Belief Change in Reasoning Agents: Axiomatizations, Semantics and Computations

The capability of changing beliefs upon new information in a rational and efficient way is crucial for an intelligent agent. Belief change therefore is one of the central research fields in Artificial Intelligence (AI) for over two decades. In the AI literature, two different kinds of belief change operations have been intensively investigated: belief update, which deal with situations where the new information describes changes of the world; and belief revision, which assumes the world is static. As another important research area in AI, reasoning about actions mainly studies the problem of representing and reasoning about effects of actions. These two research fields are closely related and apply a common underlying principle, that is, an agent should change its beliefs (knowledge) as little as possible whenever an adjustment is necessary. This lays down the possibility of reusing the ideas and results of one field in the other, and vice verse. This thesis aims to develop a general framework and devise computational models that are applicable in reasoning about actions. Firstly, I shall propose a new framework for iterated belief revision by introducing a new postulate to the existing AGM/DP postulates, which provides general criteria for the design of iterated revision operators. Secondly, based on the new framework, a concrete iterated revision operator is devised. The semantic model of the operator gives nice intuitions and helps to show its satisfiability of desirable postulates. I also show that the computational model of the operator is almost optimal in time and space-complexity. In order to deal with the belief change problem in multi-agent systems, I introduce a concept of mutual belief revision which is concerned with information exchange among agents. A concrete mutual revision operator is devised by generalizing the iterated revision operator. Likewise, a semantic model is used to show the intuition and many nice properties of the mutual revision operator, and the complexity of its computational model is formally analyzed. Finally, I present a belief update operator, which takes into account two important problems of reasoning about action, i.e., disjunctive updates and domain constraints. Again, the updated operator is presented with both a semantic model and a computational model

Belief Revision in Expressive Knowledge Representation Formalisms

We live in an era of data and information, where an immeasurable amount of discoveries, findings, events, news, and transactions are generated every second. Governments, companies, or individuals have to employ and process all that data for knowledge-based decision-making (i.e. a decision-making process that uses predetermined criteria to measure and ensure the optimal outcome for a specific topic), which then prompt them to view the knowledge as valuable resource. In this knowledge-based view, the capability to create and utilize knowledge is the key source of an organization or individual’s competitive advantage. This dynamic nature of knowledge leads us to the study of belief revision (or belief change), an area which emerged from work in philosophy and then impacted further developments in computer science and artificial intelligence. In belief revision area, the AGM postulates by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson continue to represent a cornerstone in research related to belief change. Katsuno and Mendelzon (K&M) adopted the AGM postulates for changing belief bases and characterized AGM belief base revision in propositional logic over finite signatures. In this thesis, two research directions are considered. In the first, by considering the semantic point of view, we generalize K&M’s approach to the setting of (multiple) base revision in arbitrary Tarskian logics, covering all logics with a classical model-theoretic semantics and hence a wide variety of logics used in knowledge representation and beyond. Our generic formulation applies to various notions of “base”, such as belief sets, arbitrary or finite sets of sentences, or single sentences. The core result is a representation theorem showing a two-way correspondence between AGM base revision operators and certain “assignments”: functions mapping belief bases to total — yet not transitive — “preference” relations between interpretations. Alongside, we present a companion result for the case when the AGM postulate of syntax-independence is abandoned. We also provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to assignments producing transitive preference relations (as in K&M’s original work), giving rise to two more representation theorems for such logics, according to syntax dependence vs. independence. The second research direction in this thesis explores two approaches for revising description logic knowledge bases under fixed-domain semantics, namely model-based approach and individual-based approach. In this logical setting, models of the knowledge bases can be enumerated and can be computed to produce the revision result, semantically. We show a characterization of the AGM revision operator for this logic and present a concrete model-based revision approach via distance between interpretations. In addition, by weakening the KB based on certain domain elements, a novel individual-based revision operator is provided as an alternative approach

Belief Propagation and Revision in Networks with Loops

Local belief propagation rules of the sort proposed by Pearl(1988) are guaranteed to converge to the optimal beliefs for singly connected networks. Recently, a number of researchers have empirically demonstrated good performance of these same algorithms on networks with loops, but a theoretical understanding of this performance has yet to be achieved. Here we lay the foundation for an understanding of belief propagation in networks with loops. For networks with a single loop, we derive ananalytical relationship between the steady state beliefs in the loopy network and the true posterior probability. Using this relationship we show a category of networks for which the MAP estimate obtained by belief update and by belief revision can be proven to be optimal (although the beliefs will be incorrect). We show how nodes can use local information in the messages they receive in order to correct the steady state beliefs. Furthermore we prove that for all networks with a single loop, the MAP estimate obtained by belief revisionat convergence is guaranteed to give the globally optimal sequence of states. The result is independent of the length of the cycle and the size of the statespace. For networks with multiple loops, we introduce the concept of a "balanced network" and show simulati

Belief merging and revision under social influence: An explanation for the volatility clustering puzzle

A share price in a stock market can be thought of as arising out of an aggregation procedure. The price of a stock aggregates many individual beliefs into a collective one, the collective will of the market, so to speak. How does this aggregation come about? And is this aggregation fair in the sense that it correctly reflects the value? Furthermore,in the context of a stock market, it becomes immediately clear that belief merging cannot be separated from belief revision since investors in the market have a direct stake in what others think and clearly find it optimal to revise their beliefs in the light of the information about what others believe. We show that if investors are revising their beliefs not only after receiving new exogenous information but also after their social interactions with other investors and these revised beliefs are getting merged to generate the stock price under the accepted principles of finance (no arbitrage) then the resulting price dynamics explain a long standing puzzle in finance, the volatility clustering puzzle.Volatility clustering; Social influence; Agent based simulation; Anomaly

Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective

The debate on the epistemology of disagreement has so far focused almost exclusively on cases of disagreement between individual persons. Yet, many social epistemologists agree that at least certain kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs that are open to epistemic evaluation. If so, we should expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of disagreement between group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. However, this raises a number of fundamental questions concerning what it means for groups to be epistemic peers and to disagree with each other. In this paper, we explore what group peer disagreement amounts to given that we think of group belief in terms of List and Pettit’s ‘belief aggregation model’. We then discuss how the so-called ‘equal weight view’ of peer disagreement is best accommodated within this framework. The account that seems most promising to us says, roughly, that the parties to a group peer disagreement should adopt the belief that results from applying the most suitable belief aggregation function for the combined group on all members of the combined group. To motivate this view, we test it against various intuitive cases, derive some of its notable implications, and discuss how it relates to the equal weight view of individual peer disagreement

Beliefs and Conflicts in a Real World Multiagent System

In a real world multiagent system, where the agents are faced with partial, incomplete and intrinsically dynamic knowledge, conflicts are inevitable. Frequently, different agents have goals or beliefs that cannot hold simultaneously. Conflict resolution methodologies have to be adopted to overcome such undesirable occurrences. In this paper we investigate the application of distributed belief revision techniques as the support for conflict resolution in the analysis of the validity of the candidate beams to be produced in the CERN particle accelerators. This CERN multiagent system contains a higher hierarchy agent, the Specialist agent, which makes use of meta-knowledge (on how the conflicting beliefs have been produced by the other agents) in order to detect which beliefs should be abandoned. Upon solving a conflict, the Specialist instructs the involved agents to revise their beliefs accordingly. Conflicts in the problem domain are mapped into conflicting beliefs of the distributed belief revision system, where they can be handled by proven formal methods. This technique builds on well established concepts and combines them in a new way to solve important problems. We find this approach generally applicable in several domains

Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games.

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. We also present a method to compute preference conjecture equilibria.econometrics;