21,742 research outputs found
Objectionable thick concepts in denials
So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain sense. The paper also briefly considers contextualist, presuppositional, and implicature accounts of the evaluative contents of thick concepts, but finds none clearly superior to the others
Response to Rambachan\u27s The Advaita Worldview and Thatamanil\u27s The Immanent Divine
In light of postcolonial and feminist criticism, it has become good form for scholars to locate themselves with regard to their subject matter by laying out their values and presuppositions to the extent possible. Because supposedly objective or neutral scholarship often reflects hegemonic interests, this practice ideally brings self-awareness about the discourses we carry into the hermeneutical process. Postcolonial discourse since Edward Said\u27s Orientalism (1978) instructs that if Western academics are to continue representing the so-called East, they must at least acknowledge the dominance of Western and Christian presuppositions in this scholarly tradition
On the context and presuppositions of Searleâs philosophy of society
In this article, I deal with Searleâs philosophy of society, the last step to complete his philosophical system. This step, however, requires an examination of the context and presuppositions, or default positions, that make possible the key concepts of this new branch of philosophy. In the first section, I address what the enlightenment vision implies. The second section focuses upon how consciousness and intentionality are biological tools that help us create and maintain the social world. In the third
section, I explain the importance of the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, in the fourth section I elaborate upon the default positions: the existence of one world, truth as correspondence to facts, direct perception, meaning, and causation. Importantly, I show how the context and presuppositions of the philosophy of society are an opportunity of interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the social sciences
Negation, 'presupposition' and the semantics/pragmatics distinction
A cognitive pragmatic approach is taken to some long-standing problem cases of negation, the so-called presupposition denial cases. It is argued that a full account of the processes and levels of representation involved in their interpretation typically requires the sequential pragmatic derivation of two different propositions expressed. The first is one in which the presupposition is preserved and, following the rejection of this, the second involves the echoic (metalinguistic) use of material falling in the scope of the negation. The semantic base for these processes is the standard anti-presuppositionalist wide-scope negation. A different view, developed by Burton-Roberts (1989a, b), takes presupposition to be a semantic relation encoded in natural language and so argues for a negation operator that does not cancel presuppositions. This view is shown to be flawed, in that it makes the false prediction that presupposition denial cases are semantic contradictions and it is based on too narrow a view of the role of pragmatic inferencing
A Proposal for \u27Philosophical Method\u27 in Comparative and International Law
A basic challenge of contemporary thought is to better understand the origin, persistence, and future course of international/ comparative law. I suggest that a foundational step is to begin treating the law as a philosophical matter. I propose that comparative and international legal theory require a distinct methodology that is as integrated and systematic as positivism, but which better recognizes the dialectic interdependence of normative and empirical and the metaphysical interdependence of theory and practice. Philosophical Method, as systematized by R.G. Collingwood, promotes the dialectic over the eristic, looks for overlap rather than definitive scientific classification, argues for comprehensive philosophy rather than isolated theory and recognizes a proper logical metaphysics of absolute and relative presuppositions rather than a positive legal practice isolated from its inherent philosophical determinants
âOught Implies Canâ: Not So Pragmatic After All
Those who want to deny the âought implies canâ principle often turn to weakened views to explain âought implies canâ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are that âoughtâ presupposes âcanâ, and that âoughtâ conversationally implicates âcanâ. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of âought implies canâ. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. âOughtâ and âcanâ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of âought implies canâ. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice
BECOME and its presuppositions
In hindsight, the debate about presupposition following Fregeâs discovery that the referential function of names and definite descriptions depended on the fulfillment of an existence and a uniqueness condition was curiously limited for a very long time. On the one hand, it was only in the 1960s that linguists began to take an interest and showed that presupposition was an allpervasive phenomenon far beyond this philosophersâ pet definite descriptions. And on the other hand, and this is our real concern, it is now only too obvious that the uniqueness condition is too restrictive to be applicable to the general case. An utterance of âThe cat is on the matâ should not imply that there is only one cat and one mat in the whole world. The obvious move is to limit the uniqueness condition to some notion of utterance context
Evaluative Disagreements
A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative
sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move
- âŠ