Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United States v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define Crimes, The

This article offers a historically grounded account of the twists and turns in the Supreme Court\u27s sentencing jurisprudence from the end of World War II to the Court\u27s stunning rejection of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The doctrinal shifts that have roiled this area of the law can best be understood as the Court\u27s effort to respond to the changing political and social landscape of crime in America. In the mid 1970\u27s, legislative activity in the criminal law was largely focused on Model Penal Code influenced recodification. In that era, the Supreme Court took power from an ascendant judiciary and gave it to legislators who did not seem disposed to exercise their authority too broadly. By the late 1990\u27s the tide had shifted and the Court turned sentencing doctrine on its head to take power over criminal law from legislative bodies inclined to push the limits of their power and transfer it back to a newly cautious judiciary. This article explores how that shift in power was informed by changing social and political conditions and was accomplished through doctrines regulating the Sixth Amendment right to trial

Reciprocity towards groups : a laboratory experiment on the causes

Field studies of conflict report cycles of mutual revenge between groups, often linked to perceptions of intergroup injustice. We test the hypothesis that people are predisposed to reciprocate against groups. In a computerized laboratory experiment, subjects who were harmed by a partner’s uncooperative action reacted by harming other members of the partner’s group. This group reciprocity was only observed when one group was seen to be unfairly advantaged. Our results support a behavioral mechanism leading from perceived injustice to intergroup conflict. We discuss the relevance of group reciprocity to economic and political phenomena including conflict, discrimination and team competition

Inequity Aversion, Reciprocity, and Appropriateness in the Ultimatum-Revenge Game

This article reports the results of a simple bargaining experiment on the ultimatum-revenge game. The game enables to differentiate between fairness that is stimulated by intentional based motives, distributional motives, and fairness considerations that mix both motives. The laboratory experiments indicate considerable heterogeneity of motives. A majority of subjects seem to combine both motives. However, the composition of the mix is subject to a transition, which can be formalized by the principle of appropriateness. In contrast to contemporary reciprocity models, this approach suggests that mildly unkind treatments are responded mildly unkindly, while strong unkindness leads to harsh reactions.distributional preferences, fairness, intentional based preferences, social welfare, ultimatum bargaining

Informational Warfare

Recent empirical and theoretical work suggests that reputation was an important mediator of access to resources in ancestral human environments. Reputations were built and maintained by the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the actions and capabilities of group members-that is, by gossiping. Strategic gossiping would have been an excellent strategy for manipulating reputations and thereby competing effectively for resources and for cooperative relationships with group members who could best provide such resources. Coalitions (cliques) may have increased members' abilities to manipulate reputations by gossiping. Because, over evolutionary time, women may have experienced more within-group competition than men, and because female reputations may have been more vulnerable than male reputations to gossip, gossiping may have been a more important strategy for women than men. Consequently, women may have evolved specializations for gossiping alone and in coalitions. We develop and partially test this theory