Decidability of E*A-sentences in Membership Theories

3The problem is addressed of establishing the satisfiability of prenex formulas involving a single universal quantifier, in diversified axiomatic set theories. A rather general decision method for solving this problem is illustrated through the treatment of membership theories of increasing strength, ending with a subtheory of Zermelo-Fraenkel which is already complete with respect to the There Exists*For All class of sentences. NP-hardness and NP-completeness results concerning the problems under study are achieved and a technique for restricting the universal quantifier is presented.opennoneopenOMODEO E.; PARLAMENTO F; POLICRITI A.Omodeo, E.; Parlamento, Franco; Policriti, Albert

Pairs, sets and sequences in first-order theories

Asuransi sebagai aktivitas bisnis diharuskan memenuhi prinsip-prinsip hukum asuransi. Salah satu prinsip yang harus dipegang teguh adalah principle of  utmost good faith, di samping prinsip yang lain. Prinsip ini berbunyi bahwa seorang tertanggung wajib memberi informasi secara jujur terhadap apa yang dipertanggungkan kepada penanggung. Dalam bisnis Islam, kejujuran merupakan prinsip yang harus dijunjung tinggi. Secara hukum, prinsip ini diatur dalam KUH Dagang. Persoalannya adalah apakah prinsip ini dianggap cukup dari sudut pandang hukum perjanjian syariah. Secara sekilas bahwa prinsip iktikad baik sempurna ini telah memenuhi asas perjanjian syariah, namun demikian tidak memiliki kriteria maksimal kejujuran. Ketiadaan kejujuran dalam bisnis asuransi akan berdampak pada batalnya perjanjian asuransi karena ada unsur cacat kehendak (‘uyub ar-ridla). Insurance as a business activity must fulfill principles of insurance law. One of the principles that must be hold on is the principle of  utmost good faith. The principle says that an endured person must honestly give information of  what should be given responsibility to the guarantor. In Islamic business, honesty is a principle that should be respected. From point of  view of  law, the principle is settled in commerce law. The problem is that whether the principle is represenative enough if it is viewed from law of  syariah agreement. At glance, the principle has fulfilled the basic of syariah agreement, however, it does not have maximum criteria of  honesty. Unavailability of honesty in insurance business will give effect of  invalidate of  insurance agreement, for there is a deformity of desire (‘uyub ar-ridla).</p

The predicative Frege hierarchy

AbstractIn this paper, we characterize the strength of the predicative Frege hierarchy, Pn+1V, introduced by John Burgess in his book [J. Burgess, Fixing frege, in: Princeton Monographs in Philosophy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005]. We show that Pn+1V and Q+conn(Q) are mutually interpretable. It follows that PV:=P1V is mutually interpretable with Q. This fact was proved earlier by Mihai Ganea in [M. Ganea, Burgess’ PV is Robinson’s Q, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 (2) (2007) 619–624] using a different proof. Another consequence of the our main result is that P2V is mutually interpretable with Kalmar Arithmetic (a.k.a. EA, EFA, IΔ0+EXP, Q3). The fact that P2V interprets EA was proved earlier by Burgess. We provide a different proof.Each of the theories Pn+1V is finitely axiomatizable. Our main result implies that the whole hierarchy taken together, PωV, is not finitely axiomatizable. What is more: no theory that is mutually locally interpretable with PωV is finitely axiomatizable

Intuitionistic sets and numbers: small set theory and Heyting arithmetic

It has long been known that (classical) Peano arithmetic is, in some strong sense, “equivalent” to the variant of (classical) Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (including choice) in which the axiom of infinity is replaced by its negation. The intended model of the latter is the set of hereditarily finite sets. The connection between the theories is so tight that they may be taken as notational variants of each other. Our purpose here is to develop and establish a constructive version of this. We present an intuitionistic theory of the hereditarily finite sets, and show that it is definitionally equivalent to Heyting Arithmetic HA, in a sense to be made precise. Our main target theory, the intuitionistic small set theory SST is remarkably simple, and intuitive. It has just one non-logical primitive, for membership, and three straightforward axioms plus one axiom scheme. We locate our theory within intuitionistic mathematics generally

Gödel Mathematics Versus Hilbert Mathematics. II Logicism and Hilbert Mathematics, the Identification of Logic and Set Theory, and Gödel’s 'Completeness Paper' (1930)

The previous Part I of the paper discusses the option of the Gödel incompleteness statement (1931: whether “Satz VI” or “Satz X”) to be an axiom due to the pair of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory after interpreting them as logical negations to each other. The present Part II considers the previous Gödel’s paper (1930) (and more precisely, the negation of “Satz VII”, or “the completeness theorem”) as a necessary condition for granting the Gödel incompleteness statement to be a theorem just as the statement itself, to be an axiom. Then, the “completeness paper” can be interpreted as relevant to Hilbert mathematics, according to which mathematics and reality as well as arithmetic and set theory are rather entangled or complementary rather than mathematics to obey reality able only to create models of the latter. According to that, both papers (1930; 1931) can be seen as advocating Russell’s logicism or the intensional propositional logic versus both extensional arithmetic and set theory. Reconstructing history of philosophy, Aristotle’s logic and doctrine can be opposed to those of Plato or the pre-Socratic schools as establishing ontology or intensionality versus extensionality. Husserl’s phenomenology can be analogically realized including and particularly as philosophy of mathematics. One can identify propositional logic and set theory by virtue of Gödel’s completeness theorem (1930: “Satz VII”) and even both and arithmetic in the sense of the “compactness theorem” (1930: “Satz X”) therefore opposing the latter to the “incompleteness paper” (1931). An approach identifying homomorphically propositional logic and set theory as the same structure of Boolean algebra, and arithmetic as the “half” of it in a rigorous construction involving information and its unit of a bit. Propositional logic and set theory are correspondingly identified as the shared zero-order logic of the class of all first-order logics and the class at issue correspondingly. Then, quantum mechanics does not need any quantum logics, but only the relation of propositional logic, set theory, arithmetic, and information: rather a change of the attitude into more mathematical, philosophical, and speculative than physical, empirical and experimental. Hilbert’s epsilon calculus can be situated in the same framework of the relation of propositional logic and the class of all mathematical theories. The horizon of Part III investigating Hilbert mathematics (i.e. according to the Pythagorean viewpoint about the world as mathematical) versus Gödel mathematics (i.e. the usual understanding of mathematics as all mathematical models of the world external to it) is outlined