntary control that we can appeal to. What is apprehended at the occurrent and particular level can, *a fortiori*, be strengthened or modified at a higher level. Furthermore, what is not seen at a more concrete level may be apprehended at a higher level.

Yet the further pursuit of contraries with their inherent persuasive potentialities in this way can lead to problems. I need to introduce several complications to these observations. It is tempting at this point to schematize the process of seeking the contraries for pity. We can do so by formalizing the conditions present in that emotion:

> X is a (*painful/pleasant*) emotion directed at (*significant/insignificant*) and (*deserved/undeserved*) (*good fortune/misfortune*) for (*oneself/another*).

By ranking the conditions on a continuum moving from general to specific, one can map them through a tree diagram. 'Desert' names the most general determinable; it has two contrary determinates, 'deserved' and 'undeserved'. These two contraries serve, in turn, as determinables with two contrary determinates, good fortune and misfortune. Good and bad fortune have two contraries, pleasure and pain. By adding the distinctions of significance and insignificance, and the distinctions between self regarding and other regarding emotions, we can finish mapping out the tree. (See the chart on the next page.) There are 32 possibilities for particular emotions; but,

significantly, we don't have 32 particular emotions that map onto these possibilities. It is important to see why this is so and what it reveals.

Such a procedure assumes that the emotions in this class are fixed (all of the possibilities are identified), exhaustive (all of the possibilities are named), and disjoint (each term names only one emotion). While the class is fixed, all of its members are not named. We don't have a name, for example, for the pleasant emotion directed at the significant and undeserved good fortunes of others.[7] The relevant terms are not disjoint. 'Sympathy' names an occurrent emotion and an attitude. The phrase, 'that's pathetic,' is ambiguous. It can be used to point to a situation deserving of pity, and it can be an expression of contempt. The ambiguity of expressions like 'pathetic' suggests that the relevant judgment is grounded in a deeper disposition and the depth of one's judgment within one's character is not captured by this procedure.

The ambiguity of these expressions suggests a further complication. We have ambivalent feelings. In cases of ambivalence we do not have contrary beliefs; we have contrary attitudes that are held towards a common object, that is, we have the contrary attitudes of judging-it-good and judging-it-bad that are held towards a common object. These are called predicational attitudes. We saw earlier that we have contrary dispositions expressed as attitudes towards these conditions. The scope of one's attitudes is not captured by this schematization process. The predicational attitudes revealed in case of ambivalence are useful evidence for comprehending the hierarchical culprit that creates it.



Undeserved
Good Fortune
Bad Fortune
Pleasure
Pain
Pleasure
Pain
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
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Self
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Self
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Self
Other




Deserved
Bad Fortune
Good Fortune
Pleasure
Pain
Pleasure
Pain
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other
Self
Other

The schematization project outlined above does name the 32 possible responses to deserved and undeserved good and bad fortune. It assumes falsely, however, that one's emotional responses will be *particular* emotions. To be sure, we do have the particular emotions of pity, indignation, fear and envy. But not all of our emotional responses are particular. Some of our emotional responses are manifestations of more general dispositions and judgments that are *specified* responses to the particular deliberative situation. This is especially clear in cases involving the virtues.

Consider one's pleasurable emotional responses to deserved good fortune. One can, of course, feel pride; and we saw in the previous chapter how pride works. But significantly, one can respond through and give expression to the appropriate virtues that govern our actions in these cases. I can respond to deserved and significant good fortune for myself with equanimity and insignificant but deserved good fortune with equability. (There are negative possibilities as well. Equanimity has *amour propre* as its contrary.) My response to another's insignificant and deserved good fortune can be an expression of geniality, and my response to significant good fortune can flow from a generous spirit. Each response manifest itself as an emotional expression. Our responses are manifestations of perceptual sensitivities that attend to what the situation requires, and each response is an expression of some virtue--magnanimity, humility or benevolence. Just as we can respond to deserved good fortune virtuously we can respond to undeserved bad fortune through the virtues. Kindness is a sensitivity to the propriety of another's feelings. Kindness is not gentleness. One can be gentle with another's feelings without attending to their reasons for being upset. In cases

requiring kindness but not gentleness we are attentive to the justice of those feelings.[8] The general capacity that structures one's virtuous response is made specific in the occurrent situation.

## Indignation

In her detailed analysis of the retributive emotions, Jean Hampton defines indignation as a defiant protest against an immoral action or event by defending the value which the action violated (59). While the specific value defended may vary, it will be an instantiation of moral desert. 'Desert' names that principle which justifies the differential distribution of goods in society that mark differences between people. While it is the defense of a value, indignation is typically experienced on behalf of another person. The emotion focuses on some property of the action or event that we judge 'immoral'. If the person judging the action as immoral can be harmed as a result, the emotion experienced will be fear or anger, not indignation. Unlike anger, where the agent's status can be diminished, it is the value that is seen as diminished rather than the agent who is the victim. As Jean Hampton observes, "indignant people fear that not to oppose a wrongdoer's challenge to some value may be to encourage further challenges to people's values" (59).

Even though one's judgment in indignation concerns moral criteria, there is a tendency in this emotion to view the wrongdoer as morally inferior and oneself as morally superior, increasing one's sense of self-righteousness. The phrase 'righteous indignation' is frequently applied to an adolescent's confused reactions over bruised honor. While adolescents often confuse anger with indignation, their confusion conceals an important aspect of this emotion. 'Righteous indignation' can mean that one is prone to these protests,

but it can also mean that some immoral actions are worthy of protest.[9] What a person feels indignation about names the possible objects of that emotion. What is worthy of indignation names the possible objects of the sentiment that governs the emotional occurrence.

It is the value of moral desert that Aristotle has in mind when he argues that indignation is the evaluative contrary of pity. Pity is concerned with the undeserved and significant misfortune of another whose situation we recognize as similar to our own. We feel indignation at the significant and undeserved good fortune of others (1386b). We are, thus, indignant at acts like discrimination, nepotism, and invidious class distinctions. When we feel indignation over discrimination we respond not just to bad motives and prejudice, we are defending a principle of equality of treatment. When we feel indignation at nepotism, exclusive access to higher education, and preferments due to privilege we are defending a principle of equality of opportunity. We can also feel indignant at situations where talent and effort are not properly rewarded. We are defending a principle where we ought to differently reward ability and demonstrated performance. Indignation is bound to the idea of equality and normatively justified differences in the treatment of individuals. Like pity, indignation is concerned with the idea of just deserts. What he locates in this definition are the possible objects of the governing disposition that deploys pity and indignation. If this is the case, then the objects of indignation are coordinate with anger and resentment in allied ways.

But pity has two contraries. Indignation is its *evaluative* contrary, and fear is its *causal* contrary. With the exception of anger, each of the

deliberative emotions will have contraries in each of these two classes. Like pity, indignation has causal contraries. In tracing this causal line we will find much that is relevant to emotional persuasion. When we consider the causal contraries of indignation we find two candidates, shame and envy. The possible objects of indignation are also coordinate with those of shame. Shame is another emotion of self-assessment where the agent sees himself as being at some disadvantage in the eyes of another actual or imagined observer. This disadvantage is viewed as a loss of power which manifests itself as some dishonor or as a loss of respect.

More often, however, the contrary of indignation is not shame; it is, rather, envy. An understanding of envy is important for deliberative purposes for two different but related reasons. However malformed and disruptive, envy is essentially comparative. It is a kind of distress felt at the apparent success of another, but not primarily with the desire to possess what the envied has; it is directed at the fact that the envied *has* it. The several varieties of envy can be articulated by understanding the several attitudes and judgments held towards this fact, and by understanding the relationship between the nature of the comparative judgment made and the kinds of desire that judgment allows.

Every society with egalitarian political aspirations or with claims to promoting distributive justice must deal with the problem of envy. While envy is a deeply personal emotion, like hate, it can be socially shared by people who find themselves in similar situations and who perceive that they share adversaries. This is so because society offers goods that mark differences between its members. We develop skills, talents, capacities and

virtues that help us to attain these goods. Importantly, we do not envy a person the possession of those attainable virtues like temperance and courage; rather, we envy those attributes or possessions that come in part from the exercise of those capacities. Any of these attributes or possessions (wealth, power, status, preferment, opportunity, promotion, fame, and so on) are the possible objects of envy.

The attitude or judgmental stance one takes towards the fact that someone else has that causal attribute can produce an emotion. Some of these emotions include admiration, delight or a desire to emulate; others include indignation and envy. John Rawls argues that there are five kinds of envy: general envy, particular envy, benign envy, emulative envy and envy proper. When a group envies the more favored for the kind of goods they have and not for the particular goods they possess, we call that 'general envy'. 'Particular envy', on the other hand, is singular. The envier envies another for the possession of some particular object. 'Benign envy' is a way of speaking. When we say, "I really envy you your vacation," we are making a kind of compliment. The object of envy is isolated as a good of a particular kind. It signals our recognition that the good in question has value. It is an expression or an assertion of the worth of something (532-533).

Envy proper is the most powerful member of the family of emotions we call envy. Envy proper requires four conditions to be satisfied for that episode to be so understood. First, the envier believes that the envied is, in some important respect, superior to the envier. Second, the object possessed is desired by the envier; this desire must see that attribute as pleasurable. Third, the envier recognizes that that attribute is unobtainable. This impotence may

be manifested as a painful feeling of insecurity, anguish or humiliation; or it is a species of ill-will, usually felt as rancor or malice. Finally, the envier is willing to deprive the envied of those goods even if it means that the envier cannot have the goods herself. It is important to recognize that this willingness is another form of desire, qualitatively distinct from the appetitive desire present in the second condition (Rawls 533).

These conditions open up several possibilities for manipulating one's feelings of envy. If the psychological state is one of ill-will, then a powerful motivational potential is present. Perhaps the most common strategy is to cultivate the feeling of malice. To feel malice is to desire the misery of others, but malice can be triggered only when it is perceived as useful to our interests. At bottom, the motive in envy is *amour-propre*, not some ultimate intention of mischief (although the mischief is experienced as pleasant).

It will be helpful to examine the condition of the person envied. The envier wants and probably needs for her envy to be kept hidden. When it is not hidden from the envied, several responses from the envied potentially can be present. In some cases, the envied may be indifferent to the fact of being envied, or the envied is confident enough to want or at least to find it acceptable to share that good. But all too frequently, the envied suffers from some degree of insecurity. This insecurity colors the differences so that are seen as invidious. If this is so, then the envied does not want the envier to obtain those goods. The envied is 'jealous' of that attribute, and this condition is manifested attitudinally as one of begrudging the wants of the envier. As an attitude this may be an incipient state that can be motivated into a spiteful disposition or even a specific act of spite (Rawls 533).

## Fear

With characteristic insight, the Stoics recognized the complexity of fear. 'Fear' names one of the four most general categories of the passions. 'Fear' is the determinable that organizes its many determinants like panic, hesitation, shock, dread and the like. They glossed the term 'fear' as the expectation of a future evil, and this definition is indeterminate between fear as a kind of judgment (which they defined irrational) and as an emotional state. Concerned primarily with fear as an emotional state, Aristotle defines fear as "a sort of pain or agitation derived from the imagination [*phantasia* ] of a future destructive or painful evil; for all evils are not feared. . .but [only] what has the potentiality for great pains or destruction, and these [only] if they do not appear far-off but near" (1382a 21-25).

There are four characteristics of fear. First, the object we fear is an evil that seems capable of causing great pain and destruction. Second, although fear is caused by uncertainty (it seems capable of causing harm) the destruction appears to be impending. We do not fear what appears remote. We judge events to be 'remote' through two frames of reference. Some events are remote in time. Adolescents sometimes act as if they are immortal, in part because their own mortality seems a remote possibility. 'Remote' may also refer to those possibilities that are, in some important sense, unlikely. Third, the evil appears to be one we are powerless to prevent, and this powerlessness frequently suggests a role of passive suffering. Finally, because fear is the apprehension of some future evil, its object is, in some important sense, intentional.

The intentional component of fear, the way things are seen, is the central issue in fear. The intentional component requires certain beliefs and judgments to be present. We can be startled, for example, by a truck's backfire, and this impulse is distinct from fear. The noise 'appears' threatening, just as the situation when we pull to an intersection and our perception of an approaching car is momentarily blocked by the roof support. The car appears to be less than three inches wide. We don't believe the car to be that wide; it just *appears* to be that width. When we are startled we react to the appearance of some threat without assenting to a judgment about its reality.[10] When we experience fear, we *expect* to be harmed. For fear to be present, we must assent to some belief or judgment. This assent concerns a judgment about a future evil and is, thus, intentional. This judgment is painful and it is sometimes experienced as pain. This intentional component is a necessary condition for all the members of the family of fear. To experience fear in some form we must accept an antecedent generalized claim and the occurrent cases of fear will be an instantiation of that claim. We recognize that we and the goods of our lives are vulnerable to misfortune and malevolence. If, on the other hand, the goods of our lives are impervious to harm we will feel no fear. (The force of this idea lies behind part of the Stoic arguments that the only goods in our lives are those things we can control, namely the virtues.) The pain we feel does not cause fear; it is the result of fear.

The character of this judgment has a motivational effect. When we assent to this judgment we are motivated to take control of the world around us. We have a desire to avoid being vulnerable so that we act as if the judgment

were true. Significantly, what we are motivated to do depends on why we fear X, not what X is (Gordon 73-74).[11] When we become angry over the result of an insult, for example, we do not fear the insult itself; rather, we fear the potential effect of that insult on us. We become angry, in part, to counteract the potential effect of the insult. A nonswimmer is not, typically at least, afraid of water. The nonswimmer is afraid that if he falls into deep water he may, or will, drown. The judgment has the logical form of if p, then q. The motivational impetus in fear is to break the contingent causal connection between the antecedent and the consequent of that judgment.

The object of fear may be external. A drunk driver weaving repeatedly into the opposite lane on a narrow street causes fear about what may happen to the approaching driver. The fear of what may happen to us through external forces is one source of fear. Other fears arise from deliberative uncertainty. Deliberative uncertainty is the fear of making the wrong choice and thus producing harm.[12] We differentiate the many species of fear in part on how that painful judgment presents itself to us, and in part on how that pain affects judgment. Although fear is often seen as a correlative of confidence relative to decision, it does not exist solely on this one continuum. Fear can upset judgment through a loss of equanimity; hesitation, confusion and consternation are fearful emotions in this way. Fear can focus on some property relevant to judgment and cloud that capacity; we have misgivings, or we are apprehensive. Finally, fear can manifest itself behaviorally; our actions can be timid, pusillanimous, or we can bolt in panic or terror. Significantly, we see that these emotional conditions are the privatives of other, positive emotional states. In the domain of judgment the species of fear

are privatives of equanimity. Hesitation is the privative of steadiness; consternation is the privative of composure; to be confused is the privative of being sure; to have misgivings is the privative of being imperturbable; to be apprehensive is the privative of being tranquil. In the domain of action many states of fear are privatives of courage. Timidity is the privative of boldness; pusillanimity is the privative of audacity.

Fear is closely related to and distinct from awe and respect. The Old Testament injunction to "Fear the Lord" does not advise us to be afraid, though our behavior and the nature of our soul may make us fear as a consequence of what we have done or omitted; it counsels us to stand in awe. On occasion we are in the presence of someone we greatly respect we experience a fear that we may do something for which we may be negatively judged. The fear here is 'internal' and self originating, not external, and it is a difficult matter to judge what would count as saying we don't have 'it', thus arousing fear. Factors such as the agent's personal history, the perceived relative merit of the individuals involved, and the constraints defined by social or professional roles may serve as motivational reasons for the fear felt, or they may serve as an explanation of the fact that fear is felt. While the emotion is real in the sense that fear was felt, it does not follow that the fear was legitimate. The presence of an emotional state does not, by itself, say anything about the possible justification for its occurrence. In fact, the topics we possess to arouse or quell a particular emotion are built from reasons *to* or reasons *for*, which produce motivational arguments; or reasons *that*, which produce arguments of justification; or reasons *why*, which offer explanations. A reason *to* is a normative and impersonal reason, and a reason *for* is a normative and personal reason.

The object of fear is one we seem powerless to prevent. We stand in some practical relationship to that object. As agents we possess certain inclinations, abilities and capacities to respond to harmful circumstances. But these capabilities are, sometimes, not enough. There are occasions where we have an interest or inclination to respond but lack the opportunity to do so. Wrestling coaches, for instance, can foresee the harmful consequences of an illegal hold threatening their wrestlers but be powerless to prevent the injury. We may lack the ability to prevent the harm. When climbing I cannot prevent rockfall from causing injury (I cannot alter the laws of physics). A doctor at the scene of a serious automobile accident may have the medical ability to prevent that death at a hospital but lack the resources to prevent it at the scene of the accident.

Not all fears are objective in this sense. Aristotle argues that "such things [as] are necessarily causes of fear as seem to have great potentiality for destruction or for causing harms that lead to pains," especially when this potential is close at hand (1382a 28-30). Thus, even the signs of things cause fear. The enmity or anger of those with the capacity to act on their emotions can cause fear. Since injustice is the result of deliberate choice, the unjust are capable of further similar evil decisions. Aristotle also focuses his attention on evil agency. He recognizes that man has the propensity for malevolence. When this propensity has a dispositional structure and the opportunity to express itself, fear will be considered, if not felt. We fear the cowardly, the dishonest, the unreliable, the unscrupulous and the greedy when these individuals have the power to harm us.

Still, much within our fears and many of our fears themselves are under our control. In Epistle XIII of *Epistulae Morales* Seneca argues that, "some things torment us more than they ought; some things torment us before they ought; some torment us when they ought not to torment us at all. We are in the habit of exaggerating, or imagining, or anticipating sorrow" (75). The appropriateness of one's fear turns on two questions. The first question concerns the object of our fear. The appropriateness of that object is governed by three conditions: the importance of the good being harmed; the magnitude of the harm directed at that good; and the nature, as well as the extent, to which we are powerless, when this is an objective matter. Obviously, we should not fear trivial matters. The good which is threatened can be an instrumental good when that resource or activity is absolutely essential for the attainment of some intrinsic or contributory good. The intrinsic or contributory good itself can be harmed. These goods can be harmed partially or totally.

The second question concerns our mental stance towards the prospect of this harm. As Seneca observes, some fears are groundless; others are witless (*Epistulae Morales* 79). Confusion, timidity and panic are terms that refer to different cognitive states of or behavioral responses to the prospect of fear. It is important to recognize that we possess an intellectual capacity in our contemplation of fear and hope that we do not possess with most of the other deliberative emotions. This capacity is most easily illustrated by a grammatical construction. We can say, "It is, I fear, possible (or, likely, inevitable, etc.)," or "It is, I hope, possible (or, likely, looked for, etc.)." . Other verbs that serve similar functions include, 'wish', 'regret', 'think', 'suppose', 'believe', and so

on. These verbs express propositional attitudes. Two ideas are important here. The grammatical construction reflects an intellectual or emotional capacity to distance ourselves from the emotional occurrence itself and entertain the propositions in question. We can, in short, judge the truth-value or satisfaction conditions of its claims. This implies the presence of a second capacity. Because fear and hope are prospective, we possess, in principle, some strategic capacity to control the intentional content of the emotion, its directedness if you will, to evaluate our situation.

## Anger

Anger is a particularly complex emotion, and our understanding of it is complicated further by the various uses licensed for that term. The term 'anger' is often used as a synechdoche for our propensity for aggression. As such it stands for that emotional component present in acts of this sort. That component may manifest itself as wrath, wroth, rage or ire, among others. When used in this sense one of the species of anger is seen as a natural consequence of the rivalry, either for honors, status, advantages or for limited or scarce resources that are necessary for living well. This aggression may manifest itself as malice, spite, rancor, animus or schadenfreude. The Stoics argued, accurately, that the source for this sort of aggression is intemperance, which is "a revolt from all guidance of the mind and right reason, so completely alien from the control of reason that the cravings of the soul cannot be guided or curbed" (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* IV 21). Such flaws of character can become vices. 'Anger' may also stand for some tendency in one's character. To call a person 'churlish', 'peevish', 'petulant' or 'irascible'

is to name a propensity within that person's character to act in predictable ways when the proper precipitating conditions arise.

'Anger' is also a term naming a member of the family of retributive emotions, anger, resentment and indignation, and this use will identify a qualitatively distinct emotional episode. The point of this classification is to highlight (correctly, if incompletely) the importance of retribution. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* Adam Smith argues that retribution is the point of this family of emotions. Of the several sets of qualities he ascribes to actions and conduct--which include propriety and impropriety, and decency and ungracefulness--there is another pair that must be included if we are to capture a full range of emotions. The qualities of merit and demerit, the deserving of reward and the deserving of punishment, are crucial for comprehending the organization of our sentiments. He then argues that "whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment" (67). He makes this claim because gratitude names that sentiment which prompts us to reward, to return good for good received; resentment names that sentiment which prompts us to punish, to return evil for evil that has been done. Gratitude prompts us to desire to recompense another, through our own agency, for a particular benefit conferred on us. Resentment prompts us to desire, not only that he be punished, but that he be punished by our own means and for the particular injury we have suffered because of him (69).

Smith's account has a certain kind of conceptual elegance. He argues from contraries: we can return good for good or evil for evil.[13] He intends for

us to see that the evil made in return is deserved and proportionate. His choice of the term 'resentment' for this family is, thus, deliberate; 'anger' for Smith denotes those species of excess, like rage and wroth. Gratitude and anger appear to be counterparts in both kind and degree (Nussbaum, *Therapy* 243). The benefit for which gratitude is owed must be given freely, voluntarily and intentionally; the belittling that precipitates anger is likewise voluntary and intentional. The benefits others offer us are expressions of generosity; insults are expressions of meanness. If we characteristically respond with gratitude we will also characteristically respond with anger to a like degree. This converse relation explains, for example, the conduct and character of Lawrence Boythorn in Charles Dickens' *Bleak House*. His impetuous character focuses on people's deeds, not their characters, so that his condemnations of people like Sir Leicester Dedlock are manifestations of his personal energy rather than expressions of some deep ill will.

But when we see that there are two other possibilities, that we can return good for evil and evil for good, we recognize that the 'evil' meted out for evil given is problematic in a way that is not apparent in Smith's presentation. His notion of 'evil' as deserved harm must participate in some conception of justice. Thomas Aquinas recognized this problem in his discussions of anger. The return of evil for evil in anger should be done under the aspect of good, by which he meant justice; whereas the return of evil for evil in hatred is done under the aspect of evil. But we know that 'evil' can be motivated by ill will in resentment as well as in anger, and the personal role of revenge in anger or resentment is only masked rather than eliminated. Anger, not resentment, is the central emotion in this family. Anger and

resentment are not distinguished by the strength or intensity of response as Smith claims; rage and wroth are specific possibilities that may occur as states in an episode of anger. They are to be comprehended as stages in the etiology of anger. Anger and resentment are differentiated by the relationship of the victim(s) to the person who is angry or resentful. By placing anger at the center we also see the ambiguity of revenge and the role ill will may play that a discussion of resentment may leave out.

An explanation of the particular emotion called 'anger' must precede an understanding of these wider uses. In fact, we use 'anger' to name two distinct and particular emotions. We use 'anger' and 'angry' to denote those states and their expression which result from frustration or impatience. The shade tree mechanic who can't loosen a head bolt and begins to beat the engine with the wrench is said to be 'angry' if he, in some way, blames the engine for its recalcitrance. In this sense, some people become 'angry' when animals get in the trash, a storm cuts short a vacation, or a discarded toy hurts a bare foot. We use the term 'anger' for these reactions of frustration and impatience because we retaliate and because we blame, admittedly irrationally, that which can not be intentionally responsible for the offense felt. These are not cases of the kind of anger we are concerned with.

Aristotle's definition of anger captures better than any other the implications we want to understand. He defines anger as "the desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without justification at oneself or those near to one" (1378a). Although I will follow Aristotle's

analysis of this emotion on several crucial points, my explanation is not intended as an explication of his analysis.

Aristotle's definition of anger has two crucial components: a desire for retaliation, from which a kind of pleasure follows, and the feeling of distress caused by the belief that one has been slighted. While the desiderative component is dominant, it will be helpful to examine the subordinate feelings of distress first. Aristotle argues that anger is caused by "belittling, the actualization of opinion about what seems worthless" (1378b). If we think of cause here as antecedent to the emotional episode so that our description of an episode involves a two-term relation such that a precipitating event of belittling causes anger we will misunderstand what is meant here. Here it is important to note that anger is not simply the effect of an extrinsic cause; anger is caused by the belief that one has been belittled. Initially he identifies three species of belittling: contempt, spite and insult. He later adds other causal or strengthening conditions: mockery, forgetfulness, actions or attitudes which are unfitting, and actions which cause shame or embarrassment. The result of this belittling is 'distress'. The notion of distress is significant and the Stoic insight that distress is a contraction of the soul is apt. The distress caused by belittling is felt to the degree that the insulted feels that his dignity or worth has been diminished.

The arguments of Jean Hampton on the causal features of anger are relevant here. When one has been subjected to belittling, one (or more) of three beliefs are possible (54-60). The first belief is a normative claim:

1. The insulted can believe that the insulter made a moral mistake about the worth of the insulted and that the insulter is treating the insulted in an unjustifiable manner.

The second belief expresses a relation of consequence:

2. The insulter is right to think that the insulted's worth is lower so that such treatment is permissible.

The third belief is a causal claim about our vulnerability to such actions:

3. The insulter is right to think that the insulted's worth can be diminished by such conduct and that it is permissible to do so (57)

The individual who has been belittled can assent to one of several combinations of these beliefs. If the insulted accepts belief 1 and rejects beliefs 2 and 3, then the insulted is beyond anger. The insulted accepts the act as demeaning but rejects the implication that they are diminished in any way. The insulter is guilty of a moral mistake and that mistake becomes the target of the insulted's concern. Parents and teachers who are insulted by their children or students face this possibility as a matter of course. We suffer these insults in the sense that we allow ourselves to undergo them. But to be beyond anger is not a state of willed endurance. To endure is to become inured to suffering. To be beyond anger is to find the act insulting but not one where we feel insulted. If, on the other hand, the insulted accepts the second and third beliefs as true and rejects the first belief, then the insulted can and probably will feel pain and distress, but he cannot feel anger (Hampton 56-57).

The final combinatorial possibilities are those that produce anger. Anger requires that the insulted believe (at least to some degree) the first

claim, and wants to believe 1 with certainty, while fearing either the second or third belief is true. This cognitive state is complex; it requires the conjunction of two sets of propositional attitudes held towards two related yet distinct propositions:

1. A believes (that belief 1) & A wants to believe (that belief 1 is true)
2. & A fears (that belief 2 or 3 is true).(Hampton 57)

Aristotle argues that the dominant element of anger is the desire for conspicuous retaliation. In Book II of *de Ira* Seneca accepts this insight and argues that this desire passes or can pass through three stages (II 4). The first stage presents itself as the result of the appearance (*specie* , = *phantasia*) of a wrong.[14] This appearance may produce bodily responses--a trembling, a pallor or flushed expression, a clenching of the muscles, pupil dilation, etc. We share these responses with the animals (cf. the raising of hackles, growling, the baring of fangs and claws). Those who see anger as a synecdoche for aggression typically see these signs as presumptive evidence for the universality of this emotion. This stage may not require any *cognitive* assent to the appearance.[15] The second stage requires an assent to the judgment that "it is right for me to take revenge since I have been wronged." Seneca claims that this stage is not 'stubborn'. Our capacity to reason and reflect is not overcome by the desire for revenge. Our passion is still amenable to reason. It is with and in this stage that the argument from pathos is most efficacious. In the third stage the passion is not amenable to reason. At this stage anger disquiets the mind, blinds judgment and seduces the will. Revenge will seek its own satisfaction regardless of its rightness. Rage, wrath

and wroth name some of the states experienced in this third stage. It is also necessary to recognize that the third stage of anger can, over time, come to manifest itself dispositionally.

It is important to recognize one feature of this desire that is present at each stage. To know that you have been wronged is not the same as anger. Anger requires more than blame. Martha Nussbaum offers an important insight into anger when she argues that what is crucial in anger is the wish for another's suffering. The conceptual link between one's painful fears and the desire that is necessary for anger to be what it is a "negative wish directed back against the aggressor" (*Therapy* 244). We need not desire to commit an overtly retaliatory act for the emotion to be anger. We can desire a far more subtle ill for that person. As she points out, we can wish that their lives do not go well and that people recognize that person's badness; we can wish that they be punished in the next life; we can wish that the agent continues to be the same person the individual is (244). We cannot separate the judgment of being wronged from the ill-wishing associated with anger. Ill-wishing is an essential part of anger. Although ill-wishing is not a criterion sufficient to classify a set of emotions, it is, importantly, an essential part of many other emotions and ill-will manifests itself in ways as subtly as it does in anger.[16]

Adam Smith defined 'resentment' in terms of the second stage and 'anger' in terms of the third stage. That division is false. It confuses the strength of the passion with its personal character. We should never lose sight of the fact that the objects of anger and resentment are actions, but we must also recognize that we frequently direct that feeling at a person. Anger is, certainly, the most personal of the retributive emotions. This personal

dimension manifests itself in two ways. First, the contexts in which anger arise are more direct and immediate than in resentment. I can resent the contemptuous actions of an elected official say, but unless I personally know that official I do not feel anger as a result of that contempt. Second, to be provoked to anger the insulted must believe, or want to believe, that some relevant kind of parity exists between the insulter and the insulted. (The insulter does not believe in this parity, otherwise the insult would not occur.) It may be true that a personal desire for revenge in anger is stronger and hence more common, but this fact does not establish any conceptual distinction between the two emotions. A large difference in degree is not a difference in kind.

Interestingly, this desire for conspicuous retaliation is often accompanied by a kind of pleasure. This pleasure lies in the hope for getting revenge. Hope strengthens our expectations, and our expectations allow us to anticipate it, and our anticipation depends on our ability to imagine the revenge. Thus, this pleasure may also manifest itself as imagining that retaliation. But we must be careful about the role of that pleasure. We don't desire retaliation because it is pleasant; rather, 'it' is pleasant because we desire retaliation. We need to specify what 'it' is.

The desire for retaliation can be expressed, 'I want to retaliate'. By itself this desire is not a complete account of the desiderative state in anger. At least two other beliefs are present. First, the desire for retaliation has another evaluative desire to buttress it; we judge it good that retribution would be good for the person who did the wrong. In principle, this judgment will secure the normative rightness of the response. Second, we also believe, given the way

the world is, that it is necessary for us to defiantly defend our honor, or the importance of whatever value that has been threatened. Jean Hampton argues that this second condition is an act of reaffirmation; it is the essence of our desire (60). This claim may be too strong. It is one thing to wish ill, it is quite another to act on it. We can say that this reaffirmation is a pragmatic condition which is guaranteed by the first condition. The necessity within the emotional structure of anger is conceptual but its expression is one of practical necessity. The necessity of this belief has an important practical consequence for the second belief. The normative rightness secured by the first belief should constrain the motivational excesses which the second belief is prone to.

Yet anger is one of the most disturbing and dangerous of the emotions we experience. It is liable to produce a disproportionate response, and the defiant defense against what was unjust may well turn out itself to be unjust. It is dangerous for two reasons. The desire for retaliation is animated by a kind of ill will, and this ill will is morally problematic. We also recognize that the desire for retaliation will be an instantiation of one of several possible retributive principles, and it is possible that the principle selected will produce a disproportionate response.

The danger of a disproportionate response which is the result of excessive desire has long been recognized as a significant moral problem. The Stoics, particularly Seneca, argued that anger is a cultural artifact and that is not necessary for one's proper motivation to action. In essence he took the moral features inherent in anger and relocated them in different faculties and concepts. His work, *de Clementia* is the product of this conceptual

realignment; a broadened conception of mercy becomes the motivational and justificatory principle for moral action. The Stoics were not the only people concerned with the problems of anger. The Christian tradition recognized that ill will and the desire for retribution were linked, and their moral solution is the act of forgiveness.

In his essay, "Morality and the Retributive Emotions," J. L. Mackie argues that the retributive principle of punishment is paradoxical (1-9). He argues that the retributive principle cannot be explained solely within a reasonable system of moral thought, and that such a principle cannot be eliminated from moral thought itself. The desire for retaliation or reaffirmation cannot be subsumed wholly into a reasonable system of moral thought and that a moral belief in retribution cannot be explained without an explanation of that desire. To prove this point he argues that there are six possible retributive principles we can consider. First, there is negative retributivism: one who is not guilty must not be punished. Positive retributivism claims that one who is guilty ought to be punished. Permissive retributivism claims that one who is guilty may be punished. Three possible variants to these principles emerge when the question of how much punishment is proper is added in. The fourth possibility claims that one who is guilty must not be punished our of proportion to his guilt. The fifth possibility claims that one who is guilty ought to be punished in proportion to his guilt. The final possibility claims that one who is guilty may be punished in proportion to his guilt (Mackie 1-3).

Four observations can be made. First, all of the retributive principles have, as an ineliminable component of their claims, a desire for retribution.

Second, that desire does not arise out of an abstract system of moral thought; it arises out of our emotional life. Third, while the desire for retaliation within these emotions is ineliminable, it is capable of being corrected and tutored. We can correct it by focusing on the action rather than the agent. That the desire arises out of one's emotional life complicates the issue of retribution greatly. Before turning to the final observation it will be helpful to see just how some of these complications have been dealt with. The ancient Greeks were acutely conscious of the problematic nature of these desires. In the *Oresteia* Aeschylus transforms the desire for vengeance in the blood feud to an expression of civil law. The motivating belief expressed in *Agamamnon* that "each must suffer the thing he did" is not conceptually transformed as much as it is relocated and is thus given a new locus for its expression.[17]

Thucydides is also concerned with vengeance and justice. In the Mytilenian Debate Cleon persuades the Athenian Assembly to punish its client state harshly. In the second day's debate Diodotus argues that the punishment previously rendered must be set aside. Among the persuasive strategies he employs two deserve mention. He offers a motivational argument. Fear is a less powerful motivation that hope and desire. He then alters the status of the issue; he argues that the case is not one of retributive justice, it is a case of prudent administration. He argues:

> the right way to deal with free people is this -- not to inflict tremendous punishments on them after they have revolted, but to take tremendous care of them before this point is reached, to prevent them from even contemplating the idea of revolt, and, if we do have to use force with them, to hold as few as possible of them responsible for this. (Book 3 46)

The argument turns on the recognition that in this case the desire for retribution will be self-defeating in its application but not that retribution is, in principle, wrong.

Thucydides offers another related example. In 425 BC a Spartan force is cut off in Spacteria. Their envoys come to Athens and argue:

> Sparta calls upon you to make a treaty and end the war. She offers you peace, alliance, friendly and neighborly relations. . .In our view where great hatreds exist, no lasting settlement can be made in a spirit of revenge. . . what will make the settlement lasting is when the party that has it in his power to act like this takes a more reasonable point of view, overcomes his opponent in generosity, and makes peace on more moderate terms than his enemy expected. In such a case. . .the enemy is already under an obligation to pay back good for good, and so is the more ready, from a sense of honor, to abide by the terms that have been made. (Book 4 20)

The Spartans recognize what we have already argued for. Gratitude is the contrary of retribution. Make us a debt of gratitude to repay rather than a debt of retribution.

The possibility of tutoring the desire returns us to the opposition of anger and gratitude and, thus, the fourth observation. Adam Smith was not the first thinker to discern that gratitude and anger are closely related. Epicurus observed that the gods, who are blessed and indestructible, have no need for anger and gratitude. Their self-sufficiency makes them invulnerable.[18] And we just saw that the Spartans invoked this conceptual connection in their plea to the Athenians. Anger and gratitude are signs of our weakness and individual insufficiency. The strength of our desire for retaliation can be measured by the strength of our fear, rather than the strength of our commitment to retaliation. Likewise, the particular retributive principle we

select would be determined by the character of that fear. If we weaken our attachments to the targets of belittling we will weaken the power anger has over us. But this freedom comes at a price. We will lose the strength of our gratitude to a corresponding degree because the goods we feel grateful for will become diminished as well. We may find this too high a price to pay.[19]

## How to Arouse or Extinguish Anger

While the tactics we can use to control emotional persuasion will vary with each particular emotion, there are topical principles, formulable as strategies, that govern the persuasive possibilities for each deliberative emotion. When we undergo an emotion we have assented to two judgments. We respond to some aspect of a situation which we judge good or bad. By allowing ourselves to suffer the emotion we are judging that that emotion is appropriate in this particular situation. These judgments open two avenues for persuasion. We can assess the correctness of the judgments about the worth of externals and we can judge the appropriateness of the response.

Anger contains these two judgments. We judge it good that the insulter should suffer, and we judge that it is appropriate to defy the insult through anger. More precisely, we find that anger has three topical principles. The first strategic possibility concerns motivation. Because fears and desires are concerned with our apprehension of apparent future evils and goods, many of the topical arguments available are motivational in structure and content. One can target the component of fear, the desiderative component or both. The action advocated should have the proper motivation for the correct course of action. Second, specific occurrences of anger can be caused, in part, by various forces: by intemperance, by a deficiency of respect for another, or by

excessive contempt. Conversely, one's response can excessive or deficient in some way. The question of magnitude--of harms inflicted and harms returned--governs much that is important in anger. The argument from degree is the second topical principle governing anger. Finally, the normative legitimacy of one's anger is of crucial concern; anger is or is not justified. If anger is to have a normative role, it must be governed by one's virtue of justice. As long as one's anger is controlled by the virtue of temperance, its presence or absence is, at best, only coincident with justice. The putative role of anger in one's desire for retributive justice is, ultimately an ethical concern.[20]

If an author wishes, like Thrasymachus, to incite the audience to anger or to quell the anger already aroused, the choice of the topical arguments to be deployed and their ordering must reflect the spontaneity of the angered person's stance on two levels: 1) they must track and manipulate the dynamics of the occurrent situation, and 2) they must reflect the temperament of the audience. The arousal of a desire is a highly circumstantial matter, and thus the sequencing of the arguments must follow the promptings of the angered person's heart.[21] When considering the fearful component, an old adage of folk psychology can serve as a useful guide. In situations of doubt and fear we typically express the real source of our distress only on the third prompting. The first and second reasons, though true, do not probe the sources of our turmoil too deeply. The ordering of one's arguments should reflect the reticence of the audience. With the onset of anger, when we respond with an impulse, several judgments must be made for the impulse to become a judgment bringing on anger or for the impulse to remain just that, thus

blocking the occurrence of anger. When we are concerned with occurrent cases of anger, we must control the pace of this first stage. Delay is the most powerful initial tool for preventing anger, and conversely preventing delay and reflection is the most powerful tool for bringing on anger at this stage. The temporal dimension is important because it is easy to confuse or conflate the unexpected with the unfair. A confusion of the unexpected for the unfair can trigger a willingness to believe things or even the worst. This strategic response can make the search for reasons self fulfilling. It is also easy to confuse unintentional harm with intentional hurt. Inanimate objects are incapable of intentional actions and animals are incapable of deliberate action that causes insult (Seneca, *de Ira* II 31-34). Intemperance is not anger.

We are interested in the audience's temperament because one's temperament is the nexus for reason states. A reason state is part of the cognitive stance an agent adopts towards the world; it expresses itself as reasons of various kinds, and these reasons have causal power (Audi 147). Examining an audience's temperament is useful for other reasons. It is prereflective enough to be spontaneous and is thus a reliable indicator of other, related psychological states. In particular, that reliability makes temperament stable enough so that predictions about an audience's particular emotional responses are reasonable. It can comprehend both inclinations and interests, and it is a reliable sign of deeper traits and dispositions which are crucial for comprehending one's full 'stance' towards a situation. Since the audience's stance towards a situation can be understood through matters of temperament, an author can influence the role of temperament by modulating the type of contact between author and audience. 'Contact' is that determinant

of mode that creates a sense of communicative 'presence' in writing and which is necessarily present in oral communication between author and audience. From the author's point of view there are three forms of simulated contact: personal contact gives the impression of a single speaker talking or lecturing; collective contact gives the impression that a group of speakers is speaking in unison; and impersonal contact gives the impression that the book is doing the communicating. We have two further varieties of contact available when we consider the point of view of the audience: isolative contact is present when the audience sees itself as being singular and directed at that individual; aggregative contact pretends to speak to all readers at once (Beale 46-48). The contact a writer establishes will help strengthen or weaken the force of the kinds of reasons that are used in the argument from pathos.

The arousal or quelling of the passion of anger can be achieved through the use of topical arguments that are directed at either the occurrent emotional episode or at the dispositions that govern anger's occurrence. Whether an author is concerned with the particular emotional episode or the affective stance of the audience, anger is controlled by manipulating either the beliefs and evaluations concerned with the element of fear present or the beliefs and judgments that animate or govern the desire for revenge.

Motivational arguments work to show that the motivational force present in anger is a practical necessity. These arguments do this by targeting the element of fear or the desire for revenge. First, one can arouse or extinguish anger by controlling the dimension of fear that is present. One can do this by arguing for the truth or falsity of the beliefs that are necessary for causing anger. The individual who is capable of anger partially fears that

the belittling is appropriate and wants to believe it is false. The argument from consequences is a common tactic to control these attitudes. One can argue about the intentions of the insulter. If the insult is unintentional or the insulter's opinion is demonstrably false, then one's anger would be illegitimate. One can argue for or against the relative importance of the value in question. Finally, one can criticize or utilize the credulity or self indulgence of the insulted. Second, one can address the dispositional stance of the insulted, arguing that one is or is not vulnerable to the belittling directed at them. Finally, one can work on the causal or explanatory role of propositional attitudes that activate the beliefs necessary for the desire for revenge by strengthening or weakening the attitudes of hope and desire that define the relationship between the propositions in question and the results wished for.

## ENDNOTES CHAPTER V

[1] Robert Audi, "Wants and Intentions in the Explanation of Action," *Action, Intention, and Reason* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993) 121-124. His concern in this essay is with the covering law model and how it may be modified to overcome the objections raised by the hermeneutic model.

[2] See for instance, Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949) chap IV.

[3] Audi 123. One of the most vigorous defenses of the hermeneutic model is Alan Gauld and John Shotter, *Human Action and Its Psychological Investigation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977).

[4] It is, of course, possible to be concerned with an emotional state or episode that is unnamed. While I speculate on this idea in the section on 'Semantic Depth' in Chapter IV, two comments may be in order here. First, we have emotional experiences that can be described tropologically, most typically through catachresis or metaphor. These linguistic achievements are possible, I think, because there exists some unclarified aspect of mental experience present within another larger conceptual domain. (Cf. Aristotle's discussion of the virtues where he frequently mentions an alternate state 'for which we have no name.'

[5] H. H. Goldsmith, "Parsing the Emotional Domain from a Developmental Perspective," eds. Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson *The Nature of Emotion* (New York: Oxford UP, 1994) 69-70.

[6] Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* 384. See also, Martha Nussbaum, "Tragedy and Self Sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Fear and Pity," *Essays on Aristotle's* Poetics, ed. Amelie Rorty (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992) 261-290; Alexander Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*," *Essay on Aristotle's* Poetics, ed. Amelie Rorty (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992) 291-314; and Stephen Halliwell, *Aristotle's Poetics* (Chapel Hill: UNC P, 1986) 168-201.

[7] Nor do we have names for the painful emotion directed at significant and deserved good fortune for oneself; the pleasant emotion directed at significant and deserved bad fortune for oneself; the pleasant emotion directed at the insignificant and deserved bad fortune of others.

[8] John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," 333.

[9] This is part of the point made by Aristotle in the *Eudemian Ethics* (1221a 3) when he argues that envy is a deficient contrary to 'righteous indignation,' which is the pathos which lies in the mean.

[10] Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* 83-84.

[11] Robert M. Gordon, *The Cognitive Structure of Emotions* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987) 73-74.

[12] Gordon 75, 79.

[13] There is a further problem here. While resentment may name a sentiment in Smith's sense, its particular manifestations are emotions and are distinct species different from manifestations of gratitude, which are not. 'Gratitude' is a thick, moral concept like loyalty or lying. Its expression is not an emotion, although the presence or absence of an emotional component may be crucial to our judging the sincerity of an expression of gratitude. What something is and what something must have cannot serve as the basis of a close contrary. The Aristotelian opposition of 'being angry' with 'being calm' in Book II of the *Rhetoric* names a privative, not a contrary.

[14] For a fascinating and convincing discussion of these issues in Seneca see, Brad Inwood, "Seneca on Emotion and Action," *Passions and Perceptions* ed. J. Brunschwig and Martha Nussbaum (New York: Cambridge UP, 1993) 150-183.

[15] For interesting arguments on this point see, Aristotle, *De Anima* III 9; and his *De Motu Animalium* 11.

[16] There are numerous emotions that involve ill wishing:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| abhorrence | crossness | hate | rancor |
| abominating | crustiness | hauteur | rankling |
| acerbity | cupidity | jealousy | resentment |
| acrimony | detestation | loathing | ressentiment |
| amour propre | disdain | maleficence | revulsion |
| anger | dudgeon | malevolence | schadenfreude |
| animosity | enmity | malice | scorn |
| animus | envy | meanness | shame |
| antipathy | frenzy | mordancy | shamelessness |
| arrogance | fractiousness | moroseness | spite |
| asperity | fury | nettlesome | spleen |
| aversion | grouchiness | odium | superciliousness |
| balefulness | incensed | opprobrium | surliness |
| biliousness | indignation | pique | vehemence |

| choler | invidiousness | pitilessness | vindictiveness |
|---|---|---|---|
| conceit | ire | pomposity | wrath |
| contempt | irksomeness | pugnacious | wroth |
| contentiousness | ill will | rage | zeal |
| covetousness | | | |

[17] All of the examples, save one, in this paragraph and the next were borrowed from a discussion of the Socratic notion of justice by Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991) 190-191.

[18] Diogenes Laertius quotes Epicurus as saying, "What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness." In the *Letter to Herodotus* Epicurus writes, "...for troubles and concerns and anger and gratitude are not consistent with blessedness, but these things involve weakness and fear and dependence on one's neighbors" (77).Both quotes can be found in *The Epicurus Reader* ed., Brad Invwood and L. P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett P, 1994) 17, 32. The Epicurean conception of and therapy for anger is discussed by Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* 239-279; it is also discussed in Julia Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992) 189-200.

[19] The thrust and judgment of this paragraph was inspired by Julia Annas, 196-199.

[20] On the ethical ambiguity of anger see, Plato, *Phaedrus* 246b and *Laws* 731b-d; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1125d 26ff on 'good anger' and the problem with its being deficient at 1126a 3. Seneca's *de Ira* is, of course, opposed to any belief that public anger is justified.

[21] This is a commonplace of all classical discussions of anger. For a representative example of the manner in which this commonplace is manifested, see Plutarch, "On the Avoidance of Anger," *Essays* ed., Ian Kidd, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Penguin, 1992) 176-201.

# CHAPTER VI

## ONE'S AUDIENCE AND THE TOPICAL STRATEGIES OF PERSUASION

> My purpose was. . .to see if the shameful facts, spread out in all their shame, would not burn through our civic shamelessness and set fire to American pride.
>
> -Lincoln Steffens

Aristotle argued that three conditions must be satisfied if emotional persuasion is to succeed: one must understand the nature and value of the object towards which the emotion is directed; one must understand the nature of the reasons that orients the audience to that object; and one must understand the character of the audience whose judgment will be affected by the emotional episode. In Chapter II I argued that the combination of these three success conditions yields five formal patterns of persuasion: desire + delight, desire + distress, fear + distress, fear + delight, and some emotion of distress followed by a consequent or governing attitude. These three success conditions can be considered in relationships with each other and are necessary for achieving salience. The relationship between the audience and the reasons they will find persuasive deserves exploration.

We possess several powerful strategies for effecting emotional persuasion in particular deliberative situations, but these possibilities are governed by several constraints that need to be mentioned first. Quintilian observes that there are limitations placed on one's persuasive opportunities by

the character of one's audience. He argues:

> When we are going to declaim on a theme that turns largely on its emotional features, we must give it a dramatic character suited to the persons concerned. For emotions are not transferable at will, nor can we give the same forcible expression to another man's emotions that we should give to our own. (IV. i. 47)

Emotional force matters, and that force is evoked in another. Yet emotions are not easily transferable; quite obviously, the writer is limited by the perspectival nature of emotional experience. This perspectival nature manifests itself in emotional reasoning as a matter of presumption and as a matter of point of view.

The reasons used in emotional arguments are presumptive; they depend on the audience's acceptance of them. We often confuse the fact that these reasons are internal to an agent's motivational or justificatory stance with the idea that they are subjective. That we conflate these two distinctions has led us to ignore the possibility that some of these reasons are agent-neutral. They appeal to some principle that anyone should find to have normative force in that situation. One's reasons may also be reasons for that agent, but they need not be reasons for anyone else; these reasons are agent-relative. There is, importantly, another distinction we draw about one's audience. Although one wants an audience's decision to be judicious, what counts as judicious will vary according to the role the audience can and does play in the deliberative situation. An audience may play the role of judge; as such, they are to be detached and impartial. Detachment does not imply the absence of emotion or any lack of feeling; it only requires that personal and self-interested considerations be excluded. Impartiality does not imply a lack of concern; it

excludes, for example, irrelevant identifications with one or more of the participants or biases that would distort judgment.

More often perhaps, the members of the audience involved in deliberations are or will be active participants in both the decision and the actions that bring that decision into being. Even here one's reasons to act may be objective. To act morally, for example, is to act from agent-neutral reasons. In a similar way, one's role may require adherence to agent neutral reasons. To be a teacher is to serve a role characterized by obligation and permissions that apply to anyone serving that role. These obligations exist independently of the personality of the agent occupying that role. The audience's emotional perceptions are filtered through their deliberative stance so that they may be impartial in one of several ways. An occupational or institutional role will specify which perceptual sensitivities are relevant, and these sensitivities may operate independently of the agent's personal sensitivities. An agent may accept, in principle, a sensitivity prescribed by that role and see that it exists independently of the personal desires of the agent. This situation is common enough. Teachers accept the responsibility of caring for their student's needs, but we also find that there are occasions when responding to the demands of that caring are inconvenient.

A vocation is a role whose commitments, obligations and ideals carry greater moral force for the individual occupying that role than for one who sees that role as an occupation. One internalizes the impartial sensitivities demanded by one's vocation (Blum 191). In these cases, an appeal to one's second order desires will have a double focus. The writer can offer reasons to act as the justification for that desire; these reasons are normative and

impersonal. The formal object of the targeted emotion involving normative reasons will be conceptually related to public, normative principles. Because these sensitivities have been internalized, the reasons which can constitute the principle can also be reasons for acting. Reasons for acting are normative and personal. These arguments will be satisfactory according to the degree to which the normative principles invoked are central to the deliberative aim. The topical principle of priority evaluates the centrality of that appeal. The argument will successful to the degree to which the claims are seen to have 'weight'. As a psychological matter, weight is measured in terms of the targeted emotion's strength. Obviously, these various features of importance are affected by the strategies of amplification.

Not all considerations of the audience's sense of agency can be subsumed under agent-neutral or role related reasons. The audience's goods also involve subjective desires and fears as well as self-related desires. The writer must search for reasons for acting that will move the audience to act. Like impersonal appeals, the centrality of the desires that are appealed to are subject to the appraisal of the principle of priority. Again, like impersonal appeals, the strength of the emotion is a measure of its potential success.

## Material Objects and Their Persuasive Function

Aristotle's first condition argues that one must understand to whom or towards what object the emotion is directed. I want to argue that he conflates two distinct kinds of objects. We can direct our emotions at some object in the deliberative situation, and we can direct our emotions at our opposition. There are, thus, four sources of material for effecting the argument from pathos: from the character of the author, from the character of the author's opponent,

from the audience, and from the deliberative situation proper. The material will be found by examining the six relationships that exist between these various points of view:

1. between the author and his or her audience
2. between the author and his or her opponent
3. between the audience and his or her opponent
4. between the author and the deliberative situation proper
5. between the audience and the deliberative situation proper
6. between one's opponent and the deliberative situation proper.

Either the audience already has some emotion(s) or attitude(s) directed at any one or more of these sources, or they do not. If there is no emotion already present, then one can, in principle, elicit the targeted emotion. If an emotion is present, it will either be appropriate or inappropriate for one's persuasive aim.

## Good Will and The Introduction

Rhetorical theory comprehends quite well what is necessary and usually sufficient for the writer to initially establish the proper rapport with one's audience. The writer must make the audience attentive to what will follow. The writer must make the audience receptive to the issues to be argued for, and the writer must establish good will. Good will is also a necessary preparatory condition for establishing trust. Finally, deliberation is grounded in rational hope, hope that this particular decision will participate in the larger narrative of one's life and be conducive to the rational aim that one's life will go as well as possible.

The relationships between the audience and the author's opponent and the author and his opponent will frequently yield ad hominem attacks. The

genre of negative political advertising affords a common example of this type of argumentation. The opponent's relationship to the deliberative situation proper will also yield circumstantial ad hominem attacks. It also provides opportunities for the use of the expressive and performative appeals discussed in Chapter III.

Emotional Congruence: Corresponding and Counterpart Emotions

A more interesting and important question can be posed: how is the match between the author's relationship to the deliberative situation and the audience's relationship to the same effected? Obviously, there must be some sort of correspondence between the two. In fact, there are two ways in which the audience's emotions may correspond to the author's deliberative aim; the audience's emotion may be *congruent* with the deliberative aim, or it may be made congruent because it is a *counterpart* of some emotion that will achieve salience.

The focal properties of particular objects play a crucial role in the argument from pathos. When we discussed focal properties we noted that those properties may be an instantiation of some property of the object or some relational quality. When a writer targets an emotion for persuasive purposes and that emotion has some feature or person in the deliberative situation proper as its object, the audience may likewise have some emotion directed at that same object. If the author's targeted emotion is the same as the audience's, then the author has found the emotion that is requisite for effecting persuasion. While this may appear to be matter of luck, luck is not the way such a match can be achieved.

The audience's emotion may be *congruent* with the author's targeted emotion. This idea of congruence can be explained through the analogy of seeing. The presence of an emotion that can affect judgment is part of the characteristic stance we take when evaluating a deliberative situation. Our spatial relationship to the object we see (distance, elevation, relation to a light source, etc.), our 'position', so to speak, helps explain what we see. The 'position' of the audience towards the deliberative situation is analogous to one's physical position when seeing. Sharing a physical vantage point is a necessary condition for viewing an object from the same point of view as another. An audience's emotional 'position' is a part of their sense of agency; and an emotion is congruent, in part, if the audience's sense of agency corresponds to the writer's intended sense of agency.

The evaluative content of what we see is also determined in part by what we look for and what the object of the emotion is; we attend to certain details over others because they are relevant to the task at hand. The 'orientation' of an emotion is that directed attentiveness. One's directed attentiveness in 'orientation' can be further specified by recognizing that one's motivational set pushes and pulls the agent. 'Push' names that part of one's motivation that directs the attention from the agent to the object or to another person. 'Pull' names the converse relationship; it explains how the motivational power that flows from the value of the desired object, action or individual to the deliberating agent.

Congruent emotions will involve these two pairs of features of orientation and position as well as push and pull. Anger and resentment, for example, can be directed at the same event. They are oriented in the same

direction because their evaluations are similar and their moral pulls are similar. But resentment differs from anger, in part, because anger requires the unjustified and injurious action be committed against the person who is angry or someone very close to that person. An insult directed at an individual who is not in the agent's close circle will not produce anger. The agent feels resentment instead. The push of anger and the push of resentment help to qualitatively differentiate the two. Still, the feeling of resentment will correspond to the feeling of anger.

Sympathy, pity and compassion felt for individuals who suffer unjustifiably are also congruent and corresponding emotions in this sense. These emotions can be corresponding ones because the attitude that governs the targeted emotion is congruent with the writer's deliberative aim. A targeted emotion is corresponding if its particular judgment or its motivational stance and its governing attitude are in alignment with the writer's deliberative aim. Part of this alignment is also the result of the audience's position and orientation.

Yet there is another condition that must be satisfied if the targeted emotion is to be a corresponding one. To have a corresponding emotion is to possess the ability to share emotional experience, and this ability is one of the most important imaginative faculties necessary for reasoning well. Adam Smith makes this very argument in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* when he argues:

> In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and the person principally concerned, the spectator must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little

> circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded. (I. i. 4. 6)

This capacity is necessary, but not by itself sufficient, to deliver correct judgments. Other forms of rational argument are required. The right principle, for instance, must be invoked, and its specification must be appropriate. Still, we have seen that it is one's emotional capacities that help to deliver that principle and its specification.

Yet not all congruent emotions are corresponding ones in the sense we have described them. The relative orientation of the person feeling the emotion will help specify what the congruent emotion may be. A child who has her feelings hurt usually wants tenderness or sympathy, not a fellow feeling of distress. The motivational push in the felt emotion is what counts, not the pull of an identificational fellow feeling. Tenderness and sympathy in this case are *counterpart* emotions; *counterpart* emotions are congruent emotions as well. Emotions in the genus of distress are perspectival in nature. The fellow feeling necessary for the audience's emotion to be appropriate requires that the *counterpart* emotion share the same judgment or end, but it must also respect the perspectival nature of these emotions. *Counterpart* emotions do not have to fall into the same genus; emotions of distress felt by people in deliberative situations can produce a desire to ameliorate or alleviate that distress. These desires are also *counterpart* emotions.

The congruent emotions, whether they are corresponding or counterpart ones, share the feature of motivational pull; one's orientation will help determine the motivational push of the counterpart emotion. This

feature may be a relevant causal condition, or concern the character of the desires involved, or form a part of the emotions' evaluative concerns.

To summarize: simple correspondence obtains when the two emotions of the audience and author share the criteria of position and orientation held in terms of the evaluation of X; counterpart emotions become congruent when the evaluation of the objects of both emotions are made in terms of the same criteria X.

**Counter Arguments**

Audiences do not always share the point of view of the author. They may hold emotions or attitudes that would effectively block the author's deliberative aim. These emotions may arise spontaneously as the deliberative situation comes under consideration, or these emotions may have been elicited by one's opposition.

Both the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero in *De Inventione* recognized that there were occasions when the members of one's audience were not favorably disposed to one's aim. Both authors identify three occasions where this problem can occur: when one's case is scandalous or discreditable, when the audience appears convinced by one's opposition, and when the audience is weary (RH I vi 9; DI I 20). Cicero classifies these occasions into four 'cases'. A 'difficult' case is one which has alienated the sympathies of the audience towards one's aim. A 'mean' case is one where the audience makes light of the aim or thinks it unworthy of serious attention. An 'ambiguous' case is mixed; honorable issues are mixed with dishonorable ones. Finally, an 'obscure' case is conceptually difficult or subtle and often must be presented to a slow witted audience.

Cicero's analysis commends itself on three counts. First, he gives adequate attention to the audience's stance. Second, he recognizes that particular emotional judgments may block one's deliberative aim in various ways. Finally, he recognizes that issues of conceptual complexity play a role in the apprehension and acceptance or rejection of emotional appeals. Yet his notion of a 'case' is analogous to the notion of a genre. The term 'genre' is a category that names a specific convergence of subject, purpose and method in discourse (Beale 30). Like the notion of genre, Cicero's 'cases' name types of rhetorical occasions with some content and a recommended method to meet a specific purpose. While a discussion of occasions for counter arguments would be a helpful addition to the analysis of pathos, what is needed is an analysis of the strategies, those operations of discourse, one can deploy. The explanatory power of these strategies should not be limited by substantive issues arising out of single emotions. To have the broadest scope possible, these strategies should be as formal in nature as the deliberative emotions allow.

In Chapter II I argued that each formal pattern involving the desires and fears has three possible lines of counter argument. The pattern of fear + distress, for example, can be countered by accepting that the situation is fearful but not hopeless; by countering the prospective results of that threat the pattern becomes fear + delight. One can deny that the situation is, in fact, fearful and argue that it is more appropriate to focus on the desiderative wish; by taking proper precautions one can produce a felicitous result. Finally, one can again focus on the desiderative wish and caution that a failure to attend to the operational risks attendant to its success will produce an unhappy result. Although each particular emotion in a concrete deliberative situation with a

particular audience will make unique persuasive demands, some features remain constant enough to allow us to discern strategies of counter argument.

We possess four topical strategies that can be used to effect these counter arguments. These topical strategies will arise out of highly general and formal features of the audience's emotional stance towards the deliberative situation. One can *transpose* the audience's emotions that are directed at the deliberative situation and effect a change in salience. Second, one can *transform* the emotion into another one. Finally, one can *extirpate* or *attenuate* the emotion and substitute another in its place. The choice of one's strategy of counter argument will depend on how the audience's lead emotion or emotional set blocks the writer's deliberative aim. Although each of these strategies will be explained individually, they frequently occur jointly in deliberative discourse.

## Transposition

Perhaps the simplest strategy is that which depends on the strength of the salience evoked. Deliberative situations can potentially evoke many emotions. A brutal crime, for example, can produce many emotions simultaneously: pity for its victims, indignation on their behalf, resentment towards the criminals, and horror at the crime itself. One's evaluative stance as an agent coordinates these emotions, and writers exploit that possibility for coordination by making one of those emotions salient. The prosecution in a criminal court case may work to make resentment the salient emotion in the minds of the jurors; the defense, on the other hand, will emphasize the defendant's remorse and regret, or guilt, or even try to make the defendant the object of pity. The defense attempts to recoordinate the jury's emotional

responses by making a different emotion salient. The *transposition* of the range of coordinate emotions through the office of salience is a common technique.

The example of the criminal court case points to the first of two methods by which the strategy of *transposition* may be effected. Each method depends on the satisfaction of one necessary condition. We saw in Chapter IV that it is possible for an individual or an action to be the particular object of more than one emotion at the same time. This state of affairs is quite common. We can, for example, be surprised and pleased by unexpected help from a friend. This occurrence can be quite complex as well. Satire is a literary genre of comic protest involving a wide range of emotions that play constituent roles in its success. Anger, indignation, derision, contempt, ridicule and censure are some of the more common emotions operating in this genre. Satire is successful, in part, when the judgments of these emotions as expressed by their formal objects are coordinated and directed at the representative object of that satire.

The two (or more) emotions in question must possess some property that informs the motivating aspects of the two emotions. These properties will, in turn, be present in the formal objects of the two emotions. The two emotions will be jointly *successful* if the particular object actually possesses the properties that define the formal object. All emotional patterns are subject to these criteria for their success if the emotions are to be normative. If a writer argues for a different emotional pattern than her opponent, then at a minimum, this new pattern must meet these criteria. *Success*, however, is not the same as *satisfaction*. *Satisfaction* is a condition of desires and fears; it

refers to the attainment of the want (in the case of desires) defined by the intentional component of the emotion. Two emotions are incompatible if they cannot be jointly satisfied (de Sousa 208).

The first method of *transposition* uses this distinction to produce two possible lines of counter argument. The common aim shared by the prosecution and defense in the court example is to see that justice is served. First, each side will investigate the other's emotional pattern to see if the emotions appealed to are consistent with each other or with the desire for justice. Second, each side will look to see if the satisfaction conditions of each of the desires or fears present in the set are compatible with the interests or pursuit of justice in that case.

Sometimes the writer finds that the audience's relevant emotion is oriented towards its object in such a way that that focus will effectively block the attainment of the writer's persuasive aim. 'Orientation' concerns the direction of focus of the targeted emotion. 'Orientation' has two components. First, it possesses an evaluative judgment in form of an attitude, and the act or the agent is appraised in light of that positive or negative attitude. More importantly, the emotion can be directed at oneself or at another.

The second method of *transposition* accepts the positive or negative attitude, but it works to effect one or two changes in the focus of the emotion in question. It redirects the focus of the emotion in such a way as to allow for successful persuasion. Like the first, the second method of *transposition* takes the emotions found in the deliberative situation or in the audience as given. The necessary and sufficient conditions present in the first method must be satisfied as well. The second method exploits two sets of distinctions that are

present in our emotional experience: conceptually, we distinguish the objects of our emotions by their orientation; emotions are directed at oneself or at others. Second, we distinguish the judgmental components of an emotion from its motivational potential.

Just as some emotional reactions can produce counterpart emotions, certain emotions possess *complementary* emotions. *Complementary* emotions share a common attitude, but their orientation differs. 'Praise', for example, is other directed; 'pride', one of the complementary emotions of praise, is self directed. 'Blame', typically, is other directed; 'guilt' and 'remorse' are two self directed complementary emotions of blame. The same holds for emotional conditions. 'To embarrass' is other directed; 'to be ashamed' is self directed. Mockery is other directed; shame is self directed.

Significantly, the emotions that form these complementary pairs can function as judgments or as motivational states. Consider 'blame' as an example. To say that someone deserves blame is to make a judgment; to say that that person should be blamed is to claim that the illocutionary act of blaming should produce good results. The two dimensions are obviously related. It is plausible to think that an individual is blameworthy whenever blaming will produce good results, but a moment's reflection casts doubt on this idea. It is doubtful that blaming Jeffrey Dahmer would have produced good results, yet his deeds were, at the least, blameworthy. Blaming people for the absence of innate talents (intelligence, sagacity, physical strength in the elderly, say) is likewise fruitless. There are borderline cases: absent mindedness, shyness, an ingratiating personality, all can manifest themselves in action or inaction

that is blameworthy; but each particular case must be examined to see if blaming will produce the desired results.

The method of *transposition* examines the orientation of the audience's emotion towards its object, and it seeks a complementary emotion possessing a different orientation in the deliberative situation or towards one's opposition. But *transposition* does not end here. Just as blame can be a judgment or a motivation, the complementary emotion will be capable of judgmental or motivational manifestation. The audience's emotion that must be altered can be *transposed* in one of three ways.

Take, for example, the case of blaming. Suppose the audience desires to blame an individual in the deliberative situation. The emotion is an other directed, motivational state. The writer looks to see if that individual has experienced (and possibly manifested) a complementary, self directed emotion; guilt is one such emotions. In Chapter II we argued that emotions of distress can manifest themselves 'retrospectively' or prospectively. The retrospective manifestation is an all-things-considered judgment; prospective emotions produce motivational attitudes, which in the case of guilt is 'reparative guilt', guilt with the desire to make amends. By evoking the sense of guilt felt by the targeted individual in the audience, the emotion of blaming can be *transposed* so that the audience directs their attention and alters their emotional response into either the judgmental or motivational manifestation of that emotion.

The ability to *transpose* an emotion depends on the exercise of one of two imaginative capacities: the application of the principle of reversibility or through the ability to feel empathy. These capacities in turn are governed by the principle of priority.

Transformation

The audience's emotional stance may also contain emotions with contrary judgments and attitudes that block one's deliberative aim. It is possible to counter this problem through the strategy of *transformation*. In the headnote to this chapter I quoted Lincoln Steffens' explanation of the method of argument he used in *The Shame of the Cities*. The strategy he invokes in that explanation is *transformation*. One may *transform* the dominant emotion of the audience into a new one that is congruent with the writer's deliberative aim. Transformation involves and depends on normative considerations. For example, envy may be transformed into disdain if the audience can be brought to believe that the desideratum does not, in fact, possess the worth originally thought. The possibility for transformation may be found by looking at an emotion's contraries. In fact, much of the analysis in the previous chapter should serve as a justification for this strategy.

An appropriate contrary of an emotion can be found if the two emotions of the audience and author admit of contrary evaluations in terms of either their formal or typical objects and the particular objects. Fear, for example, has as its typical objects many things: things which are harmful, things which are dangerous, and things which are bad, among others. If the kind of fear being contemplated is a fear of that which is harmful, it cannot have as its contrary things which we want even though what is harmful is unwanted. The evaluative property in the formal object is the means for achieving transformation. What has been seen as harmful is now seen as harmless; what was seen as dangerous is now seen as benign; what was bad is now neutral. Trust is both similar to and different from fear in this respect. Trust admits of

many particular contraries, and those contraries group themselves under two general ones: distrust and mistrust. Distrust questions the grounds and warrants of trust (and in this respect it is like fear); mistrust questions the motives and intentions or the evaluative propriety of trust (and this differs from a contrary evaluation of fear). If trust is the felt emotion, the appropriate contrary of trust will be found by discerning whether it is the grounds or the evaluation of that trust that is assailable.

A congruent emotion may thus also be evoked if an appropriate contrary of the audience's emotion can be used to meet the author's desired end. This can be accomplished through finding a common causal factor in the emotion and its targeted contrary. Such a common causal factor may emerge in the causal sequences of emotional response. Envy, for example, depends on secrecy for its maintenance. When envy is discovered, the envied may respond with jealousy. The 'jealousy' here carries the sense Shakespeare uses in "Jealous in honor;" it is the reverse of envy. Such jealousy may turn into spite, the envy into malice.

Pericles combined these two methods of counter argument, transposition and transformation, in his final war speech to the Athenian assembly. The Athenians were in despair; the second Spartan invasion and the plague challenged their beliefs that Pericles' strategy could, in fact, exercise some control over their destiny. The epistemic reasons present in their despair and hopelessness cast doubt over the wisdom of Pericles' policies. The Athenians thus blamed Pericles and were, hence, angry with him for having persuaded them to adopt his policy. Pericles recognized that the epistemic reasons operating in the assembly's despair and the fearful dimension of their

anger were sufficiently similar to be viewed as a common causal factor that could be persuasively exploited. His persuasive task was two-fold. He discerned that despair was the dominant, deliberative emotion present; and his speech worked to evoke despair's appropriate contrary in this situation, in this case confidence, to meet his deliberative aim. To accomplish this, he had to shift the target or object of these emotions; he recognized that he had to shift the responsibility for the Athenian's continued plight from himself to those in the assembly who wanted to sue for immediate peace.

Conversely, an appropriate contrary can also be found at a more abstract level of judgment. Some people envy others for having certain attributes and possessions like wealth, power, status, promotion, preferment, fame, and so on. The envied object is seen as a kind of good that society uses to differentiate people. Envy can be transformed into disdain if the particular object can be shown to not possess the worth the envier or the evaluative group has invested it with.

Finally, one can also effect transformation by evoking a qualitatively different evaluation that governs the occurrence of the emotions themselves. That is, one can transform the emotional repertoire of the audience by changing the character of the deliberative aim of the discourse. Diodotus transforms the Athenian assembly's judgments in the Mytelenian debate by arguing that the issue was not one of justice involving a client state as Cleon had argued; rather, the issue was a deliberative one involving what is advantageous to Athens. Cleon had argued that the issue was retributive justice and that the decision had symbolic or rhetorical importance for the rest of the empire. The subject city-states must be governed by fear. Diodotus

accepts the symbolic import of whatever decision will be reached and uses that psychological fact to transform the issue to one which involves the prudential well-being of Athens as the head of an empire. He redirected the character of the Athenians' fears by transforming the object of their desires from retribution to what was advantageous.

## Extirpation and Attenuation

Finally, the audience's emotional stance can have as its targeted emotion one whose evaluation or second order desire is the contradictory opposite of the evaluation or second order desire of the emotion the writer needs to evoke for the deliberative aim to be successful. Emotions involving contradictory opposites cannot be countered in the way contrary emotions can be countered using the strategies of *transformation*. There are two strategies of counter argument that one can use in the face of contradictory evaluations. One can eliminate the audience's emotion, or one can weaken that emotion. *Extirpation* requires the elimination of the emotion present, thus allowing the formal possibility for a new emotion to work to achieve salience. When an emotion is weakened, it is altered in degree so that what remains is either vitiated or benign, allowing another emotion to be substituted for it. *Extirpation* and *attenuation* employ the same methods, but they differ in their success conditions. Extirpation requires an elimination in kind for its success; attenuation, a change in degree.

Emotional arguments are 'reasonable' ones, and like these, they are susceptible to the same kinds of objections and counter arguments that non-emotional, reasonable arguments are prey to. Reasonable arguments are open to two kinds of challenges. A counter argument *defeats* its rival when it shows

that the first argument is categorically false. A counter argument may *undermine* a rival argument when it casts doubt on some claim or claims that are necessary or sufficient for its success. *Extirpation* is like the counter argument that defeats its rival; *attenuation* is like the argument that undermines its rival.

Both *extirpation* and *attenuation* refer to two different, but related, psychological strategies. *Extirpation* names the process of eliminating altogether a targeted emotion, seen as a type, from an individual's emotional makeup. It also names the process whereby the grounds for the targeted emotion, seen as a token of a type, are defeated in a particular deliberative context so that that emotion or its persuasive force is eliminated. *Attenuation* likewise refers to two different but related processes. The process of *attenuation* may ameliorate or weaken the force of the judgments or motivational power of an emotion, or it may refer to the weakening of the strength of emotional condition itself. Thus, to become calm after being angry names the *attenuated* condition following anger. The discussion of the privatives of certain emotions in the previous chapter identified some of the more common ones.

These distinctions must be distinguished from another set of distinctions. The strategies of *extirpation* and *attenuation* can address an emotion as a particular occurrence or holistically. Briefly, a holistic approach advocates ending the experience of an emotion (nervousness or hesitation, say) in the sense that one works to eliminate all future instances of these emotions. The particular approach works on an emotion that occurs in a particular context, such as frustration with a particular individual at work. In

what follows, I will be concerned with *extirpation* and *attenuation* in particular contexts.

It is tempting but mistaken to think that these strategies vary only in degree. It is tempting to do so because they share the same topical methods of argument. Thus an attempt at extirpation that is only partially successful would actually be an exercise of attenuation. This notion is mistaken because it evaluates arguments in terms of the degree of perlocutionary effect; success becomes a matter of the degree of preference or aversion created. We have examined several arguments and examples, particularly in Chapter IV, where it was shown that this cannot be true.

With the exception of one topic, the strategies of *extirpation* and *attenuation* share five lines of argument: a consideration of evaluations and judgments, the appropriateness of the targeted emotion, the nature of anticipation, the use of analogous cases, and the normative status of the emotion itself. The particular nature of the audience's emotional state and the personal nature of the reasons they hold in relation to the targeted emotion suggest that several of these topics must be deployed together for either of these strategies to succeed.

The first line of argument works only with the strategy of *extirpation*. The cognitive structure of an emotion can be explained in terms of different sets of contrasting types of beliefs. These beliefs can be characterized as identificatory or evaluative ones, or they can be characterized as evaluative or causal beliefs. The distinctions were used earlier to highlight two different aspects of the cognitive structure of an emotion. The first line of argument for *extirpation* utilizes the first contrast. Identificatory beliefs are

descriptively true or false. All too often one misperceives or misidentifies or mislocates the actual and particular object of that emotion so that the descriptive beliefs that are a part of the emotion are false. A husband hears of a plane crash on its approach to the airport where his wife is shortly to land. He fears she is dead, or he begins to grieve believing that his wife has died. When he learns that her plane was not the one that crashed, the emotion ends. Similarly, one can misidentify who the object of the emotion really is. We saw in Chapter IV that Joe, whose lawn mower broke, mistakenly confused the belief that whoever broke the mower is responsible with the belief that that person was his neighbor. Any clearcut case of illusory focus falls under the purview of this topic.

The second topic concerns the evaluations, beliefs or judgments within the emotion. An emotion places some value on the good or evil that its object is supposed to possess. One can ask whether the object is actually the type of good claimed for it. Is the object, for example, really an instance of an intrinsic good, or is it an instrumental good? Pleasure is an intrinsic good, but it is by no means clear that any or all means by which pleasure is achieved is an instrumental good. Instrumental goods are means to an intrinsic good. Malice can be pleasurable, but we cannot choose to be deliberately malicious and justify those acts in terms of the pleasure achieved thereby.

Other goods are problematic. Bernard Williams poses an interesting paradox about political honor. People who make political honor a good in their lives find that that good can be defeated because the attainment of that honor is dependent on those to whom the politician tries to be superior (*Limits* 39). Loyalty is also problematic. In 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer was denied the

necessary security clearance to continue work on nuclear weapons on the grounds of loyalty. He was not seen as disloyal. Because he had helped a friend cover up a questionable political past, his actions in this case were seen as unreliable enough to warrant fears about his future conduct.

Frequently the value attributed to an object depends on that object's being unique. Like the Stoics in general, Epictetus recognized the force of uniqueness in one's emotions. Uniqueness is such a powerful motivator that he argued in the *Enchiridion:*

> In every thing which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion); what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been broken you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or your wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed. (III)

Such deflationary techniques of description and classification are common, yet they are apt to be of limited or partial value. Uniqueness is often considered a sufficient criterion of value. A genuine work by Vermeer, for example, is more valuable than any copy, reproduction or forgery, no matter how accurate that performance is. What makes the original more valuable than a copy is its genuineness. But there is another distinction lurking here. During the Civil War, the treasury of the Confederacy was plagued by the proliferation of counterfeit currency. In the early days of the war, this currency was easily detectable because it was more professionally executed than the official currency. Genuineness is not the same as aesthetic merit. Just as we can confuse genuineness with aesthetic value, we can confuse the

experience of the emotion, its felt quality, with the value of the object (Goodman 53-55).

Uniqueness can also imply what is unrepeatable. This notion suggests that what is valuable about some object is its punctual aspect or the singleness of the performance. Certain concerts or special exhibitions are attractive for this reason and manufacturers capitalize on the presumption in their advertising ('limited time only', 'limited quantities', 'special editions', etc.). A live performance by Luciano Pavarotti in the hinterlands may be unique, but it is Pavarotti that makes it special. In fact, it is Pavarotti's mastery of his art that gives the opportunity to hear the performance its uniqueness.

We can also evaluate the appropriateness of the emotion, whether one conceives of it as a performance, activity or state. When a desire is at issue, one can question the value of the second order desire. This desire can be assessed for the quality of the motivation it advocates, and it can be assessed for the worth or value of the outcome. Arguments that invoke fear can be questioned from two perspectives. As Seneca argued, fears can be witless or they can be groundless. The intentional object of the fear can be assessed to test the likelihood of its becoming a material object. The motivational reason in the conditional can be imaginatively tested to see if it names a sufficient causal condition. Finally, the wish that conceptually controls the conditional can be assessed for its motivational and justificatory adequacy.

Desires and fears produce resultant emotions or states. The appropriateness of these desires and fears can be tested by examining the likelihood and propriety of the resultant emotions. By seeing which second order emotions can alter the quality of the motivations in the advocated desires

and fears, one sees how compatible they are with the deliberative aim. What may causally successful may not be normatively appropriate.

The fourth strategy concerns one's ability to anticipate harm or evil; it is, perhaps, the strongest method for extirpating or attenuating an emotion. The technique is an ancient one; Cicero tells us that it was advocated by the Cyrenaics (*Tusculan Disputations* III. 28-31, 34). Praemeditatio, as it was called, is a technique of psychological preparation; it has us think in advance about the ills in life we are prey to.

At the particular level, anticipation is a particularly powerful antidote to the power of the unexpected, and pains that are unexpected are more intense. It probably will not eliminate all suffering in an occurrent situation; expected suffering is, after all, still painful. Cicero argues that unexpected harm or evil produces two deleterious consequences:

> But on a careful consideration of the unexpected, you would find nothing else, except that all sudden occurrences are magnified, and that for two reasons: first, because no scope is given for weighing the magnitude of the occurrences; secondly because, where it seems that previous precautions could have been taken if sufficient foresight had been shown, the evil incurred, as implying blame, makes the distress keener. (TD III 52-53)

The first insight is, perhaps, obvious. The ability to anticipate the severity of a future evil places it in perspective. The second insight is more complex. The failure to exercise sufficient foresight likewise produces keener distress. The supposed justification of this distress depends on a (usually tacit) subjunctive conditional or counterfactual argument (if it were the case that I had done X, then Y would have been prevented). Yet if the antecedent is false, then the

consequent is false. The argument presupposes that the harm is or was avoidable. If the harm is unavoidable, then the conditional is also false.

If one could have or should have anticipated the future harm,then, Cicero argues, self blame will be the emotional condition that results from this failure of insight. Culpability, however, can be matter of degree. Self blame may be too strong; one can feel remorse or regret. The resultant emotion can also be weakened by focusing on issues of agency rather than on one's failings as an agent.

Anticipation is a future looking technique that addresses the unexpected. some emotional responses are past looking, and they can be made more intense through a condition that is the converse of the unexpected. Boethius gives clear expression to this converse condition when he argues, "In all adversity of fortune, the most wretched kind is once to have been happy" (61). Dante agrees; he has Francesca say of her suffering, "There is no greater woe/ that happiness recalled in misery" (*Inferno* V ll. 119-120). This intensity is apparently confirmed by the perspectival nature of one's memories.

We are apt today to focus on the expressive dimensions of the genre of consolation literature and forget the practical and therapeutic function the genre aims for. Consolation literature is certainly expressive, but it had (and has) therapeutic functions. The fifth strategy is common one in this genre. The need to place one's distress in perspective points to the fifth topic of extirpation and attenuation.

The perspectival nature and the personal character of the emotions often narrows one's focus. The topics outlined above attempt to correct that narrowness. Most of the topics just discussed are abstract in nature. By

drawing on the experiences of others through the use of exempla, one's arguments become more concrete. Concrete examples not only show what particular people felt or did, their examples exemplify what individuals should or should not do. Negative examples undermine the strength of false beliefs; positive examples illustrate what is appropriate. They not only show what we can do; they exemplify what we should do. Such examples are also successful because the reasons which the individuals in the examples act on are reasons which the members of the audience have in their motivational set.

The use of examples works for another powerful reason. Control of one emotions depends on the ability to critically reflect on them. Although they are cognitively structured, the emotions are too fluid and dynamic to allow most of us to stop and reflect on their natures as we undergo them. Examples guide one's reflections about an occurrent emotion by offering a structure or framework through which the act of reflection can take place.

The final topic grows out of an insight of Chrysippus. Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoa, was the first to distinguish two crucial judgments or motivations operating in the passions. It is one judgment to say X is bad; it is quite another to join that judgment with the causal belief that one ought to suffer because X is bad (TD III. 61). This distinction has two sets of consequences. First, it provides us with a way to conceptually link decorum with judgment so that propriety is no longer a set of conventions. More importantly, one can apply the topics of anticipation and analogy to one's ostensible expressive duties.

More to the point, however, emotions like envy and jealousy are not normative emotions. Still, people undergo these emotions and act on them, and

arguments denying their legitimacy have notoriously little effect on those who experience them. Chrysippus' distinction gives us another way to argue.

The technique involves an informal reductio argument. One begins by assuming that it is one's duty to act on the non normative emotion. One then introduces a condition that will make action on the emotion self defeating. Envy, for example, depends on secrecy for its success. By introducing the condition of publicity of one's motive, acting on envy becomes self defeating. To behave as if one were jealous of another is to act through a stratagem. To have an emotion for some purpose is to engage in manipulation. When the point of the emotional episode is revealed the action becomes self frustrating. Emotions that are ad baculum appeals can be made self defeating in the same way.

## Integrity

The deliberative emotions are forms of intentional awareness and self-assessment with occurrent and dispositional manifestations that help us shape our destinies. The capacity for self-assessment implies that the agent is capable of self evaluation, and the notion of destiny implies reflection about how one's whole life is to be lived, which includes the pursuit and defense of principles, projects and activities that make up that life. Undeserved harms threaten those activities and projects that are constitutive of our well-being. In certain, albeit extreme, cases these harms damage *us* ; they threaten who we are. They can harm our identity by threatening corruption, by undermining our autonomy, or by disintegrating our wholeness. Significantly, the very emotions that signal threats of harm can, themselves, cause harm. We can, obviously, act on the wrong desire, mistake the intensity of a desire for its

strength, or confuse strength with appropriateness. We can be overwhelmed by fear; and the dangers of hatred , envy and jealousy are well known. We can also be overcome by distress. Distress, the appearance of a present and great evil, names a family of related emotions. Their power, the Stoic Chrysippus argued, lies in their capacity to threaten and dissolve the whole individual. He offered an etymological argument to buttress this insight. *Lupe* (distress) is derived he says, from *luo*, to dissolve. Whatever the accuracy of the etymological claim, the real strength of the argument lies, however, in his recognition that emotion is a kind of false judgment. When we assent to that incorrect belief or judgment, we license the illegitimate or inappropriate experience of that emotion. Distress counsels resignation and surrender and thus breaks down one's identity (TD III. 61).

If we are to withstand these threats, our emotions must be integrated with and into other parts of our characters. We call this capacity to effect such an integration and coordination in adverse circumstances one's 'integrity'. Obviously, not all harms are this extreme; and issues of integrity do not, typically, arise in the face of these prospective harms. A stance requiring attentiveness, prudence, compassion or care may be all that is required. But it is in and through these extreme or adverse situations that the role of the emotions in deliberation are most clearly articulated.

Before turning to the issues of integrity, I need to distinguish it from its close relative, dignity. When we are able to act for noble principles in the face of misfortune or at personal cost, we act from a sense of fortitude. The ground of this fortitude for noble ends is dignity. Aurel Kolnai argues that the notion of dignity suggests worthiness, composure, calmness, restraint and

distance.[1] The emotions are controlled without being dissipated. Dignity, he suggests, has two kinds of concerns. First, dignity manifests itself in a lack of concern for external advantages and a strong concern for goodness of character. The psychic balance required for one to be unconcerned about material advantages is called equanimity. Significantly, this disregard for one's own material advantages does not extend to a disregard for the misfortunes of others. This asymmetry is important. There are three possibilities to be contrasted here. First, we could expect everyone to disregard the effects of misfortune equally. This idea is unacceptable to many; it counsels a kind of resignation rather than disdain for security. Second, we can expect others to regard our own misfortune as more important than their own. This position is not only selfish, it is psychologically implausible to expect people to behave this way. The third possibility, we saw, can arise from a sense of dignity. Pity and indignation are concerned with moral deserts, and the concerns of justice contained within these emotions form a part of the exercise of one's dignity. The second concern, the manifestation of one's character in action, suggests a second volitional capacity we can and must exercise. Dignity and integrity name related manifestations of that capacity to act.

When we say that someone acts with integrity or has integrity we are expressing a judgment of admiration or esteem. To say that a person acted with integrity is to praise that action, but it praises far more. We are praising what that action exemplifies. The action is not only the manifestation of certain virtues or admirable traits, the character and worthiness of the action is constituted by those virtues. These virtues include honesty, courage, fairness,

truthfulness, and fidelity. An act of integrity thus both possesses and refers to those properties. We are, in essence, praising that person's ethos. Integrity, in this sense, is "a form of conscientiousness" (Wallace 95). We are personally committed to defending those ethical or moral projects and principles necessary for our well being in the face of grave difficulty.

In her discussion of dignity, Gabriele Taylor reminds us that there is another, more ancient, conception of integrity. 'Integrity' refers also to the wholeness of an individual's character. The individual's character is harmoniously structured in a way such that the person is autonomous, responsible, and uncorrupted. An important aspect this sort of integrity can be characterized negatively; 'integrity' is a condition where one does not deviate from one's nature. Thus, the sense of 'integrity' insures that the individual is, in some sense, the same individual. The OED reminds us that 'truth' was originally a quality of persons. To be true was to be faithful, steadfast and constant. When exercised, this aspect of integrity implies stability and fortitude. Acts of integrity, in this sense, reveal the persistence of admirable traits in the face of adversity.

Although acts of integrity involve acting on principle, the correct and successful discharge of one's duties and obligations is, by itself, insufficient for making this judgment. Integrity requires a commitment to some worthy and justified end or goal. This commitment to defend, uphold or champion some principle manifests itself as an ability to act consistently in the face of adversity or conflicts. When we are committed, in this sense, we are bound intellectually, emotionally and volitionally to a decided course of action. We not only believe *that* the principle is true, we believe *in* its rightness and its

importance. This rightness leads the person of integrity to be also uncompromising. Thus, when we act from integrity three conditions must be present. First, the act to be performed must be justified. Second, our motivation must spring from that justification. Finally, that motivation presents itself as one of practical necessity (Wallace 95).

The three conditions necessary for integrity resemble other ways in which we can be committed and uncompromising. By contrasting integrity with these other kinds of committed action we can see more clearly what these conditions demand. The person of integrity is committed to a principle, but that commitment is neither dogmatic nor fanatical. The dogmatist is a person committed to some idea, usually of a partial, impractical or visionary nature. The dogmatist and ideologue are ones who believe they have a monopoly on truth or justice. The ideologue and dogmatist experience emotions, but an antecedent belief in the rightness of their cause blocks the opportunity to cultivate new and richer emotional perceptions. Of course, dogmatists and ideologues do have emotions. Yet they are, in essence, emotionally insensitive; what is felt is dictated by one's guiding ideological beliefs. Thus, they lack a capacity to be self-critical. As we saw earlier, pity requires an ability to see one's own possibilities as being similar to another's. Imaginative reversal manifests itself only towards the dogmatist's allies, those who are like the dogmatist in terms of a set of 'litmus test' beliefs. A recognition of human vulnerability by the ideologue, however, is likely to manifest itself as blame or contempt.

The emotions they experience do deliver judgments, but they are judged from the top down. If the judgment accords with the prior belief set,

emotional judgment usually play an evidentiary role. When they serve as reasons, these reasons are open to the charge of being self-fulfilling prophecies because they are interpreted in the light of antecedent beliefs. Thus, the dogmatist is susceptible, for example, to patterns of argument that appeal to the exercise of fortitude in the present situation because those acts will be seen as justified in the future. Like the person of integrity, the dogmatist or ideologue is uncompromising about their principles (Halfon 68). Mark Halfon also argues that while ideologues can distinguish, in principle, differences in the quality of the reasons offered, the criterion for a reason to be 'good' is its defense of that ideology (68). Unlike the ideologue, the person of integrity is willing to reflect on the rightness of those principles and is also willing to test whether those principles do, in fact, appropriately apply to the case in question.

Fanatics are also committed and uncompromising. Like ideologues, fanatics see their goals as absolute and all-important. They are uncompromising in the sense that they refuse to make concessions either for any reason at all or irrespective of the reason (Halfon 69). Fanaticism is the ruthless desire to pursue one's goal at any cost--including one's own well-being. Because we are susceptible to incompatible desires, the fanatic subordinates all of his, and everyone else's, desires and attitudes to the pursuit of that goal. The fanatic is also uncompromising. The fanatic sees an obstacle not as a problem but as a provocation. Typically when we are provoked, we become irritated or exasperated. One's threshold for frustration and its allies is grounded in one's temperament. As we saw earlier, irritation can produce a kind of mock anger, with a concomitant desire to return pain for the

perceived provocation. These observations, coupled with the more general observation that the emotions are a reliable source of motivational energy, explain another aspect of the fanatic's emotional life. The fanatic is capable of exciting the passions excessively, producing a zeal to work for that goal.

Two observations need to be made here. First, the disposition to act with zeal is not properly motivated. The object of the emotion that originates that zeal is not what is out there in the world; it is, rather, within the fanatic. Zeal is a form of desire; like all desires, zeal derives some of its content from the psychological state of the agent and some of it from the worthiness of the goal. The fanatic confuses the intensity of his devotion with a sufficient justification for that zeal. Second, this mistaken judgment affects the manner in which that zeal is expressed. Preoccupied with success, the fanatic is quite willing to choose any expedient means to reach this goal. For the fanatic, expediency exercised to achieve one's goal is justified by the 'moral' claim that one must remain committed to achieving that goal (Kekes 77-79).

An act of integrity is seen as one of practical necessity. This requirement concerns the volitional nature of one's act. An act of integrity is not one that is fastidiously done, nor is it one that is punctiliously performed. While these qualities refer to the manner of execution they are not manifestations of an intrinsic motivation. The end is seen as one of necessity; it *must* happen because it is right. This sense of necessity is sometimes perceived in terms of a test. To say one ought to do X carries two possible negations. If Y is the negation of X, then we may say, "Y ought not to happen," or we may say, "it ought not to be the case that Y ever exists." Some types of acts, simple evils for example, are clear cut in this latter way. An agent

rightly discerns that Y ought never to be the case and that act X, as a matter of practical necessity, must be done. Furthermore, the agent believes that to not act would be violation of that agent's core principles.

The act of integrity, however, may be one where we say Y ought not to happen and we say X must happen. For X to be an act of integrity X must be one of those moral or ethical principles that partially defines who the individual is. When someone acts to defend this principle that individual makes articulate who one is, in the sense that the act defines what lies at or near the ethical or moral core of that person's being. The act exemplifies a crucial aspect of that individual's character. Thus, the sense that it is necessary *to* act in defense of the principle will have its counterpart in the agent's character because it is also seen as necessary *for* the individual to act.

If integrity requires a refusal to deviate from one's nature, then it requires the activation of some trait or state of character, and the agent recognizes that she has the requisite trait to see the action through. This trait must satisfy three requirements. First, the trait is grounded in a form of self knowledge that makes the agent autonomous. That trait is a state of character with the capacity for self-determination. Second, while we recognize that questions of justification and motivation are theoretically distinct, we also want these two states to be related so that one's motivation grasps the intrinsic rightness of the principle at stake. This trait will, thus, manifest itself volitionally, protecting the agent from the threat of corruption while it instantiates the rightness of the principle. But the trait must do more than be an instantiation of the principle. It will define one's sense of agency in relation to the action to be performed, bringing the resources of one's

character to bear on the problem. Finally, the trait, by defining one's sense of agency, provides the bridge between that intrinsic motivation and the rest of the agent's character by coordinating and directing the inner resources of the agent. When integrity involves wholeness, 'constancy' names that trait. Constancy is that virtue which reaffirms the unity and harmonious wholeness of one's character in action (Halfon 49). The exercise of constancy involves firmness, but its occurrent manifestation must take into account who one is and who one will become. When integrity means conscientious fortitude, however, 'rectitude', the most often cited candidate for this trait, actually names the manner in which that trait is exercised. Rectitude itself requires a kind of self knowledge to guide its operation. Virtues like courage and justice are states of character that deliver us the capacity to act with integrity. Significantly, some emotions can serve this function as well.

An act of integrity is seen as what we must do, but that necessity carries a negation: we must not violate who we are. This conceptual fact allows us two avenues of appeal. We can appeal positively to the appropriate trait, but we can also appeal to its contrary, what we must not allow to happen. The capacity for self-assessment allows to see who we are and it allows us to imagine how others see us. The appeal to the contrary of a trait is, quite probably, the more powerful motivation. It is more powerful because it allows the agent more freedom to reveal through action what is most precious to the agent. The motivation has a double thrust; it motivates one to fight against what must not happen while revealing the strength of what is individually important. But significantly, this freedom comes at a cost of self revelation;

what is most precious may not be most worthy. Frequently, and appropriately, that appeal is to shame.

### Future Directions of Study

I have focused on the various roles of the emotions as they function as a constituent element in one's sense of deliberative agency. The dimension of agency is, I think, an appropriate place to begin to understand this dimension of persuasion. To pursue this end, I have relied heavily on classical thinkers in this study for several reasons. First, they took the passions seriously, and their understanding of the cognitive dimensions of the passions was, and still remains, quite sophisticated. Because of their cognitive approach to the passions, their observation and analyses have a practical import and subtlety that we cannot afford to ignore. Finally, and most importantly, they understood, as we all too frequently forget, that 'reasoning' is not to be conflated with 'logic', even though 'logic' is a necessary condition for reasoning well. Practical reasoning involves reason, the passions and one's character, and the passions have the potential, as Aristotle rightly observes, to make one's argument complete.

I want to conclude this study by making several observations about the directions our inquiries into this area of study might profitably proceed. There are three areas of research concerning the emotions and deliberative agency that deserve further attention. The first is, I think, obvious. Each major deliberative emotion deserves its own rhetorical study. These studies should examine the various rhetorical uses of that emotion at different times in history, and it should explain how that emotion's functions are manifested evocatively and expressively. A study, for example, of the rise of 'resentment'

as distinct from 'anger' in the English speaking world, beginning in the seventeenth century, would be quite illuminating. Interestingly, 'resentment' received comparatively little attention from the British moral philosophers (and even less from the rhetoricians) as it made a place for itself in people's emotional and volitional lives. The important explorations of anger and resentment take place in British fiction.

Second, more work needs to be done on how we represent the objects of the emotions. This will involve how they are depicted and how their properties are exemplified. Much of this analysis will be semantic in nature, but not all of the puzzles will be resolved this way. The question of exemplification will lead to further inquiries into the appropriateness of the emotions. The puzzles arising out of the objects of the emotions will also require for their solution a third area of study. Emotional appeals affecting one's sense of agency may proceed through reasoning (as I have argued in some detail), but they also are made through examples and stories. The use of examples is so common that we tend to not see how complex their functioning really is. Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the nature, types and functions of examples is J. D. Lyons' work, *Exempla*. Aristotle called the strategy of argument by example *epagoge*, and we conventionally translate this technical Greek term by another, modern technical term, induction. Yet the phrase 'rhetorical induction' is a term of art; any explanation of this term must comprehend the intentional nature of rhetorical examples, the pragmatics of their use, and the shared psychological factors that exist between writer and audience.

While emotional persuasion can be explored from the point of view of the office of deliberative agency, this approach is protreptic to the study of the role of the emotions in the deliberative agent. The arguments concerning integrity in the previous section bracketed off the question of integrity as a condition of emotional and volitional wholeness guiding the deliberating agent. What this wholeness entails is a crucial issue for understanding how one should live. Yet the nature and role of the emotions in the deliberating agent cannot, at this time, be addressed head-on. At present, we still know far too little to make any more that tantalizing speculations. We do have, however, several avenues of approach into this question that we can take.

From time to time we find it necessary to respond to problems with *faute de mieux* claims that evoke some emotion we believe to be relevant to the case at hand. Seen in isolation, these claims serve, as Nancy Sherman argues in her study of the emotions in the thought of Immanuel Kant, as instrumental strategies, and the name of this strategy fits literally many of the instances we use it. But she suggests, through her quotation from Kant's *Anthropologie*, another aspect of this strategy that deserves consideration. He argues that it is "still wisdom on nature's part to implant in us the predisposition to sympathy, so that it it could handle the reins *provisionally*, until reason has achieved the necessary strength" (as quoted in Sherman 158).

There are three ideas in Kant's argument that I want to call attention to. First, a *faute de mieux* claim may on occasion serve as evidence of an individual's dissatisfaction with her current depth of emotional understanding that is delivered by that emotion. In these cases, the claim heralds the readiness for the advent of a new stage in that agent's emotional

comprehension. Although I have already discussed certain aspects of this notion of developmental stages of comprehension, more work needs to be done in this area. Kant also places a limitation on which claims are significant in this arena when he argues that the emotions that we are to consider are those which are 'natural'. The notion of what is 'natural' is quite broad; it named quite different ideas in the classical world, and it names different ideas in the modern. David Hume was one of the first modern thinkers to recognize the importance of this concept for our understanding the potential inherent in the cultivation of the passions.

I want to suggest that this restriction also points to the social dimension of the emotions that function in these claims. This idea is broached by Eugene Garver in his recent study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* . In his discussion of the various ways emotion 'completes' an argument, he quotes Athene's speech in the *Eumenides*:

> It is my task to render final judgment here.
> This is a ballot for Orestes I shall cast.
> There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth,
> and, but for marriage, I am always for the male
> with all my heart, and strongly on my father's side.
> (ll. 734-738)

Athene's claim appears to be corrupt; preference, by itself, cannot be justified. Yet Athene does not offer it as an argument. The claim is *ad hoc*; it allows her to move from forensic rhetoric to deliberative considerations, considerations that will end the cycle of revenge and murder required by the Furies (Garver 106). Athene's commitment to the service of justice in Orestes' case can be understood as a dilemma that must be resolved. Her claim provides her with a

stance from which she can resolve the competing demands represented by the desires of Apollo and the Furies.

The third area we need to study further concerns the role of the emotions in resolving dilemmas. The roles of the emotions will vary in part because we face different kinds of dilemmas. Plato offers a well-known case. You borrow weapons from an individual who subsequently goes mad and demands their return. You must then decide whether to satisfy the obligations based on your promise to the owner or to satisfy the more general principle that one ought to prevent harm (*Republic* I, 331c 5-9). Dilemmas in this sense arise from some conflict between the oughts that are found to arise from one's duties (as defined by one's role), one's obligations (based on particular acts), and one's moral principles.

Not all dilemmas are of the sort just sketched. Agamemnon has been ordered by the gods to lead an expedition against Troy. The winds are unfavorable; his troops are dying. He must sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia, so that the fleet can sail to Troy. If he does not sacrifice her, the entire army will die. If he performs the sacrifice, he is a murderer; if he does not sacrifice, he is guilty of disobedience to the gods and all die. Bernard Williams argues that this sort of dilemma is such that the conflict is contingent ("Ethical Consistency"). Both demands cannot be realized. Dilemmas in this sense resemble conflicts of desires. The choice of one desire does not cancel out the force of the other desire. Significantly, Agamemnon will feel shame regardless of the choice that is made.

An especially interesting and significant conflict of moral desires appears in Sophocles' tragedy, *Philoctetes*. Philoctetes is guided by two moral

desires, *dike* and *aidos*, desires bound to powerful emotions. In this play, shame initially plays a powerful role in the deliberations. The bow of Heracles is necessary for an Achaean victory against the Trojans. Philoctetes, the rightful owner of the bow, suffers from an excruciating wound and has been exiled to Lemnos. The Achaean leaders send Odysseus and Neoptolemus to retrieve the bow. At first, Neoptolemus allows himself to be used by Odysseus in this task. Odysseus asks him to deceive Philoctetes, a shameful act, and he justifies the shameful act by an appeal to courage which will yield consequential justification. Neoptolemus sets aside his shame and tricks Philoctetes. After he gains the bow, Neoptolemus is overcome by pity for Philoctetes' suffering. Philoctetes' wound is the result of an accident; he unknowingly trespassed into a divine region. He is innocent of any conscious wrongdoing. Furthermore, the bow was a deserved gift offered to Philoctetes in honor of his friendship, his courage and his skill as an archer. Philoctetes is angry and desires revenge, but he cannot act; that is his tragic situation. Significantly, Neoptolemus then defines his duty of justice in terms of the pity he feels for Philoctetes. Neoptolemus is torn between conflicts of duty: he is under an obligation to retrieve the bow, and he feels an obligation to help Philoctetes. Neoptolemus's moral compass is the conviction that he "would prefer even to fail with honor than win by cheating." Neoptolemus' dilemma helps confirm the most controversial aspect of Aristotle's characterization of pity. Aristotle claims that pity is activated by a self regarding perception that imaginatively engages in situational role reversal. Often condemned as dangerously egoistic, the notion that pity is self regarding and other regarding suggests a psychological distance that is necessary for autonomous

action. (Identification undermines autonomy.) This causal condition allows pity to operate in two spheres of deliberative concern. It can serve the benevolent capacities of the individual by perceiving and judging what is undeserved. The focus on undeserved circumstances, coupled with this distance and perspective, can also motivate one to act so that those circumstances do not arise for ourselves or others. The tension in Neoptolemus' dilemma arising from the pity he feels for Philoctetes turns on a conflict within the fears he feels at the prospect of shame and the fears he feels if he does not act to help this person. Dilemmas such as the one faced by Neoptolemus reveal the tensions and conflicts within a moral system more effectively than almost any other means.

Finally, I want to suggest that one's patterns of emotional argument reveal dimensions of one's will in two related ways. Richard Weaver argued that one can discern the habit of a writer's mind by examining the type of reason deployed as the major premise of his arguments because such habitual choices reveal that writer's view of existence. Just as one's philosophical position may be revealed this way, a writer will reveal the nature of the good will directed at oneself and others. We have seen that the self-directed and other-directed passions are related in complex ways; these passions have causal and evaluative contraries, as well as counterpart and complimentary emotions. The evocation and expression of these emotions over time will manifest themselves as an affective pattern of judgments, desires and fears; and once it is discovered, it will help reveal the crucial ethical concerns of that agent.

There is another dimension of one's emotional stance that is revealed over time. We often speak of one's temper. Temper can refer to one's flash point, that threshold where anger erupts. It also refers more generally to one's self control. But these uses depend on a more general notion of temper, an idea that is necessary for understanding one's capacity for passionate deliberation. Just as we use 'temper' to describe the strength of steel, we use temper to describe the strength of one's emotional spirit. The idea is important not just because it encompasses emotions like anger; it is important because it encompasses the normative dimensions of the emotions in a social context. George Orwell had this notion of temper in mind when he described his mental image of Charles Dickens, giving him the face he *ought* to have:

> It is the face of a man of about forty, with a small beard and a high colour. He is laughing, with a touch of anger in his laughter, but no triumph, no malignity. It is the face of a man who is always fighting against something, but who fights in the open and is not frightened, the face of a man who is *generously angry* --in other words, of a nineteenth-century liberal, a free intelligence, a type hated with equal hatred by all the smelly little orthodoxies which are now contending for our souls. (104)

Such spiritedness indicates one's deliberative temper, and this temper is the ground from which one's good will emanates and, one hopes, will flourish.

## ENDNOTES CHAPTER VI

[1] An excellent discussion of this virtue is by Aurel Kolnai, "Dignity," *Philosophy* 51 (1976): 251-271.

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# APPENDIX A

## PARONYMY AND HUMEAN PROJECTION

Just as the individual attains a more sophisticated grasp of a concept through bootstrapping, it is reasonable to expect that the concept itself undergoes changes that affect its own conceptual complexity. In this appendix I want to speculate how these changes in conceptual complexity are brought about.

Denominative meaning relations are not the only kind of meaning relationships that we can draw on. We also have paronymous meaning relationships. Paronymy is the morphological variation upon a common root in lawlike correlation with meaning differences.[1] Paronymous meaning relations will reveal the standard conditions for use. They are protreptic to the truth conditions that obtain in the particular manifestations of each term's possible applications.

As a linguistic matter, we can describe these morphological derivations in two ways. They can be understood as a matter of internal arrangement: envi + ous + ly yields enviously, or they can be understood as a matter of establishing the stages through which the word develops: un + (envi + able) yields unenviable. The role of time in these stages is accorded a secondary status. One constraint for the possibility of further derivations is the domain in which the property can appear. Only praise can be described as 'fulsome' and thus far any extension of its application will produce a noninherent use. Furthermore, the number of paronymous forms suggests the conceptual

complexity of that concept. 'Fulsome' has three forms; 'resentment' has eight; envy, twelve.

While time may be a secondary consideration from a linguistic point of view, it is a significant consideration when we try to understand the conceptual complexity of an emotional concept. I want to argue that emotional concepts move through several determinate stages of increasing complexity. The defining criteria for each stage will be reflected in the semantic and grammatical possibilities that are open to that term. The notion that we can reconstruct the genealogy of a concept by examining its formal and grammatical possibilities was first suggested by Paul Grice. If such a procedure is possible, then we can significantly clarify the social component of the emotions. Before turning to the procedure itself, it is important to distinguish it from intellectual history and cultural criticism. The intellectual history of an idea traces the evolution of the arguments concerning that idea and tests their force against other arguments in the period and then evaluates the success or failure of those arguments on the subsequent development of that idea. Like intellectual history, cultural criticism is concerned with the development of intellectual, aesthetic and moral ideas and their practices. What we want to explain are those operations in language that make the intentional arguments that are the concern of intellectual history and cultural criticism conceptually possible. In fact, if the procedure works, it can make articulate when an argument exploits what is already implicitly present and when an intellectual contribution is radically new.

In a brief but illuminating argument presented twice, first in *The Conception of Value* and later in his essay, "Reply to Richards," Grice reflects

on David Hume's observation that "the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses." It is an idea that Hume returned to in his discussion of reason and taste, arguing that we have a "productive faculty, gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, [and which] raises, in a manner, a new creation."[2] Hume suggests in this passage, and Grice agrees, that this is a deep seated propensity in human nature. While Hume cites this propensity as a pervasive source of pernicious error, Grice sees it as a primitive capacity that is the origin of the concepts we use. He argues that we can explain the complexity of a concept by hypothetically reconstructing its genealogy through what he calls a 'construction routine'. The construction routine he calls *Humean Projection* offers an account of how attitudes are projected onto the world and through that process can become legitimate.[3] In the latter argument Grice is concerned with sentence operators like 'or' and 'not', but he speculates that it is possible to give an account of how concepts like mood indicators, modals and psychological propensities originate and move through successive stages, finally becoming an objective concept with satisfaction and truth conditions. He suggests that concepts progress through four successive stages. Each stage is evidenced by the grammatical and semantic operations that are permissible for the term during that stage. By putting a concept 'through the mangle' of these grammatical and semantic operations, the extension of the terms in question change; just as importantly, the intensional

meaning relationships present are also altered. At each stage, the concept repeatedly takes on new and more objective satisfaction conditions.[4]

In sketching the construction routine Grice notes that each stage has its own characteristics. In stage one the concept exists as an intuitive and unclarified attitude in our conceptual vocabulary. It seems likely that the emotions begin as felt qualities projected onto our experiences. At stage two we have reached a specific mental state. The specific mental state, judging say, is distinguished from other mental states like willing. We have evidence of the same sort of differentiation in emotion concepts. The OED reports that 'anger' originally was "that which pains or afflicts," or was a passive feeling produced by such an affliction. It was differentiated from trouble, affliction, anguish and sorrow.[5] This state generates a set of responses to the appearance of an instantiation of the initial concept. He suggests that if these states are labeled the words used would function, initially, adverbially.

During the third stage references to the specific state is replaced by a more general psychological verb. Judging and willing are understood in terms of accepting. Being 'fractious', 'irritable,' 'peevish', or 'querulous' are understood in terms of annoying someone. The use of an operator like 'not' or 'or' will appear only within the scope of the general verb, e.g., thinking p or q. The term is allowed only maximal scope within the complement of the verb, e.g., "thinking it valuable to learn Greek."[6] The question, "Did you respond with disdain, contempt or spite?" exhibits this scope restriction.

At the fourth stage the restrictions imposed by the scope of the general verb are removed. The concept has full syntactic and semantic freedom. Grice makes several observations about these stages. Stage four requires truth

conditions for statements where the term appears. Stage three can only be differentiated from stage two after stage four has been achieved. Finally, the process is not arbitrary; each subsequent stage that is exhibited has some purpose or point that justifies the change in the concept.

Grice's hypothesis that these concepts are the product of developmental stages of articulation and specification explains much. The property-response emotions identified in Chapter III have become arrested at stage three. The use of adjectives like 'startling', 'surprising' and 'horrifying' are legitimate when they denote objects that possess properties that produce states where one is startled, surprised or horrified. What is intriguing about this stage can be illustrated by our 'being startled'. When I startle you, you are startled because you find what I did startling. The converse is the same. While the emotion is yours or mine because each of us experiences it, what is the same is the affective experience of being startled, not some particular property common in each circumstance we call startling. While we share the capacity for being startled with the animals, what individuals and communities typically find startling will vary from individual to individual, community to community, and they will also vary over time. While the capacity to be startled may be inherent, the circumstances and the extrinsic causes that elicit the emotion of being startled are patterned, and possibly institutional, responses that are learned.

The property-response emotions function as widely as they do because their possible domain of application is highly general. Our legitimate application of the term will be to a concrete situation or individual, but what we select to perceive in the situation where the term can be applied is not

refined at this stage to cover a certain property of a particular individual. The key is generality. Generality has two contraries. The 'general' is opposed to the specific, and specificity is a matter of degree. We are at liberty to be as specific in our perceptions as our aims in a situation warrant us to be. The 'general' is also opposed to the particular. Property-response emotions are general in this sense. The noun forms of these emotions (surprise, horror, amusement, etc.) when present, refer to a type of experience, not a particular. The ambiguity between the specific and the particular is not recognized with these concepts at this stage. Recognition of this ambiguity operating in an emotional concept is a characteristic of the final stage.

Grice also observes that a concept, while in stage three, is understood in terms of a more general concept. 'Being startled' is a specie in the more general class of fears. 'Horror' is likewise comprehended in terms of a more general classification. Yet horror exhibits a crucial difference from being startled. 'Horror' can be specie of the fearful, e.g. "the coming war fills me with horror;" it is also a specie of distress, a painful emotion felt at something bad which is present. 'Surprise', on the other hand, can be a specie of distress or delight. The condition of generality just discussed licenses the multiple classifications. These classifications are important because they are conceptually necessary if we are to explain the emotional effects of our actions. We do not standardly respond to the question, "why did you that?" by saying, "I comforted you." We say, "I was trying to comfort you." Similarly, if you are annoyed, startled or surprised by my action I may respond by saying,

1. I *fear* that I have (annoyed, startled or surprised) you

2. I *am distressed* that I have (annoyed, startled or surprised) you

If you are comforted, charmed, or interested as a result of my action I may respond by saying,

3. I *wanted* you to find it (comforting, engaging or interesting)
4. I *am delighted* that you found it (comforting, charming or engaging).

An appeal that purports to say what our intentions are require another verb to govern the explanation of the intended emotional effect. These emotional concepts are allowed scope only within the complement of a verb. This observation suggests a topical principle. Any rhetorical use of a property-response emotion is understood and its purpose will be characterized by the end of the verb governing its explanation.

I want to suggest that the deliberative emotions are those that have reached the final stage. The syntactical and semantic freedom possessed by a concept that has reached this stage will have different success and satisfaction conditions than the emotions just discussed. We can see how Humean Projection works by examining the development of the concept of pity in English. Our present concept admits of nineteen paronymous forms. There are three verb forms: pity, pities and pitied; six noun forms: pity, pitier, pitifulness, piteousness, pitiableness, and pitilessness; seven adjectival forms: pitiful, piteous, pitiable, pitiless as well as two participial forms, pitying and pitied; and there are six adverbial forms: pitifully, piteously, pityingly, unpityingly, pitiably and pitilessly. In the Middle Ages there were nine

paronymous forms. The *Middle English Dictionary*, which records citations of the first extant recorded use, suggests that pity as a noun and piteous as an adjective are the oldest with their first recorded uses in 1300. Pitiful is recorded as appearing in 1350; piteously, in 1390; piteousness, 1393; pitifully, 1400; pitiably, 1447; pitiable, 1450; and pitiless in 1450. Verb forms are conspicuously absent. While the present forms retain some of the lexical meanings present in the Middle Ages, other meanings were added and lost over time. The changes in the extension of a word over time occur as the semantic values (e.g. for adjectives: inherence and noninherence, gradeability, dynamic vs. stative, etc.) that govern a word's meaning change. Humean Projection will indicate what conditions made those changes in meaning possible.

Still, it allows us to generate further morphological variations. In being able to locate a general property of some referent, other related semantic features become possible. The property of being 'shameful' warrants the quality of 'shamefully' and the abstractive noun form 'shamefulness'. 'Shameful' has the contrary 'shameless', which likewise warrants adverbial and abstractive noun forms. But the order in which these derivations appear reveals a part of the natural history of that emotion. And that is what we see with pity in the Middle Ages; piteous was followed by piteously and piteousness.

'Pity' is a noncount noun, and its meaning was connected with the adjective form, 'pitiful' (being full of pity, compassionate) and the adverb, 'pitifully'. As a noun, 'pity' denoted the quality of being pitiful or the disposition to mercy; it denoted the emotional directedness of tenderness or

concern aroused by the misfortunes of others; and it denoted a reason or cause for pity; and it denoted the grief, upset or turmoil that characterizes this emotional state.

The first significant change appeared in late Middle English with the appearance of 'pitiless' (without compassion) as the contrary of 'pitiful' (full of pity, or with compassion) and 'pitiable' (deserving pity or being lamentable). At the same time the noun 'pity' added another sense, the condition of deserving pity. This sense lasted until the early seventeenth century. What these changes suggest is that a distinction between the emotional occurrence and its justification emerged at this time.

Until the late fifteenth century, the experience of 'pity' was understood in terms of another related verb. The emotion was comprehended as a part of a more general psychological state. The next major change in the concept of pity occurred in the late fifteenth century when 'pity' began to be used as a transitive verb meaning 'to feel pity for'. In the early sixteenth century 'pity' as a transitive verb came to mean 'move to pity, or grieve'. The semantic achievement of making pity function as a verb is the second major event in the life of an emotional concept. It is important because verbs have aspects. Aspect is the grammatical category which refers to the way the verb action is experienced or regarded with respect to time. We can now think about how we pity, not just that we pity in some way. Pity, functioning as a predicate, is no longer conceived as simply the object of thought; it can now operate as the subject of thought as well.

Following this achievement the remaining transformational possibilities implicitly present in the term began to appear. The abstract noun

form of 'pitifulness' emerged in the middle of the sixteenth century. 'Pitying', as in grieving or the feeling or showing of pity, occurred in the late sixteenth century. A 'pitier', as one who pities, was derived from the transitive uses of the verb form. This in turn called attention to its opposite; the adverb 'pitilessly' arose at the same time. Other qualities which mark the psychological state of pity were further differentiated at this time. 'Pitiableness', the abstract quality denoting the condition of deserving pity, arose at the end of the seventeenth century. The noun form, 'pitilessness,' appeared in the middle of the eighteenth century, and 'pitiably' in the early nineteenth century. 'Unpityingly' preceded 'pityingly' in the middle of the nineteenth century.

## ENDNOTES APPENDIX A

[1] J. R. Ross, *Portraying Analogy* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1981) 137.

[2] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983) 88.

[3] Judith Baker, "Introduction," *The Conception of Value* (New York: Oxford UP, 1991) 4.

[4] Grice "Reply" 97-98.

[5] Etymological evidence suggests that there was a close association between anger, grief and anguish. T. F. Hoad in *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* says of 'anger,' "ON. *angra*, f. *angr* grief, f. base **ang-* narrow, repr. also by ON. *ongr* , Gothic *aggwus* , and OE. *enge* , OS., OHG. *engi* (Dutch, German *eng* ) narrow; related to L. *angere* ." For 'anguish' Hoad says, "AN. *anguisse* , (O)F. *angoisse* ; L. *angustia* narrowness, f. IE. **angh-* in L. *angere* , Gr. *agkhein* strangle."

[6] Grice 97.

# APPENDIX B

## ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND THE ARGUMENT FROM PATHOS

We entreat, blame, inspire, offend, threaten and praise others as ways to persuade them to take a certain course of action, alter their conduct, or express our evaluations of them or their actions. The use of these speech acts is obviously widespread. They are, for example, necessary for raising children; parents use them repeatedly and persistently. Despite their necessity, they are troublesome. Repeated use frequently becomes overuse; indiscriminate and widespread use weakens their efficacy for the individual who uses them. There is, however, a further problem. Speech acts like maligning and threatening another involve deception or force and are not normative. The problems of efficacy, coupled with the vast array of abusive or morally problematic speech acts, have certainly worked to foster the impression that emotional persuasion is nothing but an arsenal of stratagems that coerce or deceive.

The ubiquitous overuse and misuse of these tactics does not stop us from using them. The expression of our emotions is, in some important way, a natural response to situations that are not fully under voluntary control. Second, we enjoy it; there is something deeply satisfying in praising and blaming others. Third, when we rebuke or chide another, for example, we are doing something; it is an active response to a situation that calls for some kind of practical action. Finally, if that response has a putative moral component, we satisfy the motivational urge to respond normatively.

'Fulminating', 'praying', 'denouncing', and 'intimidating' all name strategies of emotional persuasion, but each differs crucially from the others both in its contents and in its purpose. These forms of argument must be examined at two levels. First, they name illocutionary acts. Speech acts are analyzed in terms of six necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Each has an illocutionary point: assertive, commissive, directive, declarative or expressive; a propositional content condition; a preparatory condition; a sincerity condition; a mode of achievement; and a degree of strength. The most detailed analysis of speech act verbs will be found in Daniel Vandervaken's *Meaning and Speech Acts.*

Second, these arguments are also purposive, and that purposiveness manifests itself in different ways. Some speech acts are constituent elements in the larger argumentative design of an essay. To 'insinuate' is to move an audience by degree to a new position; Cicero, for example, uses this verb to explain how introductions that employ 'the subtle approach' work.

Some speech acts require assent to a prior judgment for them to be successful. Censure is an especially complex act. The act of censuring can have an assertive point; it is a strong or harsh criticism or rebuke (degree of strength) that is usually made formally (mode of achievement). Censure can also be a declarative when one officially rebukes another, and censure can have an expressive point when the content focuses on the agent's disapproval of the act. To reprehend, animadvert or excoriate are speech acts that presuppose or imply some prior censure, and their propositional content depends on that recognition for it to be intelligible. To reprehend is to censure by conveying sharp (mode of achievement) disapproval (sincerity

condition). To animadvert presupposes censure (preparatory condition) and it is to comment or remark (mode of achievement) critically, usually with strong disapproval (sincerity condition). To excoriate is to censure or denounce strongly.

Some depend on a prior argument from one's opponent, and this dependence can be a matter of logic or pragmatics. To 'deny' is to deny something, a prior claim or proposition; this names a preparatory condition for the performative verb, to deny. One denies what one has been accused of or inculpated or denunciated for. One can deny a prior claim in many ways: one can oppugn, exculpate, repudiate or denounce the claim. To exculpate is to clear oneself or another of guilt or blame (mode of achievement). To oppugn is to oppose, contradict or call into question the content of the accusation. To denounce is to denounce a third party (propositional content condition); the speaker assumes a stance of moral authority, usually by attributing a grave moral error to a moral inferior (a special mode of achievement) (Vandervaken 179, 181).

One can repudiate in two ways. To repudiate can have an assertive illocutionary point or a declarative illocutionary point. As an assertive one can repudiate by emphatically (sincerity condition) rejecting either the validity of the claim (propositional content condition) by arguing that it is untrue, unfounded or unjust; or one can deny the authority of the accuser (sincerity condition of accusation). To repudiate can can also be a declarative utterance. As Daniel Vandervaken argues, to repudiate is "to declare that one is terminating an earlier obligation" as in a debt "or a right relative to it" such

as one's inheritance or nationality (200). This act generally has the perlocutionary intention of ending some responsibility.

Some strategies work to make the larger argument particular enough to be successful. The strategy's mode of achievement strives to offer the appropriate incentive. Reproofs strive to work this way. To admonish another is to offer counsel or caution with the intention of rectifying the fault or avoiding some danger, gently but earnestly (mode of achievement). The argument has the preparatory condition of a belief that that some responsibility or obligation has been disregarded or forgotten. To reproach is to express disapproval (propositional content condition) through usually regretful or unhappy criticism (mode of achievement) arising from a sense of disappointment (sincerity condition). There is also a belief that the reproached action is blameworthy (preparatory condition). To reprove another is to offer gentle (mode of achievement) criticism of some disapproved (sincerity condition) action, conduct or belief (propositional content condition) with constructive intent. To chasten is to correct by verbal punishment (mode of achievement) with the intent to restrain or subdue the agent. To chastise is to criticize as a means of effecting improvement in behavior. To chide is to scold mildly (mode of achievement) in order to correct or improve another's behavior.

Finally, some speech acts complete the argument; the act of pardoning another is an obvious example. These strategies, developed by the Roman rhetoricians, were discussed in Chapter II.

I have appended tables of these speech act verbs on the next two pages.

# Tables of Illocutionary Verbs

## Assertives

accuse
admonish
affront
alarm
allay
ameliorate
animadvert
appease
asperse
assail
assuage
assure
belittle
berate
besmirch
blame
calumniate
castigate
caution
carp
cavil
censure
chasten
chastise
chide
complain
conciliate
correct
criticize
decry
defame
denigrate
denounce
denunciate
deprecate
depreciate
deride
derogate
discredit
disgrace
dishonor
dispraise
excoriate
exculpate
expostulate
fault
inculpate
insinuate
insult
kick
lament
libel
malign
mitigate
mock
niggle
nitpick
objurgate
offend
oppugn
outrage
palliate
pettifog
placate
praise
propitiate
quibble
reassure
rebuke
recriminate
remonstrate
reprehend
reprimand
reproach
reprove
revile
ridicule
scold
slander
slur
stigmatize
sully
taunt
traduce
twit
upbraid
vilify
vituperate

## Commissives

abide
assure
browbeat
coerce
compel
consent
constrain
dedicate
favor
gratify
indulge
ingratiate
intimidate
menace
reassure
reconcile
soothe
swear
threaten
vow

## Directives

adjure
admonish
advise
advocate
alarm
anathematize
beg
beseech
blandish
cajole
caution
coax
command
consent
countenance
credit
discourage
encourage
enjoin
entreat
flatter
forbid
goad
humor
implore
importune
imprecate
impress
inspire
intercede
invite
invoke
mollify
plead
pray
recommend
stimulate
supplicate
tease
urge
warn
wheedle

## Declaratives

abjure
approbate
approve
bless
censure
confirm
condemn
consecrate
curse
damn
decry
dedicate
denounce
disapprobate
disapprove
doom
endorse
espouse
forgive
pardon
reprehend
reprimand
reprove
sanction

## Expressives

abhor
abominate
acclaim
admire
adore
adulate
affront
applaud
appreciate
approve
belittle
blame
boast
brag
celebrate
cheer
cherish
comfort
commiserate
complain
compliment
condole
congratulate
crow
deplore
deprecate
detest
disapprove
disfavor
disparage
esteem
eulogize
extol
exult
favor
fulminate
glorify
grieve
hallow
honor
inveigh
jeer
lament
laud
mourn
offend
outrage
plaudit
praise
rail
rejoice
reprove
revere
revile
taunt
venerate
vilify
vituperate
welcome

## APPENDIX C

## TABLE OF EMOTIONS AND EMOTIONAL CONDITIONS

One immediate and practical problem that any student of the emotions faces is the lack of a detailed list of emotions and emotional conditions. In the hope that someone working in this field will find it helpful, I append a working list of these states and conditions.

abashment
abhorrence
abjectness
acerbity
acrimony
admiration
adoration
affection
agape
aggravation
aggrieved
aghast
agitation
agony
alarm
allure
amour propre
amusement
anger
angst
anguish
animosity
animus
annoyance
antagonism
antipathy
anxiety
appalled
appetite
apprehension
ardor
arousal
arrogance
ashamed
asperity
astonishment
attentiveness
attraction
aversion
avidity
awe
balefulness
beatific
beguiled
belligerence
bewilderment
bewitched
biliousness
bitterness
bliss
blitheness
boldness
boredom
brooding
brusqueness
cantankerousness
capriciousness
captivated
care
cark
chagrin
charmed
cheerfulness
choleric
churlish
comfort
compassion
compunction
conceit
confidence
confounded
confusion
consolation
consternation
contempt
contentiousness
contrition
contumely
covetousness
craving
crossness
cruelty
crustiness
cupidity
daring
daunted
dejection
delight
depression
derision
desire
desolation
despair
despondent
detestation
devotion
diffidence
discomfitted
discomforted
discomposed
disconcerted
disconsolate
discontentment
discouraged
disdain
disgust
disheartened
disillusionment
dismay
disquietude
distracted
distress
disturbed
dithering
diverted
dolefulness
dolor
dour
dread
dudgeon
dyspeptic
eagerness
ebullience
ecstasy
elan
elation
embarrassment
embittered
emulation
engaged
engrossed
enjoyment
enmity
enraptured
enthusiasm
envy
eros
esteem
euphoria
exasperation
exhileration
exuberance
exultation
faithlessness

fascination
favor
fear
fecklessness
felicity
ferocity
fervor
fickleness
fierceness
fitfulness
flighty
flippancy
flustered
forlorn
fractiousness
frantic
frenetic
frenzy
fretful
fright
frivolous
froward
frustration
fulminating
fulsome
funereal
furor
fury
gaiety
galled
gladness
glee
gloomy
gratification
grief
grouchiness
grumpiness
guilt
happiness
haughtiness
hubris
impudence
incensed
infuriated
inimical
intractable
iracund
irascibility
irate
ire
irksomeness
irresolution
irritation
jealousy
jollity
joviality
joy
jubilation
keenness
lachrymose
lacivious
lamentation
langour
languidness
lassitude
lassitude
lethargy
listlessness
loathing
longing
love
lugubrious
lust
malcontented
malefic
maleficence
malevolence
malice
meanness
meekness
melancholy
mercurial
merriness
miffed
mirth
misery
mockery
mopishness
morbidity
mordancy
moroseness
mortification
mulish
mystification
nauseated
nervous
nettled
nonplussed
odium
opprobrium
ostentation
otiosity
peevishness
penitence
perplexity
perturbation
petulance
philia
pique
pitilessness
pity
placidity
pleased
puzzled
qualm
querulous
quick tempered
rage
rancor
rankling
ranting
rapacious
rapture
raving
ravished
regret
remorse
resentment
ressentiment
reticence
revulsion
ridicule
riled
roiled
rue
ruth
sadness
satisfaction
saturnine
scared
schadenfreude
scorn
sentiment
sentimental
sentimentality
shame
shamelessness
shock
shrewish
sickened
somber
sorrow
sorry
spite
splenetic
startled
stultified
stupified
sulkiness
sullen
sultry
superciliousness
surprise
sympathy
taciturn
tantalized
terror
thrill
timidity
titillation
torment
torpor
touched
transported
tremulous
troubled
trust
umbrage
unease
unstable
upset
vacillating
vainglory
vanity
vapidity
vehemence
vexation
vindictiveness
voracity
winsome
wish
wistfulness
woe
wonder
worry
wrath
wretched
wroth
yearning
zeal