Ability and Volitional Incapacity

The conditional analysis of ability faces familiar counterexamples involving cases of volitional incapacity. An interesting response to the problem of volitional incapacity is to try to explain away the responses elicited by such counterexamples by distinguishing between what we are able to do and what we are able to bring ourselves to do. We argue that this error-theoretic response fails. Either it succeeds in solving the problem of volitional incapacity at the cost of making the conditional analysis vulnerable to obvious counterexamples to its necessity. Or, it avoids the counterexamples to its necessity but fails to solve the problem of volitional incapacity

Sustainable Design and Building Information Modelling: Case Study of Energy Plus House, Hieron's Wood, Derbyshire UK

In this paper the method for sustainable design analysis (SDA) integration with building information modelling (BIM) is explored, through the prism of a complex case study based research. BIM model federation and integration challenges are reported, including issues with combining geometry and managing attribute data. The research defines SDA as rapid and quantifiable analysis of multitude of sustainable alternatives and ‘what if’ questions posed by a design team during the early stages of the project, when the benefits of correct decisions can significantly exceed the actual investment required. The SDA concept and BIM integration findings are explained from conceptualisation to calculation stage, emphasising the importance of an iterative over a linear approach. The research approach adopted has led to more informed sustainable solutions at earlier stages of project development, with a generally lower level of development (LOD) and computational/modelling effort required

The motivation question

How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the "motivation question." Broome’s answer to the motivation question is that we can bring ourselves, by our own efforts, to intend to do what we believe we ought to do by exercising a special agential capacity: the capacity to engage in what he calls enkratic reasoning. My aim is to evaluate this answer. In doing so, I shall focus on three core aspects of Broome’s overall account: his account of ought, his account of enkratic rationality, and his account of enkratic reasoning in particular. In each case I suggest there are problems

The presence of a primary male caregiver affects children's language skills

This study aimed to determine whether the presence or absence of a primary male caregiver influences a child's language skills. A language test was administered to 342 Afrikaans-speaking 4- to 9-year-olds from various socioeconomic backgrounds. The average percentile ranks for the composite language score as well as for the separate language domains of those participants with primary male caregivers was compared to the percentile ranks of those participants without such caregivers. The group with primary male caregivers fared significantly better, implying that the presence of a primary male caregiver has an influence, direct or indirect, on children's language skills.   Keywords: primary male caregivers, Afrikaans, child language skill

Constructivism About Reasons

Given constructivism’s enduring popularity and appeal, it is perhaps something of a surprise that there remains considerable uncertainty among many philosophers about what constructivism is even supposed to be. My aim in this article is to make some progress on the question of how constructivism should be understood. I begin by saying something about what kind of theory constructivism is supposed to be. Next, I consider and reject both the standard proceduralist characterization of constructivism and also Sharon Street’s ingenious standpoint characterization. I then suggest an alternative characterization according to which what is central is the role played by certain standards of correct reasoning. I conclude by saying something about the implications of this account for evaluating the success of constructivism. I suggest that certain challenges that have been raised against constructivist theories are based on dubious understandings of constructivism, whereas other challenges only properly come into focus once a proper understanding is achieved

Does “Ought” Imply “Feasible”?

Many of us feel internally conflicted in the face of certain normative claims that make infeasible demands: say, normative claims that demand that agents do what, given deeply entrenched objectionable character traits, they cannot bring themselves to do. On the one hand, such claims may seem false on account of demanding the infeasible, and insisting otherwise may seem to amount to objectionable unworldliness – to chasing “pies in the sky.” On the other hand, such claims may seem true in spite of making infeasible demands, and insisting otherwise may seem to amount to treating the agents in question with undue lenience – to mistakenly letting them “off the hook.” What is going on? One possibility is that we are making a mistake. I explore the alternative hypothesis that our ambivalent reactions, far from involving any mistake, are entirely consistent and appropriate. Rather than some single privileged ought such that the idea that “ought” implies “feasible” is either true or false, there are simply different oughts that are supposed to be capable of operating in the service of, and playing distinct roles associated with, what I shall call different core normative practices. In particular, there is a) some salient core practice-serving ought for which it’s true that “ought” implies “feasible” and b) some other salient core practice-serving ought for which it’s false that “ought” implies “feasible.” I sketch a framework for understanding different core practice-serving oughts in general and then use this framework to consider which particular core practice-serving oughts might be capable of vindicating our ambivalence. I begin by considering and rejecting a prevalent and prima facie promising account according to which the relevant oughts are the prescriptive ought and the evaluative ought. I then propose a different account that holds that the oughts we need are instead the deliberative ought and the hypological ought

Spesifieke Taalgestremdheid En Taalwetenskaplike Teorie: 'N Evaluerende Oorsig

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