39 research outputs found
On Borrowed Time -- Preventing Static Power Side-Channel Analysis
In recent years, static power side-channel analysis attacks have emerged as a
serious threat to cryptographic implementations, overcoming state-of-the-art
countermeasures against side-channel attacks. The continued down-scaling of
semiconductor process technology, which results in an increase of the relative
weight of static power in the total power budget of circuits, will only improve
the viability of static power side-channel analysis attacks. Yet, despite the
threat posed, limited work has been invested into mitigating this class of
attack. In this work we address this gap. We observe that static power
side-channel analysis relies on stopping the target circuit's clock over a
prolonged period, during which the circuit holds secret information in its
registers. We propose Borrowed Time, a countermeasure that hinders an
attacker's ability to leverage such clock control. Borrowed Time detects a
stopped clock and triggers a reset that wipes any registers containing
sensitive intermediates, whose leakages would otherwise be exploitable. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our countermeasure by performing practical
Correlation Power Analysis attacks under optimal conditions against an AES
implementation on an FPGA target with and without our countermeasure in place.
In the unprotected case, we can recover the entire secret key using traces from
1,500 encryptions. Under the same conditions, the protected implementation
successfully prevents key recovery even with traces from 1,000,000 encryptions
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Compound Effects of Clock and Voltage Based Power Side-Channel Countermeasures
The power side-channel attack, which allows an attacker to derive secret information from power traces, continues to be a major vulnerability in many critical systems. Numerous countermeasures have been proposed since its discovery as a serious vulnerability, including both hardware and software implementations. Each countermeasure has its own drawback, with some of the highly effective countermeasures incurring large overhead in area and power. In addition, many countermeasures are quite invasive to the design process, requiring modification of the design and therefore additional validation and testing to ensure its accuracy. Less invasive countermeasures that do not require directly modifying the system do exist but often offer less protection.
This thesis analyzes two non-invasive countermeasures and examines ways to maximize the protection offered by them while incurring the least amount of overhead. These two countermeasures are called clock phase noise (CPN) and voltage noise (VN), and are placed on the same FPGA as an AES encryption module that we are trying to protect. We test these designs against a highly effective algorithm called correlation power analysis (CPA) and a preprocessing technique called the sliding window attack (SW).
We found that the combined effects of the two countermeasures was greater than the impact of either countermeasure when used independently, and published a paper in the 2019 IEEE 30th International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors (ASAP) on our findings. We found that our best combined countermeasure protected about 76% of the maximum amount of traces that a well-known but invasive competitor, wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL), could with only about 41% of the area and 78% of the power. However, the sliding window attack significantly reduced the amount of protection our combined countermeasure could offer to only 11% of that offered by WDDL. Since then, we updated our methodology and made some adjustments to VN and CPN. Our CPN countermeasure greatly improved, and therefore so did our combined countermeasure, which on average protected up to about 90% of the maximum amount of traces that WDDL could with only about 43% of the area and about 60% of the power. This is remarkable because these results are after the sliding window attack, meaning that our post-proposal countermeasures protect almost as well as WDDL while requiring only about half of the resources
Effects of Architecture on Information Leakage of a Hardware Advanced Encryption Standard Implementation
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a threat to many modern cryptosystems. Many countermeasures exist, but are costly to implement and still do not provide complete protection against SCA. A plausible alternative is to design the cryptosystem using architectures that are known to leak little information about the cryptosystem\u27s operations. This research uses several common primitive architectures for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and assesses the susceptibility of the full AES system to side-channel attack for various primitive configurations. A combined encryption/decryption core is also evaluated to determine if variation of high-level architectures affects leakage characteristics. These different configurations are evaluated under multiple measurement types and leakage models. The results show that different hardware configurations do impact the amount of information leaked by a device, but none of the tested configurations are able to prevent exploitation
Sliding-Window Correlation Attacks Against Encryption Devices with an Unstable Clock
Power analysis side channel attacks rely on aligned traces. As a counter-measure, devices can use a jittered clock to misalign the power traces. In this paper we suggest a way to overcome this counter-measure, using an old method of integrating samples over time followed by a correlation attack (Sliding Window CPA). We theoretically re-analyze this general method with characteristics of jittered clocks and show that it is stronger than previously believed. We show that integration of samples over a suitably chosen window size actually amplifies the correlation both with and without jitter - as long as multiple leakage points are present within the window. We then validate our analysis on a new data-set of traces measured on a board implementing a jittered clock. Our experiments show that the SW-CPA attack with a well-chosen window size is very successful against a jittered clock counter-measure and significantly outperforms previous suggestions, requiring a much smaller set of traces to correctly identify the correct key
SoK: SCA-secure ECC in software – mission impossible?
This paper describes an ECC implementation computing the X25519 keyexchange protocol on the Arm Cortex-M4 microcontroller. For providing protections against various side-channel and fault attacks we first review known attacks and countermeasures, then we provide software implementations that come with extensive mitigations, and finally we present a preliminary side-channel evaluation. To our best knowledge, this is the first public software claiming affordable protection against multiple classes of attacks that are motivated by distinct real-world application scenarios. We distinguish between X25519 with ephemeral keys and X25519 with static keys and show that the overhead to our baseline unprotected implementation is about 37% and 243%, respectively. While this might seem to be a high price to pay for security, we also show that even our (most protected) static implementation is at least as efficient as widely-deployed ECC cryptographic libraries, which offer much less protection
Cache Timing Attacks on Public Key Encryption
The rise of cloud computing has made it a lot easier for attackers to be able to run code on the same processors as their target. This has made many attacks more viable. This thesis discusses a cache timing attack targeting the LibTomMath library. LibTom-Math is a mathematical library for computations using large integers. The library is used in some cryptographic libraries such the commercial solution WolfCrypt.
The attack mainly focuses on the modular exponentiation function of LibTom-Math which is a major part of RSA implementations. The aim of the attack is to use cache timing in order to extract the long term private key used by the server for encrypting communications. Recovering the private key, gives the attacker access to past and future communications secured using this key, which usually has a lifespan of at least one year. The attack only requires that it shares a processor with the victim and works even if the attack process and the victim process are running on different Virtual Machines.
The thesis includes a description of the RSA cipher as well as the various optimizations that are used in a lot of cryptographic libraries. Next, it describes how to use cache timing to exploit some of those optimizations in order to gain information about the secret exponent based on the memory access patterns of the target code.
Finally, it discusses the limitations of the attack as well as how cloud service providers, cryptographic library developers, as well as processor manufacturers, may be able to mitigate this class of attacks
Enhancing Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis in an Operational Environment
Side-channel attacks exploit the unintentional emissions from cryptographic devices to determine the secret encryption key. This research identifies methods to make attacks demonstrated in an academic environment more operationally relevant. Algebraic cryptanalysis is used to reconcile redundant information extracted from side-channel attacks on the AES key schedule. A novel thresholding technique is used to select key byte guesses for a satisfiability solver resulting in a 97.5% success rate despite failing for 100% of attacks using standard methods. Two techniques are developed to compensate for differences in emissions from training and test devices dramatically improving the effectiveness of cross device template attacks. Mean and variance normalization improves same part number attack success rates from 65.1% to 100%, and increases the number of locations an attack can be performed by 226%. When normalization is combined with a novel technique to identify and filter signals in collected traces not related to the encryption operation, the number of traces required to perform a successful attack is reduced by 85.8% on average. Finally, software-defined radios are shown to be an effective low-cost method for collecting side-channel emissions in real-time, eliminating the need to modify or profile the target encryption device to gain precise timing information
Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
The chapters in this open access book arise out of the EU Cost Action project Cryptacus, the objective of which was to improve and adapt existent cryptanalysis methodologies and tools to the ubiquitous computing framework. The cryptanalysis implemented lies along four axes: cryptographic models, cryptanalysis of building blocks, hardware and software security engineering, and security assessment of real-world systems. The authors are top-class researchers in security and cryptography, and the contributions are of value to researchers and practitioners in these domains. This book is open access under a CC BY license