Symbolic play as a zone of proximal development: An analysis of informational exchange

Symbolic play has long been considered a beneficial context for development. According to Cultural Learning theory, one reason for this is that symbolically-infused dialogical interactions constitute a zone of proximal development. However, the dynamics of caregiver-child interactions during symbolic play are still not fully understood. In the current study, we investigated informational exchange between fifty-two 24-month-old infants and their primary caregivers during symbolic play and a comparable, non-symbolic, functional play context. We coded over 11,000 utterances for whether participants had superior, equivalent, or inferior knowledge concerning the current conversational topic. Results showed that children were significantly more knowledgeable speakers and recipients in symbolic play, whereas the opposite was the case for caregivers, who were more knowledgeable in functional play. The results suggest that, despite its potential conceptual complexity, symbolic play may scaffold development because it facilitates infants’ communicative success by promoting them to ‘co-constructors of meaning’

Symbolic Play and Language Acquisition: The Dynamics of Infant-Caretaker Communication during Symbolic Play

Infant symbolic play and language acquisition have long been linked. While both activities are inherently social and their acquisition is typically scaffolded by a competent other (Vygotsky, 1978), most studies investigating the symbolic play-language link have considered it in contexts of solitary play. This thesis examines the dynamic nature of the relationship in a semi-naturalistic setting. Fifty-two infant-caretaker dyads engaged in a 20-minute play session that manipulated play type through the use of different toy sets (symbolic versus non-symbolic). Study 1 showed that play contexts influenced language: in symbolic play, infants spoke more and their language and interactions were more complex. CDS was more interactionally demanding (more questions and mimetics) in symbolic play, while in non-symbolic play it was more directive (imperatives and naming). Study 2 established that conversational turn dynamics patterns differed: there were more conversational turns in symbolic play, turn transitions were longer, and infants were more likely to control entire turn sequences. Study 3 demonstrated that symbolic play allowed for greater and richer content alignment: there were more semantic repetitions and infants were more likely to choose the topic of conversation than their parents. Study 4 revealed more complex and demanding epistemic exchanges of information in symbolic play: infants were more likely to inform, assert, and build on previous information when they spoke. Parents were more likely to actively engage the infants in symbolic play by seeking or requesting information, but the ambiguity of symbolic play also meant that it was more difficult for participants to understand each other. When combined, the results of these four studies suggest that symbolic play is a challenging but communicatively rich environment for infants' language development, constituting a zone of proximal development deriving from the need to establish shared intentionality during interaction

Symbolic play provides a fertile context for language development

In this study we test the hypothesis that symbolic play represents a fertile context for language acquisition because its inherent ambiguity elicits communicative behaviours that positively influence development. Infant-caregiver dyads (N = 54) participated in two 20-minute play sessions six months apart (Time 1 = 18 months, Time 2 = 24 months). During each session the dyads played with two sets of toys that elicited either symbolic or functional play. The sessions were transcribed and coded for several features of dyadic interaction and speech; infants’ linguistic proficiency was measured via parental report. The two play contexts resulted in different communicative and linguistic behaviour. Notably, the symbolic play condition resulted in significantly greater conversational turn-taking than functional play, and also resulted in the greater use of questions and mimetics in infant-directed speech (IDS). In contrast, caregivers used more imperative clauses in functional play. Regression analyses showed that unique properties of symbolic play (i.e., turn-taking, yes-no questions, mimetics) positively predicted children’s language proficiency, whereas unique features of functional play (i.e., imperatives in IDS) negatively predicted proficiency. The results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that symbolic play is a fertile context for language development, driven by the need to negotiate meaning

Young children expect pretend object identities to be known only by their partners in joint pretence

The present study examined whether three‐year‐old children (age = 42–48 months, n = 57; 31 boys) understand that object identities stipulated during pretend play could only be known by people witnessing the stipulation. Children participated in pretend scenarios that included some objects and two experimenters. Two pretend episodes corresponded to an object: one connected to its conventional function, the other to a pretend identity made‐up on the spot. These episodes happened either in the presence or absence of the other person. In the test phase, this experimenter expressed an intention to do something with an object and asked for a ‘missing’ prop. The prediction was that in case she was present previously, children would be more likely to select the prop corresponding to a pretence stipulation, compared to when she was absent. The results confirmed this pattern: in the absent condition, 68.42% of the participants chose the prop connected to the conventional use of the object, while 31.58% chose the prop corresponding to its identity stipulated in pretend play. It seems that preschool aged children refrain from generalizing their knowledge about the pretend identity of an object, in case their interactive partner could not know of this identity

Review of Making the Social World by John Searle (2010) (review revised 2019)

Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology. S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W S and other books for more details. Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

Towards a Theory Grounded Theory of Language

In this paper, we build upon the idea of theory grounding and propose one specific form of theory grounding, a theory of language. Theory grounding is the idea that we can imbue our embodied artificially intelligent systems with theories by modeling the way humans, and specifically young children, develop skills with theories. Modeling theory development promises to increase the conceptual and behavioral flexibility of these systems. An example of theory development in children is the social understanding referred to as “theory of mind.” Language is a natural task for theory grounding because it is vital in symbolic skills and apparently necessary in developing theories. Word learning, and specifically developing a concept of words, is proposed as the first step in a theory grounded theory of language

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism