Procedural group identification

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group. The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group. Both procedures expand these initial sets by adding individuals who are considered to be appropriate group members by someone in the corresponding initial set, and continue inductively un- til there is no possibility of expansion any more.consensus, liberalism, procedure, social identity

Procedural Group Identification

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group.The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members.Both procedures expand these initial sets by adding individuals who are considered to be appropriate group members by someone in the corresponding initial set, and continue inductively until there is no possibility of expansion any more.identification;social groups;social identity

Bir agregasyon yöntemi olarak toplumsal kimlik belirleme

60 pagesToplumsal Kimlik Fonksiyonu (TKF), her bireyin belirli bir kimliğe ait olup olmadığıhakkındaki kişisel görüşlerini toplumsal bir görüşe dönüştüren bir kuraldır. Kazanankoalisyonlar cinsinden ifade edilebilen TKF'ler "temel" olarak nitelendirilmiştir. TemelTKF'ler bağımsızlık (independence) aksiyomu ile karakterize edilebilirler. Daha sonra yeniaksiyomların eklenmesinin kazanan koalisyonların yapıları üzerine etkisi incelenmiştir. Aynızamanda "sade" TKF'ler grubu bağımsızlık, monotonluk ve kendiliğinden ikilik (self-duality)axiomlarıyla karakterize edilmiştir. Ayrıca, oy verenler veya oy verilenler olarak bireylerineşit muamele görmelerini temin eden şartların eklenmesinin etkileri incelenmiştir.Liberalizmin sade TKF'ler içerisinde toplumsal kimlik belirleme bağlamında çok doğal olanaksiyonları sağlayan tek kural olduğu gösterilmiştir.Anahtar Kelimeler: Toplumsal kimlik fonksiyonu, Kazanan koalisyonlar,Liberalizm.Collective Identity Function (CIF) is a rule which aggregates personal opinions onwhether an individual belongs to a certain identity into a social decision. A CIF is qualified as"elementary" whenever it can be expressed in terms of winning coalitions. Elementary CIFscan be characterized with independence axiom. We then investigate the effect of imposingnew axioms on the structure of winning coalitions. We further characterize the class of simpleCIFs in terms of three axioms, namely independence, monotonicity and self-duality. We alsoexplore the effect of imposing conditions that ensure the equal treatment of individuals asvoters or as outcomes. We show that liberalism arises as the unique simple CIF that satisfiesaxioms which are very natural in the collective identity determination context.Keywords: Collective identity function, Winnign coalitions, Liberalism

Self-supporting liberals and their cliques : an axiomatic characterization

social groupssocial status;social choice

Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

Separation of Decisions in Group Identification

We study a model of group identification in which individuals’ opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of the group’s members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. We introduce two axioms, meet separability and join separability, each of which requires the list of members generated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. We use these axioms to characterize a class of “one vote” rules, in which one opinion determines whether an individual is considered to be a member of a group. We then use this characterization to provide new axiomatizations of the liberal rule, in which each individual determines for himself whether he is a member of the group, as the only non-degenerate anonymous rule satisfying the meet separability and join separability axioms

Procedural Group Identification

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group.The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who are defined by everyone in the society as group members.Both procedures expand these initial sets by adding individuals who are considered to be appropriate group members by someone in the corresponding initial set, and continue inductively until there is no possibility of expansion any more

On the Axiomatic Characterization of "Who is a J?"

Recent work by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) considers the problem of group identification from a social choice perspective.These authors provide an axiomatic characterization of a liberal aggregator whereby the group consist of those and only those individuals each of which views oneself a member of the group.In the present paper we show that the five axioms used in Kasher and Rubinstein s characterization of the liberal aggregator are not independent and prove that only three of their original axioms are necessary and sufficient for the required characterization.aggregation;group identification;axiomatic method