Deverbal semantics and the Montagovian generative lexicon

We propose a lexical account of action nominals, in particular of deverbal nominalisations, whose meaning is related to the event expressed by their base verb. The literature about nominalisations often assumes that the semantics of the base verb completely defines the structure of action nominals. We argue that the information in the base verb is not sufficient to completely determine the semantics of action nominals. We exhibit some data from different languages, especially from Romance language, which show that nominalisations focus on some aspects of the verb semantics. The selected aspects, however, seem to be idiosyncratic and do not automatically result from the internal structure of the verb nor from its interaction with the morphological suffix. We therefore propose a partially lexicalist approach view of deverbal nouns. It is made precise and computable by using the Montagovian Generative Lexicon, a type theoretical framework introduced by Bassac, Mery and Retor\'e in this journal in 2010. This extension of Montague semantics with a richer type system easily incorporates lexical phenomena like the semantics of action nominals in particular deverbals, including their polysemy and (in)felicitous copredications.Comment: A revised version will appear in the Journal of Logic, Language and Informatio

A Compositional Treatment of Polysemous Arguments in Categorial Grammar

We discuss an extension of the standard logical rules (functional application and abstraction) in Categorial Grammar (CG), in order to deal with some specific cases of polysemy. We borrow from Generative Lexicon theory which proposes the mechanism of {\em coercion}, next to a rich nominal lexical semantic structure called {\em qualia structure}. In a previous paper we introduced coercion into the framework of {\em sign-based} Categorial Grammar and investigated its impact on traditional Fregean compositionality. In this paper we will elaborate on this idea, mostly working towards the introduction of a new semantic dimension. Where in current versions of sign-based Categorial Grammar only two representations are derived: a prosodic one (form) and a logical one (modelling), here we introduce also a more detaled representation of the lexical semantics. This extra knowledge will serve to account for linguistic phenomena like {\em metonymy\/}.Comment: LaTeX file, 19 pages, uses pubsmacs, pubsbib, pubsarticle, leqn

Language, logic and ontology: uncovering the structure of commonsense knowledge

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) we argue that the structure of commonsense knowledge must be discovered, rather than invented; and (ii) we argue that natural language, which is the best known theory of our (shared) commonsense knowledge, should itself be used as a guide to discovering the structure of commonsense knowledge. In addition to suggesting a systematic method to the discovery of the structure of commonsense knowledge, the method we propose seems to also provide an explanation for a number of phenomena in natural language, such as metaphor, intensionality, and the semantics of nominal compounds. Admittedly, our ultimate goal is quite ambitious, and it is no less than the systematic ‘discovery’ of a well-typed ontology of commonsense knowledge, and the subsequent formulation of the longawaited goal of a meaning algebra

Aspectual Coercion and Logical Polysemy

Recent work in computational semantics and lexical semantics has made an interesting shift. Motivated by a concern for lexical organization and global coherence in the structure of the lexicon, some researchers have moved towards more expressive semantic descriptions, as well as more powerful methods of composition. There has been some concern expressed, however, as to the general applicability of type-changing operations such as coercion, as well as concerning the power of generative mechanisms operating in the lexicon and semantics. In this paper, we address these concerns directly, and show that, upon closer examination, these critiques are not substantiated by the linguistic data. Without a proper notion of constraints on coercion, however, there can indeed be overgeneration of interpretations in the semantics, and in fact the notion of conditions on coercion has always been integral to the basic spirit of generative lexicons. In particular, we examine the constraints on type coercion in complement constructions of aspectual predicates in English and French. What we discover is a natural explanation for the behavior of coercion that makes reference to different types of event selection while also addressing the polysemous nature of aspectual verb

Concepts of Drift and Selection in “The Great Snail Debate” of the 1950s and Early 1960s

Recently, much philosophical discussion has centered on the best way to characterize the concepts of random drift and natural selection, and, in particular, on the question of whether selection and drift can be conceptually distinguished (Beatty 1984; Brandon 2005; Hodge 1983, 1987; Millstein 2002, 2005; Pfeifer 2005; Shanahan 1992; Stephens 2004). These authors all contend, to a greater or lesser degree, that their concepts make sense of biological practice. So, it should be instructive to see how the concepts of drift and selection were distinguished by the disputants in a high-profile debate; debates such as these often force biologists to take a more philosophical turn, discussing the concepts at issue in greater detail than usual. A prime candidate for just such a case study is what William Provine (1986) has termed “The Great Snail Debate,” that is, the debate over the highly polymorphic land snails Cepaea nemoralis and Cepaea hortensis in the 1950s and early 1960s. This study will reveal that much of the present-day confusion over the concepts of drift and selection is rooted in confusions of the past. Nonetheless, there are lessons that can be learned about nonadaptiveness, indiscriminate sampling, and causality with respect to these two concepts. In particular, this paper will shed light on the following questions: 1) What is “drift”? Is “drift” a purely mathematical construct, a physical process analogous to the indiscriminate sampling of balls from an urn, or the outcome of a sampling process? 2) What is “nonadaptiveness,” and is a proponent of drift committed to claims that organisms’ traits are nonadaptive? 3) Can disputes concerning selection and drift be settled by statistics alone, or is causal information essential? If causal information is essential, what does that say about the concepts of “drift” and “selection” themselves

Humanizing Architecture: A Polymorphic Space

The built environments in which our communities thrive constitute an integral part of human experience and evolution. Yet, many places are detached from the way we experience them due to mass-production, which often produces standardized environments, and due to the tendency of modern architecture to delineate spaces as static objects rather than dynamic interactions. Thus, there is an emerging need to humanize architecture through an interdisciplinary approach that engages nature’s behavioral patterns. The project proposes a transformable polyhedral structure that interacts with human emotion through a three-dimensional morphing space that contracts and expands. This spatial interaction is achieved through a comprehensive process of employing the principles of interactive design and by applying mechanical construction techniques of transformable polyhedrons inspired by Buckminster Fuller’s Jitterbug

Selectional Restrictions, Types and Categories

International audienceThe expressions of a language distinguish between many different types of objects. These types can affect how the meanings of these expressions combine. This paper provides a formal picture of the process of meaning combination in a richly typed framework