OpenNym: privacy preserving recommending via pseudonymous group authentication

A user accessing an online recommender system typically has two choices: either agree to be uniquely identified and in return receive a personalized and rich experience, or try to use the service anonymously but receive a degraded non-personalized service. In this paper, we offer a third option to this “all or nothing” paradigm, namely use a web service with a public group identity, that we refer to as an OpenNym identity, which provides users with a degree of anonymity while still allowing useful personalization of the web service. Our approach can be implemented as a browser shim that is backward compatible with existing services and as an example, we demonstrate operation with the Movielens online service. We exploit the fact that users can often be clustered into groups having similar preferences and in this way, increased privacy need not come at the cost of degraded service. Indeed use of the OpenNym approach with Movielens improves personalization performance

Trust management schemes for peer-to-peer networks

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking enables users with similar interests to exchange, or obtain files. This network model has been proven popular to exchange music, pictures, or software applications. These files are saved, and most likely executed, at the downloading host. At the expense of this mechanism, worms, viruses, and malware find an open front door to the downloading host and gives them a convenient environment for successful proliferation throughout the network. Although virus detection software is currently available, this countermeasure works in a reactive fashion, and in most times, in an isolated manner. A trust management scheme is considered to contain the proliferation of viruses in P2P networks. Specifically, a cooperative and distributed trust management scheme based on a two-layer approach to bound the proliferation of viruses is proposed. The new scheme is called double-layer dynamic trust (DDT) management scheme. The results show that the proposed scheme bounds the proliferation of malware. With the proposed scheme, the number of infected hosts and the proliferation rate are limited to small values. In addition, it is shown that network activity is not discouraged by using the proposed scheme. Moreover, to improve the efficiency on the calculation of trust values of ratio based normalization models, a model is proposed for trust value calculation using a three-dimensional normalization to represent peer activity with more accuracy than that of a conventional ratio based normalization. Distributed network security is also considered, especially in P2P network security. For many P2P systems, including ad hoc networks and online markets, reputation systems have been considered as a solution for mitigating the affects of malicious peers. However, a sybil attack, wherein forging identities is performed to unfairly and arbitrarily influence the reputation of peers in a network or community. To defend against sybil attack, each reported transaction, which is used to calculate trust values, is verified. In this thesis, it is shown that peer reputation alone cannot bound network subversion of a sybil attack. Therefore, a new trust management framework, called Sybildefense, is introduced. This framework combines a trust management scheme with a cryptography mechanism to verify different transaction claims issue by peers, including those bogus claims of sybil peers. To improve the efficiency on the identification of honest peers from sybil peers, a k-means clustering mechanism is adopted. Moreover, to include a list of peer’s trustees in a warning messages is proposed to generate a local table for a peer that it is used to identify possible clusters of sybil peers. The defensive performance of these algorithms are compared under sybil attacks. The performance results show that the proposed framework (Sybildefense) can thwart sybil attacks efficiently

Thwarting Sybil Attackers in Reputation-based Scheme in Mobile Ad hoc Networks

Routing in mobile ad hoc networks is performed in a distributed fashion where each node acts as host and router, such that it forwards incoming packets for others without relying on a dedicated router. Nodes are mostly resource constraint and the users are usually inclined to conserve their resources and exhibit selfish behaviour by not contributing in the routing process. The trust and reputation models have been proposed to motivate selfish nodes for cooperation in the packet forwarding process. Nodes having bad trust or reputation are detected and secluded from the network, eventually. However, due to the lack of proper identity management and use of non-persistent identities in ad hoc networks, malicious nodes can pose various threats to these methods. For example, a malicious node can discard the bad reputed identity and enter into the system with another identity afresh, called whitewashing. Similarly, a malicious node may create more than one identity, called Sybil attack, for self-promotion, defame other nodes, and broadcast fake recommendations in the network. These identity-based attacks disrupt the overall detection of the reputation systems. In this paper, we propose a reputation-based scheme that detects selfish nodes and deters identity attacks. We address the issue in such a way that, for normal selfish nodes, it will become no longer advantageous to carry out a whitewash. Sybil attackers are also discouraged (i.e., on a single battery, they may create fewer identities). We design and analyse our rationale via game theory and evaluate our proposed reputation system using NS-2 simulator. The results obtained from the simulation demonstrate that our proposed technique considerably diminishes the throughput and utility of selfish nodes with a single identity and selfish nodes with multiple identities when compared to the benchmark scheme

A layered security approach for cooperation enforcement in MANETs

In fully self-organized MANETs, nodes are naturally reluctant to spend their precious resources forwarding other nodes' packets and are therefore liable to exhibit selfish or sometimes malicious behaviour. This selfishness could potentially lead to network partitioning and network performance degradation. Cooperation enforcement schemes, such as reputation and trust based schemes have been proposed to counteract the issue of selfishness. The sole purpose of these schemes is to ensure selfish nodes bear the consequences of their bad actions. However, malicious nodes can exploit mobility and free identities available to breach the security of these systems and escape punishment or detection. Firstly, in the case of mobility, a malicious node can gain benefit even after having been detected by a reputation-based system, by interacting directly with its source or destination nodes. Secondly, since the lack of infrastructure in MANETs does not suit centralized identity management or centralized Trusted Third Parties, nodes can create zero-cost identities without any restrictions. As a result, a selfish node can easily escape the consequences of whatever misbehaviour it has performed by simply changing identity to clear all its bad history, known as whitewashing. Hence, this makes it difficult to hold malicious nodes accountable for their actions. Finally, a malicious node can concurrently create and control more than one virtual identity to launch an attack, called a Sybil attack. In the context of reputation-based schemes, a Sybil attacker can disrupt the detection accuracy by defaming other good nodes, self-promoting itself or exchanging bogus positive recommendations about one of its quarantined identities. This thesis explores two aspects of direct interactions (DIs), i. e. Dis as a selfish nodes' strategy and Dis produced by inappropriate simulation parameters. In the latter case DIs cause confusion in the results evaluation of reputation-based schemes. We propose a method that uses the service contribution and consumption information to discourage selfish nodes that try to increase their benefit through DIs. We also propose methods that categorize nodes' benefits in order to mitigate the confusion caused in the results evaluation. A novel layered security approach is proposed using proactive and reactive paradigms to counteract whitewashing and Sybil attacks. The proactive paradigm is aimed at removing the advantages that whitewashing can provide by enforcing a non-monetary entry fee per new identity, in the form of cooperation in the network. The results show that this method deters these attackers by reducing their benefits in the network. In the reactive case, we propose a lightweight approach to detect new identities of whitewashers and Sybil attackers on the MAC layer using the 802.11 protocol without using any extra hardware. The experiments show that a signal strength based threshold exists which can help us detect Sybil and whitewashers' identities. Through the help of extensive simulations and real-world testbed experimentations, we are able to demonstrate that our proposed solution detects Sybil or whitewashers' new identities with good accuracy and reduces the benefits of malicious activity even in the presence of mobility

Das Potential von Peer-to-Peer-Netzen und -Systemen : Architekturen, Robustheit und rechtliche Verortung

Um das Potential von P2P-Netzen und -Systemen für die Entwicklung und den Betrieb zukünftiger verteilter Systeme zu analysieren, erfolgt in der Arbeit zunächst eine umfassende Darlegung des aktuellen Entwicklungsstandes. Daraus leiten sich wesentliche Fragestellungen hinsichtlich Architektur, Robustheit und Telekommunikationsrecht ab. In der Folge werden diese untersucht, indem vorhandene Mechanismen bewertet sowie durch neuartige Verfahren ergänzt werden, um bestehende Defizite auszugleichen

Quantifying resistance to the Sybil attack

Abstract. Sybil attacks have been shown to be unpreventable except under the protection of a vigilant central authority. We use an economic analysis to show quantitatively that some appli-cations and protocols are more robust against the attack than others. In our approach, for each distributed application and an attacker objective, there is a critical value that determines the cost-effectiveness of the attack. A Sybil attack is worthwhile only when the critical value is exceeded by the ratio of the value of the attacker’s goal to the cost of identities. We show that for many applications, successful Sybil attacks may be expensive even when the Sybil attack cannot be prevented. Specifically, we propose the use of a recurring fee as a deterrent against the Sybil at-tack. As a detailed example, we look at four variations of the Sybil attack against a recurring fee based onion routing anonymous routing network and quantify its vulnerability.