3,673 research outputs found
Security and Privacy Issues of Big Data
This chapter revises the most important aspects in how computing
infrastructures should be configured and intelligently managed to fulfill the
most notably security aspects required by Big Data applications. One of them is
privacy. It is a pertinent aspect to be addressed because users share more and
more personal data and content through their devices and computers to social
networks and public clouds. So, a secure framework to social networks is a very
hot topic research. This last topic is addressed in one of the two sections of
the current chapter with case studies. In addition, the traditional mechanisms
to support security such as firewalls and demilitarized zones are not suitable
to be applied in computing systems to support Big Data. SDN is an emergent
management solution that could become a convenient mechanism to implement
security in Big Data systems, as we show through a second case study at the end
of the chapter. This also discusses current relevant work and identifies open
issues.Comment: In book Handbook of Research on Trends and Future Directions in Big
Data and Web Intelligence, IGI Global, 201
Securing the software-defined networking control plane by using control and data dependency techniques
Software-defined networking (SDN) fundamentally changes how network and security practitioners design, implement, and manage their networks. SDN decouples the decision-making about traffic forwarding (i.e., the control plane) from the traffic being forwarded (i.e., the data plane). SDN also allows for network applications, or apps, to programmatically control network forwarding behavior and policy through a logically centralized control plane orchestrated by a set of SDN controllers. As a result of logical centralization, SDN controllers act as network operating systems in the coordination of shared data plane resources and comprehensive security policy implementation.
SDN can support network security through the provision of security services and the assurances of policy enforcement. However, SDNâs programmability means that a networkâs security considerations are different from those of traditional networks. For instance, an adversary who manipulates the programmable control plane can leverage significant control over the data planeâs behavior.
In this dissertation, we demonstrate that the security posture of SDN can be enhanced using control and data dependency techniques that track information flow and enable understanding of application composability, control and data plane decoupling, and control plane insight. We support that statement through investigation of the various ways in which an attacker can use control flow and data flow dependencies to influence the SDN control plane under different threat models. We systematically explore and evaluate the SDN security posture through a combination of runtime, pre-runtime, and post-runtime contributions in both attack development and defense designs.
We begin with the development a conceptual accountability framework for SDN. We analyze the extent to which various entities within SDN are accountable to each other, what they are accountable for, mechanisms for assurance about accountability, standards by which accountability is judged, and the consequences of breaching accountability. We discover significant research gaps in SDNâs accountability that impact SDNâs security posture. In particular, the results of applying the accountability framework showed that more control plane attribution is necessary at different layers of abstraction, and that insight motivated the remaining work in this dissertation.
Next, we explore the influence of apps in the SDN control planeâs secure operation. We find that existing access control protections that limit what apps can do, such as role-based access controls, prove to be insufficient for preventing malicious apps from damaging control plane operations. The reason is SDNâs reliance on shared network state. We analyze SDNâs shared state model to discover that benign apps can be tricked into acting as âconfused deputiesâ; malicious apps can poison the state used by benign apps, and that leads the benign apps to make decisions that negatively affect the network. That violates an implicit (but unenforced) integrity policy that governs the networkâs security. Because of the strong interdependencies among apps that result from SDNâs shared state model, we show that apps can be easily co-opted as âgadgets,â and that allows an attacker who minimally controls one app to make changes to the network state beyond his or her originally granted permissions. We use a data provenance approach to track the lineage of the network state objects by assigning attribution to the set of processes and agents responsible for each control plane object. We design the ProvSDN tool to track API requests from apps as they access the shared network stateâs objects, and to check requests against a predefined integrity policy to ensure that low-integrity apps cannot poison high-integrity apps. ProvSDN acts as both a reference monitor and an information flow control enforcement mechanism.
Motivated by the strong inter-app dependencies, we investigate whether implicit data plane dependencies affect the control planeâs secure operation too. We find that data plane hosts typically have an outsized effect on the generation of the network state in reactive-based control plane designs. We also find that SDNâs event-based design, and the apps that subscribe to events, can induce dependencies that originate in the data plane and that eventually change forwarding behaviors. That combination gives attackers that are residing on data plane hosts significant opportunities to influence control plane decisions without having to compromise the SDN controller or apps. We design the EventScope tool to automatically identify where such vulnerabilities occur. EventScope clusters appsâ event usage to decide in which cases unhandled events should be handled, statically analyzes controller and app code to understand how events affect control plane execution, and identifies valid control flow paths in which a data plane attacker can reach vulnerable code to cause unintended data plane changes. We use EventScope to discover 14 new vulnerabilities, and we develop exploits that show how such vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to bypass an intended network (i.e., data plane) access control policy. This research direction is critical for SDN security evaluation because such vulnerabilities could be induced by host-based malware campaigns.
Finally, although there are classes of vulnerabilities that can be removed prior to deployment, it is inevitable that other classes of attacks will occur that cannot be accounted for ahead of time. In those cases, a network or security practitioner would need to have the right amount of after-the-fact insight to diagnose the root causes of such attacks without being inundated with too much informa- tion. Challenges remain in 1) the modeling of apps and objects, which can lead to overestimation or underestimation of causal dependencies; and 2) the omission of a data plane model that causally links control and data plane activities. We design the PicoSDN tool to mitigate causal dependency modeling challenges, to account for a data plane model through the use of the data plane topology to link activities in the provenance graph, and to account for network semantics to appropriately query and summarize the control planeâs history. We show how prior work can hinder investigations and analysis in SDN-based attacks and demonstrate how PicoSDN can track SDN control plane attacks.Ope
CamFlow: Managed Data-sharing for Cloud Services
A model of cloud services is emerging whereby a few trusted providers manage
the underlying hardware and communications whereas many companies build on this
infrastructure to offer higher level, cloud-hosted PaaS services and/or SaaS
applications. From the start, strong isolation between cloud tenants was seen
to be of paramount importance, provided first by virtual machines (VM) and
later by containers, which share the operating system (OS) kernel. Increasingly
it is the case that applications also require facilities to effect isolation
and protection of data managed by those applications. They also require
flexible data sharing with other applications, often across the traditional
cloud-isolation boundaries; for example, when government provides many related
services for its citizens on a common platform. Similar considerations apply to
the end-users of applications. But in particular, the incorporation of cloud
services within `Internet of Things' architectures is driving the requirements
for both protection and cross-application data sharing.
These concerns relate to the management of data. Traditional access control
is application and principal/role specific, applied at policy enforcement
points, after which there is no subsequent control over where data flows; a
crucial issue once data has left its owner's control by cloud-hosted
applications and within cloud-services. Information Flow Control (IFC), in
addition, offers system-wide, end-to-end, flow control based on the properties
of the data. We discuss the potential of cloud-deployed IFC for enforcing
owners' dataflow policy with regard to protection and sharing, as well as
safeguarding against malicious or buggy software. In addition, the audit log
associated with IFC provides transparency, giving configurable system-wide
visibility over data flows. [...]Comment: 14 pages, 8 figure
Microservices Security Challenges and Approaches
The fast-paced development cycles of microservices applications increase the probability of insufficient security tests in the development pipelines and consequent deployment of vulnerable microservices. The distribution and ephemeral of microservices create a discoverability challenge for traditional security assessment techniques, especially for microservices being dynamically launched and de-registered. To address this in applications and networks, continuous security assessments are used for vulnerability detection. Detected vulnerabilities are thereafter patched, essentially reducing the chances for security attacks. This paper illustrates the microservices architecture and its components from the security perspective. It investigates, summarizes, and highlights the microservices security-related challenges and the suggested approaches and proposals for facing them. It addresses the security impact on the different microservice architectural perspectives
Cybersecurity issues in software architectures for innovative services
The recent advances in data center development have been at the basis of the widespread
success of the cloud computing paradigm, which is at the basis of models for software based applications and services, which is the "Everything as a Service" (XaaS) model. According to the XaaS model, service of any kind are deployed on demand
as cloud based applications, with a great degree of flexibility and a limited need for investments in dedicated hardware and or software components. This approach opens up a lot of opportunities, for instance providing access to complex and widely
distributed applications, whose cost and complexity represented in the past a significant entry barrier, also to small or emerging businesses. Unfortunately, networking is now embedded in every service and application, raising several cybersecurity issues related to corruption and leakage of data, unauthorized access, etc. However, new service-oriented architectures are emerging in this context, the so-called services enabler architecture. The aim of these architectures is not only to expose and give the resources to these types of services, but it is also to validate them. The validation includes numerous aspects, from the legal to the infrastructural ones e.g., but above all the cybersecurity threats. A solid threat analysis of the aforementioned architecture is therefore necessary, and this is the main goal of this thesis. This work investigate the security threats of the emerging service enabler architectures, providing proof of concepts for these issues and the solutions too, based on several use-cases implemented in real world scenarios
CBAM: A Contextual Model for Network Anomaly Detection
Anomaly-based intrusion detection methods aim to combat the increasing rate of zero-day attacks, however, their success is currently restricted to the detection of high-volume attacks using aggregated traffic features. Recent evaluations show that the current anomaly-based network intrusion detection methods fail to reliably detect remote access attacks. These are smaller in volume and often only stand out when compared to their surroundings. Currently, anomaly methods try to detect access attack events mainly as point anomalies and neglect the context they appear in. We present and examine a contextual bidirectional anomaly model (CBAM) based on deep LSTM-networks that is specifically designed to detect such attacks as contextual network anomalies. The model efficiently learns short-term sequential patterns in network flows as conditional event probabilities. Access attacks frequently break these patterns when exploiting vulnerabilities, and can thus be detected as contextual anomalies. We evaluated CBAM on an assembly of three datasets that provide both representative network access attacks, real-life traffic over a long timespan, and traffic from a real-world red-team attack. We contend that this assembly is closer to a potential deployment environment than current NIDS benchmark datasets. We show that, by building a deep model, we are able to reduce the false positive rate to 0.16% while effectively detecting six out of seven access attacks, which is significantly lower than the operational range of other methods. We further demonstrate that short-term flow structures remain stable over long periods of time, making the CBAM robust against concept drift
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