Origin of CEO and Compensation Strategy: Differences between Insiders and Outsiders

Increasingly, U.S. firms are hiring their new CEOs from outside the firms. This study investigates the differences in compensation between outsider CEOs and insider CEOs from three dimensions: pay level, pay and performance link, and pay mix. Our analyses show: (1) outsider CEOs are paid more than insider CEOs, (2) pay and performance link is very weak for outsider CEOs, and (3) compensation package for outsider CEOs emphasizes the use of stock options. While several factors (e.g., firm size, firm performance, CEO tenure, ownership structure) influence insider CEOs\u27 pay, firm size is the only determinant of outsider CEOs\u27 pay. Our results suggest we will be able to understand CEO compensation more accurately if we analyze CEOs from different origins (insiders, outsiders, founders) separately

Acquisiton Strategies: Empirical Evidence of Outsider-Toeholds

Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, is more profitable in some market constellations, due to the positive externality on the outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to empirically observe when US firms buy outsider-toeholds and through event-studies estimate the gains of buyers, outsider firms and competitors when firms holding outsider-toeholds merge.Acquisition; Antitrust; Insiders’ Dilemma; Mergers; Toeholds

Menorah Review (No. 56, Fall, 2002)

Recent Research on Women in Israel: Politics, Academic and Motherhood -- Interdisciplinary Images -- Biblical Scholarship of Grace and Insight -- Refueling in Anytolia -- Outsider As Insider As Outsider -- The Feminist Corner -- The Yearly Battlefield -- Noteworthy Book

The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood

The theory of established-outsider figurations developed by Norbert Elias is a use-ful tool for examining deprived neighbourhoods. The case of this paper is Dort-mund Nordstadt in Germany, an old inner-city neighbourhood which from its early days has housed the newly arrived immigrants. Elias claims that the social cohesion of the established together with the stigmatisation of the outsiders lead to status and power differentials that exclude the outsiders. In Nordstadt, three lev-els of established-outsider relations overlap and affect each other. On the first, the societal level, the Germans stand opposite to the immigrants. On the second, the city level, Nordstadt is put into the outsider position. Furthermore, the spatial hierarchy is linked with the first level of established-outsider relations as Nord-stadt is a traditional immigrant neighbourhood. On the third, the neighbourhood level, the other established-outsider relations are in part reproduced and in part changed by recent developments.Deprived neighbourhoods, Immigration, Integration, Established, Outsider, Elias

Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy Speeches from Thatcher to Cameron

The article investigates how British European policy thinking has been informed by what it identifies as an ‘outsider’ tradition of thinking about ‘Europe’ in British foreign policy dating from imperial times to the presen. The article begins by delineating five phases in the evolution of the outsider tradition through a survey of the relevant historiography back to 1815. The article then examines how prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron have looked to various inflections of the outsider tradition to inform their European discourses. The focus in the speech data sections is on British identity, history and the realist appreciation of international politics that informed the leaders’ suggestions for EEC/EU reform. The central argument is that historically informed narratives such as those making up the outsider tradition do not determine opinion-formers’ outlooks, but that they can be deeply impervious to rapid change

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.Core, Non-emptiness, Indirect dominance, Outsider-independence

Mergers by Partial Acquisition

This paper evaluates partial acquisition strategies. The model allows for buying a share of a firm before the actual acquisition takes place. Holding a share in a competing firm before the acquisition of another firm, outsider-toehold, eliminates the insiders' dilemma, i.e. profitable mergers do not occur. This strategy may thus be more profitable for a buyer than acquiring entire firms at once. Furthermore, the insiders' dilemma arises from the assumption of a positive externality on the outsider firm and acquiring an outsider-toehold is thus a signal of an anti-competitive merger.Acquisition; Antitrust; Insiders' Dilemma; Mergers; Toeholds

The music of organising: Exploring aesthetic ethnography

Through a discussion of Ingarden’s phenomenology, this paper proposes an aesthetic ethnographic methodology. Aesthetic ethnography enables the researcher to view organisations as if they are works of art. This involves observing the continual oscillation between order and chaos, a quality Schiller terms as the play impulse. The shifts in focus from naïve outsider (Emotional Attachment) to critical insider (Cognitive Detachment) and then to informed outsider (Integrated Synthesis) are explored, followed by a case study of a symphony orchestra undergoing governance change

General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation

Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation: (a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear royalty, and (b) combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown that in an oligopoly, the total reduction in the cost due to the innovation for the pre-innovation competitive output forms the lower bound of the payoffs of both outsider and incumbent innovators. Further, the private value of the patent is increasing in the magnitude of the innovation, while the Cournot price and the payoff of any other firm fall below their respective pre-innovation levels. Sufficiently significant innovations from an outsider innovator are licensed exclusively to a single firm. Otherwise, all other firms, except perhaps one, become licensees. The dissemination of the innovation is generally higher with an incumbent innovator compared to an outsider. For both outsider and incumbent innovators, the monopoly does not provide the highest incentive to innovate; for sufficiently insignificant innovations, it is the duopoly that does so, and, the industry size that provides the highest incentive increases with the magnitude of the innovation. Finally, it is argued that significant innovations are more likely to occur when the innovator is an incumbent firm.Non-drastic innovation, outsider innovator, incumbent innovator, FR policy, AR policy.

On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition

We consider the issue of patent licensing in a linear city framework where firms are located at the end points of the city and compete in price. We consider three types of licensing arrangements, namely, auction, fixed fee, royalty; and focus on the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee. Contrary to the findings in the existing literature, first we show offering royalty is the best for the patentee when the patentee is an outsider for both drastic and non-drastic innovation. For insider patentee, offering no-license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. We find incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. We also show that overall increase in welfare due to innovation is independent of the fact that the patentee is outsider or insider in each of the drastic and non-drastic case.licensing, auction, fixed fee, royalty, price competition