Celebrity games

We introduce Celebrity games, a new model of network creation games. In this model players have weights (W being the sum of all the player's weights) and there is a critical distance ß as well as a link cost a. The cost incurred by a player depends on the cost of establishing links to other players and on the sum of the weights of those players that remain farther than the critical distance. Intuitively, the aim of any player is to be relatively close (at a distance less than ß ) from the rest of players, mainly of those having high weights. The main features of celebrity games are that: computing the best response of a player is NP-hard if ß>1 and polynomial time solvable otherwise; they always have a pure Nash equilibrium; the family of celebrity games having a connected Nash equilibrium is characterized (the so called star celebrity games) and bounds on the diameter of the resulting equilibrium graphs are given; a special case of star celebrity games shares its set of Nash equilibrium profiles with the MaxBD games with uniform bounded distance ß introduced in Bilò et al. [6]. Moreover, we analyze the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and of Stability (PoS) of celebrity games and give several bounds. These are that: for non-star celebrity games PoA=PoS=max{1,W/a}; for star celebrity games PoS=1 and PoA=O(min{n/ß,Wa}) but if the Nash Equilibrium is a tree then the PoA is O(1); finally, when ß=1 the PoA is at most 2. The upper bounds on the PoA are complemented with some lower bounds for ß=2.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Game Theoretic Formation of a Centrality Based Network

We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added adjacent edge. We simulate the interactions between players using an algorithm that factors in rational strategic behavior based on a common objective function. The resulting networks exhibit pairwise stability, from which we derive necessary stable conditions for specific graph topologies. We then expand the model to simulate non-trivial games with large numbers of players. We show that using conditions necessary for the stability of star topologies we can induce the formation of hub players that positively impact the total welfare of the network.Comment: Submitted to 2012 ASE Social Informatics Conferenc

Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Collaboration in Social Networks

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks

Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility and Poverty Traps

The paper explores the role social network capital might play in facilitating poor agents’ escape from poverty traps. We model endogenous network formation among households heterogeneously endowed with both traditional and social network capital who make investment and technology choices over time in the absence of financial markets and faced with multiple production technologies featuring different fixed costs and returns. We show that social network capital can serve as either a complement to or a substitute for productive assets in facilitating some poor households’ escape from poverty. However, the voluntary nature of costly social network formation also creates both involuntary and voluntary exclusionary mechanisms that impede some poor households’ efforts to exit poverty. The ameliorative potential of social networks therefore depends fundamentally on the underlying wealth distribution in the economy. In some settings, targeted public transfers to the poor can crowd-in private resources by inducing new social links that the poor can exploit to escape from poverty.social network capital; endogenous network formation; poverty traps; multiple equilibria; social isolation; social exclusion; crowding-in transfer

Measuring social dynamics in a massive multiplayer online game

Quantification of human group-behavior has so far defied an empirical, falsifiable approach. This is due to tremendous difficulties in data acquisition of social systems. Massive multiplayer online games (MMOG) provide a fascinating new way of observing hundreds of thousands of simultaneously socially interacting individuals engaged in virtual economic activities. We have compiled a data set consisting of practically all actions of all players over a period of three years from a MMOG played by 300,000 people. This large-scale data set of a socio-economic unit contains all social and economic data from a single and coherent source. Players have to generate a virtual income through economic activities to `survive' and are typically engaged in a multitude of social activities offered within the game. Our analysis of high-frequency log files focuses on three types of social networks, and tests a series of social-dynamics hypotheses. In particular we study the structure and dynamics of friend-, enemy- and communication networks. We find striking differences in topological structure between positive (friend) and negative (enemy) tie networks. All networks confirm the recently observed phenomenon of network densification. We propose two approximate social laws in communication networks, the first expressing betweenness centrality as the inverse square of the overlap, the second relating communication strength to the cube of the overlap. These empirical laws provide strong quantitative evidence for the Weak ties hypothesis of Granovetter. Further, the analysis of triad significance profiles validates well-established assertions from social balance theory. We find overrepresentation (underrepresentation) of complete (incomplete) triads in networks of positive ties, and vice versa for networks of negative ties...Comment: 23 pages 19 figure