Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."indivisible objects, resource-monotonicity.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments.

Welfare Bounds in a Growing Population

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect welfare lower bounds. The main characterization involves the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced. This welfare lower-bound grants agents equal rights/responsibilities over the jointly owned resources but insures agents against the heterogeneity in preferences. We also study the implications of imposing variable population axioms together with welfare bounds.collective ownership, allocation of indivisible goods and money, NIMBY problems, imposition of tasks, the Groves mechanisms, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, k-fairness, population monotonicity

Stability and fairness in sequencing games: optimistic approach and pessimistic scenarios

Sequencing deals with the problem of assigning slots to agents who are waiting for a service. We study sequencing problems as coalition form games defined in optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Each agent's level of utility is his Shapley value payoff from the corresponding coalition form game. First, we show that while the core of the optimistic game is always empty, the Shapley value of the pessimistic game is an allocation in its core. Second, we impose the "generalized welfare lower bound" (GWLB) that ex-ante guarantees each agent a minimum level of utility. One of many application of GWLB is the "expected costs bound". It guarantees each agent his expected cost when all arrival orders are equally likely. We prove that the Shapley value payoffs (in both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios) satisfy GWLB if and only if it satisfies the expected costs bound (ECB)

Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k- fairness. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate an object efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating a collectively owned indivisible good or bad when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.Duygu Yengi